The Hundred Forms - Articles 1 to 70

Chapter Fourteen - Applying the Hundred Forms

41. We call these the hundred forms and we consider them in the abstract. Some are ultimately general and others are subalternate. And each form has its own concrete assigned to it, to make each form clearer to the intellect, especially as whatever exists is either concrete or abstract, for nothing can exist outside of these categories. Now let us begin with entity.
Article 1 - Entity
42. Entity is an implicit term of this art, and it can be defined in the same way as we defined the explicit principles of this art. So the artist shall apply the definitions of goodness, greatness etc. as follows: now just as goodness is the cause by reason of which good does good, likewise, entity is the cause by reason of which one thing causes another thing. And just as greatness is the cause by reason of which goodness is great, so is entity the cause by reason of which goodness is something, and likewise with the other principles. "Thing", the concrete of entity, is implicit in the second species of D and in the first of E, and its constituent parts are implicit in the second species of C. Thus, any question about thing and entity shall be applied to the explicit principles and to the rules, and solved through the same process we applied to goodness, greatness etc.
Article 2 - Essence
43. Given that entity and thing are convertible, it follows that essence and being are convertible. And we can say the same about essence and being as we said about entity and thing. If we ask whether there is any difference between essence and being, we can refer to difference, which is an explicit term, and solve the question through the process whereby difference was combined with all the principles and rules, so as to clearly show without a doubt that the answer is yes. This difference exists because essence is above through abstraction and its concretes are below through contraction. So it is obvious that there is a difference between essence and being, and rule B agrees with this.
Article 3 - Unity
44. Unity is the form whose function is to unite. It is applicable to goodness, greatness etc. because it is good, great etc. Just as unity is good in goodness and great in greatness, so is goodness one unit in unity, and greatness is another unit caused by the same unity, and likewise with the other principles. And here the intellect realizes that difference distinguishes goodness and greatness as distinct principles, where each principle has its own unity. Thus, if difference is an explicit term in a question, then refer to the discourse about goodness, greatness and difference and formulate the answer in accordance with what is said there. The concrete of unity is implicit in the concretes of goodness, greatness etc. since the good is one unit and the great is another unit, and each unit has its own constituent correlatives. This is applicable to the second species of rule D and to the first of E, and the correlatives as such are applicable to the second species of rule C and to the first of D.
Article 4 - Plurality
45. Plurality is a form assembled from a number things different in identity, as shown by the second species of rule C, which is its source. It is applicable to the explicit principles, because it is good, great and eternal. And just as plurality is good in goodness and great in greatness, so are goodness and greatness plural by reason of plurality, and there is also a plurality of different kinds of goodness and of greatness etc. as shown by the second species of rule C, which is the source of plurality. Difference, concordance and equality are the prime causes of plurality and of all correlatives. And plurality is applicable to the principles and vice versa. Its concrete is applicable to the concrete of goodness, greatness etc. as we see in an elemented thing which is good, great etc. and is a unit made of a plurality of things, so that plurality is sustained in it.
Article 5 - Nature
46. Nature is the form whose function is to naturize. And given that the principles are natural by reason of nature, it is applicable to natural goodness, natural greatness etc. And thus, nature can be known by combining it with the principles and rules, as we already did in a broad sense in chapter 8. Further, nature applies to the natural correlatives of goodness, greatness, etc. because without it, these correlatives cannot be natural. The concrete of nature is applicable to the natural concretes indicated by the second species of rule C and the first of E. Moreover, as goodness has one natural relation to greatness and another to duration and conversely, nature can be applied to mixture in the same way as we dealt with goodness combined with the principles and rules, and likewise with greatness, duration etc.
Article 6 - Genus
47. Genus is identified as an intensely blended subject predicated of many things different in species. We dealt sufficiently with genus in the New Logic we wrote. It is applicable to the explicit principles because it is on account of it that they are general just as genus is good in goodness, great in greatness etc. And its correlatives are also known by the second species of rule C. Further, its concrete is applicable to the second species of rule D and the first of E. whereby we know that genus is a real thing that exists on its own, or else the correlatives of the explicit principles cannot be general, and consequently, neither can the correlatives of the implicit principles be general.
Article 7 - Species
48. "Species" is an explicit principle of this art, defined as follows: a species is something predicated of a number of individually different things. Species apply to mixture, following the process used in the chapter about great goodness etc. Entirely general goodness is no longer entirely general when we say "great goodness" because it has been contracted specifically to greatness, and the same applies to the other principles. Further, species apply to all correlatives, because each explicit principle has its own specific numerically differentiated correlatives, and thus, species apply to difference, an explicit principle of this art. Difference differentiates genus into several different species, for instance, mankind constitutes a species, lions constitute another species etc. Species also apply to the middle: now just as the middle stands between the beginning and the end, likewise, species stand between a genus and its individuals. And here the intellect realizes that species are necessarily something real, because just as the beginning and the end cannot be extremes of the middle if the middle is not something real, likewise, genus and individuals cannot be anything real unless species are something real. Anything specific is a concrete of species, applicable to the second species of rule D and the first of E through which species can be known, sensed and imagined.
49. There are also natural species, as for instance the different kinds of visibility that exist potentially in the power of sight as colors and shapes which the subject could potentially see. And there are also potential species in the moral virtues, including whatever can potentially be justified by justice, believed by faith, or specified by species. And these species are images of the faculties, they include anything that could potentially be imagined by the imagination, understood by the intellect, loved by the will and remembered by the memory. However, these species are sub species of the faculties and/or virtues.
Article 8 - Individuality
50. Individuality is defined with the first species of rule C: just as goodness is a reason for good to do good, likewise, individuality is a reason for an individual to individuate. And just as individuality is good in goodness etc. likewise, goodness etc. are individuated by individuality with its concretes and correlatives which make essence indivisible. And the correlatives of goodness etc. can be applied to the correlatives of individuality, so the intellect can know what they are; but these correlatives are beyond the reach of the senses and the imagination because they are located and contained in essence without taking on any kind of shape. Anything individual is a concrete of individuality, as shown by the second species of rule D and the first of E. However, elemented individuals can be sensed and imagined, as we see in this rose, or that lion.
