Part 5 - The Table

1. This 84 column Table is a subject or instrument used to seek out solutions to questions, by responding affirmatively or negatively to questions at hand, in accordance with the principles and rules while rejecting whatever is contrary to them.

The letter "t" in the Table means that the letters before "t" are from the First Figure and those after "t" are from the Second Figure, as in camera btcb where b preceding t means goodness, and c means greatness, and b after t means difference, and likewise with the other cameras.

In the course of investigation, loftier significations of truth are yielded by the Table than by any of the Figures.

2. This Table is derived from the Fourth Figure by turning its second and third circles (as shown in the Table) until 84 column headings are formed: the columns are mutually connected as they come from successive rotations of the circles, where column bcd connects to column bce, and column bce to bcf and so on from column to column, all the way to hik at the end of the Table, as shown. Thus, any one column implies all the other columns and every column implicitly helps all the others, given that the meanings of any and all columns can apply to solving any one question, and this is how the Table is general to a very high degree.

3. Further, each column contains a sequence of twenty questions: to give an example, let us go through the sequence of the first column bcd by treating first of goodness, then of greatness, and then of eternity, as follows.

1 Is any goodness so great that it is eternal?
2 Is there any goodness so great that it contains its own different innate co-essential parts?
3 Is goodness sufficiently great to contain in itself concordant things that are of its own essence?
4 If goodness contains contrary things, is it great?
5 Is eternal goodness different?
6 Is eternal goodness concordant?
7 Does eternal goodness contain any innate contrariety?
8 Does goodness contain intrinsic difference and concordance?
9 Does goodness contain intrinsic difference and contrariety?
10 Does goodness contain intrinsic concordance and contrariety?
11 What is the great difference of eternity?
12 What is great and eternal concordance?
13 What is great and eternal contrariety?
14 What is great difference and concordance?
15 What is great difference and contrariety?
16 What is great concordance and contrariety?
17 What does the difference of eternal concordance consist of?
18 What does the difference between contrariety and eternity consist of?
19 What does the concordance of contrariety and eternity consist of?
20 What do difference, concordance and contrariety consist of?

4. We have put 20 questions with the twenty cameras of column bcd. The first camera is bcd, the second is bcdt and so on to the twentieth camera tbcd.

Through these questions and their solutions the intellect is raised to a lofty degree of universality where it can reach countless objects, due to the general nature of the predicate and subject. And this is where we see how very useful and general this art is. To show how to solve questions, we will solve the ones above by applying the meaning of the letters to the issue at hand in such a way that the definitions of the principles and the species of the rules remain intact.

Column bcd, camera bcd
First question

5. Let us begin by answering the first question, which asks: "Is any goodness so great that it is eternal?" and I answer that there is goodness sufficiently great to be eternal, shown by the definitions of goodness, greatness and eternity. If goodness is a being on account of which good does good; and if greatness magnifies goodness and eternity; and if eternity, by definition, makes goodness and magnitude last forever, then the act of goodness must necessarily be infinite and eternal just as its essence must be. Thus, we conclude that goodness is great and eternal, because without greatness and eternity, it cannot act, or do good eternally. And this is confirmed by rule B and the second species of rules C and D. Further, the affirmative answer is confirmed by the first species of rule D, since eternity is a primordial essence without anything preceding it, and its primordial quality is good and great, it necessarily follows that some goodness must be eternally great. And the third species of rule D signifies that no contrariety of any kind can rule in eternity, but if eternity did not have great and primordial goodness it could be dominated by contrariety, which is impossible: therefore, goodness is sufficiently great to be eternal.

Column bcd, camera bctb
Second question

6. The second question asks "Is there any goodness so great that it contains its own different innate co-essential parts?"
Solution: I say that there is, as the definitions show. Now, if goodness is a being on account of which good does good, and greatness is a being on account of which goodness, difference, etc. are great, then goodness must necessarily contain different things that are coessential with it, namely the bonifier, the act of bonifying and what is bonified. And this is on account of goodness, greatness and difference which are all real and simply distinct things existing in goodness while the essence of goodness itself is indivisible, great and free of confusion. Further, rule B clearly confirms the affirmative answer, as does the first species of rule C that defines goodness concretely and essentially by its correlatives with which it converts. By the second species, difference and magnitude both posit that goodness has its innate bonifier, bonifying and bonified, as goodness could not naturally exist without these distinct parts; nor could it be a reason for good to do good, and thus goodness without greatness and difference would have no nature at all.

7. Next, greatness and difference are naturally present in goodness by the third species of rule C and goodness is naturally present in them. And by the fourth species of rule C, greatness and difference are active in goodness and goodness is active in them.

