The Vices
Chapter 19 - Avarice Combined with the Principles
159. With its malice, avarice impedes goodness from being a reason for good to do good with good things.With its greatness, avarice magnifies malice, duration and power with its act.
As long as avarice lasts, so does its insatiable act, and for this reason the avaricious man believes he is finding repose in amassing wealth, but he cannot find any repose.
The power of avarice is a habit that deprives generosity of power, just like deafness deprives the power of hearing, and this is why the avaricious man has no repose in his power.
Just as faith elevates the intellect to believe in truth above and beyond its capacity, so does avarice elevate the intellect to believe in falsehood above and beyond its capacity, and so the avaricious man believes that he is generous.
Just as charity exalts the will so it can love above and beyond its capacity, so does avarice elevate it so that it loves future possessions and finds no repose in what it already has.
The more possessions an avaricious man has, the more virtuous he believes he is.
An avaricious man believes that truth is falsehood and vice versa, just like an infidel; now avarice convenes with falsehood whereas generosity convenes with truth.
An avaricious man takes no pleasure in what he has, and even claims that he is needy; nor is he pleased with the things he hopes for, because he does not have them yet.
160. An avaricious man makes no distinction between avarice and generosity, because he believes that avarice is indeed generosity.
An avaricious man cannot reach any agreement with any virtuous man, because avarice contradicts all of the virtues.
The richer an avaricious man becomes, the more he contradicts his fellow man, because he is opposed to the final purpose of his goods.
An avaricious man perverts positive principles into privative ones, so that the more he believes he is satisfied, the more he struggles; he is like a man who believes he can see better with blinded eyes than with normal ones.
The avaricious man connects and measures all things with his avarice.
The avaricious man finds repose in privation, he is like a hungry man who enjoys suffering hunger.
With major wealth, the avaricious man is that much more avaricious. And thus, it is obvious that the more he has, the more he wants to acquire.
The avaricious man does not equalize things fairly, because avarice stands in the extremes.
Minor avarice is accompanied with minor signs, and major avarice with major signs.
Chapter 20 - Avarice Combined with the Rules
161. Is avarice subjectively a very general sin? And we reply that it is, because it craves for many different objects.162. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is avarice? And we reply that avarice is the sin that deviates good things from their intended purpose.
With the second species of rule C we ask: what does avarice have in itself coessentially? And we answer that it has privative correlatives, just as generosity has positive ones.
With the third species of rule C we ask: what is avarice in other things? And we say that in an avaricious man it is a privative habit, with which he brings poverty, sadness and toil upon himself, just like a man wearing a heavy, oversized coat burdens himself with tediousness and toil.
With the fourth species of rule C we ask: what does avarice have in other things? And we reply that in an avaricious man it has hard and perverted dealings; now an avaricious man habituated with a privative habit finds no rest either in his own wealth or in that of others, rather, he finds only toil and anxiety.
163. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does avarice arise from? And we reply that it exists on its own; now it has no nature, nor is it a creature because it is a sin and not a virtue.
With the second species of rule D we ask: what is avarice made of? And we answer that it is made of a moral defect in man, like the natural defect of deafness, now just as deafness is a privative habit opposed to the positive habit of hearing, so is avarice opposed to the positive habit of generosity. And here the intellect sees what sin is made of.
With the third species of rule D we ask: to whom does avarice belong? And we reply that it belongs to the avaricious man, just like a coat belongs to the one wearing it.
164. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there avarice? And we answer that avarice exists because a man does not want to be generous, like a man's nudity exists because he refuses to wear clothes.
With the second species of rule E we ask: why is there avarice? And we answer that it exists to prevent men from being generous or satisfied with their possessions.
165. With the first species of rule F we ask about the continuous quantity of avarice. And we say that it has continuous quantity as it is a continuous habit of the avaricious man, a habit he wears like a coat.
166. With the second species of rule F we ask about the discrete quantity of avarice. We say that it has discrete quantity so it can increase or decrease its acts at will.
167. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the proper quality of avarice? We say that it is its insatiability. And here the intellect realizes that the more an avaricious man has, the more he wants to have.
With the second species of rule G we ask: what are the appropriated qualities of avarice? And we answer that they are poverty, sadness, toil, and things like these.
168. With rule H we ask about avarice and time. And we answer that the avaricious man is habituated with avarice in time, as he has remorse about the past, because he thinks he could have acquired more, and he is in toil at the present time with his current possessions, and he is sorry that he cannot use his future possessions. And this is signified by rules C, D and K.
169. With rule I we ask: where is avarice? And we answer that it is in its privative habits that signify and represent it, namely in malice, envy, falseness, inconstancy and things like these. And rules C, D and K signify this.
170. With the first rule K we ask: how does avarice exist? And we answer that it exists in the mode of unwillingness, because the will is unwilling to be generous.