Article 9 - Property
51. Property shows up as an explicit principle in rule G, but it is an implicit principle in all the other principles and rules. To define it, we apply the first species of rule C. Now just as goodness is a reason for good to do good, likewise property is a reason for proper things to act according to their properties. And just as goodness has its proper correlatives by reason of property, so does property have good correlatives by reason of goodness. Property is applicable to difference: just as difference is a cause for differentiating, so is property a cause for appropriating; and likewise with the rest of the principles.
52. Further, anything proper is a concrete of property, constituted of concrete correlatives, as shown by the second species of rule C and the first of E. For instance, this man is properly called an animal, this lion is properly called an animal, as is this horse, and this rose is properly called another kind of body. Moral concepts apply to the third species of rule D: for instance, Socrates' horse is his own property, and Plato's horse is Plato's own property.. Here the intellect recognizes the originating principles of legislative science, with its constitutive principles, and the principles that legislators must use. And it realizes that mixture with the principles and the rules also applies to legislation.
Article 10 - Simplicity
53. Simplicity applies to the principles of this art, because the principles are simple by reason of simplicity, just as simplicity is good in goodness and great in greatness. And just as the explicit principles are combined in the mixture of principles and rules, so can simplicity be combined with all the principles and rules. Simplicity is defined by the first species of rule C as the form by reason of which the principles are simple. By the second species of rule C, simplicity has its own correlatives, for instance, through simplicity, goodness has its simple bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying, and with simplicity and its correlatives it constitutes one simple essence with simple and primordial principles by the first species of rule D. Anything simple is a concrete of simplicity, as signified by the second species of rule D and the first of E.
Article 11 - Composition
54. Composition is a form aggregated from several essences. It applies to the explicit principles drawn together in mutual combination as shown in the chapter on goodness combined with the principles, where we constitute a composite of several explicit principles by saying that great goodness is a dual reason, and great and durable goodness is a threefold reason etc. Here the intellect understands where composition springs from, and rule K consents to this. Further, composition has its own composite correlatives, as shown by the second species of rule C. And just as the bonifier, magnifier etc. enter into composition in creatures, the bonifiable and magnifiable also enter into composition, as do the acts of bonifying and magnifying, and all together they constitute one composite essence, and this essence is called composition. Its concrete is the composite, or compound, as the second species of rule D and the first of E clearly show to the enlightened intellect.
Article 12 - Form
55. Form applies to the principles: just as each principle is combined with the sequence of the explicit principles and rules, likewise, form can be combined in its own way. However, we say this with regard only to the composite form of created beings, because anything formable belongs to the genus of matter; but this is not the case with God. Form is the essence with which an agent naturally acts on matter. This composite form has its own composite correlatives, as we already noted, but by the first species of rule C, simple form in creatures has no correlatives because it is one simple part of substance, namely the formative agent. And the same can be said about accidental form. This kind of form is beyond the reach of the senses and the imagination because it has no physical shape. Whatever is formed is a concrete of form, because it is characterized by form. Formed beings that belong to the genus of body are visible and their solidity makes them tangible, as we see in stones formed by the elementative, in plants formed by the vegetative, and so forth. This is signified by the second species of rule D and the first of E.
Article 13 - Matter
56. Matter is a simple, passive essence and applies to the passive correlatives of the explicit principles, namely the bonifiable, magnifiable etc. which belong to the genus of matter by reason of passivity. The second species of rule C shows that matter has no concretes, because simplicity posits that it is one simple part of substance. Its passivity and primordial origin are signified by the first species of rule D. The materialized concrete of matter is composed of several passive principles, such as the bonifiable, magnifiable etc. and this materialized concrete is clarified by the second species of rule D and the first of E. This materialized concrete is the universal source from which all particular matter springs, just as the formed concrete is the source from which are derived all particular forms brought from potentiality into act.
Article 14 - Substance
57. Substance applies to the saffron triangle where it is said that majority exists between substance and substance etc. Hence, any discourse on substance is implicit in the discourse on majority with all the principles and rules. Its definition applies to the definitions of goodness etc. Now just as goodness is a general reason for good to produce good, so is substance a general reason for substances to produce substances. Substance has its own substantial correlatives by the second species of rule C, namely the substantiative, the substantiable and substantiating. The substantiative applies to the bonifier, the magnifier etc. The substantiable applies to the bonifiable, the magnifiable etc. and substantiating applies to bonifying, magnifying etc. Now the intellect sees that substance is jointly composed of form and matter, thus constituting a third number with them. Its concrete, namely substantial being, is signified to the intellect by the second species of rule D and the first of E, and the senses and imagination perceive it in elemented things.
Article 15 - Accident
58. Accident is explicit in the saffron triangle where it is said that there is majority between accident and accident; and so its discourse applies to all the principles and rules. And this discourse is implicit in the said triangle. Accident is a form that neither exists on its own, nor does it exist chiefly for its own end, but for the end of substance. Accidents have no correlatives per se, but only accidentally, because substance is accidentally habituated, quantified, situated etc. In the chapter on goodness, when we say that goodness is great etc. accidents arise as quantity accidentally arises from the quantified multiplication of a composite, and as it is situated in its subject, situation arises accidentally, and likewise with relation which is an accident, as are the other predicates, as well as motion and so forth. Anything accidental is a concrete of accident, applicable to the second species of rule D and the first of E; for instance, a box is a subject of accident because it has an accidental shape made by artificial means. Likewise, a logician is accidentally a master of his subject. And so with other things in their own way.
Article 16 - Quantity
59. Quantity is an explicit term in rule F of this art, and its definition applies to the definitions of goodness etc. Just as goodness is that on account of which good does good, so is quantity that on account of which quantified being acts quantitatively. Its primordial origin applies to the chapter on goodness combined with the principles. Goodness is one essence and greatness is another, and when they are brought together, multiplication results, and consequently, so does quantity, without which there can be no multiplication of created beings. This is signified by the first species of rule D. Here the intellect understands the origin of quantity. Quantity also applies to the substantial correlatives signified by the second species of rule C, and these correlatives are quantitatively measured due to difference that makes them distinct inasmuch as there is neither more nor less of them. Anything quantified is a quantitatively measured concrete of quantity, just like anything white is colored with whiteness.
