Section 2
The Second Subject

Chapter 1 - Angel in Combination with the Principles

1. An angel's goodness is a reason for it to do good, and inasmuch as this reason is great, it is a reason for it to do great good, and inasmuch as it is durable, it is a reason for it to do durable good etc. However I am not saying that one angel produces or engenders another angel, because if this were so, the angel would empty itself by reason of its newness, finiteness and indivisibility, all of which are removed from length and breadth. What an angel has in itself, is a good act of understanding, loving and remembering natural principles. Moreover, angels exchange good words with each other. But the intellect wonders, given that angels have no tongue or organs of speech, how can this conversation happen? Then it remembers that their conversation is nothing but a good act of mutual understanding, loving and remembering, and all of this is good by reason of their goodness.

2. An angel's greatness is a reason for its goodness and duration to be great; hence, it follows that goodness is great through its correlatives, without which it would not be great. And now the intellect wonders: given that an angel does not produce or engender another angel, what does it bonify? Then it remembers that the acts of the other principles are bonified in the angel's own intrinsic bonifiable, in the same way that the intellect makes the other principles understandable and understood in its own intrinsic intelligible.

3. An angel's duration is a reason for it and for its principles with their intrinsic acts to endure; and its principles and their acts endure instantaneously without any succession among them. Now the intellect wonders: what is an angel's sustenance, given that it receives neither nourishment nor growth from the outside? Then it remembers that the angelic nature is not composed of contraries. And if the Sun, that is a corporeal being, can last without nourishment, so can an angel and far more so because it is a pure spirit denuded of surface.

4. An angel's power is the reason whereby it can exist and act. Now the intellect wonders: given that an angel has no organism, what instruments does it use to act? And then the intellect remembers the correlatives of an angel's power, with which it acts as if they were instruments for powering; now just like heat is an accident with which fire can act to heat things, likewise, and even much more, are the correlatives of an angel's power the means with which it can exist and act, because these are its consubstantial correlatives. And here the intellect understands that the consubstantial principles of angels are, as it were, their instruments. And now it recognizes the reason why angels are on a higher level than lesser beings.

5. An angel's intellect is the reason whereby it understands things with its correlatives; as it is intelligent, or active in understanding with its intellective in its intelligible, in which it understands other beings. And no wonder an angel can do this, when we consider that fire, which does not have the lofty virtue of an angel, can heat the other elements in its ignifiable. Further, our intellect wonders how angelic intellect can understand species, since it does not reproduce any species through senses and imagination? Then it remembers that angelic intellect is, as it were, like an instrument for understanding (although it is consubstantial to the angel, just as its other principles are consubstantial) in the same way that a man's will is used for willing, and even much more so, because man cannot will anything without using bodily organs whereas angles, being loftier creatures than men, is able to understand things without being joined to any organ.

6. An angel uses its will as if it were an instrument, although it is not truly an instrument because an angel's will is its natural means for willing and with its will it carries out the lovable acts signified to it by the supreme order. Now the intellect wonders: how come angelic will can love things without sensing or imagining them? And it remembers its own rough and gross nature, which it has because it is joined to the senses and imagination; for an angel's will can approach objects without sensing or imagining them, far better than a plant's appetite can approach objects without sensing or imagining them.

7. An angel has virtue with which it is naturally active in its principles inasmuch as they are virtuous in virtue; and it has virtuous acts that are good in goodness, great in greatness, etc. But the intellect wonders: what mode does an angel have for acquiring accidental virtues? And then it remembers that an angel has virtuous habits as it objectifies objects through virtuous understanding and loving and through just, prudent and charitable action, as angels help us to resist sin and oppose the evil angels by transmitting messages to us from the supreme principle, by bringing our prayers into God's presence, and by praying for us.

8. By reason of its truth, an angel truly understands, loves and remembers far better than does a man who truly understands, remembers and loves with his soul, truly imagines with his imagination and truly senses things with his senses. And here the intellect wonders how an angel can truly understand men with their colors, their justice or injustice, given that it has no eyes? And then it remembers how a peasant once wondered why the king has wealth and honor whereas he, the peasant, is poor and without honor.

9. An angel's own innate glory is, as it were, an instrument with which to be glorious, just as its will is like an instrument with which it wills, and its goodness is like an instrument with which it is good. Now the intellect wonders: how come angels are glorious, given that they derive no enjoyment from the senses or the imagination? Then it remembers that man enjoys greater glory by objectifying, understanding, remembering and loving the supreme object, than by objectifying lesser beings through the senses and the imagination.

10. An angel's coessential difference is the reason whereby it is comprised of several numerically different principles. Now the intellect wonders: what causes this difference, given that an angel's innate principles are not differentiated by such things as color, taste, shape, and so on? Then it remembers that sound is not an object of sight, nor is color an object for the hearing etc.

11. An angel's own innate concordance is the cause for its numerous principles to convene in one substance that is good in goodness, great in greatness, etc. But the intellect wonders at this, until it remembers that in elemented things, many elements convene in one compound ignited and heated by fire, moistened and aerified by air, cooled and aqueified by water and
dried and earthified by earth.

12. An angel is not composed of contraries for it naturally stands outside the elements just as it stands outside of points, numbers, figures and things like these. Now the intellect wonders: if good and evil angels are not composed of contraries, then what causes them to oppose each other? Until it remembers that a good angel is habituated with the prime end, whereas an evil angel is empty of it. And here the intellect realizes how awesome this opposition is in the sempiternal aevum.

13. An angel is an effective efficient cause by reason of its principle; and its form is constituted of its "tives", namely its essential bonificative, magnificative, etc. and its matter is constituted of its bonifiable, magnifiable etc. without which it could not receive its natural end so it can be what it is without being joined to any other essence than its own. But there is another, supreme end, namely God most holy, in Whom the angel reposes as it understands, loves and remembers and as it bonifies, magnifies etc. its understanding, loving and remembering. But the intellect wonders: how can an angel have natural properties if its essence cannot be divided or altered? Then it remembers that the sun cannot be divided or altered because it is removed from motion and succession.

14. An angel is a medium or subject whose end influences its principles and whose principles flow back to the end, as each principle measures itself with the others to the full extent of its being so that they all form one complete substance. Now the intellect wonders: given that an angel has no linear quantity, how can it have measurements or be composed of several principles? Until it remembers that spiritual quantity is sustained in its subjects without any points or lines, and without it, one angel cannot have a greater essence or act than another, and one angel cannot receive from God greater glory than another angel.

15. An angel's end comprises two modes: natural and supernatural. In the natural mode, an angel naturally has a good, great etc. purpose in doing good and great deeds; in the supernatural mode, its end is in its supreme object that is supremely intelligible, lovable and honorable. Now angels make God loved, understood and remembered, but they do not make Him good, great etc. and this is why in the essence of an angel, memory, intellect and will have an end loftier than that of its other principles. But the intellect wonders how there can be such majority and minority in an angel, given that all the principles in its essence are equal? Until it remembers what was just said about is object.

16. Angels belong to a species higher than the human species. And thus, just like a magnet attracts iron by reason of its species, so do angels, as they belong to a higher species, have knowledge of things below and power over them without having any organs. But the intellect wonders how this can be, until it remembers that although this is difficult for it to understand, it is not difficult for angels to do these things, because angels belong to a species higher than the human species.

17. An angel's memory, intellect and will are equal so that it can equally objectify God with its understanding, loving and remembering. And this is because God is to be equally remembered, loved and understood, which is good, great etc. And the contrary would be a great evil in duration, power etc. which is impossible. Now the intellect wonders why an angel's reasons are not equal in existence and action to its memory, intellect and will? And it remembers the solution to this question as given above in #15.

18. An angel has innate minority, because it is created, new and finite as God created it from nothingness. And on account of this minority, some angels are habituated to sinful deeds, freely by inclination. And now the intellect wonders, what causes them to be inclined to sin? Until it remembers that evil angels are inclined to sin through unwillingness whereas good angels are inclined toward the virtues that they love.

Chapter 2 - Angel in Combination with the Rules

19. With rule B we ask: do angels exist? This rule, through the mixture of principles, shows that they do; and to give examples of this proof by mixing the principles, let us go back to some things that were said in part 8, section 1, chapter 1 about goodness. In the beginning of this chapter, it is stated that goodness is a reason for good to do or to produce good, and as it is great in greatness, there is a dual reason for good to produce great good, and divine wisdom knows this because it is good and great. Hence, as divine will is equal in greatness to divine goodness, wisdom etc. it wills that there be angels, and therefore angels exist.

20. In #4 of the said chapter we see that goodness is knowable to wisdom. So divine goodness is knowable, and as it is knowable, it is lovable in the full greatness of its knowability and lovability; therefore its act is knowable and lovable, and so is its effect, namely angels, and so angels exist as they are a great and good effect, the greatest and best that can be among created beings. And if angels did not exist, knowing the effect of divine goodness would be a mere possibility, or something potential that the divine will does not want to become actual, which is impossible and contrary to the lovability of the effect of God's goodness, therefore etc.

21. In #5 of the said chapter we see that goodness is lovable by the will etc. And if angels exist, then the entire universe is perfect, because in the universe we have inanimate bodies like stones, animate bodies like plants, men, lions, and there is spirit joined to a body, or the rational soul, so that we must also have spirit that is higher and closer to God because it is not joined to a body, and this is known to divine wisdom. And if there were no angels, or spirits that are not joined to bodies, divine will would prevent them from existing because it does not want them to exist: now this would be contrary to the great action of divine goodness in things above but not in things below, which is impossible and contrary to the knowability of divine wisdom, and so we have proved, with reference to higher causes, that angels do exist.

22. We have proved with three reasons that angels exist, which is sufficient here for the sake of brevity; and we have shown that the mixture of principles is a subject matter where the artist can discover many things at will and apply them to the issue at hand.

23. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is an angel? And we answer with the first species that an angel is a creature that is more similar to God because it is a spirit not joined to a body and can act upon things below without using any physical organs, and so forth.

24. With the second species of rule C we ask: what innate, natural and coessential things does an angel have? And we answer that it has its innate constitutive parts, like its innate goodness, greatness etc. with the exception of contrariety, which is not an innate quality of angels. And as an angel has its innate goodness with its natural bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying, and as it also has greatness and the other principles, it has its innate actions and passions; with its actions, it acts both inwardly and outwardly, and with its innate passions it inwardly receives what comes from outside, as when it receives peregrine intelligibilities in its own innate intelligibility.

25. With the third species of rule C we ask: what is an angel in other things? And we answer that it is active and passive as when it acts upon things below with understanding and loving etc. And its power carries out the desires of its will, as its intellect understands and its memory remembers; and all this proceeds without any succession and without any phantasm, but with the help of divine goodness, greatness etc. through God's presence from which angels passively receive causal influences, and this passivity is the angel's salvation and perfection. On the other hand, an evil angel receives passions from outside when it is unable to commit sinful deeds, and it has the most intense passions because in the absence of God's grace it is emptied of its final purpose.