171. With the second rule K we ask: with what does avarice exist? And we answer that it is with the lower faculties opposing the higher ones, namely with the imaginative and sensitive against the power to understand, love and remember as the latter also disfigure themselves with their greed for things that can be sensed and imagined.
Chapter 21 - Gluttony Combined with the Principles
172. The gluttonous man harms himself by eating and drinking too much, but thinks he is benefiting himself.With greatness, the gluttonous man magnifies the harm he does.
A gluttonous man's troubles last far longer than his enjoyment.
The power of gluttony cannot help the gluttonous man to resist gluttony.
Gluttony is a sin that disposes the intellect to believe it is not a sin.
Gluttony is a vice that disposes the will to desire excessive food and drink.
Gluttony is a sin that simply opposes all the virtues.
Gluttony is a deceitful vice, with which man deceives himself until it leads to his illness and death.
Gluttony gives enjoyment to the sense of taste but trouble and pain to the sense of touch.
173. The gluttonous man confuses and darkens all his higher and lower faculties.
The gluttonous man conjoins excessive eating with excessive drinking.
Gluttony contradicts good manners, health and wealth.
Gluttony brings joy in the beginning but sadness in the end.
A gluttonous man measures neither his food nor his drink.
The gluttonous man finds no repose in gluttony.
Excessive eating and drinking are the gluttonous man's major delights and characteristics.
The gluttonous man does not measure things fairly: he does not equalize his digestive and retentive powers with his appetite.
A less gluttonous man is closer to health, and a more gluttonous one is closer to illness.
Chapter 22 - Gluttony Combined with the Rules
174. Does the habit of gluttony belong to the will more than to the intellect? And we answer that it does; now the glutton's will makes him crave for food and drink, but he distinguishes between more and less with his intellect. Hence it follows that the intellect prepares the way for gluttony through ignorance and the will does so through appetite.175. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is gluttony? And we answer that gluttony is the sin whereby the glutton eats and drinks too much.
With the second species of rule C we ask: what does gluttony have in itself coessentially? And we say it has its privative correlatives in opposition to the positive correlatives of temperance, like an abnormal man whose correlatives are opposed to natural correlatives.
With the third species of rule C we ask: what is gluttony in other things? And we answer that it is ill mannered at the table, laughable in man, deceitful in society; and in man it is laziness, disease and pain, prodigality in spending, and a sin in his guilty soul.
With the fourth species of rule C we ask: what does gluttony have in other things? And we answer that it has domination in the subject in whom it exists, now just as man prepares himself with obedience to be patient or to suffer, so does he prepare himself with gluttony to be enslaved.
176. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does gluttony originate from? And we answer that it does not arise from any source, as it is a sin, and sin is nothing, and nothing does not come from anything; thus it is obvious that gluttony does not originate in anything.
With the second species of rule D we ask: what does gluttony consist of? We say it consists of a moral defect in man, like deafness consists of a defect in natural movement.
With the third species of rule D we ask: to whom does gluttony belong? And we answer that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists, like a coat to the one wearing it.
177. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there gluttony? And we answer that it exists because it is a habit acquired by the gluttonous man, like a coat worn by him.
With the second species of rule E we ask: why is there gluttony? We say it exists so that it can make a man into a laughing stock, lazy, poor and sick, and sometimes even kill him and place him in hell.
178. With the first species of rule F we ask: what continuous quantity does gluttony have? And we say it has great continuous quantity inasmuch as it is indivisible and the glutton can never have his fill with it.
With the second species of rule F we ask: what discrete quantity does gluttony have? We answer that it has as much quantity as the number of times the glutton practices it and increases or decreases its acts at his pleasure.
179. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the proper quality of gluttony? We say it is an unsatiable craving of the soul for taste, a craving beyond the soul's natural capacity. And here the intellect sees how gluttony elevates the intellect's appetite above its capacity, just as fire makes water rise by heating it beyond its capacity.
With the second species of rule G we ask: what are the appropriated qualities of gluttony? And we say they are, for instance, bad manners, derision, poverty, inebriation, and so forth. And here the intellect sees that the first species has to do with the soul and the second species has to do with the body; for this reason, gluttony begins first in the soul and then proceeds to the body.
180. With rule H we ask about gluttony and time. And we answer that it is a new habit in time. Also, it exists in time because it concerns the past when the gluttonous man regrets not having drunk and eaten more. Likewise, it exists in the present because the time when it can be practiced is now. And it also concerns the future, because there is a constant desire to eat and drink. And it also concerns the future in hell, where gluttons suffer untold eternal hunger and thirst.
181. With rule I we ask: where is gluttony? And we answer that it is a privative habit in its correlatives and in the men in which it exists. And this is signified by rules C, D and K.
182. With the first rule K we ask: how does gluttony exist? And we answer that just as temperance exists in a positive mode, so does gluttony exist in a privative mode, for the glutton eats and drinks without order or measure.
183. With the second rule K we ask: what does gluttony exist with? We say that it exists with its cause, like a coat with the tailor who made, or crafted it.