Article 17 - Quality
60. Quality is an explicit term found in rule G, and its definition applies to the definitions of goodness etc. As goodness is that on account of which good does good, so does quality posit that the bonifier has an active quality and the bonified has a passive quality. Quality applies to the substantial correlatives designated by the second species of rule C, as these correlatives are habituated with quality, and quality is situated in them. With the third species of rule C, quality posits a qualified subject in which it exists, and this qualified subject is its concrete. Further, quality applies to the second species of rule D in the chapter on goodness combined with the principles and rules, as well as to greatness etc. Now goodness, as a supremely general principle, is not qualified unless it is contracted. If we ask: what are the qualities of goodness? The answer is that it is good, durable etc. as quality arises accidentally from the contraction of principles.
Article 18 - Relation
61. Relation is an implicit term; its definition applies to the definitions of goodness etc. Now just as good causes good through goodness, so do relative things cause related things through relation. For if there is something relative, then there must be something related, and vice versa. And if there is an antecedent, then there must be something consequent, and so forth. Whatever is related is a concrete of relation, habituated with relation and situated in relation, and so forth. Further, relation as an accident applies to the contraction and mixture of the principles with the first species of rule D and the second of rule C. For if goodness is great, it follows that it has good and great correlatives without which it can never be great. And likewise with the other principles in their own way.
Article 19 - Action
62. Action is a term implicit in the correlatives and applicable to the correlatives, such as the bonifier, magnifier etc. And its definition applies to the definitions of goodness etc. Now just as goodness is that on account of which good does good, so is action a reason for the agent to act upon its passive subject. Its concrete is not signified by a noun directly derived from it, but by the second species of rule D. Further, action is clarified by the first species of rule D in the correlatives signified by the second species of C, and with the definition of medium, and also by the rest of the principles and rules.
Article 20 - Passion
63. Passion is an implicit term, and applies to the correlatives designated by the second species of rule C, namely the bonifiable, magnifiable etc. Just as these passive correlatives combine when the principles are mixed, so likewise, passion, as a general principle, can be combined with the mixture of the principles and rules. Further, anything passive is a concrete of passion, situated and habituated in passion. Now passion springs from the contraction and mixture of the principles, for instance, goodness is passive inasmuch as it is habituated with greatness and vice versa. This is clarified by the first species of rule D, and rule B also consents to it.
Article 21 - Habit
64. Habit is an implicit principle that applies to the explicit principles. Now just as a good man does good by habituating himself with good moral virtue, so whoever habituates himself with a moral habit does so by reason of habit. And the same with goodness, greatness etc. Whatever is habituated is a concrete of habit, just as white things are habituated with whiteness, or coated things with coats, or fire with heat, or a just man with justice, so whatever is habituated, is habituated with habit. Further, with the first species of rule D and the mixture of principles and rules, the intellect understands the origin of habit and the subjects in which it is diffused; for instance, the intellect habituates its intrinsic intelligible with peregrine phantasms, so that the intellect is habituated with science through the phantasms known to it. And this is clearly shown by rule B.
Article 22 - Situation
65. Situation is an implicit term, but it applies to the correlatives by the first and second species of rule D and the first of E. And its definition also applies to the definitions of goodness etc. Now given that goodness is a reason for good to do good in the essence of goodness, it then follows that the correlatives of goodness are situated, and conversely, the correlatives of situation are bonified; and thus, situation is an accident that causes situating in the principles. Further, by the first species of rule D and by the contraction and mixture of the principles and rules, the intellect understands where situation springs from, and where it is brought from potentiality into act: for instance, great goodness is situated so that the correlatives of goodness are in the correlatives of greatness and vice versa. And rule B consents to this. And whatever is situated is a concrete of situation.
Article 23 - Time
66. Time is an explicit principle of this art, but to clarify its application, let us show how it applies to the other explicit principles and rules. For instance, its definition applies to the definition of principle: now time is the principle by reason of which all created things were new. And its definition also applies to the tenth rule, because time is the instrument with which there are days, nights, hours, motion and so forth. Further, time is applicable to the correlatives by the second species of rule C, whereby it is brought from potentiality into act, when the doer acts upon the doable with time and multiplies hours, days, nights and so forth. Whatever is timed is a concrete of time.
Article 24 - Locus
67. Locus is an explicit principle combined with the principles and rules, and its definition applies to the definition of principle: now locus is the principle by reason of which all things are containers and contained. Locus applies to the tenth rule because it is an instrument with which all mobile things can be moved from one new location to another new location. And locus applies to the correlatives from which it springs when these substantial correlatives locate peregrine correlatives within themselves; for instance, when fire heats water, it locates it in its ignitable; and the generator generates the generated in its own intrinsic generable, and so forth. Whatever is located is a concrete of locus.
Article 25 - Motion
68. Motion is an implicit principle, and its definition applies to the definition of principle, to the tenth rule and also to the rest of the principles and rules. Now motion is the principle by reason of which all mobile things are mobile. And its correlatives spring from substantial correlatives, like accidents from substance. Motion is the instrument with which substance moves either locally, or by growing, or through alteration. It moves locally, like heaven that moves in a circle with its appetite which belongs to the genus of motion, or like a runner running down a road; substance moves through growth, like plants that grow and reproduce; it moves through alteration, as when wine turns into vinegar, or cold water becomes hot, or a healthy man falls ill, or when justice turns into injury and so forth. Whatever is moved is a concrete of motion, but the essence of motion cannot be sensed or imagined, although motion can be sensed and imagined in subjects in which it exists, for instance: the sight can see the mover and the moved when a hammer strikes a nail, or when the sense of touch detects motion in the pulse. Now this does not mean that the senses can perceive the essence of motion, for they can only sense the figure of motion, and likewise with other things in their own way, for instance, when the sight sees a falling stone, it does not attain the essence of motion or the essence of the stone, but only color and shape.