Column bcd, camera bctc
Third question

8. The third question asks whether goodness is sufficiently great to contain in itself concordant things of its own essence. The definitions of the terms indicate an affirmative answer: now if goodness did not contain things that are concordant and naturally coessential with it, great goodness would not be free of contrariety and could not be great without contrariety, which is necessarily impossible by the definitions of goodness, greatness and eternity. Further, the first species of rule C supports the affirmative answer: by converting subject and predicate, it defines goodness with its concordant parts, namely the bonifier, bonifying and bonified as well as the concorder, concording and concorded with which supreme goodness converts as does concordance with supreme greatness.

9. Next, the second species shows that goodness has three innate, good and concordant things without which it cannot be great. And the third species of rule C posits that greatness and concordance are present in goodness by magnifying and concording just as goodness is present in them with its good act of bonifying. And the fourth species says that every reason has essential activity in every other reason. Here we see the altitude to which the intellect can rise as it truly and really attains a height too lofty to ascend on its own without help from God.

Column bcd, camera bctd
Fourth question

10. The fourth question asks whether goodness is great if it innately contains contrary things that are coessential with it, and the answer is no, because it lacks concordance which is absolutely greater than contrariety. This is because concordance and goodness posit being through generation whereas contrariety with malice posit privation of goodness through corruption. And this is supported by the definitions of goodness, greatness and contrariety. Rule B verifies this, as does the first species of Rule C: if great goodness contained contrary things in itself, it would be much to its detriment, and greatness would be convertible with smallness in goodness, which is impossible. The second species of rule C posits greatness of the bonifier, bonified and bonifying in goodness, and so the answer must be negative. Further, the third species says that contrariety cannot coexist with greatness in a good subject, and the fourth species determines that contrariety cannot have its act in great goodness.

Column bcd, camera bdtb
Fifth question

11. The fifth question asks whether eternal goodness is different, and the answer is yes. Now if eternal goodness were not different, it could not do eternal good throughout eternity because difference would not govern the doer in its active number and the doable in its passive number, and I say the same about the act of doing; and the lack of difference would cause confusion among them, and eternity would not naturally eternalize, nor would goodness naturally do good, and so all their definitions would be destroyed, which is an impossibility. And rule B supports the affirmative answer, helped by the said definitions.

Further, the first species of rule D corroborates the affirmative answer by saying that eternal goodness is as primordial in action as in existence. Now if difference were removed from the doer and the doable, there would be neither any doing nor any action, this would entail idleness and natural privation of eternal goodness, which is impossible. Further, the second species of rule D affirms the same, as without difference among the bonifier, the bonifiable and their bonifying, goodness would have nothing to sustain its being, nor could eternity govern it, and this would set great evil eternally against great good, which is impossible. Further, the third species of rule D clearly shows that if the negative answer to this question were true, there would have to be some eternal being with eternal malice that could prevent eternal goodness without difference from being a reason for eternal good to produce eternal good, and this is false, impossible, and contrary to rule B. Therefore, etc...

Column bcd, camera bdtc
Sixth question

12. The sixth question, which asks whether eternal goodness is concordant, must be answered affirmatively by the definitions: now eternity says that goodness and concordance last forever, concordance says that goodness and eternity agree in unity and plurality, and eternal goodness is a concordant reason for good to produce good throughout eternity; this cannot be true unless eternal goodness agrees with the bonifier, concorder and eternalizer, the bonified, concorded and eternalized and their acts of bonifying, concording and eternalizing. There is further ample proof of this, as rule C supports the affirmative answer: now, goodness is a form containing innate difference and concordance where the bonifier, bonifying and bonified are all well habituated with difference and concordance, and with this habit, the differentiator and the concorder are active and the differentiable and concordable are passive. By the fourth species, goodness has acts of differentiating, concording and eternalizing.

Column bcd, camera bdtd
Seventh question

13. The seventh question asks whether eternal goodness contains any innate contrariety. If we suppose that the world is eternal, the answer would be affirmative, with the definition of contrariety saying that the world is good and evil from eternity and throughout eternity, and that goodness and evil, generation, privation and corruption are all eternal, so that eternal goodness cannot be a good reason for eternal good to produce good eternally without any contrariety or malice. And eternity would cause good and evil to last from eternity. Rule B cannot consent to this, nor can the first species of rule D admit that good and evil are equally primordial and in agreement from eternity. And by the second species, the whole universe would be composed of good and evil: and the first cause, namely God, would necessarily have to cause the world throughout eternity with as much malice as goodness, which is impossible, and by reason of this impossibility, this question must be answered negatively. And here we see that the world cannot possibly exist throughout eternity.