Chapter 23 - Lust Combined with the Principles
184. Through the goodness of the sense of touch, lust injures and depraves the goodness of chastity.By reason of the great sweetness of touch, lust magnifies the rational faculty's greatness and guilt. And here the intellect sees how conscience is awakened.
The durable physical pleasures of lust bring about durable punishment in hell.
Lust subjects spiritual power to corporeal power. Here the intellect sees how a lecher is ensnared by lust.
Lust perverts the intellect into believing it is not a sin, just as avarice perverts the intellect into believing it is not a sin. And here the intellect understands the obstinacy of sinners.
With the beauty of a woman's face, lust ensnares the lecher into loving the base and fetid parts of the woman.
A man deeply ensnared by lust believes that he is highly virtuous, but a free intellect is greatly astonished at such a false belief.
Lust is a deceitful habit because it begins with beauty and ends in turpitude. And it considers that evil is good.
Due to the pleasure a lecher derives from seeing, hearing, imagining, thinking and touching things in this mortal life, he forsakes the glory of paradise and earns endless punishment for all his faculties in hell.
185. A lecher makes no distinction between feminine beauty and turpitude.
The lecher accords beauty and depravity to one purpose and goal.
The lecher opposes lust to chastity, so he cannot experience the bliss of chastity; but he does not believe that this is what he is doing.
Lust begins with the senses and reproduces sense perceptions in the imagination until the rational faculty gets involved in sin.
A libidinous intention influences the senses and the senses respond through the imagination, until reasoning is perverted into sin.
A lecher first enjoys beauty, and then proceeds to base and fetid acts.
Major lechery displays and demonstrates itself through major signs.
Both the man and the woman are equally guilty of lust when they equally love one another in their lubricious acts.
Lust is not as great in the body as in the soul, because it is prepared in the body and completed in the soul.
Chapter 24 - Lust Combined with the Rules.
186. Does lust arise in the imagination sooner than in the senses? And we say it does, given that the imagination is closer to the rational faculty than are the senses.187. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is lust? The answer is that it is the sin whose proper function is fornication.
With the second species of rule C we ask: what does lust have in itself essentially? And we answer that it has its own correlatives that make it a specific vice.
With the third species we ask: what is lust in other things? And we answer that it is an intensive sin in the soul and an extended one in the body. And here the intellect sees how lust exists without succession in the soul but with succession in the body.
With the fourth species we ask: what does lust have in other things? And we answer that it has the upper hand in the man it dominates, like an ornamental coat covering him.
188. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does lust arise from? And we answer that it exists on its own, because as a sin it originates in nothingness and as such it is nothing.
With the second species of rule D we ask: what does lust consist of? and we say it consists of moral deformity, given that it is a privative act in the moral sense just as deafness is one in the natural sense.
With the third species we ask: to whom does lust belong? And we answer that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists, like a coat to one wearing it.
189. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does lust exist? And we answer that it is because it has been acquired as a habit.
With the second species of rule E we ask: why is there lust? And we answer that it exists to inhibit chastity, like deafness exists to inhibit hearing, and water is hot so as not to be cold.
190. With the first species of rule F we ask about the continuous quantity of lust. And we answer that it has continuous quantity because it is an indivisible habit.
With the second species of rule F we ask about the discrete quantity of lust. And we answer that it has as much discrete quantity as it is able to increase or decrease its acts. And here the intellect realizes that in the same essence and habit there can be discrete quantity due to a number of different acts.
191. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the proper quality of lust? And we answer that it is the specific quality which makes it a specific vice, just as heat is the proper quality of fire.
With the second species of rule G we ask about the appropriated quality of lust. And we answer that it is heat which swells up lustful flesh.
192. With rule H we ask about lust and time. And we answer that lust proceeds through a time of preparation by the senses and imagination, and at another time through concrete acts by reason of its conception in the soul. And this is signified by rules C, D and K.
193. With rule I we ask about the location of lust. And we answer that it exists in the senses and the imagination which are its instruments, and it exists in the soul as an essential habit. And this is signified by rules C, D and K.
194. With the first rule K we ask: how does lust exist? And we answer that it exists according to a way of life in seeing, touching, hearing and imagining, and according to the way the soul conceives and orders it.
195. With the second rule K we ask: what does lust exist with? And we answer that it exists with perverted morals, just as hot water is perverted by heat to a state contrary to its natural coldness, or like the intellect is perverted by ignorance or the hearing by deafness.
Chapter 25 - Conceit Combined with the Principles
196. By reason of its malice, conceit debases the subject in whom it exists just as humility elevates the subject in whom it exists.Great conceit diminishes its subject just like humility magnifies its subject.
The duration of conceit prepares its subject to suffer endless torment in hell.
The power of conceit cannot stand up against the power of humility.
A conceited man is one who believes that his natural talents and wealth are of his own doing.
