

Invocation

God, with your supreme perfection here begins The Ultimate General Art by Blessed Raymond Lull.

Foreword

1. After composing many general arts I want to explain them more clearly with this, the Ultimate Art, so named because we did not intend to develop a further art more general than this one; we compiled it from the other arts to which we added here some new explicit information.

Human minds adhere more to opinions than to science and each science has principles different from those of other sciences. Therefore, the human intellect requires and seeks one general science with its own general principles in which the principles of all other sciences are contained as particulars of a universal that regulates the principles of other sciences, and enables the intellect to repose in those sciences by really understanding them and banishing all erroneous opinions. This science helps to establish the principles of all other sciences by clarifying their particular principles in the light of the general principles of this art, to which all particular principles belong as parts belong to the whole.

2. Here are the principles of this art: Goodness, Greatness, Eternity, Power, Wisdom, Will, Virtue, Truth, Glory, Difference, Concordance, Contrariety, Beginning, Middle, End, Majority, Equality and Minority. We call them general, because the various aspects of goodness that all other sciences deal with refer to one general goodness, various aspects of greatness refer to one general greatness, and we can say the same about each remaining principle in its own way.

3. Further, this science is general because its general questions are general to all other questions. These ten questions imply all other questions. They are - Whether? What? Of What? Why? How much? What Quality? When? Where? How? With What?

4. Moreover, this art is general because its principles and rules are general, as we reveal below. Just as the general meaning of the term "proposition" is common to every kind of proposition, so likewise, the general meanings of these principles combined with each other are general to all particular composite principles. To dispel any doubt about this I say that all other principles are particular instances of the principles of this art. For instance, great goodness, which is a compound principle, is common to the goodness of Peter, the goodness of William, the goodness of a horse, and so forth.

5. This art has thirteen parts, namely: the alphabet, the figures, the definitions, the rules, the table, the evacuation of figure three, the multiplication of figure four, the mixture of principles and rules, the nine subjects, its application, its questions, the way to learn this art and the way to teach it.

Part 1 - The Alphabet


Here is the alphabet of this art:

- B.** stands for goodness, difference, whether? God, justice, avarice
- C.** stands for greatness, concordance, what? angels, prudence, gluttony
- D.** stands for duration, contrariety, of what? heaven, fortitude, lust
- E.** stands for power, beginning, why? man, temperance, conceit
- F.** stands for wisdom, middle, how much? imagination, faith, acedia
- G.** stands for will, end, what quality? senses, hope, envy
- H.** stands for virtue, majority, when? vegetation, charity, wrath
- I.** stands for truth, equality, where? elements, patience, lies
- K.** stands for glory, minority, how and with what? instruments, compassion, inconstancy

2. The artist must know the alphabet by heart, for without this, he cannot practice this art. The alphabet signifies the principles and the questions that provide information for solving specific problems with tried and true understanding free of doubt.

Part 2 - The Figures

Chapter 1 - The First Figure



The First Figure, signified by the letter A


There are four figures as shown. The letter A stands for the first figure, which is circular and divided into nine cameras. The first camera has B, the second has C, and so forth. This figure is circular because subjects and predicates are mutually convertible in it, as when we say "great goodness, good greatness, eternal greatness, great eternity, goodness is God, God is good," and so on. The circular motion enables an artist to discern between things that are convertible and things that are not convertible. For instance, God and good are convertible, but God and angel are not, nor are angels and goodness, nor are the goodness and greatness of angels; and likewise with the remaining terms.

2. This figure implicitly signifies all things, for instance we can say, "God is good, great and eternal etc. angels are good, great and durable, avarice is not good but evil," and so forth.

3. This figure shows the proper and appropriated qualities of subjects and predicates. Proper qualities, for instance: God is good, great etc. and angels have innate goodness, greatness etc. Appropriated qualities, for instance: evil angels have appropriated moral evil; fire has good and great dryness due to earth; man has good and great moral prudence, justice, etc.

4. The artist must habitually visualise this figure and apply it as shown to questions so that the intellect can truly attain the truth with it.

Chapter 2 - The Second Figure signified by the letter T



5. The second figure consists in three triangles, namely difference, concordance, contrariety etc. as shown. Above the angles of difference, concordance and contrariety stand the terms "sensual and sensual", "sensual and intellectual" and "intellectual and intellectual". They signify the difference that exists between some sensual beings and others, such as one body and another, between sensual and intellectual beings like the body and soul, and between some intellectual beings and others, for instance, God and angels. The same applies to concordance and contrariety.

6. Above the angle of beginning stand the terms "cause", "quantity" and "time". "Cause" stands for substantial principles, namely efficient, material, formal and final. Quantity and time signify accidental principles like the nine predicates and other similar things.

7. Above the angle of the middle, stand the terms "conjunction", "measure" and "extremes". They signify three species of medium, namely the medium of conjunction, the medium of measure and the medium between extremes. A medium of conjunction is, for instance, a nail that joins two boards. A medium of measure is like the center of a circle, equally distant from every point of the circumference. A medium between extremes is like a line between two points.

8. Above the angle of the end, stand the terms "privation", "termination" and "perfection" (or final cause) to denote three species of end. A privative end is, for instance, death ending life.

The end of termination is like the boundary of a kingdom or field. The end of perfection, or the final cause, is like God who is the cause and end of all things.

9. Above the angles of majority, equality and minority stand the terms "between substance and substance", meaning that one substance is superior to another, as human substance is greater in goodness, virtue, etc. than the substance of stones. "Between substance and accident" means that substance is superior to accident: for instance, a man's substance is more important than his size etc. "Between accident and accident" means that some accidents are superior to others, for instance, understanding is superior to sensing. We can say the same, in its own way, about minority as opposed to majority. And there is substantial equality among various things, for instance: men and stones equally belong to the genus of substance. There is accidental equality among various things, for instance: understanding and loving equally belong to the genus of accidents. There is equality between substance and accident, for instance, quantity and its substantial subject are equal in extension and surface.

10. The green triangle consisting of difference, concordance and contrariety is general to all things because everything in existence has some difference, concordance or contrariety. Everything in existence is implicitly signified by his triangle, although difference is more general than concordance and contrariety, because there can be more differences than concordances or contrarieties among things. For instance, Peter and Martin are different individuals of the same species, but they have contrary moral characters, because one is just and the other is unjust, and so forth.

Difference causes plurality and concordance causes unity. Difference distinguishes one thing from another, concordance unites various things, and contrariety corrupts and dissolves things. The green triangle exists in all natural subjects, and the discursive intellect keeps in mind and distinguishes the said three species of difference, concordance and contrariety as it moves up and down this ladder. The intellect is simply and objectively general when it thinks only in terms of difference, concordance and contrariety. But when it focuses on the ladder formed by the three species, it is neither entirely general nor entirely specific, as for instance, when it says "between sensual and sensual," etc. When the intellect thinks of individuals, it is entirely particular.

11. The red triangle consisting of beginning, middle and end is general to all things because it contains everything, since everything in existence is in the beginning, middle, or end. Indeed, nothing can exist without these terms. A beginning, or principle, is something followed by everything else. A natural or moral universal principle cannot exist in any way without including within itself its own intrinsic active principle, passive principle and functional principle. Heat cannot naturally exist without the heater, the heatable and the act of heating; likewise, a principle cannot naturally exist without its three natural intrinsic principles. The artist must know that the three intrinsic correlatives of each universal principle are its essence's own subjective causal properties, and he must know how to distinguish these essential correlatives from the morally acquired accidental ones. Causal principles are necessary, whereas accidental ones are contingent and meant for well-being. Thus, the artist must ascend and descend back and forth from universals to particulars.

12. Like the beginning, the middle, or medium, is also universal, for an agent always begins with a beginning, and then it mediates through a medium whereby it joins distinct entities into one compound or mixture.

Acts are measured with the medium of measurement, for instance: the intellect measures its act of understanding by putting it in the middle between the intellective and the intelligible. In the same way, the beholder measures his beholding, a producer measures his production, and a judge measures his judging.

The middle of extremes implies essence and continuity. Goodness, for instance, is a simple essence that stands in the middle between greatness and duration and contains its own intrinsic act of bonifying in the middle between bonifier and bonified that join each other in bonifying, and all three are one undivided goodness, which is not the case with moral goodness.

These three species of the middle, or medium, are a ladder on which the intellect ascends and descends as it investigates the middle in things.

Likewise, the efficient cause reposes beings in the ultimate terminus by means of the end, but it cannot repose them at all in a privative terminus because it is privative. In the end of termination, disparate beings repose in disparate ways. This kind of investigation is a very useful light whereby the intellect attains the entities of things.

13. In the saffron triangle, we understand that there is one universal majority above all particular majorities. With majority, an agent does major things just as it begins things with the beginning. The same applies to equality and minority in their own way. Substantial goodness and other substantial principles are associated with majority, whereas accidental goodness etc. are associated with minority. In substantial goodness, the intrinsic bonifier (active goodness), bonified (passive goodness) and bonifying (act of goodness) are essentially equal. The same applies to the intellect, to the will, to igneity (essential fire) etc. and to the equality of causal and moral accidents. The intellect ascends and descends through these three species to grasp the truth about things generally related to majority, equality and minority in substance and accident. This ascent and descent is a powerful artificial technique for acquiring science.

14. We described the second figure as the intellect's instrument for working with the first figure by distinguishing between goodness, greatness etc. by means of difference, then by comparing the principles with each other in concordance and then by proceeding likewise with the remaining principles, each in its own way. Further, with difference, the intellect distinguishes between the bonifier, bonified and bonifying in the essence of goodness. Then it compares them with concordance and finds that they are identical in essence naturally but not morally, because moral difference is not innate but acquired from contingent principles.

Chapter 3 - The Third Figure

BC	CD	DE	EF	FG	GH	HI	IK
BD	CE	DF	EG	FH	GI	HK	
BE	CF	DG	EH	FI	GK		
BF	CG	DH	EI	FK			
BG	CH	DI	EK				
BH	CI	DK					
BI	CK						
BK							

15. The third figure is composed of the first and second figures and has thirty-six cameras as shown. Each camera has two letters; the first has BC, the second BD and so on. We say it is composed of two figures, because its letter B stands for the letter B in both the first and second figures, and its C stands for C in the first figure and C in the second figure, and so on.

16. In this art, this figure serves to signify how each principle applies to the others. We apply C, D, ... K to B in order to learn about B by means of C, D, etc. and to apply what we learn here to any question regarding B. We proceed with C as we did with B, and combine C with B, D, and so on to camera CK. We follow the same process through the remaining cameras to camera IK at will, in whatever way we want to multiply many reasons for the same conclusion. We do all this by considering the meanings of the cameras and applying them to the issue at hand.

17. This figure shows how to descend to particulars gradually in four ways.


1 - First, with camera BC we say, "Goodness has great difference and concordance".

2 - The intellect considers the angle of difference and gradually descends to particulars by understanding the difference and concordance between one sensual being and another, etc. as explained in the second figure.

3 - The intellect descends further by considering that there is good difference and concordance between fire and air because they convene in heat.

4 - The intellect descends by understanding the good difference and concordance that exists among the bonifier, bonified and bonifying, which all belong to one essence of goodness. What we said about BC also applies to the remaining cameras of this figure.

Chapter 4 - The Fourth Figure



18. The fourth figure has three circles as shown, and it includes the first, second and third figures. The Table derives from it, as camera BCD is used for constructing column BCD of the Table, camera BCE for column BCE etc.

19. This figure of the art gives rise to the sequence of the Table and provides many reasons and conclusions. Here, you can find many reasons for the same conclusion by applying the letters' meanings to any issue at hand while eliminating any statement that is inconsistent with reason or that contradicts the said meanings.

20. The second circle shows how to find the minor premise of a conclusion, as C (or some other letter) stands in the middle between B and D that both participate in greatness. Likewise, contrariety in D between B and E does not allow goodness and power to associate. Thus, a concordant or connecting minor premise leads to an affirmative conclusion whereas a contrary or dissociating minor premise leads to a negative conclusion.

Part 3 - The Definitions

1. The third part is about defining the principles; we define goodness as follows:

- Goodness is the being by reason of which good does good, and thus it is good to be and evil not to be.
- Greatness is the being by reason of which goodness, eternity etc. are great, as they encompass all the extremes of being. "Etc." refers to the other principles, but not in every case, because the statement that there is goodness, greatness, etc. in God does not mean that there is any majority, minority or contrariety in God.
- Duration is that by reason of which goodness, greatness etc. are durable.
- Power is that by reason of which goodness, greatness etc. can exist and act.
- Wisdom is a property by means of which the wise understand.
- Will is that on account of which goodness, greatness etc. are desirable and good, great etc. substantial beings are desirous.
- Virtue is the origin of the unity of goodness, greatness etc. in one good, great, etc. substance.
- Truth is what is true about goodness, greatness etc.
- Glory is the delight in which goodness, greatness etc. repose.
- Difference is what makes goodness, greatness etc. clear reasons without any confusion, and makes the bonifier, bonified and bonifying exist without confusion.
- Concordance is that on account of which goodness, greatness etc. agree in unity and plurality.
- Contrariety is mutual resistance caused by divergent ends.
- The beginning is that which is relatively prior to everything else.
- The middle is the subject through which the end influences the beginning and the beginning reciprocally influences the end while the middle naturally participates in both extremes.
- The end is that in which the beginning reposes.
- Majority is an image of the immensity of greatness, goodness, eternity and the other divine dignities.
- Equality is the subject in which the ultimate concordance of goodness, greatness etc. reposes.
- Minority is being close to nothingness.

2. Some principles are substantial and others are accidental, but contrariety is always an accident. Substantial principles require substantial definitions, and accidental ones require accidental definitions. For instance, substantial goodness requires a substantial definition whereby the agent substantially bonifies the bonifiable; and accidental goodness requires an accidental definition whereby the agent accidentally bonifies the bonifiable.

3. Note that we can make definitions in many ways, all are included in two modes, and each mode has four species. The first mode consists of the efficient, material, formal and final causes. The efficient cause, as for instance: God is our creator and saviour. The formal cause, as for instance: form is the being under which matter is passive and matter is the being upon which the agent acts. The end is defined as above.

The second mode is shown in rule C, in the second chapter of part four.

4. The definitions listed above belong to both modes. To define forms with their acts, we say: "the elemental power is a being that functions by elementing, the vegetative power by

vegetating, the sensitive power by sensing, the imaginative power by imagining and the rational power by reasoning". The same applies to the efficient cause, as we say that man is a man-producing being, lions are beings that produce lions, fire is the being that ignites, and so on. This way of defining things is very easy and useful. Indeed, the definitions made with rule C are very easy, useful and clear because the thing defined converts into its definition and vice versa. For instance, goodness is a being that functions by doing good, and it is a being that has its own innate bonifier, bonified and bonifying. In a subject, Goodness is the being that bonifies the bonifiable. Goodness is a being that has action in its subject. And what we said about goodness applies to the other principles.

5. The artist can use the said two modes to define all things. However, without the art, there is an alternate, confused and prolific way of defining things that makes haphazard definitions at will, with no regard for the proper and appropriated definitions of the subject and predicate, as in saying "Man is a rational animal, and also the only animal that rides on horseback, that writes", and so forth.

6. With the art, we can make compound definitions by defining one principle in combination with another, as for instance: "Great goodness is the being because of which great good does great good". Now if we add eternity, we get "Great eternal goodness is the being because of which great eternal good does great eternal good". In this way, the artist can use primordial, necessarily true principles to make demonstrations that cannot be made otherwise. Yet another way to make compound definitions is as follows: "Goodness is the being because of which good does good; greatness is the being because of which great beings do great things", and so forth.

7. To further clarify the definitions of the principles, the artist declares their natural properties. Goodness cannot have any natural properties without its innate bonifier, bonified and bonifying, nor can greatness have any natural properties without its innate magnifier, magnified and magnifying, nor can eternity have any natural properties without its innate eternalizer that eternalizes eternalized being; and likewise with the other principles. If the principles had no natural properties, goodness would not be the being because of which good naturally does good, nor would duration be the being because of which goodness, greatness etc. are lasting. If the definitions perish, no principles remain and no universe remains. However, this is false, because we know by experience that the universe exists.