26. With the fourth species of rule C we ask: what does an angel have in other things? And we answer that an angel has power in things below in which it acts without touch, without sight, without hearing or imagination. And it has this power by reason of its presence in the things where it exists in the same way that a soul joined to a body has power over the lower faculties because it is joined to them. And good angels also have glory in God and in the other holy angels, whereas evil angels have suffering, but it would be too long to discuss that here.

27. With the first species of rule D we ask: from what does an angel originate? And we answer that it exists on its own and is not derived from anything else. And this is so that its innate goodness, greatness etc. are its own indissoluble innate principles and so that its essence can be permanent and incorruptible, nonetheless we say that it was created by God.

28. With the second species of rule D we ask: what does an angel consist of? And we answer that an angel consists of its own innate principles, namely its natural goodness, greatness etc. And each principle has a triple presence in the angel, like goodness in its bonificative, bonifiable and bonifying, and greatness in its magnificative, magnifiable and magnifying etc. And these principles are essentially different so that an angel is composed of its goodness, greatness etc. as well as of all its "tives", namely the bonificative, magnificative etc. that constitute one common form in the angel with which it is active, and all its "ables", namely its bonifiable, magnifiable etc. that constitute one common matter with which it is passive. And all its "ings" like bonifying, magnifying etc. constitute one common act with which it causes intrinsic acts, and from all three, its substance is spiritually united and composed, and removed from all corporeal matter.

29. With the third species of rule D we ask: to whom does an angel belong? And we answer that it belongs to God, because it is God's creature; but a good angel belongs to God with blessings, glory and glorification whereas an evil angel belongs to God with contradiction, pain and sorrow.

30. With the first species of rule E we ask: why do angels exist? And we answer that an angel is constituted of its natural principles as we said above in the second species of rule D. And as the principles combine with each other, they necessarily compose one common being; just as the joining of a soul to a body must compose a man and the joining of the elementative to the vegetative must compose a vegetal being.

31. With the second species of rule E we ask: why do angels exist? And we answer that angels exist for the final purpose of understanding, loving, remembering and honoring God, and in order to complete the universe, because without angels, a part of the universe would be empty, as we proved above in rule B #21.

32. With rule F we ask: what quantity does an angel have? And we answer that an angel has the quantity that the being of its essence has; and its being has continuous quantity inasmuch as it is one substance, and it has discrete quantities because it is constituted or composed of many principles. And the truth of this is signified in the second species of rule D which asks: "what does an angel consist of?".

33. With rule G we ask: what qualities does an angel have? And we answer that an angel has two kinds of qualities, namely innate or proper qualities, and appropriated qualities that are not of its own nature. What we call proper qualities are its own constitutive natural and substantial goodness, greatness etc. and what we call appropriated qualities are its acquired goodness, greatness, justice etc. In an evil angel, the appropriated qualities are its malice, envy, iniquity etc.

34. With rule H we ask about time and angels. And we say that an angel exists in time because it has a beginning in time, without which it cannot have had a beginning, and this is because whatever is and was not, cannot exist without time. And an angel is in time through its participation in aeviternity, but without any succession or motion. But when it acts externally, it acts in different "nows", as when it does on Sunday what it did on Saturday, and at one time it can be in Rome during the day, and at another time in Paris at night. However, when it leaves Rome and arrives in Paris, it travels without any motion or succession; just like it needs no eyes to see colors, so it needs neither motion nor succession to travel, but can be wherever it wants to be.

35. With rule I we inquire about angels and locus. And we answer that an angel exists in a locus because it was created in a locus, but it does not occupy space in its locus because a locus cannot be occupied without lines, angles and figures, and all angels are completely removed from these things. And it is in a locus, because when it is in one place, it is not in another place. And it is in the locus where it acts, and it cannot act in a locus without being present in it, and this is because it acts with its essence and not with any organs.

36. With the first rule K we ask: how does an angel exists and how does its act? And we answer that an angel has its mode of existence through the composition of its principles, as shown in the second species of rule D, #28. And it has a mode for action with its principles whereby it causes outward acts as it causes bonified being with its goodness, empowered being with its power and so with the other principles.

37. With the second rule K we ask: with what does an angel exist, and with what does its act? And we answer that it is with the aggregate of its own natural principles, as shown in the second species of rule D, #28. And as it acts with them, it understands with its intellect, loves with its will, remembers with its memory, and if it is good, it bonifies with its goodness, and empowers with its power etc. And if it is evil, it depraves its understanding, remembering and loving and the acts of its other principles. And an angel acts inwardly and outwardly with its principles so that its act causes what is inside to exist outside, like a man causes in his mind the words he utters outwardly.

Third Section: the Third Subject

Chapter 1 - Heaven in Combination with the Principles

1. In this chapter we will deal with heaven and its innate constitutive principles with which it acts as an efficient cause in producing its effects in things below. Heaven is good in its natural goodness and great in its natural greatness, and thus its goodness and its greatness are reasons for it to act well, greatly and naturally in things here below as it moves itself and other things as well. To those who say that heaven sometimes has an evil action, as with the influence of the evil planet Saturn, I reply that it does so by accident, and because things below do not receive its influence well, due to oppositions among the elements, and this is why Saturn sometimes causes monstrosities in things here below, with excessive dryness and cold.

2. Heaven is great and durable: it is great in essence and action, and it is durable because it is incorruptible and unalterable, so that apart from God, no other being can constrain it or impede its motion.

3. Heaven is durable per se because duration is its innate quality.

4. Heaven is powerful per se, because its power is an innate quality. And just as its duration is good and great, so is its power good and great. And here we clearly recognize that heaven can move itself, so that its goodness, greatness etc. are not deficient in power, nor is power deficient in them.

5. Just as heaven has its own natural and coessential circular motion, so does it have a natural coessential instinct to govern its orderly movement and the acts of its principles, which it could not do without such an instinct. And it has one instinct with one planet and another instinct with another, for instance, Leo has one instinct with Saturn's dry, cold, diurnal and evil qualities and affinity with lead and with Saturdays; and Leo has another instinct with Jupiter's moisture, goodness, and affinity with tin and with Thursdays, and so forth.

6. Heaven has instinct, as we said above in #5, and it also has appetite because it is with its appetite that it moves toward things below to arouse their appetite for itself; and it has one appetite with one planet and another appetite with another planet, as in the example we gave above in #5 with regard to instinct.

7. Heaven has appetite and virtue, and just as its appetite is naturally and coessentially its own, so is its virtue; and just as its appetite is good in its goodness and great in its greatness, so is its virtue; and just as it has one appetite with Leo, another with Virgo, another with Saturn and another with Jupiter, so does it have a different virtue with each.

8. Heaven is virtuous, as said above in #7, and heaven is true per se. Now just as it is virtuous in its innate virtue, so is it true in its innate truth, and its desirable qualities are true by reason of this truth. And power, instinct etc. all convene in this.

9. Heaven is true, as was said in #8, and it has innate enjoyment, and I say that this delight is neither vegetative, nor sensitive, imaginative or rational, but motive. Now just as a plant takes a certain natural delight in vegetating, so does heaven delight in moving itself and things below; and just as the vegetative power's delight is imperceptible to the senses or to the imagination, so is the delight of heaven, which can only be understood by the intellect.

10. Heaven has delight, as said in #9, and on account of difference, there is no confusion in its delight, and this difference is its own innate principle whereby it makes and causes many differences in its delighting, but this difference is imperceptible to the senses becaus it is a general principle.

11. Heaven is comprised of many differences just like a whole is comprised of many parts; and concordance is one of its own coessential principles with which it causes many concordances, so that heaven is one substance containing many things in difference and concordance.

12. Heaven has innate concordance, as said in #11, and as it is incorruptible, it has peregrine contrariety that is not coessential to it, but an instrument with which it produces oppositions in things below, as between hot and cold, moist and dry, diurnal and nocturnal qualities and so forth, with which it causes monstrosities, thunder, lightning, disease, misfortune and things like that.

12. Contrariety as such is not a coessential principle of heaven, but concordance is one of its principles as said above in #11. And heaven does more in things below by concording them than by opposing them to each other, so that there is more health than illness and more fortune than misfortune, and men are born more often with two eyes than with one eye, and so with other things in their way.

13. Heaven has its own innate principles, as we said, with which it effectively initiates things below by means of natural beings below, such as the elements with their qualities and properties. And just as heaven acts on elementsed things, so does it act on vegetal and sentiaent beings. And greatness concurs in this as it magnifies heaven's power, instinct, appetite, virtue and so forth, giving rise to the influence of things above on things below and the reflux from things below up to the Moon. And this proceeds continuously because heaven is always in continuous motion.

14. Heaven has its own innate coessential medium with which it causes lower media, now heavenly bonifying causes earthly bonifying, and by moving, heaven causes earth to move.

15. Heaven has a medium as we said, through which and with which its principles transit to the end in which they repose. And the repose of heaven is in moving itself and things below because heaven was created for this purpose.

16. Heaven has a major final purpose which is to serve man so that man can serve God and its end cannot be any higher than this. But subject to this major end, heaven has its own innate major end, namely moving, just as the vegetative has its major purpose in vegetating and the sensitive has its major end in sensing.

17. We spoke of heaven's majority, and its major equality is the equality of its own coessential principles. And heaven's equality is lesser than the equality in the soul because heaven has neither intellect, nor memory, nor will, nor can it earn any merit.

Chapter 2 - Heaven in Combination with Rule B

18. We ask: does heaven exist from eternity? And we answer that it does not, as signified by rule B and by the single question in part 5: "is the world eternal?" But to further clarify of this science, art and doctrine, we intend to give an example of it in this chapter dealing with heaven. And with the things we say about heaven, we provide a doctrine for artists with which they can also make judgments about other matters; to avoid excessive prolixity, we will apply only the letter B to the other letters in the alphabet of this art up to K. And as we match B with the other letters, so can the other letters be matched with each other.

19. BC - If heaven exists from eternity, it was not created from nothing because it always existed; (for it is not made of anything else, because beyond heaven there is no matter from which it could be made, nor is there any within heaven because its greatness contains all things) and thus, divine goodness is not a reason for God to make a good heaven, or the goodness of heaven, because heaven is eternal, and likewise, God's greatness does not cause the greatness of heaven. Hence it follows that the world in its goodness, greatness etc. is not an effect of God so that there is difference between God's goodness and the goodness of heaven, without any concordance (that should by rights exist between a cause and its effect), and likewise with greatness. With the privation of concordance between God's goodness and the goodness of heaven, God's greatness and the greatness of heaven, there arises contrariety, injury and avarice, and God's goodness is not a reason for Him to produce a good and great effect, since God does not consent to the reason of his goodness. And as all these things are impossible, it follows that heaven is created and new.