A man who loves himself more than God is conceited.
When a conceited man is criticized, he believes that he is virtuous and that his critic is vicious.
Conceit is a deceitful habit: when it believes it is ascending, it is actually descending. And when it believes that it is telling the truth, it is uttering falsehoods.
A conceited man is never satisfied with anyone, nor is anyone ever satisfied with him.
197. The conceited man sees no difference between his own conceit and someone else's humility.
Conceit contradicts all the virtues.
Conceit is a principle which debases higher values and elevates lower ones.
Conceit impedes the medium that exists between the beginning and the end, and this is why it never ascends but only descends.
A conceited man is never satisfied.
Major conceit displays major signs.
The conceited man finds no one who is his equal, and does not want to associate with anyone.
Conceit about one's body is minor, but conceit about one's soul is major.
Chapter 26 - Conceit Combined with the Rules
198. Does conceit have more to do with the intellect than with the will? And we say it does, because it is first conceived by the intellect and subsequently loved by the will.199. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is conceit? We say it is the vice that descends to the extent it believes it is ascending.
With the second species of rule C we ask: what does conceit have in itself coessentially? And we answer that it has in itself its own privative correlatives which are opposed to the positive correlatives of humility.
With the third species of rule C we ask: what is conceit in other things? And we say it is judgmental in the intellect, a factor of choice in the will, conservative in the memory, and it is the empress and root of all sins.
With the fourth species of rule C we ask: what does conceit have in other things? And we answer that it has debasement in the subject in whom it exists, just as the soul has motion in a body that runs.
200. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does conceit come from? And we answer that it is from its correlatives that are the privative correlatives of humility, just as night is due to the absence of light.
With the second species of rule D we ask: what is conceit made of? And we answer that it is made of its specific correlatives which make it a specific vice. And here the intellect sees that the first species has to do with the absence of the contrary to conceit, whereas the second species has to do only with conceit itself.
With the third species of rule D we ask: to whom does conceit belong? We say it belongs to the subject whose habit it is.
201. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there conceit? And we say it exists due to its subject's lack of humility, like blindness exists because the sense of sight is absent.
With the second species of rule E we ask: why is there conceit? And we answer that it exists to prevent humility from existing, just as fire exists in a choleric temperament to prevent water from reaching its end in it.
202. With the first species of rule F we ask about the continuous quantity of conceit. And we say that conceit has continuous quantity because it is an indivisible habit, which can be generated in an instant and corrupted in an instant.
With the second species of rule F we ask about the discrete quantity of conceit. And we answer that it has discrete quantity, because it consists of a number of privative principles, namely the privation of goodness, the privation of greatness etc.
203. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the proper quality of conceit? And we say that it is undue ascent.
With the second species of rule G we ask: what is the appropriated quality of conceit? And we say it is well deserved and violent descent. The contrary can be said about humility.
204. With rule H we ask about conceit and time. And with the first species of D we answer that it is in time whenever it begins to exist as humility is corrupted in a subject and supplanted by conceit, for the generation of one means the corruption of the other. And this is signified by rule K.
205. With rule I we ask: where is conceit? And we say it is in the subject in whom humility has been, or should have been present.
206. With rule K we ask: how does conceit exist? And we say that it exists in a way contrary to humility, just like love exists through attraction and hate through repulsion.
207. With the second rule K we ask: what does conceit exist with? We answer that it exists with the privation of humility, obedience, justice and so forth. And also with all the other things that are said about it.
Chapter 27 - Accidie Combined with the Principles
108. The accidious man is lazy in doing good, but when it comes to doing evil, he is swift and solicitous.The accidious man is solicitous in avoiding whatever is useful for the common good.
Accidie lasts with conceit, laziness, wrath and so forth.
Accidie impedes men who propose to do good and avoid evil, but cannot do so because their power is shackled by accidie.
Accidie alters and infects the intellect and makes it unable to detect it.
Accidie renders the will lazy in loving good, but solicitous in loving evil.
Accidie deems that laziness is a virtue, and diligence in doing good is a vice.
Accidie is indolent in dealing with truth, but solicitous in dealing with falsehood.
The accidious man enjoys himself with privative habits, but not with positive ones.
209. Due to intellectual accidy and laziness, the accidious man does not differentiate things in his science, but confuses them instead.
The accidious man associates all his higher and lower faculties to all the vices, because he is lazy in putting his faculties to work for acquiring virtues.
The accidious man opposes diligence in virtue with solicitude for vice.
Accidie perverts positive principles into privative ones, and this is why the accidious man grumbles, feigns to know the outcome of things, gives superfluous advice, reprehends good deeds and is hostile to accomplishment; besides, he binds form and corrupts matter so that his acts are characterized by indolence.
Accidie impedes the medium so that legitimate principles cannot find repose in the end.
The accidious man finds repose in opposing any accomplishment, but finds it very hard to accomplish anything, because accidie is hostile to final perfection.