8. Note that the principle of 'wisdom' refers to 'intellect' in rational substance, but in any non-rational being, 'wisdom' refers to 'instinct', and 'will' refers to 'appetite'.

9. Some will dare to attack our principles by disparaging and slandering our definitions with canine fangs and serpentine tongue. However, the principles of the art mutually help each other. For instance, the statement – "If greatness is the being because of which goodness is great, then all goodness must be equally great" - can be refuted with the principles of majority, minority and contrariety that do not allow every kind of goodness to be equally great.

Part 4 - The Rules

1. There are ten rules, namely: whether, what, etc. as previously shown in the alphabet. These rules are ten general questions that apply to every enquiry. In the process of investigation, each rule, according to its natural essence, clarifies, colours and displays the subject to the intellect. Just as in Latin grammar, five all-inclusive declensions serve to decline all nouns, so likewise, as it were, the ten rules, due to their general nature, include every conceivable question as it reduces to them and is regulated by them. The ten questions are general, and so are their species. Just as goodness, for instance, is entirely general due to its general bonifier, bonified and bonifying without which it cannot be entirely general, so likewise, the ten questions of this art are general due to their general species.

Chapter 1 - Rule B

2. Rule B asks the question - "Whether?" - It applies to possibility or to finding out whether the thing inquired about exists or not. Here, instead of approaching the issue of possibility with mere faith or belief, you can begin by supposing that the truth might lie in either the affirmative or the negative answer.

3. Rule B has three species, namely doubt, affirmation and negation. With the first species, we must suppose that something may either exist or not exist so that the intellect is not obstinately bound to an opinion, but instead seeks to investigate the matter until it has determined whether the true answer is affirmative or negative. This process is always conditional to adopting the solution that is best remembered, understood and desired as the true solution, inasmuch as the principles, their definitions and the remaining rules support it. For instance, if we ask whether the intellect exists, the answer is clearly positive because the intellect's existence is more memorable, understandable and lovable than is its non-existence, and we can demonstrate this by investigating the issue with the said principles.

4. We must choose the solution that we best remember, understand and love, in other words, we must choose that which we remember, understand and love more, and not less. An affirmative or negative choice that is made even though it is less worthy of remembering, understanding and loving, is neither a philosophical nor a scientific choice, because it rests on mere faith and belief. However, by making a choice that is more intelligible and in accordance with greater remembering and loving, we produce true and necessary science wherein the intellect truly reposes because it truly attains its object. This sums up the entire truth about rule B.

Chapter 2 - Rule C

5. Rule C, or the rule of quiddity, is a resource for defining things as previously mentioned in the definitions of the principles (Chapter 3 #3). This rule has four species. The first species defines things so that the thing defined is convertible with its definition, as for instance: "The intellect is the being of its essence," or "The intellect is the being whose proper function is to understand things," and likewise with other definitions, each in its own way.

6. The second species asks - "What does a thing have in itself essentially and naturally, without which it cannot exist?" - For instance - "What does the intellect essentially and naturally have in itself, without which it cannot exist?" - We answer that it has its own innate

knower, knowledge and knowing. Thus, the intellect is active with its own innate knower, it is passive with its own innate knowledge wherein it knows objects external to its own essence, and it has its own innate, intrinsic act of knowing. The three correlatives are one intellect in one undivided essence. The intellect characterizes its knowing of external objects with its own intrinsic knowing just as it characterizes external knowables in its own intrinsic knowable part. This is necessary for the proper mutual correspondence of active and passive acts, both intrinsic and extrinsic. Unlike the practical intellect that relates to external objects, the theoretical intellect is simply what it is, namely a whole that exists on account of its co-essential parts.

7. Our description of the intellect depicts its universal and particular character. It is universal because it can understand every kind of thing, its innate knowable part is universal because it can sequentially receive all the external things knowable to it, while its intrinsic knowing is universal to its successive extrinsic acts. The definitions of the principles and rule B sufficiently prove the truth of our statements about the intellect. If they were not true, then the intellect would not have any great goodness, duration, etc. nor could it operate naturally in universal and particular ways, nor would there be any truth at all in rule B, which would be merely false.

8. The third species asks – “What is a thing in other things?” - The answer is that in other things, a thing takes on different general qualities. The intellect is active as the knower when it attains objects and it is passive when it receives species; it is great when it has a great and difficult object, it is true when it truly understands, it is false when its understanding is false, it is necessarily confined to memory when it merely believes, and it finds freedom and repose in true knowledge.

9. The fourth species asks - “What does a thing have in other things?” - For instance: "What does the intellect have in its object?" We answer that it has action and passion, as the third species shows. Moreover, it has action in Grammar, Logic and Geometry, and it has passion in the positive sciences. It has goodness in moral virtue, it has guilt in sin, and so on with other qualities.

10. We have described rule C and its species. Moreover, the above example of the intellect applies to corporeal subjects in their own way: for instance, fire functions substantially and per se by igniting, and accidentally by heating. Fire has its own ignitive, ignitable and igniting parts wherever it is active in elemented compounds, for instance when it ignites a lamp or a peppercorn. The same applies to the vegetative power in vegetal bodies, to the sensitive power in sensate bodies, and to the imaginative power in bodies endowed with imagination. However, this does not apply to the heavens, for stars do not beget other stars, nor do angels beget other angels; this is because they are incorruptible and indivisible substances that do not substantially generate anything. With regard to GoD we must understand this rule in yet another way, following the natural definitions of divine goodness, infinity and eternity.

Chapter 3 - Rule D

11. The third rule inquires into material consistency; it has three species. The first inquires into origins, for instance - "From what does the intellect originate?" - We answer that the intellect exists on its own because it is not made or produced from anything else. However, it is created, because it did not exist before its creation, and now it does exist.

12. The second species asks – “What is this thing made of, and what does it consists of?” - For instance - "What is the intellect made of?" - We answer that it consists of its own co-essential principles, namely its innate knower, knowable and knowing. Likewise, a man consists of a body and a soul; nails are made of iron, and so forth.

13. The third species asks about ownership, for instance - "To whom does an intellect belong?" – and - "To whom does a kingdom belong?" The answer is, that intellects belong to men, and kingdoms belong to kings. This rule serves to inquire into the origin, consistency and ownership of things.

14. We applied rule D to the intellect and we can apply it likewise to other subjects, each in its own way. For instance: the universe, by the first species, exists on its own and is not made of any other pre-existing principle. The second species says that the universe consists of universal and substantial form and matter: every particular form derives from universal form and all particular matter derives from prime matter. By the third species, the universe belongs to God who created it.

15. The same applies to universal and substantial goodness, greatness, etc. as they are general and primordial principles. By the second species of this rule, universal goodness consists of its own bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying; greatness consists of its universal magnifier, magnifiable and magnifying, and likewise with the other principles, each in its own way, for they all have such parts. The same is true of every particular goodness, greatness, etc. as all particular goodness, greatness, etc. derives from the said universal goodness, greatness, etc. The same applies, in another way, to the elements and to elemented things. However, we cannot apply the second species in this way to man, inasmuch as a man is composed of a body and a soul that differ in genus and nature as corporeal and incorporeal substance. Likewise with substance and accidents: for instance, quantity is not of the essence of substance, but it is the quantifying habit of substance just as quality qualifies substance, and the same with the other accidents. Indeed, substance and accidents enter into the composition of all bodies, because nothing can exist as a body without composition.

16. By the third species of this rule, accidents belong to substance because they do not exist per se, rather, they exist only due to substance. This is because accidents are not composed of form and matter, whereas substance can exist per se, as it has form and matter. Accidents are likenesses, figures and instruments of substance.

17. Further, by the first species, accidents exist on their own, inasmuch as they are primordial. For instance, the prime species of quantity exists on its own as a primordial and general thing from which all other quantities derive. Primordial quantity is undivided in itself, but divides into many particular quantities just as general quality divides into many particular qualities. This division proceeds accidentally, as substance divides and fragments into the species, differences and numbers that it generates. Now, science deals with various accidents, for instance: logic deals with connecting second intentions to prime intentions. There are also mechanical accidents, such as shaping wood into a box, or stones into a tower, and other things like these, each in its own way.

18. The artist uses this rule of the art to inquire into the prime origins of things with the first species, their composition with the second species and their domination and possession with the third species. This rule applies to all things in general.

19. We have dealt with rule D, and the truth of our statements is self-evident and adequately proved by all the definitions of the principles, and by rules B and C. Indeed, if substantial goodness, intellect etc. did not consist of the parts indicated by the second species, if there was no such species, there could be no substantial goodness because goodness would have no constituent parts. Consequently, goodness would not exist per se, but merely as an accident that has no second species of D; nor could goodness be a substantial reason, nor would good substantially produce good from the essence of goodness. Consequently, some goodness would not be substantial, but merely accidental. This would destroy the definitions of greatness, duration, etc. The same applies to the other principles.

This would also mean that everything is accidental, which is impossible and contrary to rules B and C. With this doctrine and method, artists can prove one truth with another by applying the definitions of the principles, as well as rules B and C to what we said about D.

Chapter 4 - Rule E

20. The fourth question, "why", has two species: namely existence and action. Let us ask, for instance - "Why does the intellect exist?" - Regarding existence, we answer that the intellect exists because it consists of its own intellective, intelligible and intellection, just as a whole is what it is because of its own co-essential constituent parts. Regarding action, the intellect exists for understanding things, and for moving to a purposeful end. Its final purpose is to understand truths about God and other beings, and to enable man to acquire the habit of science.

21. With this rule, we inquire into the reasons why things exist. We prove that the intellect formally exists by the first species of rule E, by the definitions of goodness, greatness, etc., by rule B, and by the second species of rules C and D, without which the intellect could not naturally exist or act.

22. Further, we can say the same things about substance as we said about the intellect, for substance also exists because of its causes and occasions. Its causes are formal, material, efficient and final, and its occasions are its disposition, habit, contingency, and other accidents. The rule of "why?" relates to genera, species, individuals, liberal and mechanical arts, virtues and vices, etc.

Chapter 5 - Rule F

23. The fifth question is about quantity. It has two species, namely: simple and compound quantity. For instance, let us ask - "In what quantity does the intellect exist?" - We answer that in its essential simplicity, the intellect exists in the quantity of its essential being. As for composition, the intellect exists in the quantity of its existence and action, which is the quantity of its constituent knower, knowable and knowing.

24. This rule serves to inquire into the measurement and number of things. The truth of our statements about the intellect is amply proved by the definitions of goodness, greatness, etc. and by the second species of rules C and D. Now goodness, as a simple essence and form, has a continuous quantity that is generally and naturally disparate from the continuous quantity of other essences. However, as a reason for good to produce good, goodness is naturally discrete due to its active, passive and functioning correlatives, which are the bonifier, bonifiable, and

bonifying, whose influx influences foreign and discrete quantities as they enter into composition in individuated subjects, whose goodness has both continuous and discrete quantity.

25. Our statements about goodness also apply to other higher forms that cause continuous and discrete quantities in things below, for instance: a stone is habituated with one continuous quantity and with the discrete quantities that it has due to the elemental essences that compose it. Likewise, plants are composed of elementative and vegetative powers, and man is composed of the elementative, vegetative, sensitive, imaginative and rational powers. The same applies to artificial things like towers or ships, although they are less homogeneously continuous than natural subjects are, because quantity is more discrete in the integral parts of artificial things.

Chapter 6 - Rule G

26. The sixth question is about quality. It has two species, namely: proper and appropriated quality. For instance, let us ask - "What qualities does the intellect have?" - With the first species, we answer that the intellect has the qualities of its own intellectivity, intelligibility and intellection. With the second species, we answer that the intellect has the qualities of the intelligible habits it appropriates by attaining other intelligible beings through its action in its own intelligibility. Likewise, let us ask - "What quality does fire have due to its proper quality of heat?" - The answer is, that it has a heating quality. Further, because of its dryness, a quality that fire appropriates from earth, fire is passively dried; but in air, fire is an actively drying element with its dryness; and the same applies to the other elements.

27. This rule serves to inquire about proper and appropriated qualities. Proper qualities are higher causes and appropriated qualities are lower causes, for instance: the heat of fire is a higher quality and its dryness is a lower one. With this rule, the artist inquires to find out whether the subject or the object is higher or lower. I call proper qualities proper passions, and I call appropriated qualities appropriated passions.

Chapter 7 - Rule H

28. The seventh rule, or question, asks about time. It has as many species as the second, third, ninth and tenth rules put together. We made this rule because the essence of time is very difficult to understand. First, let us apply rule H to rule C, and ask, with the first species of rule C - "When does the intellect exist?" - We answer that the intellect exists when the being of its essence exists. With the second species, we answer that it exists when it has its co-essential parts. With the third species, we say that the intellect exists in other things whenever it acts, as practical intellect, in its subjects. The fourth species asks - "When does the intellect have something in other things?" - We answer that the intellect has something in other things when it has an understanding of their likenesses. Now we have said enough about the intellect with rule C.

29. For describing time with the first species of rule D we say that time is a primordial essence, neither produced nor engendered by any other essence, just as prime matter does not derive from any previous matter, and prime form does not derive from any previous form. Time is a primordial, formal entity that causes its own particular forms, such as days, hours, etc. By the second species of rule D, time consists of the timer, timable and timing due to

movement and its intrinsic mover, movable and motion. This does not mean that time and movement are essentially identical; rather, they are two habits that habituate subjects and make them subject to passions. With the third species of rule D we say that time is subjected to the doer, doable and doing, whenever substance assumes the habit of time naturally and/or morally.

30. By the modal rule, we understand that time consists of the habit that the mover has with the movable - or moved - object in motion, in accordance with the way in which the parts of substance exist substantially within each other. The likeness, or figure, of time consists of the past, the present and the future, just as the habit of heat consists of the heater, heatable - or heated - and heating, and just as movement consists of the mover, movable - or moved - and motion.

31. By the second - or instrumental - rule K, time is an instrument of substance in movement that enables substance to act in subjects configured in time and movement. In this definition, the intellect really and truly grasps the essence of time. Moreover, the definitions of the principles, as well as rules B C D E F G, attest to it. Here, the intellect must reach a very lofty and clear understanding, far removed from confusion and doubt, once its subject matter has been prepared both subjectively and objectively.

Chapter 8 - Rule I

32. With the eighth rule, we will investigate the nature of locus by asking where the intellect is. This question, or rule, has fifteen species taken from the second, third, ninth and tenth rules. First, by the first species of rule C, the intellect is what it is in its co-essential and co-natural locus, which is its own being and essence, just as man is man in his essential humanity and in his existential being. By the second species, the intellect is a being in itself because its intrinsic parts constitute a whole. By the third species, the intellect resides in the soul, in man, and wherever man is. By the fourth species, the intellect is present in its virtuous habit of practical knowledge in the subjects it deals with, and so forth.

33. This rule asks about things located in space, and about things that simply exist without occupying any locus in space: for instance, the intellect exists locally by the third and fourth species of rule C, but it occupies no locus in space by the first and second species of the same rule. As we just used rule C to locate the intellect, let us use it to find out what locus is. Now, locus is a being whose proper function is to locate things with its innate locative, located and locating. And locus exists in located subjects as a habit, as in heat located in fire, as in action located in the agent, and so forth.

34. Further, let us inquire into locus with the first species of rule D: just as the intellect is primordial and not derived from any pre-existing thing, so is locus a primordial and general part of the universe. With the first species, although we cannot sense or imagine locus, we can understand it. However, we can sense and imagine the figure of locus (not its essence) with the second species. By the third species, locus belongs to everything that it locates, just as heat belongs to everything that it heats and habituates.

35. With these three species, the intellect attains the essence of locus in a purely intellectual way. Now all particular loci sustained in particular subjects spread and derive from the universal locus sustained in the universal subject where the universal locus collocates all

located things just as universal heat makes all hot things hot, and universal movement moves all moving things.