20. BD - If heaven is eternal, then there are many eternities, namely God's eternity and the eternity of heaven; and heaven's eternity implies infinite eternities, like those of its innate goodness, duration etc. and of its circles and revolutions. Thus, injury and gluttony have existed in mankind as long as justice and prudence, malice and contrariety as long as goodness and concordance; and there never was a first man, nor will there ever be a last one. Thus there is a deficiency of divine goodness, as it is not a reason for God to have goodness rightly precede evil and for God's eternity to precede the eternity of heaven. And it also follows that there is no afterlife because all the matter contained by heaven cannot suffice for accommodating the resurrected bodies of the dead (as we intend to prove) so that God's justice would be defective and impeded from rewarding the just and punishing the unjust in eternity, all of which would be due to injury and malice. Further, God's fortitude would be debilitated and lust would be eternal. And as all these things are impossible, it follows that heaven is new and has a beginning.

21. BE - If heaven is eternal, it has power to be eternal on its own, because eternal being has never been in potential existence, nor is it potentially non existent; and thus God's power is not the cause of heaven's power, nor is God's goodness the cause of heaven's goodness; and God's power cannot deprive heaven of power because heaven would govern itself on its own so that conceit, and consequently sin, would be eternal; hence it would follow that heaven would be an end unto itself and God would not be its end, given that the privation of the cause deprives the effect. And as all these things are evil, injurious, full of conceit and opposed to rule B, it has been demonstrated that they are impossible and that the answer to this question must be negative.

22. BF - If heaven is eternal, then time is eternal so that God's eternity does not precede time, which is contrary to justice and faith. And accidy is eternal, giving rise to eternal injury. And this is known to divine wisdom, and divine goodness is a reason for God to do good by destroying these evils; but God does not consent to this, and so his wisdom knows that He is being injurious, lazy and evil. And as all these things are impossible, therefore etc.

23. BG - If heaven is eternal, is there either one eternal will general to all human wills, and from which all the other particular wills materially derive, or does God create individual human wills? If there is one general will, it is indivisible and individual wills are eternally corruptible; (nor is there an afterlife, as shown by the impossibilities pointed out in camera BD #20). And thus, injury is done to the individual wills that love God, and God's justice has no power of judgment over them in eternity, nor over the wills that hate God, hate hope, and love envy; supposing that the individual wills, once corrupted, never return to being, because the general will cannot provide enough matter for this, considering what was said in camera BD; but these things are contrary to God's justice and goodness, therefore there cannot be any eternal general will. But if individual wills were created by God, and if heaven were eternal, creation would not have any repose as there would never have been a first will or a second one and there never would be a last one, which presents the same inconvenience as shown in camera BD #20. Therefore etc.

24. BH - If heaven is eternal, then the virtues and the vices have existed from eternity, and there is more vice than virtue; and divine goodness and charity are reasons for God to make virtues greater than vices; but if God does not consent to this, He is injurious and contrary to his own charity and justice; as this is impossible, its opposite must necessarily be true.

25. BI - If heaven is eternal, its eternity is equal in duration to God's eternity so that truth and falsehood, patience and impatience are equally eternal, but as all these things are contrary to divine goodness, justice and truth, it follows that heaven is new, and that divine goodness and truth justly precede the duration of heaven with their eternity, just as their immensity and infinity precede the limited and finite goodness and truth of heaven.

26. BK. - If heaven is eternal, then the liberal and mechanical arts have existed from eternity so that there has never been repose in this life; compassion and inconstancy are equally eternal, as are hammers and tongs; and this life does not exist for the purpose of the afterlife because one eternity does not cause another, nor does it repose in another eternity; and it is minority close to naught, that is never fully reduced to naught. And as all these things are evil, injurious and contrary to divine goodness and justice, it then necessarily follows that heaven is new and created.

Chapter 3 - Heaven in Combination with Rule C and the Other Rules

27. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is heaven? And we answer that heaven is the prime mobile, and the body that has the greatest magnitude and greatest motion, for beyond it there is nothing mobile; and it is a body that moves on its own, because it has the greatest mobility of all bodies; and thus, motion begins naturally from heaven and remains within it; and it is the source from which all other movements arise like streams from a fountain.

28. With the second species of rule C we ask: what does heaven coessentially and naturally contain in itself? And we answer that it has in itself its own coessential and natural motivity, mobility and moving, so that motivity provides its form, mobility its matter and moving is its act with which it causes extrinsic acts; and it has its innate goodness and greatness etc. as well as stars, planets and signs, and other such coessential parts of itself.

29. With the third species of rule C we ask: what is heaven in other things? And we answer that heaven is active, moving and influential in the elements and in elemented things from which it receives no passion at all, on account of its great activity and motivity, and as such, it neither increases nor decreases. And now the intellect wonders: how can heaven have such great motivity without undergoing any subjective alteration or change? And then it takes strength in considering that the infinite power of God can cause such an effect at will.

30. With the fourth species we ask: what does heaven have in other things? And we answer that heaven has natural rulership over the elements and elemented things with which it causes natural mobilities in the regions below, four seasons, days, hours, thunder, lightning, wind, rain, snow, monstrosities, disease and things like that. And it does this because things below receive its mobilities and influences through which it works its effects.

31. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does heaven arise from? And we answer that heaven exists on its own, because it is not made or derived from any preexisting matter; and as it exists primordially on its own, it is incorruptible by reason of its primordiality, and it moves forever with its own motion.

32. With the second species of rule D we ask: what is heaven made of? And we answer that heaven is made of its own coessential parts such as its innate goodness, greatness etc. And this is shown by the second species of rule D.

33. With the third species of rule D we ask: to whom does heaven belong? And we answer that it belongs to God, as an effect belongs to its cause. And as it is God's possession, it causes effects in things below as God wants it to.

34. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does heaven exist? And we answer that heaven exists because it is constituted of its own coessential parts, such as its innate goodness, greatness etc. except contrariety, which is not a coessential part of heaven because if it were, then heaven would be corruptible. Further, it exists because its celestial form and celestial matter are joined in it, so that heaven is produced by them as necessarily as a man is produced by joining a soul to a body.

35. With the second species of rule E we ask: why does heaven exist? And with regard to its final purpose, we reply that heaven exists in order to be a cause that causes motivities in things below, whereby man is disposed to exist and also to serve God.

36. With rule F we ask about the quantity of heaven. And we answer that heaven has continuous and discrete quantity: its continuous quantity is circular, as shown by its shape; and its discrete quantity is found, for instance, in the concave eighth sphere and in the spheres of Saturn and the other planets.

37. With rule G we ask: what qualities does heaven have? And we answer that heaven has proper and appropriated qualities. The proper qualities are its innate goodness, greatness etc. and its motion, its shape as well as its quantity etc. The appropriated qualities are, for instance, heat, dryness, cold, moisture, masculinity, femininity and so forth. And it is said that its appropriated qualities are in it because with them it acts on things below; now the Sun is said to be hot and dry because it heats and dries things.

38. With rule H we ask about heaven and time. And we answer that the essence of the eighth sphere exists in the present in which it was created, like a circle that essentially exists without any succession, but causes time in things below with its motion, for instance, as Saturn is moved successively from one present into another present. And from the eighth sphere to the sphere of fire there is only one day, but from the sphere of fire to the sphere of earth there are many days and many nights due to the presence and absence of the Sun so that the Sun is the cause that produces numerous days, nights, hours etc.

39. With rule I we ask about heaven and locus. And we answer that the eighth sphere exists in the locus in which its essence was created, and likewise with Saturn, etc. but due to motion and to several circles that exist between the eighth sphere and the sphere of fire, with reference to direction it is in many places, so that Saturn, for instance, is at one time in Aries, and at another time in Taurus, and so with the Sun as it is in one locus of heaven at one time and in another locus at another time, and it artificially causes day in some place and night in another place.

40. With the first rule K we ask: how does heaven exist? And we answer that heaven's mode comprises the particular modalities of its own essence, or its innate parts, like its goodness, greatness etc. and its habit, situation and so forth.

41. With the second rule K we ask: with what does heaven exist? And we answer that it exists with its own natural constitutive parts, like its goodness, greatness etc. with which it causes circularities, and mobile goodnesses, greatnesses etc.

Section Four: the Fourth Subject

Chapter 1 - Man in Combination with the Principles

1. Man's own innate goodness is a reason for him to do specific good, and whatever is done by man as a member of the human species, is done either in a natural or in a moral way. Spiritual and corporeal goodness are joined in man by reason of his soul and body so that through these dual reasons man naturally has reason to do good by objectifying, unerstanding, loving and remembering; and with his body by procreating, sensing and imagining; and good works proceed from both parts, as we see in the liberal and mechanical arts.

2. Man's own innate greatness, like his goodness, is of a dual nature, and man does what he does greatly with greatness just as he does it well with goodness.

3. Man's own innate duration is a reason for his goodness, greatness and so forth to last in a dual way, as said above in #1; and man acts naturally through necessity and he acts morally at will.

4. Man's own innate power is dual in nature, like his goodness (as we said), and since he can exist and act through his power, it is clear than he can act in accordance with his species. And here the intellect understands how man has specific freedom to act.

5. Man's own innate intellect is specific to each man, and with it he understands things in a specific way; and it does not descend from any other intellect that generates it, nor is it essentially identical to any other intellect, because if it were, it would be engendered in man and then annihilated or corrupted after a man's death, and it would be confined within time, locus, quantity, surface, division, succession and motion; and it would be situated and configured in points and lines, which is impossible, because all these things are physical or corporeal in nature. And here the intellect realizes how evil and false are the statemente of those who think and assert that there is only one intellect shared by all men. Further, by what was said, our intellect realizes that a human body's natural instinct is joined to a human intellect in the way we described in the paragraph on goodness. The intellect has a mode for rendering intelligible species in its own intelligible part through the sensitive and imaginative powers, and it builds science from these intelligible species.

6. Man's own innate will is a specific power with which he does specific lovable deeds. But this will does not descend from some general will, because if it did, its essence could be generated and corrupted, as we said about intellect, and his freedom would be destroyed because the will would be necessarily compelled to act in accordance with its general principle, just like the body has appetites that higher causes necessarily compel it to have, like its appetite for food when it feels hunger and for drink when it feels thirst, for warmth when it feels cold and so forth. Further, if all men shared one single will, all men would seek out the same objective, and the rational soul would die when a man dies so that there would be no afterlife and neither God's justice nor God's mercy would have any subject to act upon, which is impossible, and an utterly absurd thing to say. Further, the body's appetite and the will are joined, as was said about goodness, so that by willing, the will renders species from the sensitive and imaginative powers, just as the intellect does by understanding. And the same can be said in its own way about the memory, as it is a part of the soul.

7. Corporeal and spiritual virtues are joined in man; and because the spiritual virtue is above, it informs and perfects the lower virtue. And here the intellect sees how moral virtues arise from spiritual virtue and corporeal virtue just like substance arises from form and matter; the virtues will be dealt with in the ninth subject.

8. Man's truth is spiritual and corporeal, and because spiritual truth is higher, it perfects the lower truth. Hence, the intellect realizes that just as the senses truly sense things with sight, hearing etc. so likewise does the soul truly attain the essences of things through remembering, understanding and loving, for otherwise it would do more in things below with its lower virtues than in things above with its higher virtues, which is utterly absurd and contrary to intellectual reason. And the intellect finds great joy in realizing this.