Major accidie is the source of all the vices.
With accidie, the accidious man brings the acts of all the vices equally into play to fortify his accidie against the love of virtue.
Minor accidie is associated with minor diligence, but not at all with major diligence.
Chapter 28 - Accidie Combined with the Rules
210. We ask: is accidie a deadly sin? And the answer is yes, because it impedes all the acts of the virtues. But now the intellect wonders: given that accidie is a deadly sin displayed through many signs and figures, why is it so little known to mankind? Then it remembers that most of mankind is habituated with accidie.111. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is accidie? And the answer is that accidie is the vice which makes the accidious man grieve about the good fortune of his fellow men and rejoice in their misfortune.
With the second species of rule C we ask: what does accidie have in itself coessentially? And the answer is that it has its correlatives made of the privative correlatives of charity, given that a charitable man rejoices in the good fortune of his fellow men and is grieved by their misfortunes.
With the third species of rule C we ask: what is accidie in other things? And the answer is that it is lazy and ill willed in doing good, but in doing evil it is solicitous, swift and selective.
With the fourth species of rule C we ask: what does accidie have in other things? And the answer is that it has its acts in every vice.
212. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does accidie arise from? The answer is that it comes from an absence of charity, which had been and should still be present in the subject.
With the second species of rule D we ask: what is accidie made of? The answer is that it consists of its own privative correlatives which make it a specific vice, like deafness consists of its own privative correlatives which make it a specific deformity.
With the third species of rule D we ask: to whom does accidie belong? The answer is that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists, just like deafness belongs to a deaf man.
213. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there accidie? And the answer is that accidie exists because it has been acquired as a habit, like daylight exists because the sun is shining above the horizon.
With the second species of rule E we ask: why is there accidie? And we say that it exists in order to impede charity from having subjects in whom it can exist, because accidie is a privative habit which opposes the positive habit of charity in order to defeat its purpose.
214. With the first species of rule F we ask about the continuous quantity of accidie. And we say that it has continuous quantity throughout all the vices it gives rise to.
With the second species of rule F we ask about the discrete quantity of accidie. And we reply that it has discrete quantities due to the different vices in which it acts in different ways.
215. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the proper quality of accidie? And we answer that it is laziness without which it can do nothing.
With the second species of rule G we ask: what is the appropriated quality of accidie? We say that it is malevolence and iniquity, for with these the accidious man rejoices in evil and is grieved by good.
216. With rule H we ask about accidie and time. And we answer with rule C that it is lazy in time so that the subject in whom accidie exists does nothing useful with his available time.
217. With rule I we ask: where is accidie? And the answer is that it is in the laziness of the soul, of the imagination and of the sensitive faculty as they all neglect to do good and love to do evil.
218. With the first rule K we ask: how does accidie exist? The answer is that it exists in a way opposed to the mode of charity; now charity exists through loving what is good for one's neighbor, and hating what is bad for him, but accidie exists in an opposite way.
219. With the second rule K we ask: what does accidie exist with? The answer is that it exists with the privative habits of the virtues, namely with injury and imprudence, as well as with laziness, wrath and so forth.
Chapter 29 - Envy Combined with the Principles
220. The envious man has an unreasonable craving for things that do not belong to him, which is bad for his spiritual life. And if he were aware of this, he would no longer be envious.The greatness of envy coexists with the greatness of the other vices, so it cannot be defeated by the greatness of any single virtue.
The duration of envy lasts together with the duration of the other vices, so that it cannot be defeated without the duration of the virtues.
The power of envy is rooted in the power of the other vices so that it cannot be defeated without the power of charity together with the power of the other virtues.
An envious intellect is perverted and altered by envy, and it is unaware of this; but it can be cured by understanding what envy is.
Envy distracts the will from the supreme object, however the will can be healed by inducing it to objectify the supreme object.
The envious man has no virtues, but he has vices; now if he wants to acquire virtues, let him change what he has into what he does not have.
The envious man does not have the truth, but he has falsehood; and thus he deceives himself, but he can be cured by stopping his self deception.
Once the envious man has gotten what he wants, he still remains unsatisfied because his conscience troubles him. But he can be cured if he follows the dictates of his conscience.
221. A man is driven by envy to commit as many different acts as he commits with the other vices; but he can heal himself by frequently enumerating these acts.
Envy does not agree with any of the virtues, and the cure consists in realizing this fact.
Envy contradicts the virtues with privative habits, and the cure consists in opposing the vices with positive habits.
Envy begins with sense objects, it is prepared in the imagination and completed by the spiritual faculties, and the cure consists in defeating the impressions of the senses and the imagination by using the power of the spiritual faculties.
Envy is a standard whereby the envious man measures injury, imprudence and so on, but the cure is in applying the standards of justice, prudence and so forth.
The envious man has no repose in the things he covets, as he strives to acquire them; the cure consists in ceasing and desisting from such efforts until his peace of mind is restored.