Column bcd, camera btbc
Eighth question

14. The eighth question asks whether goodness contains intrinsic difference and concordance, and the answer is yes, as shown by the definitions. Without its different and concordant parts, goodness could not be a reason for good to produce good, and there could be no concordance among things without difference, for without difference, there would be confusion and occultation between the bonifier and the bonified, the concorder and the concorded, and I even say that this would imply an impossible contradiction. Also, the first species of rule C says that eternity is a being whose function is to eternalize which it cannot do without concordance among the eternalizer, the eternalized and their eternalizing, and thus concordance is natural and necessary, as signified by the second species of rule C. The third species shows that the eternalizer is active in the eternalized, and the eternalized is passive. By the fourth species, the active eternalizer has its act of eternalizing.

Column bcd, camera btbd
Ninth question

15. The ninth question asks whether goodness contains intrinsic difference and contrariety, and the answer is that it does in some subjects such as elemented things in which different elements oppose each other, like fire and water through hot and dry, or air and earth through moist and dry, which is good, as without this kind of opposition, no elemented things could exist. Further, rule B attests to what we say.

And the first species of rule D supports the negative answer, because the bonifier, the bonified and their bonifying cannot oppose each other in the essence of goodness; if they could, goodness would have no consistency by the second species of rule D. And by the third species of this rule, it would be subject to innate malice and would have no nature, which is impossible.

Column bcd, camera btcd
Tenth question

The tenth question asks whether goodness contains any concordance and contrariety, and the answer is that it does in some subjects habituated with goodness, like elemented things that are good through goodness and in which fire agrees with air through heat, and air with water through moisture, and water with earth through cold, and fire with earth through dryness. But air and fire are opposed through dryness and moisture, water and earth through moisture and dryness, air and water through cold and heat, and earth and fire through cold and heat. In motion, elements are opposed through lightness and heaviness. And what we say is clarified by the definitions of goodness, concordance and contrariety, otherwise, the elementing power could not be a reason for producing good elemented things in subjects, and the definitions of concordance and contrariety would also be destroyed.

Further, rule B corroborates the affirmative answer, as does the first species of rule C: now, an elemented thing is a good subject in which there is some agreement between concordance and contrariety, like fire and air that agree in elemented things through heat but oppose each other through dryness and moisture, and so with the other elements, in circular fashion, as said above. Further, the second species of rule C supports the affirmative answer, since elemented things contain innate concordance and contrariety, as we just said. And by the third species of rule C, fire is concordant with air and air is generally concorded with heat by fire, but they are generally opposed through moisture and dryness because fire opposes air with dryness and air opposes fire with moisture. Further, the fourth species shows that every element has action and passion in every other element in a circular pattern where the elements are dislocated and split up in elemented things so that they can proceed through mixture and composition, because elemented things are habituated with goodness as well as concordance and contrariety.

Column bcd, camera cdtb
Eleventh question

17. The eleventh question asks what the great difference of eternity is. And we answer that it is a form that necessitates the eternalizer, the eternalized and their eternalizing in eternity so that greatness is a being on account of which difference and eternity are great, and eternity is a being on account of which greatness and difference last forever, and difference is a being on account of which the eternalizer, the eternalized and their eternalizing are distinct from one another. Further, rule B attests to the truth of what we say, as well as the first and second species of rule C and the third species of rule C likewise, so that the eternalizer be naturally active and produce a product in the eternalized being which also has the nature of eternity, magnitude and difference by the fourth species of rule C. Next, the first species of rule D supports the same conclusion, so that greatness has the eternalizer, the eternalized and their eternalizing primordially and eternally. And the second species of rule D posits the same, so that eternity can have consistency. And the third species of the same rule agrees with this.

Column bcd, camera cdtc
Twelfth question

The twelfth question asks: "What is great and eternal concordance?" We say that it is a form that necessitates concordance in greatness and eternity among the eternalizer, the eternalized and their eternalizing. And this is evident enough by the first species of rules C and D, as well as the second species of C and D and the third species of rule C so that the eternalizer is a magnifying, eternalizing and concording entity in greatness, eternity and concordance. And by the fourth species of rule C the eternalizer has natural power to eternalize the eternalized, magnify what is magnified and concord what is concorded; and the third species of rule D agrees to this. Further, the definitions confirm and attest to this, as greatness without concordance of the eternalizer, the eternalized and their eternalizing cannot be a being on account of which eternity and concordance are great, nor would eternity have any natural way of lasting forever, as eternity cannot have concordance without them, and without concordance it cannot be removed from contrariety.

Column bcd, camera cdtd
Thirteenth question

The thirteenth question asks: "What is great and eternal contrariety?" And we answer that it is the world's eternity, supposing that the world is eternal. And the definitions and rules show this, as the definition of contrariety posits that there is great controversy between God's eternity and the world's eternity, where both are primordial beings by the first species of rules C and D, and thus God's eternity is not singular, without which singularity, greatness is not a being on account of which God's eternity is great, but rather, a being on account of which the contrariety between God's eternity and the world's eternity is great, as the world's eternity posits eternally restless evil while God's eternity posits eternal good in eternal repose; and God's eternity posits eternal, everlasting good while the world's eternity posits eternal, everlasting evil. And the second species of rule D posits that eternal good and eternal evil are joined together in a single compound. And the definition of greatness posits that their conjunction is great. And the third species of rule D posits that both eternities are subjected to one another, while the second species of rule C posits the opposer, the opposed and their opposing. Thus, eternity rules both God's eternity and the world's, and by ruling both, produces an eternally restless and contrary eternal being, which is impossible, and by reason of this impossibility, the world cannot be eternal.