Article 26 - Immobility
69. Immobility is an implicit principle, but we can apply its definition to the definition of principle. Now just as principle is the cause by reason of which things can begin, so is immobility the principle by reason of which immobile things are immobile. Immobility applies to its intrinsic correlatives, from which it can never be separated, as form cannot be separated from action, nor matter from passion, nor hot things from heat, nor good things from goodness, and so forth. Whatever is immobile is a concrete of immobility. The correlatives of immobility are the immobilizer, the immobile and immobilizing, just like the essence of intellect comprises the intellective, the intelligible and understanding, which are immobile because they are permanent in their difference, properties and the duration of their numerical identities. Now if they were mobile, the essence of the intellect could be corrupted and altered, as could the essence of fire, etc. And this is signified by the first species of rule E and the second of D. Also, by the second species of rule E, immobile things do not seek repose outside of themselves, and so forth.
Article 27 - Instinct
70. Instinct is an implicit principle that applies to wisdom, and its definition applies to the definition of wisdom with the tenth rule: now just as wisdom is that with which the wise understand, so likewise, natural instinct is that with which natural subjects naturally act entirely in accordance with their species. For instance, a plant instinctively produces flowers, leaves, fruit, taste etc. and irrational animals likewise have the instinct and industry they need to survive. By the second species of rule C, the correlatives of instinct apply to the correlatives of the explicit principles, and anything instinctive is a concrete of instinct, as signified by the second species of D and the first of E. And the purpose of instinct is shown by the second species of rule E.
Article 28 - Appetite
71. Natural appetite is an implicit principle, and its definition applies to the definition of will. Now just as the will wants something and makes it an object of desire and longing, so does appetite seek out its object in order to find repose in it: and this is how elemented things have an appetite for elementing, plants for vegetating and producing flowers, leaves and fruit and for reproducing individuals of their own species. The explicit principles concur in this, for instance, goodness in a subject has an appetite for its own act of bonifying. And this is shown by the second species of rule E. Appetite has its own correlatives that apply to the correlatives of will. And appetite has its concrete designated by the second species of rule D and the first of E, whereby it moves to find repose in the second species of rule E, like a man moving with his will toward moral principles, or to his beloved, and so forth.
Article 29 - Attraction
72. Attraction is an implicit principle which applies to the definitions of the end and of goodness. Now the end attracts completed things to itself just like the bonifier attracts the bonified, the will attracts the beloved, respiration attracts what is breathed, vision attracts colored objects, taste attracts savory objects and so forth. The correlatives of attraction apply to the correlatives of the explicit principles by the second species of rule C. Now the attractor attracts the attracted to the passive part of its essence, like fire attracts air to its heating power so as to heat it, respiration attracts air so as to breathe it, a power attracts its object so as to objectify it, and so with other things in their own way. Whatever is attracted is a concrete of attraction. And attraction attracts natural species and operations to itself to enable itself to act and to enable the explicit principles to have their acts and to have repose in the second species of rule E, just like a magnet that attracts iron with its entire species so that the dryness and cold in the iron artificially come to rest in the dryness and cold of the magnet as in their natural subject. And here the intellect sees how artificial things are attracted by natural ones.
Article 30 - Reception
73. Reception is an implicit principle whose definition applies to the definition of the material principle, whereas attraction applies to the formal principle, just as active correlatives belong to the genus of attraction and passive correlatives to the genus of reception. However, this does not mean that reception has correlatives, because if it had any, then the active and passive correlatives, as well as form and matter, would be numerically identical, which is impossible. But it does mean that the attractor receives the peregrine attracted object in the passive part of its essence, like sight receives color in its own innate visible, and the intellect also receives peregrine species in its own innate intelligible, and so on. And here the intellect realizes that the object does not move the power, but that the power moves itself with the object, for otherwise the object would be both active and passive, so that power would be confused with act and the active and passive would be numerically and naturally identical, and thus the very same things could be said about attraction as about reception, which is impossible. Whatever is received is a concrete of reception, applicable to the second species of rule D and the first of E, and is constituted from several passive correlatives in the subject in which it exists.
Article 31 - Phantasm
74. Phantasm, or species, applies to the definitions of wisdom and will with the fourth species of the rule of instrumentality, because whatever these faculties do is done with phantasms. Phantasm applies to the first species of rule D and to the definition of principle as follows: while a man is looking at a horse, he is not imagining it, but when he closes his eyes, or when the horse is absent, then he imagines it, and the phantasm is brought from potential to act in the subject, received in the imagination where the intellect gathers it into its own innate intelligible so as to build science, and also places it into memory for conservation, and thus it acquires another new phantasm. And the will acts in the same way with its concupiscible and irascible parts. Here the intellect sees how sciences and moral customs are generated, with the concurrence of all the explicit principles and the rules; now it is very difficult to generate a phantasm due to the smallness of the being in which it exists. A fantasy imagined and constituted from several likenesses is a concrete phantasm, however, in irrational animals, fantasies do not go beyond the imagination, for if they did, then even beasts would have science; but their fantasies remain permanently within their imagination to provide them with the industry they need to survive. And this is manifested by rule B.
Article 32 - Fullness
75. Fullness is an implicit principle whose definition applies to the definitions of goodness, greatness etc. Now the fullness of goodness is a reason for it to produce god, and the fullness of greatness is a reason for goodness to be full of greatness and conversely. And likewise with the rest, as shown in the mixture of principles and rules. Further, the correlatives of fullness apply to the correlatives of goodness, which are full of the correlatives of fullness. Whatever is full is a concrete of fullness as shown by the second species of rule D and the first of E, and especially when it finds repose by the second species of rule E. Emptiness is its opposite, and its definition is applicable to terms opposite to fullness. And in view of what we just said, we have sufficiently dealt with evacuation.