36. Now let us investigate locus with the rule of modality. We observe that in elemented things, one part exists in another part, like fire in air and vice-versa, and form in matter and conversely, and every part exists in the whole and conversely; further, as the whole expresses its likeness or figure outwardly, one locus is accidentally in another locus and all particular loci are in the universal locus. Locus shows its figure in the container, the act of containing and the content.

37. We can find out more about locus with the second rule of K. Locus is an instrument of substance with which substance collocates parts in one another as habituated subjects in their habits. For instance, it locates good things in goodness, white things in whiteness, great things in greatness and so forth. We can see and imagine the figure of locus as an instrument that locates flour in water and water in flour, and other things like this. We have dealt with locus and identified it by discoursing with rules C D K. The definitions of the principles and rules B C D E F G H bear out our conclusions.

Chapter 9 - The first rule K, or modality

38. The ninth question is about modality, or the way in which things exist, and it has four species. The first asks - “How does a thing exist in itself?” - I say that the intellect is a thing that exists per se in a way that distinguishes it from all other essences.

39. The second species asks - “How does the intellect exist in other things, and other things in it?” - We answer that the intellect has a way of existing in the will, and the will has a way of existing in the intellect, as together with memory they constitute the rational soul.

40. The third species asks - “How does the intellect exist in its parts, and its parts in it?” - We answer that the intellect exists in its parts, and its parts in it, through the natural property whereby it consists of its own intellective, intelligible and intellection, and whereby these three correlatives exist as parts of the intellect.

41. The fourth species asks - “How does the intellect transmit its likeness externally?” - The answer is that the intellect has the power to transmit its likeness externally through the habit of science whereby it understands many things that it makes intelligible in its own innate intelligibility. With this rule, we inquire into the way things exist in themselves and in one another, as we said.

42. Note that difference has a way of distinguishing things by causing differences among them. Moreover, concordance has a way of joining things together by making many things convene in one composite. This gives rise to the mode whereby parts exist in each other and the whole exists in its parts: as in a coin, where gold is in silver and silver is in gold while each metal retains its own essence and being. This general modality is an entity inclusive of all particular modalities, and all subjects are likenesses of it, just as shape is a likeness of substance, colours are likenesses of coloured things, and so forth. Further, moral modality is a likeness of natural modality. We can prove and verify our above statements about modality by using the definitions of the principles with rules B C D E F G H I, as any artist can see if he diligently applies this art.

Chapter 10 - The second rule K, or instrumentality

41. The tenth rule deals with instrumentality. It asks - "What do things exist with and what do they act with?" - It has four species similar to those of the rule of modality. The first species asks - "With what is the intellect a part of the soul?" - The answer is that the intellect is a part of the soul with difference, concordance, power and all the other principles except contrariety.

44. With the second species we ask - "With what does the intellect understand things other than itself?" - We answer that for understanding things, the intellect uses the species that it acquires, combines and locates in its own innate intelligibility, like an eye beholding its own likeness in a mirror.

45. With the third species, we ask - "With what is the intellect universal and particular?" - We answer that the intellect is universal with its active, formal and intellective power for viewing many images. It is particular with the specified species it has acquired and stored in memory, as it understands them when it descends to practical, specific considerations..

46. With the fourth species, we ask - "With what does the intellect transmit its likeness externally?" - We answer that the intellect transmits its likeness externally with its own intellectivity, intelligibility and intellection, with which it produces species that it understands, that memory remembers and that the will chooses to love or to hate. This rule serves to inquire about spiritual and corporeal instruments.

47. Further, some instruments are substantial, such as the organs of procreation with which breeding plants and animals generate offspring. Other instruments are accidental, such as the heat with which fire heats heatable things, or the justice with which a man justifies himself.

There are universal instruments, such as the intellect's innate intelligibility with which it makes various external objects intelligible to itself, or the organs with which breeders generate numerous offspring, or the heat with which fire heats many heatable things, or a hammer with which a blacksmith makes many nails.

There are particular instruments, such as the various articles with which a builder builds a house, or the two propositions that lead to a conclusion; and so on with other similar things in their own way.

There are also intrinsic instruments, like the intellect's intelligibility, which is of the intellect's own essence. And then there are extrinsic instruments external to the intellect that teachers use for teaching science, as blacksmiths use hammers for making nails.

The definitions of the principles of this art and the rules all corroborate and prove the truth of our statements about instrumentality and the truth of our statements about the ten rules. Indeed, the ten rules are like vessels disposed to receive everything that the human intellect can understand in a way proportioned to it.

Part 5 - The Table

bcdt	bcet	bcft	bcgt	bcht	bcit	bckt
bctb	bctb	bctb	bctb	bctb	bctb	bctb
bctc	bctc	bctc	bctc	bctc	bctc	bctc
bctd	bcte	bctf	bctg	bcth	bcti	bctk
bdtb	betb	bftb	bgtb	bhtb	bitb	bktb
bdtc	betc	bftc	bgtc	bhtc	bitc	bktc
bdt d	bete	bftf	bgtg	bhth	biti	bktk
btbc	btbc	btbc	btbc	btbc	btbc	btbc
btbd	btbe	btbf	btbg	btbh	btbi	btbk
btcd	btce	btcf	btcg	btch	btci	btck
cdtb	cetb	cftb	cgtb	chtb	citb	cktb
cdtc	cetc	cftc	cgtc	chtc	citc	cktc
cdtd	cete	cftf	cgtg	chth	citi	cktk
ctbc	ctbc	ctbc	ctbc	ctbc	ctbc	ctbc
ctbd	ctbe	ctbf	ctbg	ctbh	ctbi	ctbk
ctcd	ctce	ctcf	ctcg	ctch	ctci	ctck
dtbc	etbc	ftbc	gtbc	htbc	itbc	ktbc
dtbd	etbe	ftbf	gtbg	htbh	itbi	ktbk
dtcd	etce	ftcf	gtcg	htch	itci	ktck
tbcd	tbce	tbcf	tbcg	tbch	tbei	tbck

bdet	bdft	bdgt	bdht	bdit	bdkt	bef t
bdtb	bdtb	bdtb	bdtb	bdtb	bdtb	betb
bdt d	bdt d	bdt d	bdt d	bdt d	bdt d	bete
bdte	bdtf	bdtg	bdth	bdti	bdtk	betf
betb	bftb	bgtb	bhtb	bitb	bktb	bftb
betd	bftd	bgt d	bht d	bit d	bkt d	bfte
bete	bftf	bgtg	bhth	biti	bktk	bftf
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btde	btdf	btdg	btdh	btdi	btdk	btef
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det d	dft d	dgt d	dht d	dit d	dktd	efte
dete	dftf	dgtg	dhth	diti	dktk	eftf
dtbd	dtbd	dtbd	dtbd	dtbd	dtbd	etbe
dtbe	dtbf	dtbg	dtbh	dtbi	dtbk	etbf
dtde	dt dF	dt dg	dt dh	dt di	dt dk	etef
etbd	ftbd	gtbd	htbd	itbd	ktbd	ftbe
etbe	ftbf	gtbg	htbh	itbi	ktbk	ftbf
etde	ft dF	gt dg	ht gh	it gi	kt ik	ftef
tbde	tbd f	tbd g	tbd h	tbd i	tbd k	tbef

begt	beht	beit	bekt	bfgt	bfht	bfit
betb	betb	betb	betb	bftb	bftb	bftb
bete	bete	bete	bete	bftf	bftf	bftf
betg	beth	beti	betk	bftg	bftb	bfti
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bgtg	bhth	biti	bktk	bgtg	bhth	biti
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bteg	bteh	btei	btek	btfg	btfh	btfi
egtb	ehtb	eitb	ektb	fgtb	fhtb	fitb
egte	ehte	eite	ekte	fgtf	fhtf	fitf
egtg	ehth	eiti	ektk	fgtg	fhth	fiti
etbe	etbe	etbe	etbe	ftbf	ftbf	ftbf
etbg	etbh	etbi	etbk	ftbg	ftbh	ftbi
eteg	eteh	etei	etek	ftfg	ftfh	ftfi
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gtbg	htbh	itbi	ktbk	gtbg	htbh	itbi
gteg	hteh	itei	ktek	gtfg	htfh	itfi
tbeg	tbeh	tbei	tbek	tbfg	tbfh	tbfi

bfkt	bght	bgit	bgkt	bhit	bhkt	bikt
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bftf	bgtg	bgtg	bgtg	bhth	bhth	biti
bftk	bgth	bgti	bgtk	bhti	bhtk	bitk
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bktf	bhtg	bitg	bktg	bith	bktb	bkti
bktk	bhth	biti	bktk	biti	bktk	bktk
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btbk	btbh	btbi	btbk	btbi	btbk	btbk
btfk	btgh	btgi	btgk	bthi	bthk	btik
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fktf	ghtg	gitg	gktg	hith	hkth	ikti
fktk	ghth	giti	gktk	hiti	hktk	iktk
ftbf	gtbg	gtbg	gtbg	htbh	htbh	itbi
ftbk	gtbh	gtbi	gtbk	htbi	htbk	itbk
ftfk	gtgh	gtgi	gtgk	hthi	hthk	itik
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ktbk	htbh	itbi	ktbk	itbi	ktbk	ktbk
ktfk	htgh	itgi	ktgk	ithi	kthk	ktik
tbfk	tbgh	tbgi	tbgk	tbhi	tbhk	tbik

cdet	cdft	cdgt	cdht	cdit	cdkt	ceft
cdtc	cdtc	cdtc	cdtc	cdtc	cdtc	cetc
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cdte	cdtf	cdtg	cdth	cdti	cdtk	cetf
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detd	dftd	dgtg	dhtd	ditd	dktd	efte
dete	dftf	dgtg	dhth	diti	dktk	eftf
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cetg	ceth	ceti	cetk	cftg	cfth	cfti
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cgte	chte	cite	ckte	cgtf	chtf	citf
cgtg	chth	citi	cktk	cgtg	chth	citi
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egt g	eh th	eiti	ektk	fgtg	fh th	fiti
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gtcg	htch	itci	ktck	gtcg	htch	itci
gt eg	ht eh	itei	ktek	gtfg	htfh	itfi
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cfkt	cght	cgit	cgkt	chit	chkt	cikt
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dfte	dgte	dhte	dite	dkte	dgtf	dhtf
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dtef	dteg	dteh	dtei	dtek	dt fg	dt fh
eftd	egtd	ehtd	eitd	ektd	fgtd	fhtd
efte	egte	ehte	eite	ekte	fgtf	fhth
eftf	egtg	ehth	eiti	ektk	fgtg	fhth
etde	etde	etde	etde	etde	ft df	ft df
et df	et dg	et dh	et di	et dk	ft dg	ft dh
etef	eteg	eteh	et ei	etek	ft fg	ft fh
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ft df	gt dg	ht dh	it di	kt dk	gt dg	ht dh
ftef	gteg	hteh	itei	ktek	gt fg	ht fh
tdef	tdeg	tdeh	tdei	tdek	td fg	td fh

dfit	dfkt	dght	dgit	dgkt	dhit	dhkt
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dftf	dftf	dgtg	dgtg	dgtg	dhth	dhth
dfti	dftk	dgt h	dgt i	dgtk	dhti	dhtk
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ditf	dktf	dhtg	ditg	dktg	dith	dkth
diti	dktk	dhth	diti	dktk	diti	dktk
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dt d i	dt d k	dt d h	dt d i	dt d k	dt d i	dt d k
dt f i	dt f k	dt g h	dt g i	dt g k	dthi	dthk
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fit f	fktd	ghtg	gitg	gktg	hith	hkth
fit i	fktd	ghth	giti	gktk	hiti	hktd
ft d f	ft d f	gt d g	gt d g	gt d g	ht d h	ht d h
ft d i	ft d k	gt d h	gt d i	gt d k	ht d i	ht d k
ft f i	ft f k	gt g h	gt g i	gt g k	hthi	hthk
it d f	kt d f	ht d g	it d g	kt d g	it d h	kt d h
it d i	kt d k	ht d h	it d i	kt d k	it d i	kt d k
it f i	kt f k	ht g h	it g i	kt g k	ithi	kthk
td f i	td f k	td g h	td g i	td g k	tdhi	tdhk

dikt	efgt	efht	efit	efkt	eght	egit
ditd	efte	efte	efte	efte	egte	egte
diti	eftf	eftf	eftf	eftf	egtg	egtg
ditk	eftg	efth	efti	eftk	egth	egti
dktd	egte	ehth	eite	ekte	ehth	eite
dkti	egtf	ehtf	eitf	ektf	ehtg	eitg
dktk	egtg	ehth	eiti	ektk	ehth	eiti
dt d i	etef	etef	etef	etef	eteg	eteg
dt d k	eteg	eteh	eteh	etek	eteh	eteh
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iktd	fgte	fhth	fite	fktd	ghth	gite
ikti	fgtf	fhth	fitf	fktd	ghth	gite
iktk	fgtg	fhth	fiti	fktd	ghth	gite
it d i	ftef	ftef	ftef	ftef	gteg	gteg
it d k	fteg	fteh	ftei	ftek	gteh	gtei
itik	ftfg	ftfh	ftfi	ftfk	gtgh	gtgi
kt d i	gtef	htef	itef	ktef	hteg	iteg
kt d k	gteg	hteh	itei	ktek	hteh	itei
ktik	gtfg	htfh	itfi	ktfk	htgh	itgi
tdik	tefg	tefh	tefi	tefk	tegh	tegi

The letter "t" in the Table means that the letters before "t" are from the First Figure and those after "t" are from the Second Figure, as in camera bctb where b preceding t means goodness, c means greatness, and b after t means difference; the same applies to the remaining cameras.

In the course of investigation, the Table yields loftier significations of the truth than do any of the Figures.

2. This Table is derived from the Fourth Figure by turning its second and third circles (as shown in the Table) until 84 column headings are formed. The columns mutually connect as they come from successive rotations of the circles, where column bcd connects to column bce, and column bce to bcf and so on from column to column, all the way to hik at the end of the Table, as shown. Thus, each column implies all the other columns and every column implicitly helps all the others, given that the meanings of all the columns can apply to solving any single question. In this way, the Table is general to a very high degree.

3. Further, each column contains a sequence of twenty questions: to give an example, let us go through the sequence of the first column bcd by first discussing goodness, then greatness, and then eternity, as follows.

- 1 Is any goodness so great that it is eternal?
- 2 Is there any goodness so great that it contains its own different innate co-essential parts?
- 3 Is goodness sufficiently great to contain concordant things that are of its own essence?
- 4 If goodness contains contrary things, is it great?
- 5 Is eternal goodness different?
- 6 Is eternal goodness concordant?
- 7 Does eternal goodness contain any innate contrariety?
- 8 Does goodness contain intrinsic difference and concordance?
- 9 Does goodness contain intrinsic difference and contrariety?
- 10 Does goodness contain intrinsic concordance and contrariety?
- 11 What is the great difference of eternity?
- 12 What is great and eternal concordance?
- 13 What is great and eternal contrariety?
- 14 What is great difference and concordance?
- 15 What is great difference and contrariety?
- 16 What is great concordance and contrariety?
- 17 What does the difference in eternal concordance consist of?
- 18 What does the difference between contrariety and eternity consist of?
- 19 What does the concordance of contrariety and eternity consist of?
- 20 What do difference, concordance and contrariety consist of?

4. We have put 20 questions with the twenty cameras of column bcd. The first camera is bcd; the second is bctb and so on to the twentieth camera tbcd.

Through these questions and their solutions, the intellect rises to a lofty degree of universality where it can reach countless objects, due to the general nature of the predicates and their subjects. Here, we see how very useful and general this art is. Now we will show you how to solve questions by solving the ones above. As we apply the meanings of the letters to each question, we will ensure that the definitions of the principles and the species of the rules remain intact.