Column bcd, camera ctbc
Fourteenth question

20. The fourteenth question asks: "What is great difference and concordance?" The answer is that in the essence of greatness, the magnifier, differentiator and concorder are one person and one identical number; and the magnified, differentiated and concorded are another person; and the acts of magnifying, differentiating and concording are another person: and all three persons are identical in essence, nature, greatness, difference and concordance. And this is shown by their definitions and by the first and second species of rules C and D and by the third species of C so that greatness, difference and concordance are actually active, concordant and removed from emptiness and idleness. And by the fourth species of rule C they all have acts in one another, for without these acts their definitions would not be true, which is impossible, as rule B attests.

Column bcd, camera ctbd
Fifteenth question

21. The fifteenth question asks: "What is great difference and contrariety?" We answer that it is the cause which causes one opposite in another, like in elemented things in which fire and water are mixed together with air and earth, and in the opposition between natural innate good and moral evil, or sin and man. And this is shown by the definitions of greatness, difference and contrariety. Difference clarifies and differentiates opposites, and contrariety deprives the subject of concordance and generates contrary appetites and ends. And this is signified by rule B as well as by the first and second species of rules C and D; and likewise, the third species of rule C shows clearly enough that an opposite is both active and passive in its counterpart. By the fourth species of rule C each has action in its counterpart, and by the third species of D they are subjected to one another. Now this is where the great torments of hell are signified. By the fourth species of rule C, one opposite has its act in the other: without these acts their definitions would not be true, as rule B attests.

Column bcd, camera ctcd
Sixteenth question

22. The sixteenth question asks: "What is great concordance and contrariety?" We answer that it is the being which places concordant and opposite things in the same subject through elemental generation and corruption, like fire and earth that both agree with air in generation, as fire is hot and dry and receives dryness from earth while giving heat to air. By the third species of rule D, as fire rules in dryness and moisture, it puts great contrariety and mutual corruption between them.
And the things said about fire apply to the other elements as well, according to their qualities. Thus, by the first and second species of rules C and D and by the definitions of greatness, concordance and contrariety, we see how elements enter into mixture and compose elemented things. And by the third species of rules C and D, each element is active and passive in the others as it moves through them in the process of generation and corruption.

Column bcd, camera dtbc
Seventeenth question

23. The seventeenth question asks: "What does the difference of eternal concordance consist of?" We answer that it consists of nature and relation. Now difference posits things that are distinct and naturally related through the differentiator, the differentiated and their act of differentiating in eternal concordance which by definition posits the concorder, the concorded and their act of concording in one essence or nature where eternity by its definition posits the eternalizer, the eternalized and their act of eternalizing. This is shown by rule B and by the first and second species or rules C and D. The third species of rule C posits action and passion, without any matter. The fourth species of the same rule posits natural, eternal acts. And the third species of rule D cannot contradict this, because it is disparate from any primordial different and concordant acts.

Column bcd, camera dtbd
Eighteenth question

24. The eighteenth question asks: "What does the difference between contrariety and eternity consist of?" And the answer is that it consists of God and the world, supposing that the world is eternal. This is shown by their definitions: eternity posits innate good and eternal good, as well as moral evil, and difference distinguishes them. And contrariety posits eternally contrary ends without repose, as rule B clearly shows. And by the first species of rules C and D all differences are contrary. And by the second species of the same rules, they are eternally compounded, although there cannot be eternal composition. And the third species of rule C says that the world is infinite in its infinite innate goodness while its moral goodness and evil both last eternally; and the world, through eternity, has innate infinity while all its other innate parts are finite, because heaven is a body finite in quantity, habit and situation. And the third species of rule D posits primordial and contrary domination and subjection, which is utterly impossible.

Column bcd, camera dtcd
Nineteenth question

25. The nineteenth question asks: "What does the concordance of contrariety and eternity consist of?" The answer is that it consists of two eternities, namely God's eternity and the world's eternity, were we to suppose that the world is eternal, and both eternities are in agreement and discord throughout infinite duration. Now God's substance is infinite, and that of the world is finite. God's eternity is simply good, and the world's eternity is both good and morally bad, which destroys the definition of concordance and necessarily makes contrariety eternal by definition, thus destroying the definition of eternity as the duration of greatness, goodness and virtue does not precede the duration in greatness of evil and vice. And the first rule shows this. The first species of rules C and D show primordial concordance between good and evil; and by the second species of rules C and D it is eternally composed of primordial contraries, outside of its genus; and thus we have a so-called concordance implying the contradiction of compounded contraries, giving rise to eternal concordance and eternal contrariety. By the third species of rule D it is both subjected and not subjected, which is impossible.