9. In man, spiritual and corporeal glory are naturally joined, so that there is a natural conjunction of both spiritual and corporeal enjoyment. Hence it follows that the soul enjoys acting in the body and the body enjoys being acted upon, and man enjoys all of this. And here the intellect sees how man finds enjoyment in moral matters.

10. In man there is a conjunction of spiritual and corporeal differences, and this is why the intellect understands things in one way through hearing, in another way through seeing and so forth; and likewise, the body is acted upon in one way by the intellect, in another way by the will and in another way by the memory. And by what was said, the intellect realizes how it builds science with its discourse, as the will builds a science of love and the memory builds a science of remembering.

11. The body and the soul enter into the composition of man as they join together in him while the soul remains in its own essence as does the body. And here the intellect realizes how the body and the soul convene in objectifying the same objects, as the body sees them, hears them etc. and the soul understands, remembers and loves them.

12. The human body is composed of four elements, whereas the soul is not made of opposites because it is incorruptible. And because the soul and the body are joined together in man, he is consequently subject to direct and natural oppositions in the body and indirect, accidental oppositions in the soul. And here the intellect realizes that all sin is accidental. And as the soul and the body are joined in man, so man is an efficient cause, moving form in matter toward an end, namely by moving the soul in the body. And here the intellect knows how man is an efficient, material, formal and final cause.

13. In man, the soul and body are joined and this act signifies a conjunction which is a medium made of influences from the soul and the body. And this medium consists of the connatural and substantial understanding, willing and remembering, elementing, vegetating, sensing and imagining, without which there would be no substantial conjunction in man. And man lives as long as this natural conjunction lasts in him, and dies as soon as it is dissolved. And here the intellect knows how the soul and the body join together and measure their acts with their own proportionate dispositions where the soul influences the body and the body sends its influence back to the soul, while man exists as a subject in the middle, and as the third number. And here the intellect understands how the root moisture and the nourishing moisture exist in man: the root moisture is made of primordial principles, points and lines to which the soul is joined; and instrumental moisture is its instrument - like the shuttle in a weaver's loom - in which points and lines are induced by the motion of the elementative, vegetative, sensitive and imaginative powers whose influence flows back and forth so as to keep the root moisture alive and growing with what it receives from outside and transmutes into its own species through the vegetative as the vegetative transmutes food into flesh, nerves and bones, and drink into blood, and food with drink into marrow, phlegm, choler, melancholy, brains, tears, saliva and sweat.

14. In man there is a natural conjunction of spiritual and corporeal ends whereby man is meant for these ends: for the spiritual end through his soul and for the spiritual end through his body. And moral ends arise or come forth from the soul and the body with which they find the enjoyment that is their repose.

15. In man, the soul is a greater substantial image than the image of the body and the body is a lesser image than the image of the soul. Further, in the body, the imagination is a greater image than the sensitive power because it objectifies and moves it more. And the sensitive power is a greater image than the vegetative in which it is rooted and sustained. And then the vegetative is a greater image than the elementative because the elementative is the foundation on which it stands. And so the intellect now realizes that just as there are greater and lesser substantial powers, so there are greater and lesser accidental powers.

16. In man the body and the soul are not equal, for the soul has higher principles and the body has lower ones; nonetheless they are joined so that the soul is entirely in the body and conversely, so that the composition and conjunction in man is equal.

17. Given that man, being a creature, was brought forth from nothingness, he is clothed with minority and so has to deal with minor things. And as body and soul are joined in man, so does man move toward lesser mores with his soul and toward minor natural things with his body, and with these he composes his morality. And here the intellect sees how the soul is inclined to sin, a thing so small that it has no essence, it is but a privative habit that deviates its subject from his intended end. And here the intellect knows what sin is, how it grows and what its beginnings are. 

Chapter 2 - Man in Combination with the Rules

18. With rule B we ask whether we can know man better through affirmation than through negation. And the answer is that we can, because as we affirmatively state something about a subject, we define the subject with its predicate when there is a natural connection between them, as when we say that man is a rational animal. On the other hand, when a predicate is negatively attributed to a subject, no definite information is provided about the subject, as in saying that man is not a stone, or that man is not a plant. Further, a true affirmation always posits things that are in the subject, whereas a true negation always removes something from the subject, and even a false negation has a way of removing something from a subject. Moreover, an affirmation precedes its negation, like an antecedent precedes what is subsequent to it. And it is therefore obvious that we can know more about man through affirmation than through negation.

19. To be a man without knowing what man is, amounts to neglecting human existence; and thus, to find out what man is and to know more about him, let us define man with 30 definitions in the broad sense, even though just one definition in the strict sense can be used to define him, namely as the being of his essence, let us nonetheless define man in this way to understand him more clearly. Twenty-eight of these definitions refer to the 18 principles of this art and to the 10 predicates, and the last two refer to what man does; in all of them the predicate is naturally connected to its subject.

20. And now as we ask with the first species of rule C: what is man?

1. We first answer by saying that man is the animal about whom more different species of goodness can be predicated than about any other animal.

2. Man is the animal that has more different species of greatness than any other animal.

3. Man is the animal that has one incorruptible part.

4. Man is the animal in whom there are more powers than in any other animal.

5. Man is the animal who renders intelligible species with his organs.

6. Man is the animal who renders lovable species with his organs.

7. Man is the animal who practices virtues and vices.

8. Man is the animal that truly uses liberal and mechanical arts.

9. Man is the animal in whom there are more different kinds of enjoyment than in any other animal.

10. Man is the animal in whom there are more differences than in any other animal.

11. Man is the animal in whom there are more concordant things than in any other.

12. Man is the animal in whom there are more oppositions than in any other.

13. Man is the animal in whom nature uses more principles than in any other.

14. Man is the animal through whom all corporeal things serve God.

15. Man is the animal who is meant for a greater end than any other animal.

16. Man is the animal that belongs to the greatest of all the animal species.

17. Man is the animal in whom there are more equalities than in any other animal.

18. Man is the animal who can demean himself more than any other animal.

19. Man is the substance that is composed of more things than any other.

20. Man is the substance in which there are more different species of quantity than in any other.

21. Man is the substance that subsists on spiritual and corporeal qualities.

22. Man is the substance that subsists on more relations than any other.

23. Man is the substance that subsists on spiritual and corporeal actions.

24. Man is the substance that subsists on spiritual and corporeal passions.

25. Man is the substance that is habituated with either virtue or vice.

26. Man is the substance that maintains an upright posture in walking and sitting.

27. Man is the substance one of whose innate parts is not confined to succession in time.

28. Man is the substance in which the rational soul and the body are located within each other.

29. Man is a man-producing substance.

30. Man is a being that reproduces its species.

21. With the second species of rule C we ask: what does man have coessentially in himself? And we answer that man has substance and accidents, without which he cannot exist. And he also has in himself the correlatives of his principles. And he has in himself the habits he has accidentally acquired.

22. With the third species we ask: what is man in other things? And we say that man is a reproducer of man in woman, and that woman nourishes the seed, moves it and makes it grow with what comes to it from the outside as nourishment. I saw an egg placed under a hen, and there was a hole about the size of a coin in one part of the shell, and in the middle of the inner membrane there was one drop of blood about the size of a grain of millet, and from this drop, slender red lines came out like hair, and they were disposed like a spider's web, and this drop was moving on its own and moving the web as well, just like a spider in the middle of its web. Further, man is habituated in habit, located in locus etc.

23. With the fourth species we ask: what does man have in other things? And we answer that he has science in his habits, shape in his disposition, motion in his body and location in space.

24. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does man originate from? And we answer that he originates from his first parents with regard to the body, but not at all with regard to the soul, for instance, his intellect does not descend from any other intellect, as was already proved above in chapter 9, #5.

25. With the second species of rule D we ask: what does man consist of? And we answer that he consists of his soul and body; his soul consists of its spiritual principles and his body consists of corporeal principles.
 
26. With the third species of rule D we ask: to whom does man belong? And we answer that he belongs to God. And some men belong to other men, like slaves belong to their masters. And a sinful man belongs to the world, the flesh and the devil.

27. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does man exist? And we answer that he exists because he is made of his soul and body, and this conjunction of soul and body necessarily brings him into being.

28. With the second species of rule E we ask: why does man exist? And we answer that it is in order to understand, remember and love God and receive everlasting blissfulness from Him. Man also exists as a medium through whom and with whom all corporeal creatures serve God by serving man. And he also exists in order to reproduce his species.

29. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does man have? And we answer that he has the same quantity as the continuous quantity of his substance.

30. With the second species of rule F we ask: what quantity does man have? And we answer that he has the same quantity as that of his discrete parts. Now let us ask: how good or how evil is man? And we answer that he is as good or evil as his habits are good or evil.

31. With the first species of rule G we ask: what qualities does man have? And we answer that he has his own proper qualities without which he cannot exist, such as visibility, shape and so forth.

32. With the second species of rule G we ask: what qualities does man have? And we say that man is good, great etc.

33. With rule H we ask: when does man exist? And we answer that he exists when God creates a rational soul in a body, whereby the body is brought into the human species. And he exists now, in the present, not in the past or the future. And man can be known by combining this present "now" with rules C, D and K. But we leave this up to subtle and diligent readers, for the sake of brevity.

34. With rule I we ask: where does man exist? And we say that man exists in his humanity, outside of which he has no way of existing. And man also exists in the space where he is located and contained, as signified by rules C, D and K.

35. With the first rule K we ask: how does man exist, and how does he express his likeness outwardly? In answer to the first question we say that he exists in the way that his parts come together to compose him. To the second question we answer that man has ways to express his likeness outwardly by procreating and also by drawing forth letters and figures from his mind with the motion of his hand and pen, and so forth.

36. With the second rule K we ask: what does man exist with? And we say that it is with his first parents. And he exists with his primordial principles, both essential and accidental, without which he cannot exist. And he is just with his justice, and a writer with his hand, and so forth.

37. Further, let us ask: with what is the human intellect - as well as memory and will - universal and particular? We say that it is universal with the soul's universal principles, like spiritual goodness, greatness etc. And it is universal with its universal correlatives designated by the second species of rule C. And it is particular with the particularities of its objects with which it is practical as it successively produces intelligible species one after the other.

Section Five: the Fifth Subject

Chapter 1 - The Imagination Combined with the Principles

1. The imagination is a power with which man imagines peregrine imaginable things in his intrinsic imaginable part, as some likeness or likenesses previously present to the senses, or likenesses similar to these.

2.The imagination is good, as it produces a good effect, because without the imagination, there would be no science of past things, nor would animals know how to return to their watering hole, and so forth.

3. The imagination has greatness with which it magnifies its other principles. And this can be seen in the things we imagine at will.

4. The imagination is durable: now its objects last as long as they are objectified by the imagination. And as spiritual objects last in the rational soul through memory outside imagination, so do sense objects last outside the senses of irrational animals, in their imagination. And here the intellect recognizes that just as the rational soul completes the lower powers, so does the imagination of irrational animals complete their lower powers.