Column bcd, camera bcd

First question

5. Let us begin by answering the first question, which asks - "Is goodness so great as to be eternal?" - I answer that goodness is so great as to be eternal, and the definitions of goodness, greatness and eternity show this. If goodness is a being because of which good does good, if greatness magnifies goodness and eternity; and if eternity's definition makes goodness and greatness last forever, then the act of goodness must be infinite and eternal, and consequently, the essence of goodness must be infinite and eternal as well. Thus, we conclude that goodness is eternally great, because it cannot have its eternally great act of bonifying without greatness and eternity; now rule B confirms this, as do the second species of rules C and D. Further, the first species of rule D confirms the affirmative answer. As eternity is a primordial essence beyond which there is no other preceding thing, and as its primordial quality is good and great, it necessarily follows that some goodness must be eternally great. In addition, the third species of rule D signifies on the one hand that no contrariety of any kind can rule in eternity, and moreover, on the other hand, that contrariety would rule over eternity if eternity did not have great and primordial goodness. However, this is impossible, and therefore, goodness is so great as to be eternal.

Column bcd, camera bctb

Second question

6. The second question asks - "Is there any goodness so great that it contains its own different innate co-essential parts?" - Solution: I say that there is, as the definitions show. Now, if goodness is a being because of which good does good, and greatness is a being because of which goodness, difference, etc. are great, then goodness must necessarily contain different things that are co-essential with it, namely the bonifier, bonifying and bonified. This is because of goodness, greatness and difference, which are all real and simply distinct things existing in goodness while the essence of goodness itself is indivisible, great and free of confusion. Further, rule B clearly confirms the affirmative answer, as does the first species of rule C, which defines goodness concretely and essentially by its correlatives with which it converts. By the second species, difference and magnitude both posit that goodness has its innate bonifier, bonifying and bonified, as goodness could not naturally exist without these distinct parts; nor could it be a reason for good to do good, and thus goodness without greatness and difference would have no nature at all.

7. Moreover, greatness and difference are naturally present in goodness by the third species of rule C, and goodness is naturally present in them; and by the fourth species of rule C, greatness and difference are active in goodness and goodness is active in them.

Column bcd, camera bctc

Third question

8. The third question asks whether goodness is so great as to contain in itself concordant things of its own essence. The definitions of the terms indicate the affirmative answer: now if goodness did not contain things that are concordant and naturally co-essential with it, great goodness would not be free of contrariety and could not be great without contrariety, which is

necessarily impossible by the definitions of goodness, greatness and eternity. Further, the first species of rule C supports the affirmative answer: by converting subject and predicate, it defines goodness with its concordant parts, namely the bonifier, bonifying and bonified as well as the concorder, concurring and concorded with which supreme goodness converts as does concordance with supreme greatness.

9. Next, the second species shows that goodness has three innate, good and concordant things without which it cannot be great. The third species of rule C posits that greatness and concordance are present in goodness by magnifying and concurring just as goodness is present in them with its good act of bonifying. The fourth species says that every reason has essential activity in every other reason. Here we see the altitude to which the intellect can rise as it truly and really attains a height too lofty to ascend on its own without help from God.

Column bcd, camera bctd

Fourth question

10. The fourth question asks whether goodness would be great if it contained innate contrary things that are co-essential with it, and the answer is no, because it would lack concordance which is absolutely greater than contrariety. This is because concordance and goodness posit existence through generation, whereas contrariety and malice posit the privation of goodness through corruption. The definitions of goodness, greatness and contrariety concur with this. Rule B verifies this, as does the first species of Rule C: if great goodness contained contrary things in itself, it would be much to its detriment, and greatness would be convertible with smallness in goodness, which is impossible. The second species of rule C posits the greatness of the bonifier, bonified and bonifying in goodness, and so the answer must be negative. Further, the third species says that contrariety cannot coexist with greatness in a good subject, and the fourth species determines that contrariety cannot have its act in great goodness.

Column bcd, camera bdtb

Fifth question

11. The fifth question asks whether eternal goodness is different, and the answer is yes. Now if eternal goodness was not different, it could not do eternal good throughout eternity because difference would not govern the doer in its active identity and the doable in its passive identity, and I say the same about the act of doing. Moreover, the lack of difference would cause confusion among the correlatives, and eternity would not naturally eternalize, nor would goodness naturally do good, and consequently, all their definitions would perish, which is impossible. Rule B supports the affirmative answer, with the help of the said definitions.

Further, the first species of rule D corroborates the affirmative answer by saying that eternal goodness is as primordial in action as in existence. Now if difference was removed from the doer and the doable, there would be no doing and no action, which would entail idleness and natural privation of eternal goodness, and this is impossible. Further, the second species of rule D affirms the same, as without difference among the bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying, goodness would have nothing to sustain its existence, nor could eternity govern it, and this would set great evil eternally against great good, which is impossible. Further, the third species of rule D clearly shows that if the negative answer to this question was true, there would have to be some eternal being with eternal malice that could prevent eternal goodness

deprived of difference from being a reason for eternal good to produce eternal good, and this is false, impossible, and contrary to rule B. Therefore, etc...

Column bcd, camera bdtc

Sixth question

12. The sixth question, which asks whether eternal goodness is concordant, must be answered affirmatively by applying the definitions. Now eternity says that goodness and concordance last forever, concordance says that goodness and eternity agree in unity and plurality, and consequently, eternal goodness is a concordant reason for good to produce good throughout eternity. This cannot be true unless eternal goodness agrees with the bonifier, concorder and eternalizer, the bonified, concorder and eternalized and their acts of bonifying, concurring and eternalizing. There is further ample proof of this, as rule C supports the affirmative answer: now, goodness is a form containing innate difference and concordance where the bonifier, bonifying and bonified are all well habituated with difference and concordance, and due to this habit, the differentiator and the concorder are active and the differentiable and concordable are passive. By the fourth species, goodness has acts of differentiating, concurring and eternalizing.

Column bcd, camera bdttd

Seventh question

13. The seventh question asks whether eternal goodness contains any innate contrariety. Supposing that the world is eternal, the answer would be affirmative. The definition of contrariety says that the world is good and evil from eternity and throughout eternity, and that goodness, evil, generation, privation and corruption are all eternal. Thus, eternal goodness cannot be a good reason for eternal good to produce good eternally without any contrariety or malice. In addition, eternity would cause good and evil to last eternally. Rule B cannot consent to this, nor can the first species of rule D admit that good and evil are equally primordial and in agreement from eternity. In addition, by the second species, the whole universe would be composed of good and evil. The first cause, namely God, would necessarily have to cause the world throughout eternity with as much malice as goodness, which is impossible, and because of this impossibility, the answer to this question must be no. Here, we see that the world cannot possibly exist throughout eternity.

Column bcd, camera btbc

Eighth question

14. The eighth question asks whether goodness contains intrinsic difference and concordance, and the answer is yes, as shown by the definitions. Without its different and concordant parts, goodness could not be a reason for good to produce good, and there could be no concordance among things without difference, for without difference, there would be confusion and occultation of the bonifier, the bonified, the concorder and the concorder, and I must add that this would imply an impossible contradiction. In addition, the first species of rule C says that eternity is a being whose function is to eternalize, which it cannot do without concordance

among the eternalizer, eternalized and eternalizing, and thus concordance is natural and necessary, as signified by the second species of rule C. The third species shows that the eternalizer is active in the eternalized, and the eternalized is passive. By the fourth species, the active eternalizer has its act of eternalizing.

Column bcd, camera btbd

Ninth question

15. The ninth question asks whether goodness contains intrinsic difference and contrariety. We answer that it does in some subjects, such as elemented things in which different elements oppose each other, as do fire and water through heat and dryness, or air and earth through moisture and dryness. Now this is good, because no elemented things could exist without this kind of opposition. Moreover, rule B attests to this.

On the other hand, the first species of rule D supports the negative answer, because the bonifier, bonified and bonifying cannot oppose each other in the primordial essence of goodness. If they could, goodness would have no consistency by the second species of rule D. In addition, by the third species of this rule, goodness would be subject to innate malice and would have no natural character, which is impossible.

Column bcd, camera btcd

Tenth question

The tenth question asks whether goodness contains any concordance and contrariety, and the answer is, that it does in some subjects habituated with goodness, like elemented things that are good due to goodness and in which fire agrees with air through heat, and air agrees with water through moisture, and water agrees with earth through cold, and fire agrees with earth through dryness. However, air and fire are opposed through dryness and moisture, water and earth are opposed through moisture and dryness, air and water are opposed through cold and heat, and earth and fire are opposed through cold and heat. In motion, elements are opposed through lightness and heaviness. The definitions of goodness, concordance and contrariety clarify our statements, or else the elementing power could not be a reason for producing good elemented things in subjects, and the definitions of concordance and contrariety would be destroyed.

Further, rule B corroborates the affirmative answer, as does the first species of rule C. Now an elemented thing is a good subject in which there is some agreement between concordance and contrariety, as in fire and air that agree in elemented things through heat but oppose each other through dryness and moisture, and so with the other elements, in circular fashion, as we said above. Further, the second species of rule C supports the affirmative answer, because elemented things contain innate concordance and contrariety, as we just said. By the third species of rule C, fire is concordant with air, and air is generally concordant with heat due to fire, but they are generally opposed through moisture and dryness because fire opposes air with dryness and air opposes fire with moisture. Further, the fourth species shows that every element has action and passion in every other element in a circular pattern where the elements are dislocated and split up in elemented things so that they can proceed through mixture and composition, because elemented things are habituated with goodness as well as concordance and contrariety.

Column bcd, camera cdtb

Eleventh question

17. The eleventh question asks - "What is the great difference in eternity?" - We answer that it is a form that necessarily implies the eternalizer, eternalized and eternalizing in eternity, where greatness is a being because of which difference and eternity are great; where eternity is a being because of which greatness and difference last forever; and where difference is a being because of which the eternalizer, eternalized and eternalizing are distinct from each other. Further, rule B corroborates the truth of our statements, as do the first and second species of rule C. By the third species of C, the eternalizer is naturally active and productive in eternity, greatness and difference, and its product is the eternalized being that equally has natural magnitude and difference in eternity by the fourth species of rule C. Moreover, the first species of rule D, whereby greatness eternally has its primordial eternalizer, eternalized and eternalizing, leads to the same conclusion, as does the second species of rule D, whereby eternity has consistency. The third species of D also supports this.

Column bcd, camera cdte

Twelfth question

The twelfth question asks - "What is great and eternal concordance?" - We say that it is a form that necessarily implies concordance in greatness and eternity among the eternalizer, eternalized and eternalizing. This is evident enough by the first species of rules C and D, by the second species of C and D and by the third species of rule C whereby the eternalizer is a magnifying, eternalizing and concurring entity in greatness, eternity and concordance. In addition, by the fourth species of rule C, the eternalizer has natural power to eternalize the eternalized, to magnify the magnified and to concord the concorded; and the third species of rule D agrees to this. Further, the definitions positively attest to this, because greatness without concordance of the eternalizer, eternalized and eternalizing cannot be a being on account of which eternity and concordance are great, and as eternity cannot have concordance without its correlatives, and as without concordance it cannot be removed from contrariety, eternity would have no natural way of lasting forever without concordance.

Column bcd, camera cdtc

Thirteenth question

The thirteenth question asks - "What is great and eternal contrariety?" - We answer that it is the world's eternity, supposing that the world is eternal, and the definitions and rules show this. The definition of contrariety posits that there is great controversy between God's eternity and the world's eternity. Both must be primordial beings by the first species of rules C and D, and thus God's eternity is not singular. Without singularity, greatness is not a being on account of which God's eternity is great, but rather, a being on account of which the contrariety between God's eternity and the world's eternity is great. By the definitions of eternity, the world's eternity posits eternally restless evil while God's eternity posits eternal good in eternal repose; and God's eternity posits eternal, everlasting good while the world's eternity posits eternal, everlasting evil. The second species of rule D posits that eternal good and eternal evil are joined together in a single compound, whilst the definition of greatness posits that their conjunction is great. The third species of rule D posits that both eternities are

subjected to one another, while the second species of rule C posits the opposer, the opposed and their opposing. Thus, eternity dominates God's eternity as well as the world's eternity, and as it rules both of them, it produces an eternally restless and contrary eternal being, which is impossible, and by reason of this impossibility, the world cannot be eternal.

Column bcd, camera ctbc

Fourteenth question

20. The fourteenth question asks - "What is great difference and concordance?" - We answer that in the essence of greatness, the magnifier, differentiator and concorder are one person and one identical number; the magnified, differentiated and concordered are another person; and the acts of magnifying, differentiating and concording are another person. Now the three persons are entirely identical in essence, nature, greatness, difference and concordance. Their definitions and the first and second species of rules C and D show this, as does the third species of C, whereby greatness, difference and concordance are active and concordant in their act, and removed from emptiness and idleness. In addition, by the fourth species of rule C, they all have acts in one another, for without these acts, their definitions would not be true, which is impossible, as rule B attests.

Column bcd, camera ctbd

Fifteenth question

21. The fifteenth question asks - "What is great difference and contrariety?" - We answer that it is the cause that makes opposites stand in mutual opposition, as they do in elemented things wherein fire and water mix together with air and earth; and as they do in man, in whom natural innate good and moral evil - or sin - oppose each other. The definitions of greatness, difference and contrariety show this. Difference clarifies and differentiates opposites, whereas contrariety deprives its subject of concordance and generates opposite appetites and ends. Rule B, as well as the first and second species of rules C and D signify this. Likewise, the third species of rule C shows clearly enough that an opposite is both active and passive in its counterpart. By the fourth species of rule C, each opposing part has action in its counterpart, and by the third species of D, both opposites are subjected to one another. This signifies the great torments of hell. By the fourth species of rule C, each opposite has its act in the other, for without these acts, their definitions would not be true, as rule B attests.

Column bcd, camera ctcd

Sixteenth question

22. The sixteenth question asks - "What is great concordance and contrariety?" - We answer that it is the being that introduces concordant and opposite things into the same subject through elemental generation and corruption. For instance, fire and earth both agree with air in generation: fire is hot and dry, and while it receives dryness from earth, it gives heat to air. By the third species of rule D, as fire rules in dryness and moisture, it puts great contrariety and mutual corruption between them. These statements about fire apply to the other elements as well, according to their qualities. Thus, by the first and second species of rules C and D, and by the definitions of greatness, concordance and contrariety, we see how elements enter into mixture and compose elemented things. By the third species of rules C and D, each

element is active and passive in the others as it moves through them in the process of generation and corruption.

Column bcd, camera dtbc

Seventeenth question

23. The seventeenth question asks - "What does difference in eternal concordance consist of?" - We answer that it consists of nature and relation. Here, difference posits things that are distinct and naturally related through the differentiator, differentiated and differentiating in eternal concordance, whose definition posits the concorder, concorded and concurring in one natural essence in which eternity's definition posits the eternalizer, eternalized and act of eternalizing. Rule B and the first and second species or rules C and D indicate this. The third species of rule C posits action and passion, without any matter. The fourth species of the same rule posits natural, eternal acts. The third species of rule D cannot contradict this, inasmuch as it is disparate from any primordial different and concordant acts.

Column bcd, camera dtbd

Eighteenth question

24. The eighteenth question asks - "What does the difference between contrariety and eternity consist of?" - We answer that it consists of God and the world, supposing that the world is eternal. The definitions indicate that eternity posits innate good and eternal good, as well as moral evil, while difference distinguishes them. In addition, contrariety posits eternally contrary ends without repose, as rule B clearly shows. Moreover, by the first species of rules C and D, the differences are contrary. By the second species of the same rules, they are eternally compounded, although composition cannot be eternal. The third species of rule C says that the world is infinite in its infinite innate goodness while its moral goodness and evil both last eternally. Thus, due to eternity, the world has innate infinity, whereas all its other innate parts are finite, because heaven is a body whose quantity, habit and disposition are finite. The third species of rule D posits primordial and contrary domination and subjection, which is utterly impossible.