Article 33 - Diffusion
76. Diffusion is an implicit principle and its definition applies to the definitions of goodness, difference etc. Now goodness is a reason that produces good, and it is diffusive, expanding in the subject in which it exists as it contracts with greatness, duration etc. and as difference distinguishes diffusion with its correlatives signified by the second species of rule C. Whatever is diffused is a concrete of diffusion, habituated with diffusion and situated in it as is shown by the second species of rule D and the first of E. The opposite of diffusion is restriction, which applies to the definition of concordance, and it is with this that the avaricious man practices avarice.
Article 34 - Digestion
77. Digestion is an implicit principle and its definition applies to the definitions of virtue and majority. Now innate virtue digests peregrine virtues in its own species with majority, just as a plant, with its own species, digests the elements into this species, and this is also how animals digest food and drink. The correlatives of digestion apply to the correlatives of virtue and majority. Whatever is digested and habituated with digestion is a concrete of digestion.
Article 35 - Expulsion
78. Expulsion is an implicit principle that applies to the definition of contrariety. Now an opposite expels its counterpart from the subject in which it exists, as we see when animals expel feces, urine and scabs; and plants act similarly by expelling flowers, leaves and fruit that do not permanently reside in them. Morally, a king can be expelled from his kingdom, and a sinner from God's grace and from the end for which he is meant. Further, the correlatives of expulsion apply to the correlatives of contrariety. Whatever is expelled and habituated with expulsion is a concrete of expulsion.
Article 36 - Signification
79. Signification is an implicit principle whose definition applies to the explicit principles and to the rules. Now given that goodness is a reason for good to produce good, when goodness is contracted to greatness, it signifies that good and great things produce great good, and likewise with the other principles. The correlatives of signification apply to those of goodness, greatness etc. and it is with the correlatives of signification that goodness signifies what it is and what it contains in itself. Whatever is signified and habituated with signification is a concrete of signification. The opposite of signification is occultation and its definition applies to things opposite to signification.
Article 37 - Beauty
80. Beauty is an implicit principle whose definition applies to the definitions of the explicit principles. Now goodness, greatness etc. are instances of beauty, except contrariety and minority, although minority is beautiful when it is proportioned to the subject in which it exists, as for instance in a small child. The correlatives of beauty consist in the second species of rule C, as a beautiful cause naturally causes a beautiful effect, and as the intellect causes beautiful figures in the imagination with love by reason of the end designated by the second species of rule E, as well as by rule G whereby beauty is more beautiful in its own habit than in an appropriated one. Likewise, beauty consists more in majority than in minority, as we see in rhetoric, when rhetoricians color their words more in the light of a major end than of a minor end.
Article 38 - Newness
81. Newness is a primordial form, whose subjects are habituated with new habits, like heaven is habituated with locus, time and motion. And this can be said about all elemented things. And this is signified by the first species of rule D. There had to be a first newness just as there was a first motion, time and place. And here the intellect realizes that newness cannot exist without place, time and motion, because the all must exists together at the same time. And rules B, H and I consent to this.
Article 39 - Idea
82. In eternity, an idea is God, but in newness it is a creature, like the shape of a chest that was old in the carpenter's mind and was new when it was brought from potentiality to act. And this is shown plainly enough by the divine correlatives designated by the second species of rule C. Now in its own infinite and eternal intelligible, the divine intellect attains all newnesses stripped of every created subject, and such newnesses are the divine ideas, but by the third species of rule C, they are creatures, and as such they are new, finite and delimited.
Article 40 - Metaphysics
83. Metaphysics is the form with which the human intellect strips substance of all accidents so that only substance remains, so it can distinguish between genus and species and thereby acquire and build science. This metaphysical form is exemplified and caused by means of idea stripped of all creatures, so that this idea can be known through the metaphysical form. And this is shown by the first species of rule D, the second species of rule E and the fourth species of K. This form is the genus of all the forms that are brought from potentiality to act, as shown in the ninth subject.
Article 41 - Potential Being
84. Potential being is a form which exists in its subject without any motion, surface, quantity, quality and so forth, as for instance in a seed in which a tree potentially exists. And when this form is brought from potentiality to act, something arises during this process, namely the generation of the form's accidents; and once this form has arisen with the said accidents, it is already habituated with them because these accidents arise, or have arisen, from the accidents actually existing in the subject in which the said form existed potentially. And here the intellect sees how one substance naturally springs from another substance and some accidents spring naturally from other accidents. And rule B consents to this, as do the definitions of goodness, power, virtue, principle and medium. Similarly, this is confirmed by the second species of rule C, by rule G and the fourth species of rule K.
Article 42 - Punctuality
85. Punctuality is the essence of the natural point, which is the smallest part of a body. A point is indivisible and so close to minority that neither the senses nor the imagination can attain it. And here the intellect wonders how it can learn anything about the natural point, since it cannot be sensed or imagined. But it gets help from the mental point objectified by sight and imagination, which gives it access to knowledge about the natural point and on which it can build science. Rule B, the first species of rule D as well as rules F and I support this.
Article 43 - The Line
86. The natural line is a length constituted of several continuous points, and its extremes are two points. It is the second part of body, it is called the second because it is constituted of several points, as shown by rules K and F. Points stand for discrete quantity, but length stands for continuous quantity; and the fact that a line can be divided into points shows that points signify discrete quantity. Width arises from several continuous lines and consequently, surface arises from the simultaneous presence of length and width in a subject. But depth springs from the rotundity of the points, because a point is spherical in nature before having length and breadth, as we can see in the buds that grow into branches on a tree. A further reason for the point's rotundity is that the circle is a likeness of heaven, and as such, it is the strongest of all figures with regard to natural motion. And here the intellect knows what the primordial principles of body are, namely: the point, the line, length, breadth, surface and depth.
Article 44 - The Triangle
87. A triangle is a figure with three angles contained by three lines, as we can see in elemented things where each element has its own triangle. For instance, fire has one angle which is hot and dry, another angle which is hot and moist, and another which is cold and dry. This triangle is attributed to fire which rules the other angles with its heat and dryness. Likewise, air has another triangle where it rules with moisture and heat. Water also has a triangle where it rules with cold and moisture. And earth has one where it rules with dryness and cold. Now the intellect knows the essences of which elemented bodies are full, and by reason of which the elements enter into mutual composition through difference, concordance and contrariety. But the intellect doubts whether it can have any scientific knowledge of such triangles, since they have never been perceived by the senses. Then it remembers the plane figure of a triangle which can be sensed and which serves to imagine and know the natural triangle, with the help of rule K and the second species of rules D and E.