Major envy brings major strife to the envious man, but he can be cured if he enables major charity to perform major acts.
Envy equalizes all the acts of the other vices with its acts, and the cure consists in equalizing the acts of all the virtues with major acts of charity.
The envious man thinks that his possessions are minor as compared to the coveted things he does not have; the cure consists in inquiring into the usefulness and purpose of these things.
Chapter 30 - Envy Combined with the Rules
222. Objectively, is envy a sin more general than avarice? And the answer is yes. Now the avaricious man does not objectify as many things as the envious man does, since the avaricious man objectifies the things he believes he has, whereas the envious man objectifies all kinds of things that he cannot possibly have.223. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is envy? We say that it is the sin whereby the envious man has an unreasonable craving for things that are not his.
With the second species of rule C we ask: what does envy have in itself coessentially? And we reply that it has its own privative correlatives which make it what it is.
With the third species of rule C we ask: what is envy in other things? And we reply that in the envious man it is a habit that keeps him in constant labor and grief.
With the fourth species of rule C we ask: what does envy have in other things? We say that in the envious man it has the upper hand and the leading position; now the envious man is always shrouded in envy, which he wears like a coat.
224. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does envy originate from? And we answer that it arises from its own privative correlatives, as does blindness.
With the second species we ask: what is envy made of? We answer that it is made of its specific correlatives that make it a specific sin, just as deafness consists of its privative correlatives opposed to the correlatives of hearing.
With the third species of we ask: to whom does envy belong? And we answer that it belongs to the subject whose habit it is, just as malevolence belongs to the will, forgetfulness to the memory and ignorance to the intellect.
225. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there envy? And we answer that it exists as an effect produced in the envious man, just as deafness is an effect caused by the absence of hearing.
With the second species of rule E we ask: why is there envy? And we answer that it exists to make its envious subject strive painfully until he earns endless sorrow and sadness in hell.
226. With the first species of rule F we ask about the continuous quantity of envy. And we answer that it has continuous quantity inasmuch as with it the envious man can measure avarice, lust, gluttony and so forth.
With the second species of rule F we ask about the discrete quantity of envy. And we answer that it has discrete quantity because it is capable of committing a great number of different individual acts.
227. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the proper quality of envy? And we say it is a passion which the envious man has for coveting the belongings of others.
With the second species of rule G we ask: what are the appropriated qualities of envy? And we say that it has injury, which is opposed to justice, and imprudence which is opposed to prudence and so on with the other virtues.
228. With rule H we ask about envy and time. We say that it exists in time as a new habit of its subject; and because it performs different acts at different times, and also because its subject is in different places at different times etc.
229. With rule I we ask: where is envy? And we reply that it exists in the soul that fabricated it, and also in the imagination that helps to shape it, and it is also signified and shaped in the senses.
230. With the first rule K we ask: how does envy exist? And we reply that it exists in the way the possessions of others are unreasonably objectified by the morbid acts of the subjects in whom it resides.
231. With the second rule K we ask: what does envy exist with? And we answer that it exists with the privative habits of which it consists, such as malice, injury and so forth.
Chapter 31 - Ire Combined with the Principles
232. With ire, the will is moved to hate good without any deliberation, and so deliberation is the remedy.With great fury, ire devastates everything; but the remedy lies in great forbearance and deliberation.
As long as ire lasts, so do its acts. The remedy is in firmly keeping one's mind focussed on some other object.
The power of ire is defeated by the power of patience, forbearance and deliberation.
Ire confuses the intellect by taking away its understanding. The remedy lies in restoring understanding to the intellect.
Ire perverts the intellect into hating what it should love, the remedy is in pracicing forbearance until the will is regenerated by loving.
With ire, the will is vicious; the remedy is to make the will virtuous through forbearance.
With ire, the intellect does not understand the truth, but the remedy consists in patiently understanding the truth.
The irate man suffers from his hatred, and he can be cured by finding repose in loving.
233. The irate man makes no distinction between his own evil and that of others. The remedy consists in making this distinction.
The irate man associates vices with vices, the remedy for him is to associate virtues with virtues.
With ire, the irate man contradicts patience. His remedy lies in resisting ire with patience.
Ire arises in hate, but is dispelled by love.
Ire measures without measure, the remedy is to measure with measure.
No man finds repose in ire, but all men find repose in patience.
Without major patience, major ire is impregnable, but not vice versa. And here the intellect realizes that virtue is absolutely stronger than vice.
Ire equalizes the acts of the intellect and the will with fury, the remedy is in equalizing them with forbearance, patience and charity.
Minor ire is defeated by minor patience.
Chapter 32 - Ire Combined with the Rules
234. Is ire a sin more general than any other sin? The answer is yes, because fury totally deprives the intellect of any deliberation.235. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is ire? We say it is the sin with which the will hates good and loves evil, without any deliberation.