Column bcd, camera dtcd

Nineteenth question

25. The nineteenth question asks - "What does the concordance of contrariety and eternity consist of?" - We answer that it consists of two eternities, namely God's eternity and the world's eternity - if we suppose that the world is eternal - and that these eternities both agree and disagree throughout infinite duration. Now God's substance is infinite, and that of the world is finite. God's eternity is simply good, and the world's eternity is both good and morally bad, which destroys the definition of concordance and necessarily makes contrariety eternal by definition, thus destroying the definition of eternity, because the duration of greatness, goodness and virtue does not precede the duration in greatness of evil and vice. The first rule shows this. The first species of rules C and D indicate primordial concordance between good and evil, which, by the second species of rules C and D, is eternally composed of primordial contraries extraneous to its genus. Consequently, we have a so-called concordance that involves the contradiction of compounded contraries, and gives rise to both

eternal concordance and eternal contrariety. By the third species of rule D, it is both subjected and not subjected, which is impossible.

Column bcd, camera tbcd

Twentieth question

26. The twentieth question asks - "What do difference, concordance and contrariety consist of?" - We answer that they consist of themselves, because they are supremely general genera by definition. Rule B confirms this, as do the first and second species of rules C and D. This does not mean that contrariety has any place in the second species of rules C and D. Contrariety is an accident, and there is no natural way in which an accident can exist simply on its own; if it could, it would be a substance composed of form and matter, which is impossible. The third species of rule D indicates this.

27. We discussed the first column and gave a doctrine for extracting questions and solutions from it by using the definitions and rules. Our work with this column can be replicated in all the others, each in its own way. Moreover, the general questions we made with it are applicable to particular questions by descending through the ladders of the green triangle with intellectual discourse and building various sciences. Now, let us give an example of this process by using the same column to solve one question with twenty different reasons, guided by the cameras from which we extract them.

A single question – Is the world eternal?

28. We will use the first column of the Table to clarify the solution to this question. We could do the same with the other columns, because the columns are interlinked. Let us begin with the first camera of the first column, followed by the second camera, and the rest in sequence to the last camera, to multiply twenty reasons for solving one question, answered in the negative by the column's implicit definitions and rules.

29. This art teaches how to use its explicit terms when they appear in a question. For instance, the question - "Is the world eternal?" - refers to eternity, an explicit term of the First Figure. Eternity indicates D, as well as the terms signified by D, including the ladder in the angle of D, namely contrariety between sensual and sensual, sensual and intellectual, intellectual and intellectual. In addition, the question - "whether" - indicates B, and B indicates all the terms that belong to this letter, as shown in the alphabet. We also want to apply C to this question in which it is implicit, and thus, all the terms attributed to C come into play. This is the doctrine for using the first column to solve the said question by finding implicit and explicit terms and applying them to the issue at hand. The solutions cannot violate the principles, definitions and the species of the rules. We bring in the species of other rules as well, to show how other terms can play a supporting role. Let us begin with the first camera, as follows.

Chapter 1

Camera bcd

30. In answer to the question - "Is the world eternal?" - we say that it is not, because if it was eternal, it would have good reason to produce eternal good throughout eternity. Greatness, by definition, would magnify the said good reason in eternity and from eternity. Moreover, eternity would make the world's production last in eternity and from eternity, so that there could be no evil in the world, because good and evil are contrary. Nevertheless, there is evil in the world, as we know by experience. Therefore, we conclude that the world is not eternal. Further, rule B and the said definitions indicate the negative answer to this question, for they contradict what we propose to say by rules C and D, as follows. If the world is eternal, its eternity causes evil and good to endure equally, as shown by the first species of Rule C. By the first species of rule D, evil and good are equally primordial. By the second species of rules C and D, the world is composed of good and evil in eternity and from eternity. By the third species of rule C, the world is infinite in eternity, although it is finite in good and evil. By the fourth species of C, the world has ultimate repose in things subjected to generation and decay, where generation is caused by good and decay is caused by evil. In addition, by the second species of rule D, if God's eternity and goodness compose the world's eternity, they must repose in evil. All these things are impossible, and therefore, the answer to the question is clearly negative.

Chapter 2

Camera bctb

31. If the world is eternal, then there are two different eternities, namely God's eternity and the world's eternity. Therefore, the difference between sensual and sensual, between sensual and intellectual, and between intellectual and intellectual signifies three different general eternities. Goodness says that they are good and greatness says that they are great, but this is false and impossible because difference indicates that the three eternities are evil by definition, since goodness that is deficient in greatness turns the goodness of greatness into a source of confusion, which is impossible. Therefore, the answer to this question is negative.

Chapter 3

Camera bctc

32. If the world is eternal, then the innate concordance that exists in the world's essence between sensual and sensual, between sensual and intellectual, and between intellectual and intellectual is eternal. This gives us three concordances and three general subordinate eternities, all endowed with great goodness of eternity and with eternal, everlasting greatness and goodness. This is false and impossible because of three subordinate oppositions that oppose the three concordances with great and eternal evil.

33. Further, the negative solution is supported by rule B and by our statements about the definitions. In addition, the first species of rules C and D indicate the same, because supremely general concordance indicates, with its ladder, that God's eternity and the world's eternity agree to exist together in one good, great entity, which is false, since great and eternal contrariety does not allow it. Moreover, by the second species of rules C and D, if the world is eternal, then good, great and eternal concordance entirely enfolds the world's essence removed from any kind of contrariety, which is false.

34. Next, by the third species of rule C, supposing that the world is eternal, then the world's essence contains eternal generation and perfection in the greatness of eternity, which is false, because the world harbours corruption and guilt as the effects of the greatness of contrariety and evil. On the same point, by the fourth species of rule C, concordance has great goodness and eternity in the subject in which it exists. However, this is false, because contrariety habituates the subject with great, eternal evil. Further, by the third species of rule D, if the world is eternal, it is equally subject to evil and good; but we cannot say that this is true, as divine eternity clearly shows that it is the prime cause with its great concordance of goodness, duration, etc.

Chapter 4

Camera bctd

If the world is eternal, then there is good, great and eternal contrariety between sensual and sensual etc., which is impossible, because contrary ends cannot be good in eternal greatness. Now if they could, goodness would be a reason for good to produce good and evil and greatness would magnify good and evil endlessly with eternal contrariety while eternity would make this great, good and evil contrariety last forever, which is impossible. By rule B, the definitions say that the world is not eternal. The first species of rules C and D posit primordial good, great and eternal contraries. In addition, the second species of rules C and D posit the composition of goodness and evil, smallness and greatness, eternity and time, contrariety and concordance, which is impossible. Likewise, by the fourth species of rule C and the third species of rule D, evil and smallness have dominion in eternity while goodness and greatness are eternally subjected to eternal contrariety, which is impossible. We therefore conclude from the above that the world is not eternal.

Chapter 5

Camera bdtb

36. Supposing that the world is eternal, the difference between sensual and sensual etc. posits the existence of three good and eternal eternities in which goodness is a reason that produces eternal good without any confusion. However, this is false and impossible.

The difference that exists between sensual and intellectual, as between Socrates and Plato, was obviously not produced from eternity and throughout eternity, and the same can be said about the difference between sensual and sensual in decaying animal, elemented and vegetal matter.

However, if the world is not eternal, the difference between sensual and intellectual, for instance between the late Peter and Paul (and the same applies to all the departed) can be transported into eternity by resurrection with the good, eviternal habit that God gives to reward merit. In addition, rule B supports this, as does the first species of rule C, whereby God is the being who gives rewards in eternity. Further, the first species of rule C says that God's eternity is simply primordial and in every way different from time, and goodness says that this difference is good.

37. By the second species of rule C, there is no innate act of eternalizing in the world's eternity. If there was such an act, it would endlessly expand the world into infinite eternalized being, which is impossible. Then, the second species of rule D says that if the world is eternal,

it has difference, because its eternity contains the eternalizer, eternalized and eternalizing as components of the world's eternity, which is impossible.

38. Likewise, the third species of rules C and D say that the difference between God's eternity and the world's eternity is good. However, this statement is false, because it subordinates God's eternity by depriving it of its eternal singularity. Further, the fourth species of rule C posits that if the world was eternal, in its eternal duration, it would have too much similarity to God in whom there can be no evil and confusion.

Chapter 6

Camera bdtc

39. Supposing that the world is eternal, then there is good agreement between God's eternity and the world's eternity, which is false and impossible because the world's eternity contains eternal evil and eternal corruption and sin; rule B shows this clearly enough with the definitions of goodness, eternity and concordance. Further, the first species of rule C posits that if the world is eternal, it follows that its eternity is a being beyond which there is nothing prior in duration, which is against God's eternity (as the third species of rule D shows by implying subjection) since it cannot annihilate something as lasting as itself. In addition, the first species of rule D confirms this by saying that the world always was, is, and will be. The second species of rules C and D also posit this, now the world's substance consists of the eternalizer, the eternalizable and their eternalizing, which makes it a being that cannot be removed. Likewise, the third species of rule C posits that goodness and eternity are subordinate to eternal contrariety. Moreover, the fourth species of rule C says that they are passive under evil, which is impossible. Therefore, etc.

Chapter 7

Camera bddd

40. If the world is eternal, its innate contrariety is good and eternal, which is false. The first and second species of rule D indicate that the world's eternity is a subject forever composed of intrinsically opposite eternal good and eternal evil in mutual confrontation. By the first species of rule C, substance is a composition of eternal primordial opposites. By the second species of rule D, the world eternally has its innate opposer, opposed and opposition. In addition, by the fourth species of rule C, eternal goodness has action in eternal evil and conversely; which is an utter impossibility to which rule B simply cannot consent. We therefore conclude that the world cannot have existed from eternity.

Chapter 8

Camera btbc

41. If the world is not eternal, then the goodness and difference that exist between sensual and intellectual etc. can be in good concordance in the aevum. However, this could not be so at all, if the world existed from eternity, as there would never have been a first man and never would there be a last one. Thus, the world would be a confused subject in which moral goodness would be eternally deprived of concordance, and the definition of concordance could not be preserved in a world whose eviternal corruption, privation and guilt clearly contradict the first rule.

42. Further, by the first species of rule C, the world is a subject in which goodness has no concordance and no repose. Moreover, by the first species of rule D, goodness, difference and concordance are primordial, innate forms forever removed from perfection. By the second species of rule D, the world is confused, and by the second species of rule C, it has its innate confuser, confusable and confusion. The third species of rule D says that there is some dominant being who gives rise to a confused world. Likewise, by the third species of rule C, the prime cause is evil in the world, and by the fourth species of rule C, it has dominion over the world, which is impossible. Therefore, we conclude that the world is not eternal.

Chapter 9

Camera btbd

43. If the world is eternal, its innate contrariety is eternally sustained in goodness and evil without any clear mutual distinction in an eternal, universal ladder that stands between sensual and sensual etc. Contrariety can in no way sustain such a ladder. Further, the first rule fully consents to asserting that the answer to this question is negative.

Likewise, the first species of rule C posits that if the world is eternal, then contrariety eternally obstructs all the good that is divided into sensual and sensual etc. while eternally existing goodness brings the ladder between sensual and sensual etc. to perfection, and while the difference that exists between sensual and sensual etc. distinguishes good from evil. Moreover, by the second species of rule D, the world is composed of good and different primordial contrarieties, which is false as shown by the first species of rule D. Now the second species of rule C and the third species of rule D indicate that the world is subordinated to its innate parts. In addition, by the second species of rule C, it is intrinsically corruptible while by the fourth species, it has the habit of eternity. Because all this is impossible, we conclude that the world is not eternal.

Chapter 10

Camera btcd

44. If the world is eternal, its goodness is eternal and intrinsic to the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. while this ladder exists in the habit of eternal concordance and contrariety, which is impossible because it contradicts the definitions of the said reasons. And rule B confirms the negative answer. In addition, the first species of rule C indicates that the world is a substance composed of eternal contraries existing in a corruptible state, even though it is eternal, which is utterly impossible and dissonant with reason. Likewise, the first species of rule D says on the one hand, that there is primordial corruption because of the primordial contrariety that exists between good and evil, but on the other hand, that primordial concordance indicates the opposite. Moreover, the second species of rules C and D say that the world is composed of contraries placed within each other.

45. Further, the third species of rule C says that the world is corruptible in its contrariety, and incorruptible in its concordance, good in its goodness, and evil in its evil. Likewise, the third species of rule D says that the world is subordinated to its imperfection by some being external to its essence and so disparate from God, that God is no longer a good God but an evil God, which is impossible. Therefore, etc.

Chapter 11

Camera cdtb

46. Supposing that the world is eternal, what is the great difference in its eternity in the ladder of sensual and sensual etc.? We answer that it is an essence which posits an eternity differentiated among sensual and sensual etc. by the eternalizer, eternalized and eternalizing. This is impossible, because generated things, by definition, cannot be incorruptible. Moreover, rule B negates these statements. And the first species of rule C positively asserts that the said definition is false and impossible.

47. Next, the first species of rule D says that corruption and incorruptibility coexist primordially; and that both are great in greatness, eternal in eternity and clearly distinct in their difference. Likewise, the second species of rules C and D say that the world is composed of these things. In addition, the third species of rule C says that the world is incorruptible in heaven but corruptible in elemented things, and the world has both a corruptible and an incorruptible nature by the fourth species of rule C. Therefore, its great difference is eternally corruptible and incorruptible, which contradicts the third species of rule D, therefore etc.

Chapter 12

Camera cdtc

48. If the world is eternal, we ask - "What is the great concordance of its eternity?" - We answer with the definitions of greatness, concordance and eternity, and with the second species of rule C, that it is a being that contains its own innate eternalizer, eternalized and eternalizing. Now by the second species of rule C and by the first and second species of rule D, the world's constituent parts entirely remove it from contrariety, as greatness endows it with boundless extension, just as eternity provides its endless duration by the fourth species of rule C. Moreover, by the third species of C, it is infinite in greatness and eternity, and removed from the third species of rule D. However, this is false and impossible, as indicated by the ladder of sensual and sensual, and therefore we conclude that the world is not eternal.

Chapter 13

Camera cdtd

49. Let us suppose that the world is eternal, and ask - "What is the great contrariety between greatness and eternity?" - By the first species of rule C we answer that it is infinite mutual resistance between divine eternity and greatness. Further, by the first species of rule D, divine eternity causes its own likeness in infinite duration, whereas greatness causes the finite greatness of heaven, which is unlike the infinite greatness proper to eternity. And by the third species of rule D, God's greatness is hindered from having its active effect, but his eternity is free to have it. This gives rise to accidental, great and eternal contrariety between divine eternity and greatness by the second species of rules C and D, whereby God's greatness and eternity oppose each other. In this way, divine eternity seems to have more power and vigour than divine greatness has, which is false and impossible. And rule B proves this, as do the definitions of greatness, goodness and eternity. Therefore, etc.

Chapter 14

Camera ctbc

50. Supposing that the world is eternal, we ask - "What is the greatness of its difference and concordance?" - We answer by the first species of rules C and D that they are primordial, eternal essences totally removed from any contrariety. But, by the second species of rules C and D, the world is composed of these things without any contrariety, which is obviously impossible, due to the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. because this ladder is the world's proper passion by the third species of rule D, which indicates that the world is subject to corruption due to the great and eternal action that contrariety has in the world. As rule B and the definitions of the principles cannot support this, therefore, etc.

Chapter 15

Camera ctbd

51. If the world is eternal, we ask - "What is the great contrariety of its difference?" - We answer by the first species of rules C and D, that it is the ladder between sensual and sensual etc. in the simple habit of contrariety, which must be compound nonetheless, as indicated by the second species of rules C and D, because the world's co-essential difference is subordinate to this ladder. By the third species of rules C and D, contrariety is active in difference. By the fourth species of C, contrariety has simple, eternal acts, which it cannot have, as shown by the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. as well as by rule B and by the definitions of the principles, therefore etc.

Chapter 16

Camera ctcd

52. Supposing that the world is eternal, we ask - "What is the great distance that exists between its concordance and contrariety?" - By the first species of rules C and D, it is the formal cause of contradiction in the eternal ladder between sensual and sensual etc. whereby they are joined in eternity, which is a simple principle in which they stand as compounds by the second species of rules C and D. Moreover, the principles are subjected to each other by the third species of rule D. In addition, the second and third species of rule D posit a great, eternal distance between concordance and contrariety in the subject where they have natural opposition within each other by the fourth species of C. Since the world's eternity posits its own co-essential contradiction, which is altogether impossible, we must conclude that the world is not eternal.