Article 45 - The Square
88. The natural square is a figure with four right angles. And each right angle of the square implies two acute angles, because they belong to the genus of the triangle; now each element has two qualities: a proper and an appropriated one, as shown by rule G. In the square, fire rules one angle, and air rules another etc. And here we see how the square is divided into four equal triangles by diametrical lines. And now the intellect sees how the square results from four triangles, the triangle from three lines, and the line from continuous points.
Article 46 - The Circle
89. The circle is the ultimate figure. It is called ultimate because it is more perfect than any other figure, for it contains all the other figures from which it descends and of which it is constituted, as shown by the first species of rule D and the fourth species of rule K. For the circle springs from the triangle, the square, the pentagon etc. until the angles join together as points in a circular line to produce a likeness of heaven, which is the greatest figure. And rule B consents to this.
Article 47 - Bodies
90. A body is a substance full of points, lines and angles, situated in length, breadth and depth and habituated with a surface. A body has its coessential parts which are the points, lines and angles of which it is fully composed. By the second species of rule C, one body is terminated by another body. By the second species of rule D, it is made of its coessential parts. By rule F it has continuous and discrete quantity. By rule G it is a common aggregate composed of substance and accidents. By rule H it exists in time, by rule I it exists in space, and by rule K it is in motion. But the intellect wonders why the eighth sphere is not contained in any other place. And it remains in doubt until it considers the fact that all bodies are finite and habituated with shape, otherwise there would be an infinite body, which is impossible.
Article 48 - Figures
91. A figure is an accident made of situation and habit, which are its parts by the second species of rule C. And by the third species of this rule, a figure is a habit of bodies, and by the fourth species, it has straight and curved lines. With color, a figure is an object of sight, but with lines and angles and without color, it is an object of touch, and with all these things it is an object of the imagination. And here the intellect realizes that the imagination is a higher power than the senses, and more general than sight. Now a figure cannot be objectified by the intellect without imagination. And here the intellect realizes that after a man's death, his soul retains the species it had acquired through the imagination so as to keep in memory this earthly life and the body in which it was present.
Article 49 - The Directions
92. There are six general directions, with the body at the center of the intersecting diametrical lines, so that the body can move up, down, to the right, to the left, forward and backward. Now the intellect wonders why there are no more or less than six general directions. Then it remembers that motion cannot be complete without them, for if there were more or less of them, motion would be imperfect, as shown by the third and fourth species of rule C. And the second species of the same rule signifies that the six said directions are essential parts of the motion with which bodies are situated and habituated. But the intellect wonders why spherical bodies have no such directions, for instance the human head, an eye, an apple and things like that. Then it remembers the world with its spherical body, and that the world is not enclosed by any such directions because it is the ultimate body which reproduces its likenesses in the said spherical bodies, so that the intellect can gain knowledge of it. And rules B and K consent to this.
Article 50 - Monstrosity
93. Monstrosity is a deviation of natural motion from the starting point to the ending point in the subject in which it exists, due to excessive or insufficient influence from the virtues of bodies above, below, to the right, to the left, to the front and to the back. Such motion causes privative habits like blindness, deafness and so forth. And this is because it moves outside the second species of rule C. And this motion is imperfect in the third species of rule C; by the fourth species of rule C it has the imperfections that are due to a deficiency in the second species of rule C.
Article 51 - Derivation
94. Derivation is a general subject through which the particular descends from the universal, like a stream from a fountain, a line from points, a triangle from lines, a child from parents through the general instruments of procreation, a conclusion from its premises, the consequent from the antecedent, science from things reflected through the intellect, and so forth. And as the intellect thus considers derivation, it knows by the second species of rule C that derivation contains its own innate essential correlatives from which many particulars are derived, like many children from the same parents, or many elemented things from the four general elements, or like many sciences invented by one and the same intellect. The intellect contains its own innate coessential and general correlatives with which it investigates and builds many sciences derived from the same form or species. And here the intellect realizes that its own correlatives are above those of science, with species standing between the two, as between the cause and the effect. And now the intellect knows what sciences are derived from, and how.
Article 52 - Shadow
95. Shadow is a habit that deprives light so it cannot move in its six directions which we dealt with above in article 49, because it is blocked by a body standing in the way. And we clearly experience this in the shadow of a tree, or a tower. But now the intellect asks: what is shadow a color of? And what is a shadow's shape? And it considers that air is transparent, because outside the shadow it receives the color of the Sun and of fire, namely brightness, and wherever there is shadow it receives the color of earth, like a crystal - and crystal is nothing but congealed water - when placed on something yellow takes on a yellow habit, and a black habit when placed on something black. And here the intellect realizes that light is the color of the Sun and fire; black is the color of earth; transparency is the color of air and white is the color of water because it causes whiteness. The shape of a shadow is the terminus where light and shadow meet. And this is supported by the definition of medium and the second and fourth species of rule C.
96. But the intellect asks: why is there shadow on the Moon? And it remains in doubt until it considers that the Moon is a clear body on which the shadow of earth appears. Then it wonders why no shadow appears on the Sun which is also a clear body. And it continues to reflect until it considers that the Sun is colored by its own light and that moonlight comes from sunlight just as the heat of air comes from the heat of fire. And this is proved by rules B, C, G and E.
Article 53 - Mirrors
97. A mirror is a clear body disposed to reflect all the shapes put before it. But the intellect wonders: given that glass is a clear body, why does it not reflect shapes just like a mirror also made of glass? And to clarify this issue it remembers the article on shadow. Now glass without lead is a body clear on both sides and it lets light pass in all the six directions dealt with in article 49. But this is not the case with a mirror: here the lead, with the gross and highly compacted features of its matter, blocks light in some directions. All the particles of lead are highly compacted together and thus, just as a tree causes a shadow by standing in the way of light, so does the glass between the lead, the air and the shape or color presented to it generate within itself a shadow similar in habit and color to the shape before it. Now the intellect understands the principles of shadow and reflection in mirrors.