With the second species we ask: what does ire have in itself essentially? And we answer that it has its correlatives, which are confused by its fury.
With the third species we ask: what is ire in other things? And we say that it is a bond that shackles the will to irrational hating, the intellect to ignoring and the memory to forgetting.
With the fourth species of rule C we ask: what does ire have in other things? We answer that it has dominion over the will because it commands the will to hate good and to love evil. And ire also has dominion over the intellect and the memory, as it compels the intellect to ignore and the memory to forget.
236. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does ire arise from? We reply that it does not arise from anything, because it is a sin, and sin, morally speaking, does not arise from anything.
With the second species of rule D we ask: what is ire made of? We reply that it is made of its specific correlatives that make it a specific sin.
With the third species we ask: to whom does ire belong? To which we answer that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists.
237. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there ire? And we reply that it is because it exists in a subject in whom there is no charity, patience or forbearance.
With the second species of rule E we ask: Why is there ire? And we say that ire exists in order to keep the virtues from having their acts.
238. With the first species of rule F we ask about the continuous quantity of ire. We reply that it has continuous quantity inasmuch as it disables all acts of charity, patience, forbearance, as well as justice, prudence, etc.
With the second species of rule F we ask about the discrete quantity of ire. And we say that it has discrete quantity inasmuch as it increases or decreases its acts.
239. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the proper quality of ire? And we say it is fury, which is proper to ire alone.
With the second species of rule G we ask: what are the appropriated qualities of ire? We say that they are impatience, lack of forbearance, and so forth.
240. With rule H we ask about ire and time. We reply that ire exists in time because it is a new habit which reproduces its acts in time.
With rule I we ask: where is ire? And we reply that it is in the will with its hatred, in injury with its injurious acts etc. And it is also in motion, because the more it is stirred up, the more it reproduces its acts.
242. With the first rule K we ask: how does ire exist? We say that it exists by perverting the intellect, the will, the memory and the imagination, and the perversion induced by ire exists by reason of its fury and lack of deliberation.
243. With the second rule K we ask: what does ire exist with? And we answer that it exists with objects of the senses and of the imagination, and also with a perverted soul and with the privative habits of the principles, such as malice and so forth.
Chapter 33 - Falsehood Combined with the Principles
244. The false man deceives himself as he deceives others; this is shown by the definition of goodness.Falsehood cannot be detected by its own greatness, but it can be detected by great truthfulness.
Falsehood lasts so long as it is not detected, but once it is detected, it is dispelled.
Falsehood has no power against understanding, but it has power over believing, so that prudence is its enemy.
Falsehood deceives understanding with believing.
Under the guise of truth, falsehood makes itself lovable, but truthfulness finally reveals and reproves it.
With hypocrisy, falsehood feigns to be a virtue, but prudence destroys it and reveals its true nature.
Falsehood does not act with acts of truth, hence it follows that it is detected with acts of truth.
Falsehood promises enjoyment but brings grief, and it is revealed through this.
Falsehood does not distinguish between things, but confuses them; thus, it is revealed by drawing distinctions.
The false man associates sense objects and their meanings so as to deceive the imagination and the intellect, but truthfulness, with its concordance, explodes falsehood.
Falsehood contradicts the end with which it is contradicted.
Falsehood brings enjoyment at first, but sadness in the end, and it can be recognized by this.
Falsehood sets aside the medium which is disposed between the beginning and the end, and it can be recognized by this.
The false man is comfortable at first, but suffers in the end, and falsehood can be recognized by this.
Major falsehood is detected by major truthfulness.
The false man equalizes likenesses and unlikenesses, and falsehood can be recognized by this.
Falsehood is clearly revealed by minor truth.
Chapter 34 - Falsehood Combined with the Rules
246. Is falsehood as strong as truthfulness? And the answer is no, because truthfulness is a positive habit and falsehood is a privative one.247. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is falsehood? And we answer that it is the sin with which man deceives and is deceives.
With the second species of rule C we ask: what does falsehood have in itself coessentially? And we answer that it has its correlatives that comprise its essence.
With the third species we ask: what is falsehood in other things? And we say that it is deceptive in sense objects through perverted meanings, it is deceptive in the imagination because of the intellect's ignorance, and it is an enemy in the end.
With the fourth species we ask: what does falsehood have in other things? We say that in privative principles it has its acts that are opposed to positive principles.
248. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does falsehood arise from? And we answer that it exists on its own, because it is a sin.
With the second species we ask: what is falsehood made of? We say that it is made of its own specific privative principles that make it a specific sin; like deafness consists of its privative correlatives that make it a specific deformity.
With the third species of rule D we ask: to whom does falsehood belong? And we answer that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists.
249. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there falsehood? We reply that it exists because of the lack of truthfulness in its subject.
With the second species we ask: why is there falsehood? And we answer that it exists for the purpose of deceiving men, like an instrument exist so that things can be done with it.