Chapter 17

Camera dtbc

53. Given that the world is eternal, we ask - "What does its eternity consist of?" - By the first species of rules C and D we answer that it consists of different, concordant and primordial things both finite and infinite, sustained in the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. In this way, eternity is a general infinite duration of general difference and concordance standing on the ladder and extending into infinite quantity, habit and disposition, while remaining eternal in eternity. Hence, by the second species of rules C and D, the world is composed of infinite and finite parts, and by the fourth species of rule C, eternity has dominion in both, including all the finite intrinsic parts. Moreover, by the third species of rule D, eternity must be subject to

the finite parts, which is false and impossible. Rule D corroborates this, as do the definitions of the said principles, therefore etc.

Chapter 18

Camera dtbd

54. If the world is eternal, let us ask - "What do its innate, co-essential differences and oppositions, namely its own passions, sustained in the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. consist of?" - By the first species of rules C and D we reply that their constituent primordial and eternal differences and oppositions are compounded by the second species of rule C. And by the fourth species of rule C and the third of rule D, they have equal and mutual rulership and obedience between them, as if all the reasons or principles in an eternal subject existed within each other in the same way that natural points exist in each other when they compose a continuous line, which is false and impossible. Rule B and the definitions of the principles show this, and therefore etc...

Chapter 19

Camera dtcd

55. Supposing that the world is eternal, let us ask - "What do its own natural and co-essential concordances and contrarieties indicated by the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. consist of?" - Likewise, we ask - "What do its moral concordances and contrarieties consist of?" - We answer by the first species of rule D, that they exist on their own. And by the first species of rule C, eternity is a being composed of contraries. The second species of rules C and D indicate that eternity has its own intrinsic concorder, opposer and eternalizer, with its concordered, opposed and eternalized and concording, opposing and eternalizing. In this way, there is opposition within the subject. The world exists eternally in its corruptible parts as well as in its incorruptible parts, as shown by the third species of rule C. And by the fourth species of C, the world has an infinite number of cycles whose endless number grows eternally, while it exists in endless repose and endless toil, which is false and impossible. Moreover, rule B proves this, as do the definitions of eternity, concordance and contrariety. Therefore, we conclude that the world is obviously not eternal.

Chapter 20

Camera tbcd

56. If the world is eternal, we ask - "Are its difference, concordance and contrariety eternal?" - The answer is yes, as shown by the green triangle of the second figure, for without universal difference, concordance and contrariety, the world would have nothing to consist of. Thus, the first species of rules C and D show that the world consists of primordial parts ordered to an eternal end by difference and contrariety so that divine eternity both is and is not the cause of the world. In addition, by the second species of rules C and D, the world is both compound and not compound while it has parts that are both innate and not innate by the fourth species of rule C. Moreover, by the third species of rule C, it reposes in its end although it has none. Moreover, by the third species of rule D, the world is both subjected and not subjected to God, both necessarily and not necessarily created, removed from contingency and joined to contingency, and thus it both is and is not. All these things are contradictory, false and impossible, as rule B and the definitions of the said principles show; therefore, it is abundantly clear that the world is not eternal.

57. We proved that the world is new, and this proof necessarily proves the existence of God since the world cannot create itself or bring itself into being from non-being. If it could do so, it would have existed even before existing, which is a contradiction. Therefore, we have discovered that God exists, with his grace and blessing, and we greatly rejoice over this discovery because we will continue existing after death on account of his great goodness, justice and charity. This is how the practical doctrine of this art provides the intellect with a mode for descending to particulars by multiplying twenty reasons for the same conclusion while mixing the principles with the species of the rules to find solutions in the mixtures. We used the first column as an example, and the same can be done with the second, third columns etc. in sequence. Here, we see that the Table of this art is a general subject that enables the intellect to find middle terms in every kind of subject matter inasmuch as we know the meanings of the terms. Conclusions are reached by means of these middle terms, which are the very subject of this art.

Part 6 - Evacuating Figure Three

58. The third figure divides into 36 cameras as shown; each camera implies 12 statements and 24 questions with solutions.

To evacuate a camera, we extract the said statements, questions and solutions following the practical doctrine and technique of this art, and thus we unfold the camera's implicit content and make it explicit.

The definitions of the principles and the species of the rules are applied here to solve questions. Artists can follow this process to solve other questions, to the extent they know what the terms mean.

Chapter 1 - Camera BC

59. We begin to evacuate this camera by making statements, then we interchange subjects with predicates, and then put questions; the example given here with the twelve statements of camera BC applies to the other cameras of figure three. After this, we will take three statements from each camera and prove the solutions to their questions; the process followed for these three statements applies to the remaining statements in each camera.

In addition, you must know why the intellect "evacuates" cameras in the third figure: in other words, it extracts all that it can from each camera by taking the meanings of the letters and applying them to the questions at hand, and by so investigating, it discovers practical answers. We will give an example of this process with the twelve statements of one camera, and you can apply the same to the remaining cameras. Let us proceed thus with camera BC from which the intellect extracts twelve statements by saying:

"Goodness is great; goodness is different; goodness is concordant; greatness is good; greatness is different; greatness is concordant; difference is good; difference is great; difference is concordant; concordance is good; concordance is great; concordance is different."

Now we have finished evacuating the camera's statements, as we made twelve statements by permuting subjects and predicates.

60. Next, the intellect evacuates from the camera twelve middle terms that stand between the subject and predicate because they agree with them generally or specifically. In addition, with these middle terms, the intellect assumes a stance ready for decisive debate. We extract the middle terms from the twelve statements by saying: "Everything that is magnified by greatness is great, but goodness is magnified by greatness, therefore goodness is great." - The same applies to the remaining statements.

61. After doing this evacuation, the intellect evacuates the camera with 24 questions where two questions arise from each statement, as follows: "Goodness is great. Is goodness great? What is great goodness? Goodness is different. Is goodness different? What is different goodness? Goodness is concordant. Is goodness concordant? What is concordant goodness? Greatness is good. Is greatness good? What is good greatness? Greatness is different. Is greatness different? What is different greatness? Greatness is concordant. Is greatness

concordant? What is concordant greatness? Difference is good. Is difference good? What is good difference? Difference is great. Is difference great? What is great difference? Difference is concordant. Is difference concordant? What is concordant difference? Concordance is good. Is concordance good? What is good concordance? Concordance is great. Is Concordance great? What is great concordance? Concordance is different. Is concordance different? What is different concordance?

62. After evacuating the questions in this way, the intellect evacuates the camera with the definitions of goodness and greatness, and then with the three species of difference and concordance as shown in the second figure. Finally, it evacuates the camera with the three species of rule B and the four species of rule C.

After doing the general evacuation, the intellect goes on to solve the questions it raised in the course of said evacuation according to the camera's conditions, by making affirmative and negative statements. Thus, the intellect expels doubt from the camera where it reposes in an assertive, confident stance, aware that it has reached a high level of general knowledge and artificial skill, and that it has acquired a great scientific habit.

Now let us make and solve questions and prove the solutions with three statements, following the previously specified order.

"Goodness is great. Is goodness great?" - The answer is yes, for the definition of greatness by the first species of rule C says: "Greatness is a being because of which goodness is great". The second species of rule C says that goodness is great because it has its essential bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying in which it has great natural repose by the fourth species of rule C. In addition, by the third species of the same rule, goodness is in difference and concordance by definition, because it differentiates its co-essential correlatives and merges them in its general essence, which gives rise to great moral goodness. Thus, we have proved that goodness is great.

63. We ask - "What is great goodness?" - By the first species of rule C, great goodness is the essence which includes (by the second species) its own innate, distinct and concordant bonifier, bonified and bonifying. By the fourth species, goodness has its own essential, natural intrinsic act with its own actions and passions whereby it moves morally when (by the third species) it is a great reason for good to produce great good from itself. Without all these things, goodness cannot be an intense, natural and great part of general substance.

64. We ask - "Is goodness different?" - The answer is yes, and the first angle of the second figure shows this, as do the definitions of goodness. Without difference, goodness cannot be an intrinsic natural reason for good to produce good, and without goodness, the intrinsic natural passions of difference cannot cause any natural relations. This is proved by rule B and by the first species of C: unless it is different, goodness cannot be defined as the being whose proper function is to do good. Then, by the second species of rule C, goodness is naturally relational. In addition, by the third species, goodness is a habit existing between this sensual thing and that intellectual thing etc. Further, by the fourth species of rule C, goodness has different natural properties in stones, in plants, etc.

65. We ask - "What is different goodness?" We answer by the first species of rule C, that different goodness is the reason why the bonifier distinguishes its bonified object and its act of bonifying from itself. By the second species of the same rule, different goodness is the

being which contains its own co-essential and natural relations, and the entire essence of goodness simply resides in each correlative part. Further, by the third species, different goodness is diffused in many different special habits: gold has one kind of habit; rubies have another kind, etc. Likewise, by the fourth species, differentiated goodness has different habits in different subjects, as proved by rules B and C.

66. Goodness is concordant. Is goodness concordant? We answer by the first species of rule C that it is concordant, or else it would not be a reason for good to produce good of its own species. By the second species of this rule, if goodness was not concordant, there would be no concordance among its correlatives, which would be something evil and contrary to its general nature. Likewise, by the third species of the same rule, because of its concordance, goodness is a good, concordant and diffusive habit existing between sensual and sensual etc. In addition, by the fourth species of the same rule, through its concordance, goodness has natural diffusion between sensual and sensual etc.; the definitions of goodness, concordance, and rule B demonstrate this.

67. We ask - "What is concordant goodness?" - By the first species of rule C we answer that concordant goodness is the essence in which the bonifier, bonified and bonifying are in proper accord. The second species of the same rule proves this. Likewise, by the third species of this rule, concordant goodness is the form that makes different men belong to the same species. Similarly, by the fourth species of the same rule, concordant goodness is the natural reason why good men have good mutual accord, naturally or morally.

Chapter 2 - Camera BD

68. Goodness is durable. Is goodness durable? We answer that it is, by the definitions of duration, goodness and the angles indicated by B C D in the second figure. Rule B proves this, as do all the species of rule D. By the first species of D, goodness is primordial. By the second species, goodness has co-essential correlatives in which it naturally lasts. If goodness did not consist of the bonifier, bonified and bonifying, it could not naturally last on its own. Moreover, by the third species of rule D, goodness is substantially durable on its own, and good accidents influenced by it are durable both naturally and morally.

We ask - "What does durable goodness consist of, and what does it belong to?" - We answer by the first species, that it consists of itself because it has its own primordial constituting correlatives shown by the second species of the same rule D. Next, by the third species, durable goodness belongs to the whole, where it exists as a part. Rule B proves this.

69. Goodness is different. Is goodness different? This was answered above, in camera BC Chapter 1.#64. What does different goodness consist of? The species of rule D give the answer in the same way as shown above in the previous number.

70. Goodness is contrary. Is goodness contrary? We reply that it is, as shown by the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. and the definitions of goodness, difference and contrariety confirm this, as does rule B.

What does contrary goodness consist of? We answer that it consists of many good habits, like cold, heat, moisture and dryness, heaviness and lightness, generation and corruption and such things, verified by the first species of D. By the second species of the same rule D, the goodness of contrariety exists by accident, for instance in elemented things where elements

oppose each other through contrary qualities. By the third species, we see that as contrariety is an accident, it is subject to substantial goodness, as an instrument to the efficient cause.

Chapter 3 - Camera BE

71. Goodness is powerful. Is goodness powerful? We reply that it is, by the definitions of goodness and power, since power is a being on account of which goodness can exist and act; if goodness was not powerful, it could not be a reason for good to produce good. In addition, rule B affirms that goodness is powerful.

Why is goodness powerful? By the first species of rule E we reply that it is powerful because it consists of its own co-essential bonificative, bonifiable and bonifying. Thus, goodness as an active and powerful being bonifies peregrine bonifiable things in its intrinsic bonifiable, and these peregrine bonifiable things do not belong to the genus or nature of goodness' own intrinsic bonifiable. By the second species, goodness is powerful so it can habituate other essences, and rule B shows this.

Is goodness different? This was answered in camera BC Chapter 1 #64.

72. Goodness initiates. Does goodness initiate anything? We reply that it does so by definition, as it is the reason for good to produce good. The definitions of beginning and difference in the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. prove this, where goodness is a general principle, from which descends the good difference that exists between one plant and another, as well as between all good causal and accidental principles.

Why is initiating goodness a causal and accidental principle? Referring to the ladder of beginning we confirm by rule B and the first species of rule E, that goodness is a causal or formal principle due to its bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying. In addition, by the second species, goodness is an accidental or final principle so that other good principles can be subject to it as goodness clothes them with good habits.

Chapter 4 - Camera BF

73. Goodness is knowable. Is goodness knowable? We reply that it is, as shown by rule B and the ladder of difference between sensual and sensual etc. and by the three species of medium combined with the essence of goodness, where the intellect knows the discrete natural relations whereby goodness has continuous quantity. This is proved by the definition of medium. Goodness is different. Is goodness different? The answer is yes, as we proved in camera BC Chapter 1 #64.

74. Goodness has a medium. Does goodness have a medium? We reply that it has, because difference declares that in goodness, bonifying is a medium that exists between the bonifier and the bonifiable, without which goodness could not be a reason for good to produce good, or have any natural movement or real relations, and this is abundantly proved by rule B.

75. How much goodness can we know? We can know goodness as much as the natural or moral medium can enter into goodness through the ladder between sensual and sensual etc. with the definitions of goodness, difference, wisdom and medium. Rule B confirms this.

How long can goodness last? We reply that goodness can last so long as it diffuses through the cameras of figure three where it mixes with principles habituated with goodness.

How much can goodness be mediated? We reply that it can be mediated inasmuch as the medium can enter into it with the definitions of medium, goodness, wisdom and difference. Rule B and the first and second species of rule F prove this, because goodness has continuous quantity in its essence and it has discrete quantities caused by difference in its relations.

Chapter 5 - Camera BG

76. Goodness is lovable. Is goodness lovable? The answer is affirmative, as shown by the definitions of goodness, end, rule B and the ladder of sensual and sensual etc.

Goodness is different. Is goodness different? We answer that it is, as shown in camera BC, Chapter 1.

Goodness is differentiated. Can goodness be differentiated? The answer is as above.

Goodness exists for an end. Does goodness exist for a purpose? We answer that it is, because if it did not exist for purpose, goodness would not be a reason for good to produce good, nor would difference make it a clear reason with its own relations, intrinsic - or natural - as well as extrinsic - or moral – and thus, it would terminate in malice and privation, which is false and impossible. Moreover, rule B, the definitions of goodness, difference and end as well as the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. confirm this.

77. What kind of goodness is lovable, differentiated and purposeful? We reply that substantial goodness is lovable because of its own intrinsically related passions clarified by difference as they repose in their end. Another kind of goodness is accidental, like the goodness of will, greatness, etc. or the goodness of justice, wisdom, etc.

What kind of difference is lovable in goodness? Answer: the kind that posits intrinsic relations and passions within goodness as well as extrinsic or moral passions outside of it, and the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. proves this.

What kind of end is lovable? We reply that it is the supreme end, which is the prime cause as well as the proper end of natural and moral goodness. Likewise, the end of difference is lovable because without it, the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. cannot universally exist: now its absence would entail privation depriving the world of being, because the destruction of the parts precedes the destruction of the whole, as shown by rules B and G.

Chapter 6 - Camera BH

78. Goodness is virtuous. Is goodness virtuous? We answer that it is, as shown by the definitions of goodness, virtue and majority, by the ladder of difference between sensual and sensual etc. and by the ladder of majority between substance and substance etc. Rule B confirms this.

Goodness is different. Is goodness different? We reply as above in Chapter 1.

Goodness is major. Is goodness major? We answer that it is, because there is major goodness in substance and minor goodness in accidents, and substantial relations are greater than accidental ones; and because goodness is greater in some subjects than in others, as shown in the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. and in the ladder of majority between substance and substance etc.