5. The imagination has power over the senses, as the power of imagination descends to the lower powers in order to act with them in itself, just as the root moisture descends to the nourishing moisture in order to subsist on it.

6. The imagination has natural instinct, as we see in irrational animals with their survival skills and their avoidance of harm, for instance, goats instinctively avoid wolves.

7. The imagination has appetite with which it seeks out imagined objects. And here the intellect realizes that the imagination has an instrument for doing its act in attaining objects.

8. The imagination has a virtue with which it attracts species from the senses and places them in its innate imaginable where it characterizes them and makes images of them.

9. Truth is an instrument of the imagination for truly attaining its object, nonetheless truth is sometimes deficient in the imagination that is then like an agent unable to act either because he has no instrument or he has one but does not know how to use it.

10. The imagination causes joy or sadness in the subjects in which it exists.

11. The imagination has difference, with which and through which it acts in diverse manners in its subject, like a mirror receiving diverse images in its innate difference.

12. The imagination concords with the subject in which it exists, as when a mother enjoys imagining her son, or his likeness acquired by her imagination.

13. With contrariety, the imagination contradicts or resists the subject in which it exists, as when a mother hates to imagine the death of her son.

14. The imagination is an efficient principle, it transmits nothing outside of itself, and finds its material in sense objects whose likenesses it derives with its form from sense impressions, namely with its imaginative part which is its form, so that it can finally repose in its object.

15. In man, the imagination is a medium existing between the powers of sense and intellect, and the imagination enables the intellect to acquire likenesses of things that can be senses or imagined. And here the intellect realizes that it first acquires species through the senses, and then from these species it draws other species in an extra sensory way, or without using the senses. In an irrational animal, the imagination is not a medium, but the highest extremity or form that habituates its life and makes it complete; but in the human body, this role is played by the rational soul.

16. The imagination naturally reposes in its own end, which is the imagined object, or else, imagining would not be an act proper to imagination.

17. There is majority in imagination, now its substantial goodness is greater than its accidental goodness, and its intrinsic act is greater than its extrinsic act. It is also greater in imagining a lion than in imagining a goat, and it is greater as it objectifies a great man, or an even greater one, or the greatest man of all.

18. The imagination has equality in its correlatives designated by the second species of rule C. Now if they were not essentially equal, they could not be equal in attaining their object, which is impossible.

19. By reason of minority, the imagination is close to naught and it tends toward this minority by objectifying minor objects.

Chapter 2 - The Imagination Combined with the Rules

20. We ask: is the imagination corporeal in nature? And we answer that it is; now the imagination cannot objectify an object that does have any of the conditions of sense objects, like lines, shapes, points and so on.

21. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is the imagination? We answer that its definition was already given in the previous chapter, at the beginning of this subject, #1. However, as the imagination is a difficult thing for the intellect to grasp, we want do define it with 10 definitions taken in the broad sense so our intellect can know it better, and the definitions refer to the 10 predicates. And now for the first definition:

1. The imagination is a part of animate substance with which this substance is imagined.

2. The imagination is a power with which animals imagine things that have size and quantity.

3. The imagination is a power with which animals imagine the qualities of things, and when quality is joined to quantity, then an animal imagines quantity and quality together, as in a long and green piece of wood.

4. The imagination is a power with which animals attain imaginable objects in their intrinsic imaginable through the correlatives of imagination.

5. The imagination is active with its imaginative part that exists by reason of the form that animals move as they move objects in the intrinsic imaginable of the imaginative.

6. The imagination is passive in its imaginable part, which is like matter, so that objects can be characterized and imagined in this imaginable part.

7. The imagination is a habit of animals with which they render imaginable species.

8. The imagination is a power situated in the upper part of the heads of animals, in a membrane in which images of objects appear to its imaginative, like the images of eyes appearing in a mirror.

9. Imagination is a power that exists in time due to the subject in which it exists, without which it can neither exist nor attain any objects.

10. The imagination is a power that exists in a locus in which it can imagine objects.

We defined the imagination with the 10 predicates, and the other powers of the body can be defined in the same way.

22. With the second species of rule C we ask: what does the imagination have in itself? And we answer that it has its correlatives without which it cannot exist, namely the imaginative, the imaginable and imagining.

23. With the third species of the same rule we ask: what is the imagination in other things? And we say that it is a disposition in man with which the intellect disposes itself to objectify lower objects, and the senses dispose themselves with the imagination to sense things; and the imagination is the form and complement of irrational animals.

24. With the fourth species of rule C we ask: what does the imagination have in other things? And we answer that it has an object in the subject in which it exists, and it has power to discover sense objects by drawing species from them with its light, namely its imaginative part, as it investigates species which it places and clarifies in its own coessential imaginable; like a crystal whose transparency takes on the color of the object on which it is placed, or like a mirror clothed with the species presented to it.

25. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does the imagination originate from? And we answer that it exists on its own, as a specific species.

26. With the second species of rule D we ask: what does the imagination consist of? And we answer that it consists of its matter and form so as to be active and passive with them in the subject in which it exists.

27. With the third species of rule D we ask: to whom does the imagination belong? And we say that it belongs to man and to man's soul. But it belongs to irrational animals like a part belongs to its whole.

28. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does the imagination exist? And we say it is because it consists of its parts, namely the imaginative, the imaginable and imagining.

29. With the second species of rule E we ask: why does the imagination exist? And we say it is to enable animals to objectify objects by imagining them apart from the senses; and the senses, when present, dispose themselves in proportion with the imaginative to sense their objects, as when a carpenter imagines the shape of a chest so as to bring it from potentiality into act; or as when a bird gets ready to fly when it has to.

30. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does the imagination have? And we answer that it has the quantity of its essence extended into its correlatives, and its quantity as a habit of the subject in which it exists, like a coat whose size is the same as that of the man wearing it.

31. With the second species of the same rule we ask: what quantity does the imagination have? And we say that it has the quantity of its distinct correlatives. Here the intellect wonders why the imagination increases or decreases its act, as when a man imagines that a small stone is the size of a mountain. Then the intellect reflects upon itself and considers that in irrational animals, the imagination imagines objects as having the same size and shape as shown by the senses, and not otherwise; for instance, when a goat imagines a wolf, it cannot imagine that it is as big as a mountain, for if a goat could increase its imagining in this way, it could also build science, which is impossible. But since the imagination is subject to the higher power of the intellect, the intellect uses it beyond the senses, as when it compels the imagination to visualize a wolf the size of a mountain.

32. And here the intellect sees how Geometry measures the heights and depths of heaven. And so with Arithmetic, used to enumerate infinite parts with the help of Geometry, by dividing one part into two, and so on into infinite parts. And the intellect also understands how logicians use second intentions in conjunction with first intentions. Further, it realizes that there is something in the intellect that was never present to the senses, for instance, the senses have never witnessed a wolf the size of a mountain. And after realizing all these things, the intellect understands that its essence is another essence totally removed from corporeal essences and their conditions, and it rejoices greatly in this, because it understands that it is immortal and incorruptible.

33. With the first species of rule G we ask: of what is the imagination a property? And what is proper to imagination itself? The answer to the first question is that the imagination is a property of the animal to which it belongs. And in answer to the second question we say that it is proper to the imagination to objectify likenesses of sense objects when the senses are absent from them. Now the intellect wonders: given that the imagination has no senses such as hearing, eyes etc. how can it attain likenesses of sense objects? Then it remembers how a magnet attracts iron by its species, and also how rhubarb attracts choler by its species, and likewise animals, in the absence of the senses, attract species or likenesses by their own species through the imaginative power.

34. With the second species of rule G we ask: what are the appropriated qualities of imagination? And we say they are the likeness drawn from sense objects and brought into the imagination, like the colors of colored objects, the quantities of quantified objects, the sound of a bell, the coldness of water, etc. with which the imagination objectifies its objects by imagining them.

35. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does the imagination exist? And we answer that it exists as long as the animal exists, because an animal cannot be without imagination any more than it can be without senses. But we leave the discourse on the imagination with the species of H up to those who are thoroughly familiar with the method, for the sake of brevity.

36. With rule I we ask: where does the imagination imagine its objects? And we answer that it is in its own essence, namely in its intrinsic and consubstantial imaginable part, apart from which and without which no imaginable thing can be imagined; now just as hot things cannot exist without heat, so an imagined object cannot be imagined anywhere except in the intrinsic imaginable, consubstantial to the imagination, which is a subject universal to whatever can be imagined. We will not deal here with the discourse on imagination through the species of I, but leave it up to those who are thoroughly familiar with these species, for the sake of brevity.

37. With the first rule K we ask: how does the imagination objectify its objects? But at first sight, the intellect has difficulty in answering this, because the process is not accessible to the senses; but then it remembers the four species of rule K with which it intends to solve this question. Now in animals, the sensitive and imaginative powers are parts of the same compound, and have one compound organ in common, each power exists in the other so that the imagination draws likenesses from sense objects through the senses and objectifies its objects with them, like fire mixed with water draws likenesses from water with which it heats flesh, as happens for instance when the imagination imagines the process of sexual intercourse.

38. With the second rule K we ask: with what does the imagination imagine its objects? And we answer that it is with the organ in which it resides, namely a membrane inside the head, as we already mentioned above in #21, the eighth definition. And it attains objects with the complexion of this membrane, which is melancholy, for the back part of the membrane is coagulated by the restrictive quality of cold, like lead that closes the back of a mirror to block the transparency of that part. The front part of the membrane faces the forehead and is porous, by reason of dryness that is the proper quality of earth, so that it draws things out and absorbs them. In the forehead, man discovers species with his intellect whereas irrational animals do so with their instinct, and these species are presented either by the intellect or by the instinct to the front of the membrane; and the intellect as well as instinct present these species to the front of the membrane through their own species, like a magnet attracts iron through its species: and then the membrane, like a mirror, colors, paints and clothes itself with images through its species. And the imagination also attains objects through the disposition of the senses as well as with its own disposition, and with the proportion between both, and with appetite, objectification, and by discovering species, and with the descent of the imagination to sense objects, followed by its return as it withdraws from the sense object and ascends back into itself through the senses, and also with the nourishment derived from species, and there are yet more ways in which we can say that the imagination attains its objects. And here the intellect realizes that just as it is very busied with the burden of its objects, so is the imagination also greatly occupied and burdened by its own objects in its own way.

Section Six: the Sixth Subject

Chapter 1 - The Sensitive Faculty Combined with the Principles

1. The sensitive faculty is a power with which animals sense things and with which they are sensed; in animals, this power comprises a common sense and particular senses.

2.The sensitive is a good faculty because with its goodness it causes a good act of sensing, and when greatness is added, it causes good and great sensing.

3. The sensitive faculty is great because it causes a great act of sensing, as perceived in sex, or in touching hot iron or boiling water.

4. The sensitive faculty lasts through duration in the subject in which it exists with innate goodness, greatness etc.

5. With its power, the sensitive faculty can exist and act. And here the intellect realizes that an animal senses things through its species just like a magnet attracts iron through its species.