Column bcd, camera tbcd
Twentieth question

26. The twentieth question asks: "What do difference, concordance and contrariety consist of?" The answer is that they consist of themselves: they are supremely general genera by definition. And rule B confirms this, as do the first and second species of rules C and D. This does not mean that contrariety has any place in the second species of rules C and D because contrariety is an accident and there is no natural way for an accident to exist simply by itself; if it could, it would be a substance composed of form and matter, which is impossible. And the third species of rule D shows this.

27. We have spoken about the first column and given a doctrine for extracting questions and solutions from it through definitions and rules, and what we did with this column can be done with all the others, each in its own way. And the questions we made with it are general and applicable to particular questions by descending through the ladders of the green triangle with intellectual discourse and by making different sciences; now let us exemplify this by using one and the same column to solve one question with twenty different reasons, guided by the cameras from which we extract them.


ONE SINGLE QUESTION

Is the world eternal?

28. The solution to this question will be clarified with the first column of the Table. This can also be done with the other columns, because the columns are interlinked. First, let us take the first camera of the first column, then the second, and so on sequentially to the last camera and multiply twenty reasons to solve a single question, answered in the negative by the definitions and rules implied in this column.

29. This art teaches how to use its explicit terms when found in a question, as in asking whether the world is eternal: in this question we have eternity, an explicit term of the first figure, and eternity involves D, which in turn involves the terms signified by D as well as the ladder in the angle of D, namely contrariety between sensual and sensual, sensual and intellectual, intellectual and intellectual. And "whether" involves B, and B involves all the terms that belong to it as shown in the alphabet. As we want to apply C to this question in which it is implicit, all that belongs to C also comes into play. This is the doctrine for applying the first column to solve the said question by finding implicit and explicit terms and applying them to the issue at hand so that the solution does not contravene the principles with their definitions and the species of the rules, with assistance from the species of other rules to show how using other terms can also help. Let us begin with the first camera as follows.

Chapter 1
Camera bcd

30. In answer to the question "Is the world eternal?" we say that it is not, because if it were eternal, it would have good reason to produce eternal good throughout eternity while greatness, by its definition, would magnify this good reason in eternity and from eternity; and eternity would make this production last in eternity and from eternity, so that there could be no evil in the world, because good and evil are contrary; but there is evil in the world as we know by experience. Therefore we conclude that the world is not eternal.

Further, rule B and the said definitions indicate the negative answer to this question and contradict what we propose to say by rules C and D, as follows: if the world is eternal, its eternity causes evil to endure as much as good, as shown by the first species of Rule C. By the first species of rule D, evil and good are equally primordial. By the second species of rules C and D the world is composed of good and evil in eternity and from eternity. By the third species of rule C the world is infinite in eternity but finite in good and evil. By the fourth species of C the world has repose in things subjected to generation and decay, where generation is due to good and decay is due to evil. And by the second species of rule D God's eternity and goodness necessarily repose in evil as they cause the world's eternity. And as all these things are impossible, the answer to the question is clearly negative.

Chapter 2
Camera bctb

31. If the world is eternal, there are two different eternities, namely God's eternity and the world's eternity; and thus the difference between sensual and sensual, sensual and intellectual, intellectual and intellectual signifies three different general eternities. Goodness says that they are good and greatness says that they are great, but this is false and impossible because difference says that they are evil by definition since goodness is deficient in greatness so that the goodness of greatness is a source of confusion, which is impossible. Therefore, the answer to this question is negative.

Chapter 3
Camera bctc

32. If the world is eternal, the innate concordance existing in the world between sensual and sensual, sensual and intellectual, intellectual and intellectual is eternal and thus there are three concordances and three general subordinate eternities, all endowed with greatness of goodness and eternity and with eternal duration of greatness and goodness, which is false and impossible because there are three subordinate contrarieties opposed to them with greatness of evil and eternity.

33. Further, the negative solution is supported by rule B and by what we said about the definitions. And the same is shown by the first species of rules C and D because supremely general concordance says with its ladder that God's eternity and the world's eternity agree to exist together in one good, great entity, which is false because great and eternal contrariety does not allow it. And by the second species of rules C and D, if the world is eternal, then good, great and eternal concordance entirely enfolds the world's essence removed from any kind of contrariety, which is false.