79. When is goodness virtuous? We reply that goodness is naturally virtuous when it has being, and morally virtuous when it is clothed in habits of justice, prudence etc. The definitions of goodness, virtue, majority and difference demonstrate this, as does rule B.

When is goodness differentiated? We reply that it is differentiated when it has being because of the real relations that difference places in it, without which goodness can have no nature. In addition, it is differentiated when it has one moral habit for justice, another for prudence etc. Moreover, the definitions of the principles prove this.

When is goodness major? We reply that it is major when it exists both substantially and morally. In addition, when its virtuous moral habit exists in practice, it is greater than when it is not put into practice. Moreover, it is greater when it acts with charity than when it acts with justice. The same applies to substantial and accidental activity. And rule B proves these things.

Chapter 7 - Camera BI

80. Goodness is true. Is goodness true? We reply that it is, by rule B and by the definitions of goodness, truth, difference and equality. If goodness was not true, it would not be a true reason for true good to produce good, nor could difference truly stand among the bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying, nor could equality repose in any subject, given that equality exists among the concretes of goodness. Thus, the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. would be destroyed as well as the ladder of substance and substance etc.; and as the world cannot exist at all without these ladders, goodness must be a true essence per se.

Goodness is different. Is goodness different? We reply as before in Chapter 1.

Goodness is equal. Is goodness equal? We reply that it is, as shown by rule B and the definitions of the principles. Now goodness is a reason for good to produce good, and truth verifies this with difference and equality, so that truth is diffused equally in the true bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying, and in the ladders of sensual and sensual etc. and those of substance and substance etc. shown in the second figure.

81. Where is true goodness? We reply by the first species of rules C and D, that it is a being in itself, a primordial essence existing in its own genus. Moreover, by the second species of rules C and D, it is in its own good and true concretes, and it exists in truth, difference and equality as a habit of everything that is clothed with it. In addition, it exists in the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. and also in the ladder of substance and substance etc. Rules B, I and K confirm this.

Chapter 8 - Camera BK

82. Goodness is glorious. Is goodness glorious? We reply that it is, as proved by rules B and K, and by the definitions of goodness, glory, difference and minority in the ladders of sensual and sensual etc. and of substance and substance etc. Now glory is what gives goodness distinct, good and glorious concretes of its own genus and nature, whereby it reposes far from confusion and minority.

Goodness is different. Is goodness different? We reply, as before in Chapter 1, that it is.

Goodness is minor. Is goodness minor? The answer is affirmative, as we see in the ladder of sensual and sensual etc., because a stone has less goodness than a plant has, a plant has less goodness than an animal has, colour has less goodness than sight has, sight has less goodness than understanding has, and so forth. Rules B and K confirm this.

83. How does glorious goodness exist? We reply that glorious goodness has a mode of existence due to difference, making it one substantial essence distinct from all other essences, due to its own distinct, substantial, general and natural correlatives in which it reposes intrinsically and naturally. And as goodness exists in glory, and glory exists in goodness, the glory of goodness has a moral mode for causing distinct, good and glorious moral habits. Rules B and K confirm this.

84. With what is goodness different? The answer is that it is different both per se and with difference that distinguishes its essence from all other essences not of its own species and nature. In addition, goodness is different in another way: with its own co-essential and substantial correlatives, it causes many kinds of accidental goodness; this is signified by the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. and by the ladder of substance and substance etc.

Chapter 9 - Camera CD

85. Greatness is eternal. What is eternal greatness? We reply that eternal greatness is a being which has its own intrinsic, great, infinite, eternal and primordial correlatives, indicated by the definitions of greatness, eternity, concordance and contrariety, and by the first and second species of rules C and D. By the third species of rules C and D, the said concretes exist in infinite greatness and concordance etc. separated from contrariety and subjection; and every concrete exists in the others. The entire essence of eternity exists in each of the said concretes and so does the entire essence of concordance, and each concrete has its own distinct number in the others where the three exist as one single essence, one without a second.

86. What is great concordance? Great concordance is an essence that exists by reason of the second species of rules C and D. By the third species of rules C and D, it is, in other things, the entire essence of concordance, and each of its concretes is the entire essence of concordance ruling all other accidental or peregrine concordance. What is great contrariety? Answer: it is a form that causes corruption in elemented things. It also causes privative habits like envy, lust, etc.

87. We ask - "What do eternal greatness, concordant greatness and contrary greatness consist of?" - The attentive student can see the answer in what was given previously in this chapter,

and we proceed thus for the sake of brevity, to avoid boring the student's intellect with too much repetition.

Chapter 10 - Camera CE

88. Power is great. What is great power? We answer that it is the being in which greatness and power convert. The first species of rule C signifies this. Further, by the second species of C and the first of E, power is great because it has its own formal and co-essential concretes, namely the magnifier-powerer, magnified-powered and magnifying-powering. By the third species of C, it is in other essences to enable them to exist and act. By the fourth species, it has action and passion, as it is active and passive in its appropriated subjects. And the second species of rule E says that great power exists to make all other things possible by magnifying them. The definitions of greatness and power prove this.

89. Greatness is concordant. What is great concordance? Find the answer in the text of camera CD, chapter 9, #86.

Greatness is a great principle. What is a great principle? We say that it is a being in which greatness and principle convert without any matter or accident, and the second species of rule C, the first of E and the definitions of the principles signify this. The magnifier-initiator exists so that there be a magnified-initiated entity and so that magnifying-initiating proceed from both, with the definitions of greatness, power, concordance and beginning.

Why do great power, great concordance and great principle exist? The answer is that they exist because of the things signified by the species of rules C and E and by the definitions of the principles.

Chapter 11 - Camera CF

90. Great intellect exists. What is great intellect? We answer that great intellect is a being in which greatness and intellect convert, as signified by the first species of rule C. Moreover, intellectual greatness exists because the intellect has its own co-essential and relative concretes, namely the knower, knowable and knowing whereby it has a discrete nature, whereas its essence is continuous and indivisible, as shown by the second species of rule C. Further, the intellect's greatness enables its essence to contain all intelligible things - as signified by the third species of rule C - so that the intellect can accomplish great things in practice. Then, by the fourth species, the intellect exists in order to have a general relation to all things, to understand various objects, to acquire intelligibility in which it understands them, and to have an act of understanding with which it understands them and puts them into practice in particular ways, by moving through successive steps on the ladder of sensual an sensual etc. and the ladder of the means of conjunction etc.

What is concordant greatness? Find the answer above in camera CD, Chapter 9.

91. Greatness has means. What are great means? We find the answer in the ladder of middle, the ladder of concordance and the first and second species of rules C and F, all things without which great means cannot exist. Greatness devoid of means remains empty and idle, and conversely, there can be no great means without greatness. The truth of our statements is proved by the definitions of the principles, the species of the rules and by the said ladders in

which the intellect gradually ascends and descends step by step as it acquires new sciences and scientific habits.

92. We ask - "How much greatness does the intellect have? How much concordance does it have? How many means does it dispose of?" - We say that the intellect has these things as much as they are signified by the statements about its greatness, concordance and means in the paragraphs of the present camera CF. We leave this as an exercise for those who are good at speculation and who know this art, and we do so for the sake of brevity.

Chapter 12 - Camera CG

93. What is great will? By the first species of rule C we reply that great will is a being in which all great things are lovable. By the second species of rule C and the first of G, great will has a great lover, beloved and loving; and the lover informs the beloved through loving. Further, by the fourth species, great will possesses in itself all that is lovable. And by the second species of G, the general qualities of great will are the appropriate lovable acts it gives rise to. The definitions of greatness, will, concordance and end as well as the ladders of C and G in the second figure give ample proof of this.

What is great concordance? Find the answer above in Chapter 9.

94. What is a great end? We reply with the first species of rule C, that a great end is a being which has its own correlatives, namely the consummator, consummated and consummation, in the essence of greatness. In the great end's own intrinsic consummated correlative, all other consummated things come to appropriate consummation. The first and second species of rule C, and the definitions of the principles in camera CG signify this.

What kind of will is great? What kind of concordance is great? What kind of end is great? Find answers to these questions in our previous statements in the present chapter, where the solutions are implicit, and you can artificially adduce them to the issue at hand.

Chapter 13 - Camera CH..

95. Greatness is virtuous. We ask - "What is great virtue?" - We answer that it is a being greatly distinct from corruption and sin; the first species of rule C signifies this. Next, by the second species, great virtue is one that has its own innate virtuous magnifier, magnified and magnifying, which naturally and substantially relate and exist outside of time and within time. Likewise, by the third species, great virtue is one that causes great virtues to exist within time. Further, by the fourth species, great virtue is one that has rulership over all other virtues that do not belong to its own general nature.

What is great concordance? Find the answer above in Chapter 9.

96. Greatness is major. What is major greatness? We answer that it is the substance furthest removed from smallness, minority and accidents. Next, by the second species of rule C, it is a being that has its own intrinsic magnifier, magnified and magnifying. By the third species, it is a major ruler in other essences, and by the fourth species, it obtains everything it wants from these essences. Camera CH.. holds sufficient proof of these things.

97. When is greatness virtuous? And when are great concordance and majority virtuous? We answer that they are virtuous before time and movement existed, and this is proved by all the species of rule H.

Chapter 14 - Camera CI

98. Greatness is true. What is true greatness? We reply that it is the substance furthest removed from falsity and accident, because it has, by the second species of rule C, the true magnifier, magnified and magnifying that stand infinitely unopposed within and without space. Next, by the third species, true greatness is the cause that makes true - not false - magnitudes exist in space, both substantially and accidentally. Further, by the fourth species, it has great and true action in all new subjects, and the definitions of the principles of camera CI prove this, as do the rules.

99. What is great concordance? Find the answer in Chapter 9 above.

Now let us ask - "What is major concordance?" - Answer: it is a major substance with innate, major and substantial relations removed from all accidents.

100. There is great equality. What is great equality? We answer that it is a being whose innate correlatives are entirely separate from majority and minority. Then, by the third species, it is the cause of all related majorities and minorities, while it exists both within space without being contained by space, and infinitely outside of space. Further, by the fourth species, it has whatever it wants to have in space; rule C and the definitions of the principles in camera CI prove this.

101. Where are great truth, great concordance and great equality? We answer that they exist in themselves by the first species of rule C. By the third species, they are in other subjects that they cause; the second and fourth species indicate similar answers, each in its own way. Each species of rule I provides its own way of answering this question.

Chapter 15 - Camera CK

102. What is great glory? We answer that it is the substance most distant from smallness and punishment. By the second species of rule C, it is a being that has its own innate, glorious magnifier, magnified and magnifying. By the third species, it is a cause in all peregrine substances and accidents. In addition, by the fourth species, it has great glory in the greatly glorified, and conversely. The same applies to magnifying and glorifying. Rules C and K confirm this, as do the definitions of the principles in camera CK.

103. What is great concordance? Find the answer in Chapter 9 above.

Now if we ask - "What is the great concordance of glory?" - The answer resides in all four species of rule C, as indicated by them. And the definitions of greatness, concordance and glory attest to this.

104. What is great minority? We reply that it is something accidental, closer to non-being than to substance. And it is a being with its own co-essential correlatives, by the second species of rule C. However, some substantial minorities exist by accident, as shown in the ladder of

sensual and sensual etc. and the ladder of substance and substance etc. Rules C, K. The definitions of minority also prove this.

105. How does great glory exist? How does great concordance exist? We answer by the third species of rule C that they exist in relation within each other, magnifying and glorifying in concordance entirely separate from minority.

106. What does great glory exist with? What does great concordance exist with? We answer that they exist with the magnifier-glorifier-concorder, the magnified-glorified-concorder and magnifying-glorifying-concording, and with the conversion of identity in essence, substance and nature, while the three correlatives remain distinct, as by the second species of rule C, each one is per se numerically distinct from the others. There is also great glory and great concordance in the ladder of sensual and sensual etc. and in the ladder of substance and substance etc. but this glory is not as great as the former, which is the prime cause while the latter is a second cause.

Chapter 16 - Camera DE

107. Duration is powerful. By the first species of rule D, where does powerful duration first arise? We say that it originates in itself, in its own innate primordial essence and power, and this power enables it to exist and act.

By the second species of rule D we ask, what things does powerful duration consist of? We reply that it consists of duration's correlatives with those of power.

By the third species of the same rule we ask - "To what does powerful duration belong?" - The answer is that accidental powerful duration, as it is the habit that enables substantial powers and durations to last, belongs to substantial duration and power.

108. What does contrariety's duration consist of? We answer that it consists of primordial qualities, virtues and vices that last with the staying power that they have.

What does the duration of principles consist of? We say that it consists of primordial durations and the thorough mixture of principles where duration communicates its essence to principle while principle communicates its essence to duration.

109. Why does power last? We reply that it lasts because it consists of the sustainer-powerer, durable-powerable and enduring-powering in the compound subjects in which they exist.

Why does powerful opposition last? We reply that it lasts because it is habituated with contrary relations, duration and power in the compound subjects in which they exist.

Why do the principles of power last? We reply that they last because their correlatives are generally habituated with relation and power.

Chapter 17 - Camera DF

110. What does knowable duration consist of? We answer that it consists of the sustainer-knower, durable-knowable and enduring-knowing.

What does the duration of contrariety consist of? We say that it consists of enduring, joining and measuring caused by continuous duration of contrary qualities.

111. What is the quantity of duration? We reply that duration has the same quantity as its essence and concretes have.

How durable is contrariety? We say that it lasts as long as there is a quantity of oppositions or contrary moral values in a subject.

How long does the middle last? We say that it lasts as long as enduring and mediating exist between the sustainer-mediator and the endured-mediated.

Chapter 18 - Camera DG

112. What does lovable duration consist of? We reply that it consists of peregrine species attracted to and printed upon the innate durable-lovable.

What does the duration of contrariety consist of? Find the answer in the preceding Chapter, #110.

What does the end's duration consist of? We reply that it consists of the consummator consummating and enduring to an extent beyond which appetite cannot reach.

113. What kind of duration does the will have? We reply that it has the kind of duration that is determined by its substantial correlatives giving rise both to proper passions in the genus of duration and will, and to appropriated passions that habituate and dispose the subject.

What kinds of contrary durations are there? We say that they are the kind that endure and oppose each other within the subjects in which they exist.

What kinds of ends are durable? We say that they are ends whose qualities are determined by appetites so habituated with them that they seek no further repose beyond them.

Chapter 19 - Camera DH

114. What does virtuous duration consist of? We say that it consists of itself together with substantial and accidental virtue.

What does the duration of contrariety consist of? The answer is as above, in Chapter 17 #110.

What does the duration of majority consist of? We reply that it consists of the major sustainer, durable and enduring, increaser, increasable and increasing.

115. When is there virtuous duration? We say that it exists when it is really present in the species of rules D and H.

When does contrariety endure? We say that it endures whenever generation, corruption and contrary qualities or contrary moral values are present in subjects. When is there lasting

majority? We reply that majority lasts whenever powers or substances have their acts.

Chapter 20 - Camera DI

116. Duration is true. We ask - "What does true duration consist of?" - We reply with the first species of rule D that it consists of itself, because duration and truth are primordial principles in their own genus. By the second species of D, it consists of its correlatives.

What does the duration of contrariety consist of? The answer is as before, in Chapter 17.

What does the duration of equality consist of? We say that it consists of the equalizer-sustainer, equalized-endured and equalizing-enduring.

117. Where is the duration of truth? We reply that it is in all the species of I.

Where is the duration of contrariety? We say that it is in subjects in which contrary qualities exist with their contrary acts, and it is in dispute. Where is the duration of equality? We reply that it is in the correlatives specified by the second species of rules C and D, as well as in modality and instrumentality.

Chapter 21 - Camera DK

118. Duration is glorifiable. What does glory's duration consist of? We reply that it consists of the sustainer, durable and enduring together with the glorifier, glorifiable and glorifying.

What does the duration of contrariety consist of? The answer is as above in Chapter 17.