Article 54 - Color and Colored Things
98. Color is a quality which is an object of sight. And it is the habit of colored things, which are the substances in which color is sustained. A colored thing has its own substantial correlatives, but color is a habit of these substantial correlatives. And by the first species of rule D, color exists on its own, and by the third species of this rule it belongs to the colored thing. And by the first species of rule G, color is a proper quality in a real man or plant, but an appropriated quality in a picture of a man or plant, etc. The quantity of a color does not properly belong to it but it is appropriated, for it belongs to the colored thing. And here the intellect understands how one accident is situated in another by reason of rule G. And what was said about color and colored things can also be said about heat and hot things, etc.
Article 55 - Proportion and Proportionate Things
98. Substantial proportion consists in consubstantial correlatives, for instance, infinity has its own proportionate consubstantial correlatives, without which infinity can neither exist nor act. Finite things are not proportionate to infinite ones because they are limited and encompassed. Nor is time proportionate to eternity because it is new. But infinity is truly proportionate to the infinite agent through an infinite act proportionate to both. And the same can be said about the eternalizer, the eternalized and eternalizing, and also about the other divine reasons. And we can likewise consider the substantial correlatives in created things, for instance in the intellect whose innate intellective, intelligible and understanding are its own natural proportionate correlatives; but science cannot be proportionate to the intellect because it can never be enough for the intellect, like fuel for fire, given that fire can burn more fuel than can be supplied to it. Nonetheless, there can really be accidental proportion in correlatives, like between a heated thing and heating. And here the intellect realizes that no accident can be proportionate in weight to substance, because substance has more in itself and accidents have less. And this is clear by the definitions of majority and minority. But in accordance with justice, there can be proportion between substance and accidents, and between accidents and accidents. And here the intellect understands how an animal's organs are proportionate to it, and how mores are proportionate to man, and the things by which a subject is proportioned.
Article 56 - Disposition and Things that are Disposed
100. Substantial disposition is a form in which substantial correlatives are equally disposed by the power, the object and the act: for instance, in infinite and eternal divine goodness, a reason is disposed for infinite and eternal good to produce infinite and eternal good, which is disposed toward the bonifier, and bonifying is likewise disposed toward them by infinite and eternal goodness. However, there is another disposition which is accidental, as shown by the third species of rule C: for instance, God is disposed to pass judgment and to produce whatever man is disposed to receive in the way of justice or mercy. However, this is not done according to weight, but according to justice, for God is more disposed toward man by reason of his goodness than man is disposed toward God, just as fire is disposed to burn more fuel than can be supplied to its combustive power. And the same can be said about the human intellect, because the intellect is more disposed to understand an accidental object than the object is disposed to be understood by the intellect; for instance, the intelligibility of a stone is not proportionate to the human intellect because it can understand higher things, such as the intelligibility of the sensitive faculties, or of heaven or of the angels etc. which are higher intelligibilities than those of a stone. And the same can be said about man: he can run more than he does, because he does not want to run as much as he could. And the same can be said about other things in their own way.
Article 57 - Creation and Created Things
101. Creation is an idea in eternity by the second species of rule C because it is known to divine wisdom and loved by the divine will from eternity and in eternity. But in created being it is a habit and an act by the third species of rule C, and by the fourth species of the same rule, creation as an idea has creation, which is a creature, whereby it has a new created being, passive under its action and habituated with a new habit. And here the intellect sees how idea transits to ideated being by reproducing its likeness by the fourth species of rule K.
Article 58 - Predestination and Predestined Things
102. Predestination is an idea in God's eternal wisdom. Thus, it exists from eternity and in eternity, by reason of the correlatives of the second species of rule C. Now the eternal intellective understands all future, new, past and old things in its own eternal intelligible. Future and new things have always been understood by God's wisdom from eternity and past and old things will always be understood by it in eternity. Given this, the predestined man who exists in the middle between the said termini is accidentally habituated with a new predestination, like someone wearing a new coat. And thus, predestination is considered in one way with the second species of rule C and in another way with the third species of this rule, for by the second species of rule C it is an idea, but it is a created habit by the third species, and the predestined man disposes himself freely toward doing good with this habit, like a man wearing a new coat, and like a judge disposed to pass judgment with the habit of justice; otherwise, predestination as an idea would have no way to create new predestination objectified from eternity and in eternity, which is false, as shown by the fourth species of rule K. And here the intellect rejoices because it has been greatly enlightened about predestination, but it grieves because this kind of clarification is little known in the world, now the obfuscation of predestination is a source of error and doubt for many.
Article 59 - Mercy, and the Recipient of Mercy
103. Mercy is an idea in eternity, by the second species of rule C; and by the third species of rule C, it is a habit that exists in a newly predestined man who is disposed to contrition, confession and satisfaction for committed sins, so he can be habituated with mercy, like a predestined man is habituated with predestination through the good deeds he loves with his free will; otherwise, if a sinner does not dispose himself toward receiving forgiveness, he cannot be habituated with mercy, just like an evil man committed to doing evil cannot put on the habit of goodness. And this is a source of rejoicing for sinners who do penance, for God can forgive more than man can sin, as fire can burn more fuel than can be supplied to it.
Article 60 - Necessity, and Necessitated Things
104. Necessity is a form that cannot be otherwise, as the second species of rule C shows. And since nothing can be necessitated without necessity, it follows that necessity is the antecedent and the necessitated thing is consequent. For instance, infinite and eternal divine goodness is a reason for infinite and eternal good to produce infinite and eternal good, so that the producer is necessitated by reason of goodness, and consequently the produced and the production are necessitated as well. And this is shown by the second species of rule C.
Further, there is another kind of necessity and of necessitated things: for instance if a man is good, he is necessitated or called to do good, but if he is evil, he is necessitated to do evil. Now just as God's justice necessitates judgment in judging, so does God's mercy necessitate forgiveness in granting pardon. And here the intellect realizes that when a sinner is disposed to receive judgment by sentencing himself to penance, he is disposing himself to be pardoned. Further, the intellect sees how God's justice and mercy necessitate their acts in a new subject, and the intellect greatly rejoices in this knowledge.