6. The sensitive faculty has an innate instinct, for instance, humans are instinctively frightened by the sight of snakes, just as goats are afraid of wolves; and a kitten with its eyes not yet open uses touch instinctively to seek out its mother's nipples, which it imagines with appetite. And here the intellect knows what principles dispose the imagination to imagine objects.

7. The sensitive faculty causes appetite in animals for sensing things so it can exercise its acts through the animals in which it exists.

8. The sensitive faculty has a virtue for sensing things, as seen in its particular senses; now as the sense of sight cannot see anything without light and space, so it cannot see if it is not habituated and situated in its innate virtue.

9. The sensitive faculty truly senses things by reason of truth, just as a hand holding a hot iron truly feels heat. And here the intellect realizes that it truly understands its object, for otherwise, the sensitive faculty, which is below the intellect, would have a superior act while the intellect, a faculty higher than the sensitive faculty, would have an inferior act, and this is impossible. And this impossibility is a source of great joy to the intellect.

10. With the sensitive faculty, animals enjoy sensing things, as is apparent when one sees a beautiful shape, or hears a beautiful song, and so forth.

11. Through difference, the sensitive faculty has particular senses, by reason of the organs whereby sense objects are differentiated; for instance, color is an object of sight, sound is an object of hearing and so forth. Now the intellect wonders whether objects are judged by the common sense, or by particular senses. Then it remembers that the water of a fountain is essentially one in itself and in the numerous streams into which it divides, where it has one situation and shape in one stream, another in another stream; likewise, the common sense has one situation and shape in one organ, and another in another organ.

12. The sensitive faculty has innate concordance whereby the power, the object and the act accord in one entity, namely the sensitive faculty which is their essence, as shown by its correlatives designated by the second species of rule C. And here the intellect sees how the senses sense things with the peregrine habits with which the senses are habituated, as colored objects are perceived by seeing and odorous objects are perceived by smelling.

13. In the sensitive faculty there is accidental contrariety, like bitterness to the taste or roughness to the touch and so on. Now the intellect wonders: what is the cause of contrariety in the senses? Then it remembers that the sensitive faculty is a composite of the four elements which cause contrary qualities, habits, situations, actions and passions in elemented things; and each and every plant and animal acts according to its own species, like an apple with its sweetness or absinthe with its bitterness. The intellect also considers the fact that ailments of the senses cause monstrosities, as when sweet food accidentally tastes bitter to a sick man.

14. Situated as a principle, the sensitive faculty is an efficient cause that causes things like taste in food and enjoyment in sex. This sensitive faculty is a form in animals that moves matter and disposes it to receive passions, so that an end may follow, namely the sense object that can be colored, odorous, etc. And animals are made sentient by the sensitive faculty just as colored things are colored by color and things are made odorous by their odour.

15. The common sense is central whereas the particular senses are peripheral, in the same way as the circumference is peripheral to its center, and a situation is peripheral to what is situated in it, and a habit is peripheral to what it habituates. And here the intellect realizes that the common sense is a cause of sense objects inasmuch as they are sensed, as the common sense uses its particular senses as instruments: for instance, an apple is sensed by the common sense using taste, smell, sight, touch and the affatus that calls it an apple, and the hearing that hears the word "apple". And the sensitive faculty exists between the imaginative and the vegetative, like a line between two points. The imaginative faculty is grafted on and founded in the sensitive power, as is the sensitive in the vegetative, so that the imaginative can imagine the conditions of the vegetative by means of the sensitive faculty. And this is shown by the definition of the medium, and its ladder included in the second figure.

16. The sensitive power has an innate end toward which it moves, as it moves toward sense objects with its instinct, appetite and its other innate principles like a man using his sight and his feet to move to his destination. And here the intellect realizes that the sensitive faculty acts with its innate principles.

17. Some sensitive faculties are greater than others, but this is accidental: now just as the water of one fountain has greater qualities of coldness, taste and purity than that of another fountain because of the greater quality of the site where it is disposed, due to the species of the subject in which it exists, so for instance, an eagle has a greater sense of sight than other animals, vultures have a greater sense of smell, dogs have a greater sense of hearing, and humans have greater senses of taste and touch than other animals.

18. In the sensitive faculty there is equality of the power with the object and the act, which is the intrinsic equality of its correlatives, namely the sensitive, the sensible and sensing. But there is no such equality between an object and the peregrine act, as between the taste sensed in an apple and the sensation of taste caused by the act of tasting it.

19. Some sensitive faculties are lesser than others due to the subjects in which they exist. For instance, the sense of taste in non predatory birds is not as developed as in predatory birds. And the same can be said about other senses in their own way, as was mentioned in the chapter on majority.

Chapter 2 - The Sensitive Faculty Combined with the Rules

20. We ask: is the sensitive faculty generated, or created? . And the answer is that it is generated; now without the sensitive faculty, an animal cannot sense the conditions of the body, and the sensitive faculty would then sense them in the imagination and not in itself, because it would not be naturally grafted on its foundation in the vegetative power. Moreover, Martin would not be the son of John in accordance with their species, which is impossible. Now the intellect wonders: when a man dies, where does the sensitive faculty go and reside? And we say that it goes back to its universal principles, where it remains and stands, miraculously, in its own identity so that the resurrection of humans can take place and so that God's justice and mercy can have a subject upon which to act.

21. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is the sensitive faculty? The answer to this was already given above, in chapter 1, #1.

22. With the second species of the same rule we ask: what does the sensitive faculty have coessentially in itself? And we answer that it has its correlatives that constitute the common sense.

23. With the third species of the same rule we ask: what is the sensitive faculty in other things? And we say that it is a being that causes other things to be sensed and things with which it senses other things, like sight that causes colored objects to be sensed inasmuch as it senses them;, and smell causes things to be smelled, inasmuch as it smells them.

24. With the fourth species of the same rule we ask: what does the sensitive faculty have in other things? And we say that it has its objects, for instance, sight has objects with color and shape, and the sense of smell has odorous things. And it also has knowledge of its objects so it can make judgments about them.

25. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does the sensitive faculty originate from? And we answer that it originates in its own principles, namely the first parents from whom it is derived and who engendered it. Otherwise, one animal would not be another animal's offspring, which is impossible.

26. With the second species of rule D we ask: what is the sensitive faculty made of? And we answer that it is made of its own form and matter, so that it is active with its form and passive with its matter.

27. With the third species of rule D we ask: to whom does the sensitive faculty belong? And we answer that it belongs to the animal in which it exists, like an instrument belongs to the agent using it, because animals use it to sense things, to survive and to generate other animals.

28. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does the sensitive faculty exist? And we answer that it exists because it is constituted of the conjunction of its form and matter.

29. With the second species of rule E we ask: why does the sensitive faculty exist? And we answer that it exists so that its instinct and appetite can have natural acts, so that animals can have the skill to survive.Further, it exists so that the imaginative faculty can draw species from it, and exercise its act by imagining sense objects.

30. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does the sensitive faculty have? And the answer is that it has the quantity of the objects it senses. Now the intellect wonders, how can it be continuously present in the subject in which it exists and in subjects that have hair, nails and bones that do not sense anything? Then it remembers its discrete quantity signified by the second species of rule F. Further, the intellect wonders: since the sensitive faculty has no points, lines or shape, how can it have quantity? Then it remembers that a crystal placed on a colored object takes on its color; likewise, the sensitive faculty takes on, as a habit, the quantity of the subject in which it exists. Now punctual and linear quantities reproduce their species in the sensitive faculty just like a colored object placed under a crystal reproduces its color in the crystal. And here the intellect sees how one habit is placed over another.

31. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is proper to the sensitive faculty? And we answer that it is the act of sensing, with which it senses things on its own, and with its own organs, namely ears, eyes etc. with which it senses things, and these organs are its instruments.

32. With the second species of rule G we ask: what are the appropriated qualities of the sensitive faculty? And we answer that the appropriated qualities of the sensitive faculty are the sense objects inasmuch as they are acquired externally and introduced into the sensitive faculty; for instance, as a colored stone is sensed by the sense of sight, an apple that is smelled is sensed by the sense of smell, and so forth. And here the intellect realizes that the sensitive faculty reproduces its species, just as the imaginative faculty does.

33. With rule H we ask: how does the sensitive faculty exist in time and motion, given that it has no points or lines? And we answer that it exists in time and motion because of the subject in which it resides. And this is proved by rules B, C, D and K, as the diligent reader can see. And this clarification is sufficient, for the sake of brevity.

34. With rule I we ask: where does the sensitive faculty reside? And we answer that it is in its intrinsic sensible part, which is of the essence of the sensitive faculty, for without this sensible part, no object can be sensed. But here the intellect wonders: how can a stone, and other such objects be sensed, given that they are not located in the essence of the sensitive power, or have any senses, nor do they have any direct contact with the eyes; because if this were so, the sense of sight would attain substance and the sense of hearing would attain the bell itself, and so irrational animals could perceive substance and build science, which is impossible. But it remembers how a rose spreads its fragrance through the air that is in touch with the rose, and likewise, the sight reproduces its species in the air that is in touch with the sight and the colored objects it senses. And this is enough about rule I, for the sake of brevity.

35. With the first rule K we ask: how does the sensitive faculty sense things? At first, the intellect has difficulty in answering this question, because this process cannot be sensed, and the intellect wants to clarify it by using the senses. But it descends to the imagination, that can imagine this process, and to the memory whereby rule K can be remembered, and then the intellect answers this question by saying that the sensitive faculty has a process for sensing things by mixing together its instinct, appetite, virtue and other principles whereby it draws and collects from objects the likenesses with which it objectifies them; for instance, the sight draws and collects likenesses from colored objects, and in these likenesses the sight introduces its own likeness, and with these likenesses it senses and sees colored objects.

36. With the second rule K we ask: with what does the sensitive faculty sense things? And we answer that it is with its species, like a magnet that attracts iron with its species. And it also senses things with its natural instruments, such as sight, hearing etc. And it senses things with acquired species whereby it senses peregrine objects, and also with its instinct, appetite, virtue and ability to move its organs to sense things.

Section Seven: the Seventh Subject

Chapter 1 - The Vegetative Power Combined with the Principles

1. The vegetative is good, as appears in plants that are good as such, and in the animals that live on them and cannot survive or be what they are without them.

2. The vegetative is great, for it enfolds and encompasses all vegetation and all the things rooted in the vegetative power. Now the intellect asks: is the vegetative power in animals and plants one and the same power? And the answer is that it is one and the same general power but there are many different species in diverse subjects by reason of these species, but not by reason of the vegetative per se. So if someone were to say that the vegetative power is plural per se, would be saying in other words that unity is plurality, and plurality is unity, which is impossible. Thus it is obvious that it is one and the same genus, but diversified into different species in various subjects.

3. The vegetative lasts through is own specific duration But the intellect wonders: why makes it last, given that the subjects in which it exists are corruptible? Then it remembers the elementative that makes it last, like the oil in a lamp makes the flame last.