34. Next, by the third species of rule C, supposing that the world is eternal, then the world's essence contains eternal generation and perfection in the greatness of eternity, and this is false because the world harbors corruption and guilt, which are effects caused by greatness of contrariety and evil. On the same point, by the fourth species of rule C, concordance has great goodness and eternity in the subject in which it exists: but this is false, because contrariety habituates the subject with great evil and eternity. Again, by the third species of rule D, if the world is eternal, it is equally subject to evil and good, and we cannot say that this is true, as divine eternity clearly shows because it is the prime cause with its great concordance of goodness, duration, etc.

Chapter 4
Camera bctd

If the world is eternal, then there is good, great and eternal contrariety between sensual and sensual etc. which is impossible because contrary ends cannot be good in eternal greatness, for if they could, goodness would be a reason for good to produce good and evil and greatness would magnify good and evil endlessly with eternal contrariety while eternity would make this great, good and evil contrariety last forever, which is impossible. By rule B, the definitions say that the world is not eternal. The first species of rules C and D posit primordial good, great and eternal contraries. And the second species of rules C and D posit the composition of goodness and evil, smallness and greatness, eternity and time, contrariety and concordance, which is impossible. Likewise by the fourth species of rule C and the third species of rule D, evil and smallness have dominion in eternity while goodness and greatness are eternally subjected to eternal contrariety which is impossible. We therefore conclude from the above that the world is not eternal.

Chapter 5
Camera bdtb

36. Supposing that the world is eternal, the difference between sensual and sensual etc. posits three good and eternal eternities in which goodness is a reason that produces eternal good without any confusion, and this is false and impossible.

The difference that exists between sensual and intellectual as between Socrates and Plato was obviously not produced from eternity and throughout eternity, and the same can be said about the difference between sensual and sensual in decaying animal, elemented and vegetal things.

But if the world is not eternal, the difference between sensual and intellectual, for instance between the late Peter and Paul (and the same applies to all the departed) can be transported into eternity by resurrection with the good, eviternal habit that God gives to reward merit. And rule B supports this as well as the first species of rule C, whereby God is a being who gives rewards in eternity. Further, the first species of rule C says that God's eternity is simply primordial and in every way different from time, and goodness says that this difference is good.

37. By the second species of rule C, there is no innate act of eternalizing in the world's eternity, for if there were, it would endlessly extend infinite eternalized being, but this is impossible and the second species of rule D says that if the world is eternal, it has difference as its eternity contains the eternalizer, the eternalized and their eternalizing that constitute the world's eternity, which is impossible.

38. Likewise, the third species of rules C and D say that the difference between God's eternity and the world's eternity is good, which is false because it subordinates God's eternity by depriving it of its eternal singularity. Further, the fourth species of rule C posits that if the world were eternal, its eternal duration would make it have too much similarity to God in whom there can be no evil and confusion.

Chapter 6
Camera bdtc

39. Supposing that the world is eternal, then there is good agreement between God's eternity and the world's eternity, which is false and impossible because the world's eternity contains eternal evil and eternal corruption and sin; rule B shows this clearly enough with the definitions of goodness, eternity and concordance. Further, the first species of rule C posits that if the world is eternal, it follows that its eternity is a being beyond which there is nothing prior in duration, which is against God's eternity (as the third species of rule D shows by implying subjection) since it cannot annihilate anything as lasting as itself. And this is confirmed by the first species of rule D saying that the world always was and is and will be. The second species of rules C and D also posit this, now the world's substance consists of the eternalizer, the eternalizable and their eternalizing, which makes it a being impossible to remove. Likewise, the third species of rule C posits that goodness and eternity are subordinate to eternal contrariety. And the fourth species of rule C says that they are passive under evil, which is impossible. Therefore, etc.

Chapter 7
Camera bdtd

40. If the world is eternal, its innate contrariety is good and eternal, which is false. Now eternal contrariety opposes eternal goodness with evil and conversely, and hence the world's eternity is a subject composed of innate contraries. And this is shown by the first and second species of rule D. By the first species of rule C, substance is composed of eternal primordial contraries. By the second species of rule D, the world eternally has its innate opposer, opposed and their opposing. And by the fourth species of rule C, eternal goodness has action in eternal evil and conversely; this is an utter impossibility to which rule B simply cannot consent. We therefore conclude that the world cannot have existed from eternity.

Chapter 8
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41. If the world is not eternal, the goodness and difference that exist between sensual and intellectual etc. can be in good concordance in the aevum, which would not at all be the case if the world existed from eternity, as there would never have been a first man and never would there be a last one; and thus the world would be a confused subject in which moral goodness would be eternally deprived of concordance, and the definition of concordance could not be preserved in a world whose eviternal corruption, privation and guilt clearly contradict the first rule.

42. By the first species of rule C the world is a subject in which goodness has no concordance and no repose. And by the first species of rule D goodness, difference and concordance are primordial innate forms removed from perfection. By the second species of rule D the world is confused and by the second species of rule C it has its innate confuser, confusable and their confusing. By the third species of rule D there is some dominant being that posits a confused world. Likewise by the third species of rule C the prime cause of the world is evil, and dominates the world by reason of the fourth species of rule C, which is impossible and so we conclude that the world is not eternal.