250. With the first species of rule F we ask about the continuous quantity of falsehood. And we answer that it has continuous quantity inasmuch as its subject can act with it.
With the second species we ask about the discrete quantity of falsehood. And we say that it has discrete quantity due to its privative principles.
251. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the proper quality of falsehood? And we answer tat it is deception, because this is its specific act.
With the second species we ask: what are the appropriated qualities of falsehood? And we say that they are lies, hypocrisy and so forth.
With rule H we ask about falsehood and time. And we answer that it exists in time because it is a new habit and has its acts in time.
253. With rule I we ask: where is falsehood? And we answer that it is found in liars, hypocrites and deceivers.
254. With the first rule K we ask: how does falsehood exist? And we answer that it exists by means of feigning, deceiving, lying and so forth.
255. With the second rule K we ask: what does falsehood exist with? And we answer that it exists with dissimulation, deception and so forth, as shown by what we have said about it.
Chapter 35 - Inconstancy Combined with the Principles
256. Constancy is a habit whereby goodness is a reason for good to do good, and because inconstancy impedes this, it is a sin.Great constancy overcomes inconstancy.
Inconstancy lasts as long as there is a lack of constancy.
The power of inconstancy has no power over the power of constancy.
With inconstancy, the intellect's understanding cannot be strong.
Constancy is not lovable if accompanied by inconstancy.
Constancy accompanied with inconstancy is not a virtue.
Constancy and inconstancy cannot both be true at the same time.
Inconstancy does not belong to the genus of enjoyment, but to the genus of grief.
257. Constancy reveals and distinguishes differences, but inconstancy hides and darkens them.
Constancy has no general or specific concordance with inconstancy.
Because of the nature of inconstancy, it must be resisted from the very first, because it is difficult to resist it later on.
Because constancy is prior, all inconstancy is posterior.
Constancy joins things together but inconstancy splits them apart.
The constant man finds repose in constancy, but inconstancy brings grief to the inconstant man.
Major inconstancy cannot be ranked above major constancy.
By reason of the free will, constancy or inconstancy can equally be chosen, but they cannot be equally measured.
Minor inconstancy is easily defeated by major constancy.
Chapter 36 - Inconstancy Combined with the Rules
258. Does the habit of inconstancy belong more to the will than to the intellect? The answer is yes, because the will is more changeable than the intellect, given that the intellect proceeds through discourse, whereas the will can change suddenly; and thus the intellect knows that the remedy against inconstancy consists in repressing the sudden fluctuations of the will, by making it participate in the intellect's discourse.259. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is inconstancy? And we answer that it is a deviated offshoot of constancy.
With the second species of rule C we ask: what does inconstancy have in itself coessentially? And we say that it has its correlatives which make it what it is.
With the third species we ask: what is inconstancy in other things? And we answer that it is a ruler of the will, disobedient to the intellect, timid in imagination and unstable with regard to sense objects.
With the fourth species we ask: what does it have in other things? And we answer that it has a lack of will power in the will, and deception in promises.
260. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does inconstancy arise from? And we say that it exists on its own, because it is a sin.
With the second species of rule D we ask: what is inconstancy made of? And we answer that it is made of its specific privative principles that make it what it is.
With the third species we ask: to whom does inconstancy belong? We say that it belongs to the subject whose habit it is.
261. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there inconstancy? And we say that it exists in the subject in whom it resides due to his lack of constancy, just as heat exists in water because of the absence of cold. From this the intellect can tell how natural habits resemble moral habits.
With the second species of rule E we ask: why is there inconstancy? And we say that it exists to prevent constancy from existing. And here the intellect realizes that sin amounts to naught, because it is opposed to being.
262. With the first species of rule F we ask about the continuous quantity of inconstancy. We say that it has quantity inasmuch as it impedes constancy.
With the second species of rule F we ask about the discrete quantity of inconstancy. And we answer that it has discrete quantity because the will can frequently change in practice.
263. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the proper quality of inconstancy? And we answer that it is changefulness of the will.
With the second species we ask: what is the appropriated quality of inconstancy? and we answer that it is faintheartedness.
264. With rule H we ask about inconstancy and time. And we reply that it exists at the time when the will is altered by it and habituated with it. And it exists at the time when the inconstant will acts against constancy.
265. With rule I we ask: where is inconstancy? And we answer that it is found in weak will power, in lack of perseverance and in the places we mentioned above.
266. With the first rule K we ask: how does inconstancy exist? The answer is that it exists in a way contrary to the way of constancy, as the latter proceeds with discourse, deliberation, choice, prudence and above all with fortitude.
267. With the second rule K we ask: what does inconstancy exist with? And we answer that it exists with sudden change, and with the cause whose effect it is, and with lack of constancy, just like shadow is due to a lack of light.
268. We have dealt with the nine subjects combined in sequence with the principles and rules of this art. And just as we dealt with them here, the artist can also deal artificially with other related peregrine subjects in their way.