4. The vegetative is powerful with its own specific power, in which all the vegetal powers of plants and animals are planted and rooted.

5. The vegetative has instinct, whereby each and every vegetated thing is committed to its own work of specification as it habituates matter with its own specific habits, situation, quantity, quality and so forth.

6. The vegetative has appetite to turn elemented things into vegetated ones. For instance, the sense of sight has an appetite to make colored things sensed by itself. And this appetite is general to all the appetites that belong to the vegetative genus.

7. With virtue, the vegetative is habituated, quantified, qualified etc. as is seen in plants. Now whatever comes to a plant from the earth, water, air and fire in which it is planted, is transmuted by it into its own species, and it does this by taking solid and liquid nourishment. And the vegetative also has virtue in plants, as physicians know by experience.

8. By reason of truth, the vegetative truly vegetates and truly has its conditions, such as true substance, quantity, quality etc. without which it would not be rooted in its own truth.

9. The vegetative enjoys preserving its existence and reproducing its species, as we see in plants that procreate as much as they can to avoid non being.

10. The vegetative is planted and rooted in difference, so that there are many species belonging to its genus. But the intellect wonders: why is green a color more general than any other color in plants? Then it remembers that earth and water compose the color green, and that the vegetative is planted, rooted and nourished chiefly in these elements. And the intellect also wonders why figs do not generate a hard shell like nuts do? And why are roses red and lilies white? Then it remembers greatness, by reason of which difference is great.

11. The vegetative has concordance so that its species have things in which they convene, like garlic and pepper that convene in heat, lettuce and squash in coldness etc. and many things convene in color, situation, and so forth. And the same can be said in its own way about the vegetative in animals. Now the vegetative always proceeds by vegetating the dominant complexion of the subject in which it exists.

12. Contrariety is a subject in which the vegetative is planted so that contrariety can cause corruption just as concordance causes generation. But the intellect asks: why does realgar kill animals whereas wheat keeps them alive, and why do garlic and squash have opposite qualities? Then it remembers the greatness in which the vegetative's contrariety is planted.

13. The vegetative is a principle with which vegetating compounds transmute one species into another. And vegetative form is a principle whereby composites transmute old forms into new ones and old matter into new matter, which is done in order to produce vegetated beings in which its species are engendered and reproduced.

14. The vegetative is a general medium that exists between the elementative and the sensitive faculty, like a line between two points. The vegetative is grafted on, and planted in the elementative, and the sensitive faculty, in turn, is grafted on the vegetative. And as the sensitive power is the end, it stands above the vegetative and influences it while the vegetative reciprocates by sending its own influence with its own specific principles back to the sensitive. And because the vegetative stands above the elementative, it influences it and the elementative reciprocates by influencing the vegetative. And here the intellect knows the process whereby plants and animals survive, feed and grow with the vegetative and on the vegetative, with the elementative and on the elementative. And this point is useful to physicians. The intellect also realizes that a tree is a medium, or subject, or instrument with which and in which the vegetative has its acts and its principles, likewise, have their acts; as when water enters into a vase through one hole and leaves it through another hole, and this proceeds through generation, corruption and privation.

15. In the vegetative, the end has its species shown in the second figure, in the angle of the end. The end of privation in the vegetative is a cause of corruption; now the sensitive and elementative powers are the termini of the vegetative in which the vegetative is terminated. And the end of perfection is the subject and object of the vegetative.

16. The vegetative in plants makes some plants bigger than others, and likewise in animals, the vegetative makes some animals bigger than others; for instance, a lion can be bigger than other lions, than a goat, a hare and so on. And this is so that the vegetative can be planted in majority, with reference to the majority of the ten predicates and of the principles of this art. But the intellect wonders: how come a big tree can potentially exist in a tiny seed? And it remembers how a spark comes out of a stone when someone strikes it with iron, and that a great flame potentially exists in this spark, depending on the material available to it. Then the intellect wonders: why are some fruits of the same tree bigger than others, as they all belong to the same species, and the same can be asked about leaves. Then it remembers the spark in the previous question, and the solution becomes clear to it right away.

17. There is equality in the vegetative, so that there can be many equal plants and other things, like this lion and that lion who both equally belong to the same species, and pepper and garlic are equal in their degree of heat, and many apples in the same apple tree have equal fragrance, taste and color, and other things are also equal in this way.

18. The same things can be said about minority and the vegetative as were said about majority, because majority and minority are related. Though minority, the vegetative can be reduced to non being, because it exists now but did not exist before it was created.

Chapter 2 - The Vegetative Combined with the Rules

19. With rule B we ask: is the vegetative power accessible to the senses? We answer that it is, in a certain way, because it is joined or composed with the sensitive faculty in the subjects in which it exists. And it is accessible in another way through the voice, as when the affatus calls it by its name and the hearing hears this name. But the other senses cannot sense it at all. And here the intellect realizes that the affatus is a sense that delivers an audible signal to the ear after having sensed an object.

20. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is the vegetative? And we answer that it is a power that transmutes one species into another, as we see in animals in which it transmutes food into flesh, and in plants in which it transmutes the elementative into itself.

21. With the second species of rule C we ask: what does the vegetative have in itself essentially and consubstantially? And we answer that it has its constitutive correlatives with which it does its work, which are its vegetative, vegetable and vegetating: now the vegetative vegetates all peregrine vegetable objects in its innate vegetable part, like the sensitive faculty senses all peregrine sensible objects in its innate sensible part, and like the heater heats all peregrine heatable objects in its innate heatable part.

22. With the third species of rule C we ask: what is the vegetative in other things? And we answer that it is a foundation of the sensitive faculty, and it is founded in the elementative. And with reference to the predicates, it is identified with the subject in which it exists so that it is a substantial part of the substance in which it exists, as the vegetative's quantity stands upon the quantity of the elementative, and the same can be said about its quality, relation etc. And here the intellect realizes that the vegetative power stands above the elementative. But the intellect wonders whether its relation is accidental until it remembers that its substantial relation has accidental relation as an instrument and habit with which it acts in the subject in which it exists, like substance acting with its accidents.

23. With the fourth species we ask: what does the vegetative have in other things? And we answer that it has its substance in the substance of the elementative, and its quantity in the quantity of the elementative, and so on with the other predicates. And here the intellect sees how the vegetative is situated and located in the elementative.

24. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does the vegetative originate from? And we say that its origin is in its own specific principles, with which it acts.

25. With the second species we ask: what is the vegetative made of? And we say that it is made of its correlatives.

26. With the third species we ask: to whom does the vegetative belong? And we answer that it belongs to the subject in which it exists, like a part belongs to its whole, or an instrument to an agent; now the vegetative is a part of animals with which they act and live; and likewise, plants live through the vegetative and with the vegetative.

27. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does the vegetative exist? And we answer that it is because it is constituted of its consubstantial parts, namely its correlatives.

28. With the second species of rule E we ask: why does the vegetative exist? And we answer that it exists so that vegetated things can exist and so that it can live, feed, grow and transmute one species into another through generation.

29. With the first species of rule F we ask: does the vegetative have continuous quantity in a subject in which it exists? And we answer that it does, so that it can be in continuous motion.

30. With the second species of rule F we ask: does the vegetative have discrete quantity? And we say that it does, so that it can be in successive motion. But the intellect wonders: how can it have both continuous and discrete quantity in one and the same subject? Until it remembers that it has continuous quantity in its essence, and discrete quantity in its correlatives.

31. With the first species of rule G we ask: what property is proper to the vegetative? And we answer that its proper quality is the general quality from which all particular qualities descend; for instance, the hot qualities of pepper and garlic descend from the general quality of heat, and the coldness of lettuce and squash descends from the general quality of cold, etc. And the properties proper to the vegetative are derived from the general elemental quality so that the quantity of the vegetative is derived from the quantity of the elementative. And we say that the general property or quality of the vegetative is that of transmuting one species into another.

32. With the second species of rule G we ask: what is the appropriated quality of the vegetative? And we answer that it is the transmutation of species which proceeds as the elementative appropriates its quantity, quality etc. to the vegetative; and vegetation, as it is effected by the motion of heaven, is also an appropriated quality.

33. With rule H we ask: in what way does the vegetative exist in time? But the intellect has difficulty in answering this, until it remembers that the vegetative receives influence from the elementative whereby it exists in time and motion as well as in quantity, quality etc. And this is because the elementative essence is punctual and linear, which is not at all the case with the vegetative. And this is signified by rules C, D and K to the diligent reader.

34. With rule I we ask: where does the vegetative vegetate vegetated things? And the answer is that it does this in its own intrinsic and consubstantial vegetable part, apart from which and without which it cannot vegetate, just as the heater without its intrinsic heatable part cannot heat anything. The vegetative's locus can be known with rules C, D and K. Now the vegetative attains substance because it participates with substance through its contact with it.

35. With the first rule K we ask: how does the vegetative vegetate vegetated things? And we say that it vegetated them with the process of its correlatives: now the vegetative places in its intrinsic vegetables part the form and matter it gets from the elementative; and in this vegetable part it turns one substance into another as the vegetative strips the elementative form and matter it acquires externally and clothes a new vegetated being with them. And many other processes concur with this one, such as the process of proportion, the process of generation, corruption, privation, growth and so on, as it places one part in another and the parts in the whole and conversely as the whole transmits its likeness to the things it assimilates.

36. With the second rule K we ask: with what does the vegetative vegetate vegetated things? And we answer that it vegetates them with its own correlatives, namely its coessential vegetative, vegetable and vegetating parts ; now the vegetative, in its intrinsic vegetable part, vegetates all peregrine vegetated things through the act of vegetating. And it also vegetates with the principles of this art, namely goodness, greatness etc. The things said here about the vegetative are sufficient, although many more things can be said about it, whatever can be said about it is implicitly contained in what we just said.

Section Eight: the Eighth Subject

Chapter 1 - The Elementative Power Combined with the Principles

1. The elementative is a power with which the elements enter into composition and it exists as a substrate of elemented things. The elementative power is good because without it, corporeal things would be idle and deviated from the end for which they are meant, and the world would be incomplete. And inasmuch as it is good, it is a reason for good to good.

2.The elementative is a great power, encompassing many things within its greatness. And its greatness greatly magnifies its duration, goodness etc.

3. The elementative lasts as long as the corruption of one element is promptly and without delay followed by the generation of another element, so that no species are absent, nor any of their conditions, because no element is corruptible in its essence.

4. The elementative is a powerful species, for it is what it is and does what it does. And it has no shortage of this power in any way, now the elementative can element elemented things just like the vegetative can vegetate vegetated things, the sensitive faculty can perceive sense objects, and the imaginative faculty can imagine imaginary things.

5. The elementative has a general instinct from which the instincts of species descend, followed by the instincts of individual elemented things. And we know this by our experience of the four seasons of the year, namely spring, summer, autumn and winter when the elementative works in different ways; as well as in the four directions, namely in the East, the West, the South and the North. And the same can be said abut the plant and animal life. And it has an instinct for receiving virtue from the motion of heaven. Now the intellect knows why each element acts in accordance with its species.