Chapter 9
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43. If the world is eternal, its contrariety is innate, eternal and sustained in goodness and evil against clear difference by the eternal and universal ladder existing between sensual and sensual etc. Contrariety can in no way sustain such a ladder. Further, the first rule altogether confirms and asserts that the solution to this question is negative.

Likewise, the first species of rule C posits that if the world is eternal, contrariety impedes all good divided into sensual and sensual etc. and eternal goodness is a being that perfects the ladder between sensual and sensual etc. and the difference between sensual and sensual is a being that distinguishes between good and evil and also by the second species of rule D the world is composed of good and different primordial contrarieties, which is false as shown by the first species of rule D. Now the second species of rule C and the third species of rule D show that the world is subordinated to its innate parts. And by the second species of rule C it is corruptible in its innate parts while by the fourth species it has the habit of eternity. Because all this is impossible, we conclude that the world is not eternal.

Chapter 10
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44. If the world is eternal, its goodness is eternal and innate to the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. while this ladder exists in the habit of eternal concordance and contrariety, which is impossible because it contradicts the definitions of the said reasons. Further, rule B confirms the negative answer. And the first species of rule C says that the world is a substance composed of eternal contraries and exists in a corruptible state even though it is eternal which is utterly impossible and dissonant with reason. Likewise the first species of rule D says that there is primordial corruption on account of the primordial contrariety that exists between good and evil but on the other hand, primordial concordance says the opposite. And the second species of rules C and D say that the world is composed of contraries placed within one another.

45. Further, the third species of rule C says that the world is corruptible in its contrariety and incorruptible in its concordance, good in its goodness and evil in its evil. Likewise, the third species of rule D says that the world is subordinated to its imperfection by some being external to its essence and so far removed from God that God is no longer a good God but an evil God, which is impossible. Therefore, etc.

Chapter 11
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46. Supposing that the world is eternal, what is the great difference of its eternity in the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. The answer is that it is the essence which posits an eternity differentiated among sensual and sensual etc. by the eternalizer, the eternalized and their eternalizing which is impossible, because generated things would then be incorruptible, which contradicts their definitions, and rule B also negates these statements. Likewise the first species of rule C posits and asserts that the said definition is false and impossible.

47. Next, the first species of rule D says that corruption and incorruptibility coexist primordially, both are great in greatness, eternal in eternity and different or clear in their difference. Likewise the second species of rules C and D say that the world is composed of these things. And the third species of rule C says that the world is incorruptible in heaven but corruptible in elemented things, as the world has both a corruptible and an incorruptible nature by the fourth species of rule C. So it is eternally corruptible and incorruptible with great difference, which is a contradiction and against the third species of rule D, therefore etc.

Chapter 12
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48. If the world is eternal, we ask: "What is the great concordance of its eternity?" We answer with the definitions of greatness, concordance and eternity and with the second species of rule C that it is a being that contains its own innate eternalizer, eternalized and eternalizing. Now by the second species of rule C and by the first and second of rule D the things of which it consists remove it entirely from contrariety, as greatness endows it with boundless extension just as eternity gives it the endless duration it has by the fourth species of rule C. And by the third of C, it is infinite in greatness and eternity and removed from the third species of rule D which is false and impossible as shown by the ladder of sensual and sensual which leads to the conclusion that the world is not eternal.

Chapter 13
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49. Let us suppose that the world is eternal and ask: "What is the great contrariety between greatness and eternity?" And by the first species of rule C, we answer that it is infinite resistance between divine eternity and greatness. The first species of rule D bears this out, now divine eternity causes infinite duration as its own likeness, while greatness causes the finite greatness of heaven, which is unlike eternity's own infinite greatness. And by the third species of rule D God's greatness is hindered from having its active effect, which is not at all the case with eternity; hence there accidentally follows great and eternal contrariety between divine eternity and greatness by the second species of rules C and D so that God's greatness is opposed by his eternity and conversely. And so divine eternity seems to have higher power and vigor than divine greatness, which is false and impossible. And this is proved by rule B with the definitions of greatness, goodness and eternity. Therefore etc.

Chapter 14
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50. Supposing that the world is eternal, we ask: "What is the greatness of its difference and concordance? And we answer by the first species of rules C and D that they are primordial, eternal essences totally removed from any contrariety. And by the second species of rules C and D the world is composed of these things without any contrariety which is obviously impossible by the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. as this ladder is the world's own proper passion by the third species of rule D that says the world is subject to corruption on account of the great and eternal action that contrariety has in the world. But rule B and the definitions of the said principles cannot support this, therefore, etc.