Article 61 - Fortune and the Fortunate Man
105. Fortune is a mere accident extraneous to the second species of rule C. And it is a habit with which the fortunate man is accidentally disposed toward his good fortune, like a traveler who by chance finds gold on his way. Fortune consists in the second species of rule D, it has existence in its subject by the fourth species of rule C, and it is what it is by the third species of rule D. And it is extraneous to the beginning, middle and end, and to concordance and contrariety; but it is not extraneous to majority and minority. And here the intellect realizes that fortune is a very small thing in itself, but a great thing for the fortunate man.
Article 62 - Order and Orderly Things
106. Order is the assemblage of many principles that enables them all to repose together in one common end. Whatever is ordered is a concrete of order and habituated with order. Order first emerges from the first species of rule C as a habit in the subject in which it exists, and it has repose in the fourth species of rule C. Order has its own primordial principles, as shown by the first species of rule D and by the definition of principle, and it is derived from the definition of concordance, whereas contrariety is its enemy when the modality designated by rule K is deficient.
Article 63 - Advice and who is Advised
107. Advice is a proposal about some doubtful issue, and it is intended for the person advised. The advisor must examine the doubtful issue at hand by applying the second species of rule C, rule B and the definitions of the principles to test how the person advised by him is configured by the ninth subject in the third species of rule C, and habituated with the virtues in the fourth species of rule C, to ensure that this habit is removed from the vices in the ninth subject with the help of rules D, E, F, G, H, I and K.
Article 64 - Grace and the Recipient of Grace
108. Grace is a primordial form placed in its recipient without any merit on his part, as shown by the first species of rule D and by majority in the giver of grace and minority in its recipient, as well as by the habit of charity. Grace is also in its recipient due to the definition of goodness, and to the magnificence of a will habituated with liberality. And so the intellect now sees how grace is diffused in the subject in which it exists. And when it is impeded, it is not by higher principles but by lower ones, as when someone considers that he is worthy and deserves to receive grace through his own merit, and not by reason of the generosity, liberality and kindness of the giver of grace.
Article 65 - Perfection and Perfect Things
109. Perfection is a form which reposes in a perfect subject, and it is habituated with all that constitutes the perfect subject's habits, as shown by the third species of rule C. And perfection is derived from the second species of rule C through many streams, which are the numerous principles and rules of this art. Now this kind of perfection is specifically moral, as shown in the ninth subject. Nonetheless, the highest perfection is in the natural perfection which is essentially, naturally, infinitely and eternally perfect. And this perfection is the highest due to its own consubstantial correlatives designated by the second species of rule C. The perfector produces the perfected from its own consubstantial and natural perfection, and not from any other being, for the perfected is coessential with the perfector and both together do their perfect act of perfecting which is coessential and consubstantial with them.
Article 66 - Clarification and what is Clarified
109. Clarification is a form in which the intellect comes to rest through discernment, by means of the definition of concordance entirely segregated from the definition of contrariety. Clarification is the habit of clarified subjects, as shown by the third species of rule C. Its essence consists in the second species of rule C where the knower clarifies knowledge, aware that he is active and that the knowledge is passive in the act of knowing. And here the intellect sees how habit accidentally arises from substance, so that clarified subjects can be dealt with scientifically, with the help of the principles and the rules.
Article 67 - Transubstantiation and Transubstantiated Things
111. Transubstantiation is an act with which nature strips transubstantiated things of old forms and clothes them in new and different forms so that nature's act can move successively through all things subject to generation and corruption; now without this kind of transubstantiation, nature would be restrained from accomplishing its own substantial act as well as its accidental acts, and its privative habit would be immutable, thus destroying the definitions of its principles, which is impossible. The artist can get a general notion of transubstantiation from the seventh subject where the vegetative is combined with the sequence of the principles and rules of this art.
Article 68 - Alteration and Altered Things
112. Alteration is a form which arises in things that are altered, as shown by the third species of rule C. And this alteration springs from the alteration which exists in the second species of rule C, like a streamlet from a source. Here the intellect recognizes the ways of natural motion and moral movement: now he recognizes the natural way of motion in generation, where form and matter are altered as the altering agent, in its own innate alterable and with its coessential altering act, alters things that come to it from outside, so that the motion of nature can grow and exist, by means of the definition of medium. Moral alteration occurs when a man exchanges one habit for another, like justice for injury, ire for patience, logic for medicine, sadness for joy and so forth.
Article 69 - Infinity and the Infinite
113. Infinity is a form with an infinite act removed from all that is finite, and which has no way of existing without an infinite being. The reason for this is that it cannot repose in a finite subject. Infinity has its own correlatives by the second species of rule C, and it cannot have them without infinite goodness, greatness, eternity etc. or else there would be a contradiction, whereby it would be infinite and not infinite, impeded and unimpeded, which is an impossibility. Infinity is the cause of finiteness and whatever is finite, as shown by the third species of rule C; and infinity has action in infinite being by the second species of rule C, and in finite being by the fourth. Finite being is habituated with passion just as it is habituated with newness, or else it would have an infinite habit as well as a finite one, which is impossible. And here the intellect realizes that just as finiteness has finite coessential correlatives which are the finitizer, the finitized and finitizing, so likewise and far better, does infinity have infinite ones, namely the infinitizer, the infinitized and infinitizing; or else the nature of finiteness would be greater whereas the nature of infinity would be lesser, which is impossible.
Article 70 - Deception and who is Deceived
114. Deception is a positive habit for the deceiver and a privative habit for the one deceived. And thus, by the second species of rule C, the knower causes deception in his innate knowledge and clothes his knowing with it, and by the third species of rule C he is the deceiver of the deceived person he misleads. However, the deceived person is not deceived in his own second species of rule C, but in the third species, and in the fourth he has a misleading habit with which he deviates from the final purpose for which he exists. And here the intellect sees what sin arises from and where it dwells.

             Next
             Previous
             Contents