6. The elementative has an appetite for elementing elemented things so that the appetites of the elements enter into mixture and composition, where some elements have an appetite for ascending, and others have an appetite for descending, and thus the elementative is a substrate of elemented things. Here the intellect sees what causes the elements to move through generation, corruption and privation.

7. The elementative has a general virtue from which the special virtues of the elements descend, and these virtues are the foundation of the virtues that exist in vegetated and sentient beings. However, sometimes its virtue is deficient because of oppositions between elements.

8. The elementative has true conditions whereby one species does not transmute itself into another species. And here we know why alchemists have reason to weep.

9. The elementative naturally enjoys elementing things, as the vegetative enjoys vegetating and the sensitive enjoys sensing. And because of this, the elementative expands and reproduces its acts as much as it can, to provide great enjoyment to the elements. And here the intellect sees what causes intense heat, taste, color and things like this.

10. With its difference, the elementative has different subjects in which it is diffused, as in the four masses that are accessible to the senses, like this flame, this air, this water, this earth that we use. And the elementative is also found in metals, plants and animals: not in any way accessible to the senses, but only to the imagination and the intellect. And here the intellect knows what causes the deception in the statements of some philosophers who say that the elements do not exist in elemented things actually, but only potentially and virtually.

11. By reason of its concordance, end, goodness, greatness, power, instinct, appetite and virtue, the elementative exists in the four masses and in elemented things in a less intense and more dispersed state, to allow for temperament among contrary qualities where water, with its coldness, mortifies fire, and fire mortifies water with its heat, air mortifies earth with its moisture, and earth mortifies air with its dryness, so that the elementative can generate elements by elementing, just like the digestive digests what is digested and a blacksmith softens iron with heat to make a nail. And here the intellect knows that concordance is a general cause of elemented things.

12. The elementative is habituated and situated in contrary qualities, namely heat and cold, moisture and dryness, lightness and heaviness, rarity and density; so that contrariety can cause corruption in elemented things.

13. In the elementative, there are four principles: now the elementing entity is an efficient principle that introduces form into matter to produce elemented things in the end. And the principles of this art, namely goodness, greatness etc. concur in this process, as does the motion of heaven that causes the elementative to move in things below. Moreover, the ten predicates are in the elementative which is diffused in them as well as in the principles and rules of this art. The principles are in the elementative in a more objective way, whereas the rules are in it subjectively, comparatively speaking. And here the intellect realizes that the principles objectify the elementative whereas the rules sustain it.

14. The elementative is a medium between the simple elements and elemented things, just like the particular senses mediate between the common sense and sense objects. And here the intellect recognizes the source of elementative motion as well as that from which it flows back to its source, and the subject through which it runs its course.

15. The end purpose of the elementative is in having and generating the elemented things in which it reposes, and the elementative has no other appetite beyond this; now if it did have an appetite for anything more than its elemented product, its elemented product would not be its own proper goal, so that it would repose more in something that does not come out of its own nature, than in something that does. Thus, a blacksmith would find more satisfaction in the nails he produces than in his own son that he has engendered, and a lion would find greater satisfaction in hunting than in generating offspring, which is impossible. So it is clear that the end purpose of the elementative is in having and generating the elemented things in which it reposes. Now the intellect knows that the elementative reposes in elemented things just like the vegetative reposes in vegetated things, the imaginative in imagined things and the intellect in the things understood by it

16. The elementative is quantitatively more present in some subjects than in others; for instance, in pepper, it is more present with heat than with dryness, and more with dryness than with moisture, and more with moisture than with cold. And here the intellect knows the process whereby the elementative produces subalternate degrees in its subjects; however, the pattern of youth and old age is not the same, for here the elementative is greater in the middle than in the extremes, like the Sun that has a greater and hotter effect at noon than in the morning or in the evening.

17. The elementative is situated in equality: now the elementative has quantitatively equal essences so that there can be proportionality in elemented things and so that this rose and that rose can equally belong to the same species, and likewise with other things in their way: for otherwise, the elements would corrupt each others' essence and nature, or one element would transmute another into its essence, as if a rose could transmute a lily or a violet into its own essence.

18. The elementative is situated in minority, because its principles were brought forth from nothingness by creation. And when the elementative exists in lesser elemented things, its habits and situation are lesser in quantity, quality etc.

Chapter 2 - The Elementative Power Combined with the Rules

19. We ask: is the elementative essentially different from elemented things? And we answer that it is not, because if it were essentially different, the elements would not have a subject in which they could enter into composition, and the elementative would not proceed from generation but from creation; and the qualities of the elements would change into new subjects; for instance, the heat of fire in a stone would not belong to the same subjective species as the heat of fire in the sphere of fire, which is impossible. Further, just as the quality of humanity is no different from the soul and the body inasmuch as they are joined, because humanity consists of both of these things in conjunction and not of either one by itself; likewise, the elementative is no different from the conjoined elements that make it up.

20. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is the elementative? And we answer that its definition was already given above, in #1 of the previous chapter.

21. With the second species of rule C we ask: what does the elementative have in itself, essentially and consubstantially? And we say that it has its correlatives of which it is made and with which it acts in elemented things, as in stones, flames, plants and animals.

22. With the third species of rule C we ask: what is the elementative in other things? And we say that it is an instrument that enables the elements to act in elemented things. And in the ten predicates, it is what it is. And it is the foundation of the vegetative. Further, the elementative potentiality of fire is an image of God's infinity and eternity, for if fire had an infinite amount of fuel, it could burn infinitely and eternally, but as it does not have it, this potentiality remains as a mere disposition, and finite because it does not have an infinite amount of matter.

23. With the fourth species we ask: what does the elementative have in other things? And we say that in the subjects in which it exists, it has its matter, its form, its quantity, quality, motion and so forth as in plants and animals.

24. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does the elementative originate from? And we say that it originates in its primordial principles placed in the elements, and the elements are made of these universal principles and of universal form and universal matter.

25. With the second species of rule D we ask: what is the elementative made of? And we say that it is made of its own specific form and matter with which it can act according to its own species by elementing elemented things.

26. With the third species of rule D we ask: to whom does the elementative belong? And we say that it belongs to the subjects in which it exists, like a part to its whole, as we see when a plant elements another plant when it generates it.

27. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does the elementative exist? And we answer that it is because it is made of the composition of elements in elemented things, and also because through its mediation elements enter into composition in elemented things.

28. With the second species of rule E we ask: why does the elementative exist? And we say that it is so that through it, elemented things can exist, and so that the vegetative, the sensitive and the imaginative can be founded upon it and nourished by it.

29. With the first species of rule F we ask: does the elementative have continuous quantity? And we answer that it has, so that its continuous quantity can be general to the individual quantities that are delineated and sustained in it.

30. With the second species of rule F we ask: does the elementative have discrete quantities? And we answer that it has, as we see in individual elemented things that have numerically different quantities. And its quantity is punctual, because it is made of the conjunction of the four elements.

31. With the first species of rule G we ask: what proper quality does the elementative have? And we answer that it has the quality of its own elements, like choler that is elemented and has the proper quality of heat.

32. With the second species of rule G we ask: what is the appropriated quality of fire? And we say that dryness is its appropriated quality because it receives dryness from earth; and the same can be said about the other qualities except heat, as fire receives them from the other elements.

33. With rule H we ask: how does the elementative exist in time? And we answer that it exists in time in the present in which it exists. And it also exists in time through its current motion as it increases, alters and moves the subject in which it exists from place to place.

34. With rule I we ask: where is the elementative? And we say that it is in elemented things, but in a subjective way, unlike sight that is objectively present in colored objects; because if the elementative were not present in elemented things, either there would be no qualities in them, or the qualities would have no subject, which is impossible, as we see in a flame, that contains heat, or in ice that contains cold and so forth.

35. But the intellect now doubts whether the dryness of earth and the coldness of water are present in the sphere of fire, given that they belong to the lower elements, and that moisture resists and opposes earth's dryness and the heat of fire opposes the coldness of water. And then it remembers that if all the elements were not present in the sphere of fire as well as in every other sphere of every other element, the general mixture of elements would be destroyed, as well as the mixtures particular to elemented things, as the destruction of a universal is followed by the destruction of its particulars.

36. Moreover, fire, which is hot per se in its own sphere, and dry on account of earth, would be dry per se. And air, which is moist per se and warm on account of fire, would be warm per se. And then water, which in its own sphere is cold per se and moist on account of air, would be cold per se. And likewise earth, which is dry per se in its own sphere and cold on account of water, would be cold per se. And thus, each element would have two general qualities, namely two warm, two moist, two cold, and two dry qualities, yielding eight elements in accordance with these supposed qualities, namely two igenities, two aereities, two aqueities and two terreities, which is an absurd thing to say, just as it would be absurd to state that there are two general whitenesses, two general vegetative essences and two general sensitive essences.

37. Further, natural appetite would be destroyed as it would be deprived of an object, now one fire would not seek out another fire, nor would fire have an appetite for earth given that it would be dry per se, and the same can be said about the other elements in their own way. And appropriated quality would be destroyed, along with the second species of rule G as it signifies this quality. And motion that seeks to ascend would be destroyed as well as motion that seeks to descend, entailing the destruction of nature as nature would have no subject to sustain it. And the elementative itself would be destroyed, as well as all elemented, vegetated and sentient beings. And the entire sublunar body would be totally deprived of its end purpose, so that the intent of nature would be a privative natural habit like blindness is to the sight, or deafness to the hearing. And since all these things are utterly impossible, so rule B and the definition of truth show that all the elements are mixed in their spheres and masses, and likewise in all elemented things where they are in a greater degree of mixture and composition, as in plants, where they are composed with the vegetative, and in animals with the sensitive and imaginative, through the intermediary of the elementative composed with them.

38. But now the intellect wonders: through what process can earth, which is down here, ascend to the sphere of fire above, given that there is air in between, and air opposes earth? And likewise, how can fire descend down here given that water stands in the way and opposes it? Then it remembers the ladder of concordance depicted in the second figure: now fire descends through its affinity with air as it gives its heat to air, and air descends through its affinity with water as it gives its moisture to water, so that fire descends to water through heated moisture, and water descends to earth as it gives it its moistened and heated coldness, and earth ascends to fire as it gives it its cooled, moistened and heated dryness. And as the qualities never leave their own subjects in the process of ascent and descent, the elements ascend and descend with them, giving rise to circular motion and mixture.

39. With the first rule K we ask: how is the elementative made of the mixture and composition of the four elements? But the intellect recalls what was just said in the previous paragraph, where the solution to this question is implicitly signified. And this is sufficient, for the sake of brevity.

40. With the second rule K we ask: with what does the elementative element elemented things? And we answer that it is with the appetite and instinct of its constitutive principles, following the way it moves in accordance with the natural definitions of the principles and rules through which it runs its course. And the elementative also elements elemented things by imprinting itself in the ten predicates as its motion is impelled along by the general motion of heaven. But this matter would take a lengthy clarification, and this clarification is accessible enough to those who know this art.

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