Chapter 15
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51. If the world is eternal, we ask: "What is the great contrariety of its difference?" We answer by the first species of rules C and D that it is the ladder between sensual and sensual etc. in the simple habit of contrariety which is nonetheless compound by the second species of rules C and D; and the coessential difference of the world is subordinate to this ladder. By the third species of rules C and D contrariety is active in difference and by the fourth species contrariety has simple, eternal acts, which is impossible as shown by the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. as well as by rule B and the definitions of the said principles, therefore etc.

Chapter 16
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52. Supposing that the world is eternal, we ask: "What is the great distance that exists between its concordance and contrariety?" By the first species of rules C and D it is the form that causes contradiction in the eternal ladder between sensual and sensual etc. because they are joined in eternity which is a simple principle wherein they stand as compounds by the second species of rules C and D. And the principles are subjected to one another by the third species of rule D. And the second and third species of rule D posit a great, eternal distance where concordance and contrariety are opposite in the subject and where their natures are opposed within each other by the fourth species of C. And since the world's eternity posits its own coessential contradiction, which is totally impossible, the conclusion must be that the world is not eternal.

Chapter 17
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53. Given that the world is eternal, we ask: "What does its eternity consist of?" By the first species of rules C and D we answer that it consists of different, concordant, primordial, finite and infinite things sustained in the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. Now eternity as a genus, is an infinite duration of difference and concordance that stand on the ladder as genera where they extend into infinity in quantity, habit and situation, while remaining eternal in eternity. Hence, by the second species of rules C and D it follows that the world is composed of infinite and finite parts, while eternity has dominion in them all by the fourth species of rule C, and in all its other innate parts that are finite. Then, in turn, eternity must also be subject to them by the third species of rule D, which is false and impossible. And the same is corroborated by rule D and by the definition of the said principles, therefore etc.

Chapter 18
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54. If the world is eternal, let us ask: "What do its innate and coessential differences and contrarieties, that is to say its own passions, sustained in the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. consist of?" By the first species of rules C and D we reply that they consist of primordial and eternal differences and contrarieties which are compound by the second species of rule C and have both dominion and subjection by the fourth species of rule C and the third of rule D as if the reasons or principles all existed within one another in an eternal subject in the same way that one natural point exists in another point when they compose a continuous line, which is false and impossible. This is also shown by rule B and the definitions of the principles, and therefore etc...

Chapter 19
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55. Supposing that the world is eternal, let us ask: "What do its own natural and coessential concordances and contrarieties designated by the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. consist of?" And likewise we ask: "What do its moral concordances and contrarieties consist of?" And we answer by the first species of rule D that they exist on their own. And by the first species of rule C eternity is a being composed of contraries as shown by the second species of rules C and D as it has in itself its own concorder, opposer and eternalizer and its own concorded, opposed and eternalized with their acts of concording, opposing and eternalizing, which amounts to placing opposition within the subject. And the world exists in its corruptible parts as well as in its incorruptible parts as shown by the third species of rule C while by the fourth species of the same rule it has an infinite number of cycles that grow infinitely and eternally in number, and so the world exists in an infinite state of repose and toil, which is false and impossible. And rule B proves this, as do the definitions of eternity, concordance and contrariety. Therefore we conclude that the world is obviously not eternal.

Chapter 20
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56. If the world is eternal, we ask : "Are its difference, concordance and contrariety eternal?" And the answer is that they are, as shown by the green triangle of the second figure, for without universal difference, concordance and contrariety, the world would have nothing to consist of. And thus the first species of rules C and D show that the world consists of primordial parts ordered to an eternal end by difference and contrariety so that divine eternity both is and is not the cause of the world. And by the second species of rules C and D the world is both compound and not compound while it has parts that are both innate and not innate by the fourth species of rule C. And by the third species of rule C it reposes in its end although it has none. And by the third species of rule D the world is both subjected and not subjected to God, both necessarily and not necessarily created, removed from contingency and joined to contingency, and thus it both is and is not. And as all these things are contradictory, false and impossible, as shown by rule B and the definitions of the said principles, it is abundantly clear that the world is not eternal.

57. We proved that the world is new, and this proof necessarily proves the existence of God since the world cannot create itself or bring itself into being from non being; now if it could do so, it would have existed even before existing, which is a contradiction. So we have found out that God exists, with his grace and blessing, and we greatly rejoice over this discovery because we will continue to exist after death on account of his great goodness, justice and charity. This is how the practical doctrine of this art provides a mode for the intellect to descend to particulars by multiplying twenty reasons for one and the same conclusion while mixing the principles with the species of the rules to find solutions in these mixtures. We used the first column as an example, and the same can be done with the second, third column, etc. in sequence.

Here we see that the table of this art is a general subject the intellect has for finding middle terms in every kind of subject matter inasmuch as we know the meanings of the terms. Conclusions are reached by and through these middle terms which are the very subject of this art.

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