What does minority's duration consist of? We reply that it consists of the sustainer-diminisher, durable-diminishable and enduring-diminishing.

119. How does glory's duration exist? We say that it exists in the way that duration and glory are active in the durable-glorifiable while the latter is passive under duration and glory, so that enduring-glorifying proceed in the neutral mode from active and passive correlatives.

How does the duration of contrariety exist? We say that it exists in the way in which contrary qualities exist in one another.

How does the duration of minority exist? We say that it exists with the modes of duration, division and corruption.

What does glory's duration exist with? We say that it exists with the correlatives of duration and glory.

What does the duration of contrariety exist with? We say that it exists with the influences that arise from the likenesses of mutually opposing parts.

What does the duration of minority exist with? We reply that it exists with divided correlatives in subjects that are in a state of corruption.

Chapter 22 - Camera EF

120. Power is knowable. Why is power knowable? We answer that it is knowable because intellect and power have correlatives whereby both principles communicate essentially and naturally.

We ask - "Why is power a principle?" - Answer: it is a principle because it enables the other principles to exist and act.

Why can power be mediated? We answer that it can be mediated so that its act of empowering can proceed between the powerer and powered when they are in conjunction.

Wisdom is powerful. How much power does wisdom have? Answer: as much as power communicates itself to wisdom and spreads through wisdom.

What quantity does a beginning have? We reply that it has quantity inasmuch as it enters into the middle.

How many means are there? Answer: as many as there are species of means existing in subjects.

Chapter 23 - Camera EG

121. Power is lovable. Why is power lovable? We say that it is lovable because it empowers the will in existence and action.

Why is power a principle? Find the answer above in Chapter 22.

Why does power repose in an end? We reply that it does so by reason of its own general existential act.

122. What are the qualities of power? We say that power has proper qualities like powerability, and appropriated ones like lovability.

What are the qualities of principles? We say that some principles are substantial and others are accidental, and that the accidental principles clothe the substantial ones.

What kinds of end are there? We say that one kind of end is perfective, another is terminative and another is privative, as shown in the ladder of the second figure.

Chapter 24 - Camera EH

123. Power is virtuous. Why is it virtuous? We say that it is virtuous because it abides in substantial and habitual virtue.

Power is major. Why is it major? We say that it is major because of its major correlatives and because it reposes in a major end.

Why does power exist in time? We say that power that is created with time and in time, consequently acts within time.

124. When does power exist? We say that it exists when it enables the other principles to exist and act.

When does a principle exist? We say that it exists when it is primordial, and when it has its own correlatives.

When does majority exist? We say that it exists when powers have major acts or effects.

Chapter 25 - Camera EI

125. Power is true. Why is it true? We say that it is true because it is habituated with truth and with the species of truth.

Why is power a principle? Find the answer above in Chapter 22 #120.

Why does power have equality? Answer: because it stands equally in its correlatives.

126. Where is power? We say that it is in its correlatives and in the truth that clothes it.

Where does a principle exist? Answer: it exists in its own correlatives and in its own power that enable it to exist and act; it exists in truth because it is clothed with truth and it exists in equality because its correlatives are equal.

Where is equality? We say that it is in its own intrinsic correlatives as well as in the correlatives of power, principle, truth, etc.

Chapter 26 - Camera EK

127. Power is glorious. Why is it glorious? Answer: because its substantial correlatives are imprinted and habituated with glory.

Why is power a principle? The answer was given above, in Chapter 22 #120.

Why is power minor? We say that it is minor because its correlatives are disposed in minority and habituated with it. Consequently, it causes division and decrease, which belong to the genus of minority just as increase belongs to the genus of majority.

128. How does power exist? We reply that it exists by means of the mode of modality when it is habituated with modality.

How does a principle exist? We answer that it exists by means of the mode of its own innate constituent correlatives, while it also has a mode whereby power clothes principle and enables it to give rise to things. Likewise, principle has a mode for glorifying with glory by giving rise in its own intrinsic initiabile part to peregrine beings that do not belong to its own genus.

How does minority exist? We reply that minority's mode of being consists of giving rise to division, inanition, corruption and annihilation.

129. With what is power glorious? We say that it is glorious with glory just as glory is powerful with power.

What does a principle exist with? We say that it exists with its correlatives and its power without which it cannot exist.

What does minority exist with? We say that it exists with division, corruption and annihilation.

Chapter 27 - Camera FG

130. Wisdom is lovable. How lovable is it? We say that wisdom is lovable as much as the will is knowable because they have equal correlatives.

The means to the end are lovable. How lovable are the means? We say that the means are loved as much as loving joins and measures the will in which they exist.

How much can the end be known? Answer: as much as science can repose in it.

131. We ask - "What kind of self-knowledge does the intellect have?" - We say that the intellect, in its own self-knowledge, knows its own intrinsic intelligibility in which other intelligibilities arise whenever the second species of rule G introduces extraneous species.

What is the medium's proper quality? We say that it is its own passive, mediable part that contains peregrine, appropriated mediabilities.

What is the intellect's own end? Answer: the intellect's own end is in its own innate intelligibility, where its knowledge of things ultimately reposes.

Chapter 28 - Camera FH

132. The intellect is virtuous. How virtuous is it? We say that it is as virtuous as it is clothed with virtue.

How virtuous is the intellect's means to its end? We say that it is virtuous inasmuch as its ladder of medium is habituated with virtue.

How big is the intellect's majority? Answer: as big as is its outreach toward objects with its major act of understanding.

133. When is the intellect virtuous? Answer: when it is clothed with natural and moral virtue.

When is virtue mediated? Answer: when it enters the middle and abides there once it has entered.

When is majority understood? Answer: when the intellect attains the essence and the act of virtue.

Chapter 29 - Camera FI

134. The intellect is true. How true is it? Answer: it is true inasmuch as it exists between the knower and knowing.

How equal is the intellect? Answer: it is as equal as are its constituent correlatives.

Where is the intellect's truth? We say that it is in its correlatives and in the objects that it truly attains and understands.

Where is the truth of the middle? We answer that it abides in the correlatives of the middle disposed in truth and clothed with truth.

Where is the intellect's equality? We answer that it is in its correlatives, outside of which there cannot be any equality.

Chapter 30 - Camera FK

135. The intellect is glorious. How glorious is it? We say that it is as glorious as its correlatives are clothed in glory and repose in glory.

How glorious is the intellect's means to its end? Answer: as glorious as it measures glory with understanding.

How much can the intellect decrease? Answer: as much as it can clothe itself in minority.

136. How does the intellect understand? We reply that it understands with the modes of the sensitive and imaginative powers to which it is joined, according to their way of introducing peregrine species into its innate intelligibility.

How does the intellect measure its understanding? Answer: it measures its understanding by the actions and passions it encounters when attaining its object.

How does the intellect decrease its understanding? We reply that it does this with the mode of belief, because belief does not belong to the genus of intellect. It also decreases its understanding by clothing itself in inferior modalities.

137. What does the intellect understand with? We say that it understands with its act of understanding and with the species that the sensitive and imaginative powers imprint in its own intelligibility.

With what does the intellect attain species from the sensitive and imaginative powers? We say that it attains them with its own act of understanding.

With what does the intellect decrease its understanding? We say that it is with proximity to ignorance and with idleness of intellect, memory and will.

Chapter 31 - Camera GH

138. Will is virtuous. What kind of will is virtuous? We say that it is will segregated from sin and clothed with virtue.

In what kind of end does the will repose? We say that it reposes in the supreme end by the second species of G, and in its own end by the first species. However, it needs its appropriated end as an instrument.

What kind of will is major? We say that it is will that has a major lover, major beloved and major loving, with major habits of virtue, goodness, etc.

139. When does the will have major virtue? We say that it is when it loves major virtue.

When does the will have major repose? We say that it is when it loves the greatest beloved with the greatest love.

When is the will major? Answer: when its loving has major purpose and virtue.

Chapter 32 - Camera GI

140. The will is true. What kind of will is true? We say it is will that has true innate correlatives and true goodness, greatness, etc.

In what kind of end does the will repose? Answer: in a true and perfect end.

What kind of equality does the will have? We say that its equality is the same as the equality in which its correlatives are habitually disposed.

141. Where is truth lovable? We say that it is lovable in lovability, which is the will's own passion.

Where does truth repose? We reply that it reposes in its own end and also in the end of the will.

Where is equal truth? We say that it is in its own correlatives and in the correlatives of equality.

Chapter 33 - Camera GK

142. The will is glorious. What kind of will is glorious? We say that it is will with correlatives clothed in glory.

What kind of end does the will have? We say that its end is good, etc.

What things diminish the will? Answer: things like inferior willing habituated with inferior truth and glory.

143. How is the will true? We say that it is true by means of its way of loving truth.

How does the will repose in its end? We say that it reposes in the same way as it loves a truly glorious end.

How does the will distance itself from minority? We say that it does so by its way of objectifying the greatest true and glorious beloved.

144. With what means is the will glorious? Answer: with its correlatives habituated with glory.

With what does the will repose? Answer: with its intrinsic lover and lovability, and with its loving, which introduces peregrine lovable beings into its intrinsic lovability.

With what does the will decrease? We say that it is with minor willing, minor goodness, etc.

Chapter 34 - Camera HI

145. Virtue is true. When is it true? Answer: when it causes true virtues.

When is virtue major? Answer: when it causes major virtues.

When is virtue equal? Answer: when it causes virtuous understanding, remembering and loving.

146. Where is true virtue? We reply that it is in truth, outside of which it cannot be true.

Where is major virtue? We say that it is in substance as well as in accident.

Where is virtue equal? Answer: in its substantial correlatives clothed in equality.

Chapter 35 - Camera HK

147. Virtue is glorious. When is it glorious? Answer: when glory is imprinted in its correlatives.

When is major glory present? Answer: when it has a major act of glorifying.

When is virtue equal? We say that it is equal when it equally causes understanding, remembering and loving.

148. How is glory virtuous? Answer: with its way of clothing its correlatives in virtue.

How does glory increase? We say that it increases with its way of causing major acts.

How does glory decrease? We say that it decreases with its way of causing minor acts.

149. What is virtue glorified with? Answer: with the glory in which it is clothed.

What is majority glorified with? Answer: with major acts of glory.

What is minority glorified with? Answer: with its appropriated minor acts habituated with glory.

Chapter 36 - Camera IK

150. Truth is glorious. Where is it glorious? Answer: in its correlatives located or disposed in glory.

Where is truth equal? We reply that it is in its substantial correlatives, outside of which it can have no equality at all.

Where is minor truth? We say that it is present in minor habits and acts.

151. How is truth glorious? Answer: in its way of causing true and glorious acts.

How is truth equal? We say that it is equal by means of the mode it has in its substantially equal correlatives.

How is truth minor? We reply that truth decreases through the way in which it causes minor acts.

152. What is minority glorified with? We say that it is glorified with its repose in glory and in the correlatives of glory.

With what means is truth equal? We say that it is equal by means of the equality of its correlatives and habits.

With what is truth decreased? We say that it is decreased by accidents and increased by substance.

153. We covered the evacuation of figure three by evacuating it with a selection of statements and questions. Artists who practice this art can likewise evacuate it with all the remaining statements and questions that are implicitly contained in the cameras and that we omitted here for the sake of brevity: each camera has twelve statements and twenty-four questions.

154. Further, each camera is general to all other peregrine questions relevant to its general reasons. Moreover, each camera is general to all particular questions about God, Angels, etc. In conclusion, we say that anyone who is well versed in the doctrine we gave in the third figure is fully enabled to put the entire general art into practice.

Part 7 - Multiplying Reasons with Figure Four

1. We will deal with this figure in five ways. First, we will show how to produce multiple reasons for the same conclusion; second, a way to find many middle terms to reach conclusions through syllogisms. Third we will deal with the major and minor premise. Fourth, we will show a way to detect fallacies. Fifth, we will show a way to learn other sciences more quickly and accurately by applying this science. Now let us begin with the first mode.

Chapter 1 - Producing multiple reasons.

2. Column BCD of the table showed by example how twenty reasons could apply to the same conclusion in answer to the question - "Is the world eternal?" - Likewise, we can multiply this figure's cameras beginning with BCD, BCE, all the way to camera BCK and each camera yields twenty reasons. Secondly, we continue multiplying cameras through BDE, BDF, etc. where each camera also yields twenty reasons. Third we continue multiplying successive cameras and treat camera CDE as we treated BCD in the previous multiplications. In addition, we treat DEF in the same way as CDE, and so on with the others in their own way, ending with camera HIK as we repeatedly revolve the artificial circles until we have formed the eighty-four columns of the table. We mentioned this feature of figure four in Part 5 about the table. Here, multiplication brings each principle into multiple combinations with the others and each principle takes on the habits of the others with proper and appropriated passions. Further, in the fourth type of multiplication, figure four contains figure three: for instance, camera BCD contains cameras BC and CD of figure three, and likewise camera CDE contains cameras CD and DE of figure three, and so with the others.

Chapter 2 - Finding the Logical Middle Term.

3. In camera BCD and in other cameras, C stands in the middle circle between B and D and as C joins B to D due to certain positions, habits and situations that occur between subjects and predicates, this art always uses the middle circle to investigate the middle term. Now "animal" stands as a middle term of measure and conjunction between "substance" and "man" when we conclude that man is a substance. Likewise, the letter in the middle circle must stand between the letter in the upper circle and the letter in the lower circle, in arguing as follows: all C is B, but all D is C, therefore all D is B. Now certain conjectures and passions necessarily lead to conclude that an animal is a substance and man is an animal. Likewise, the artist of this art will conjecture the things signified by BCD, namely the subalternate principles where B says or means goodness, difference and whether; C signifies greatness, concordance and what; and D signifies duration, contrariety and of what. Moreover, the things said or signified by the letters include the definitions of the principles and the species of the rules used by the artist to conjecture about any issue by matching the middle term with the letters above and below it. Here, the intellect builds science with universal affirmation and universal negation, particular affirmation and particular negation, exceptions, demonstration, directed combination, possibility and impossibility.

4. The intellect acquires the habit of using these five modes as follows, by saying: "All C is B, and all D is C." We prove this as we recognize, for instance, that greatness is good on account of goodness, and goodness is great on account of greatness; goodness has great correlatives signified by the second species of C, and greatness has good correlatives signified by

goodness and the second species of C. The same applies to greatness and duration with their respective conditions.

5. Saying that all C is B and all D is C involves universal affirmation and negation as well as particular affirmation and negation because B implies difference and D implies contrariety. First, we say, "All animals are substance. But all men are animals, therefore all men are substance."

Second, "No animal is a stone. But all men are animals; therefore no man is a stone."

Third, "All animals are substance. But some men are animals, therefore some men are substance." In other words, all C is B but some of D is C, therefore some of D is B. This is because contrariety implied by D cannot be concordance implied by C, nor can great evil be great good, for if it could, an object would be intrinsically opposed to itself, which is impossible and against the correlatives in the second species of rule C. Fourth, we say: "No animal is a stone. But some men are animals; therefore some men are not stones." In other words, "No C is B, but some D is C therefore some D is not B." This reasoning follows the pattern of the third syllogism, which concludes with a particular affirmation.

6. First, the four ways we described for making syllogisms indicate instances of necessary reasons to the intellect. For example, it negates that all C is B, since created goodness cannot be created greatness because difference posits that each principle exists per se, but also posits that it is possible for goodness to be habituated with greatness. When the intellect affirms that not all B is D and not all D is C, it can tell what is possible or impossible. Now it sees how to make demonstrations with the first species of rule G, and directed combinations with the second species of rule G: all the cameras containing G in the third figure indicate this.

7. Second, the intellect finds means to contract the principles, by taking an entirely general principle and contracting it to a principle that is neither entirely general nor entirely specific. Difference, for instance, as a supremely, or entirely general principle, is contracted to the differences between sensual things, which are neither entirely general nor entirely specific. Further, we can contract difference to ultimately or entirely specific differences like those of a given animal, a given plant or a given stone, where the individual consists both substantially and accidentally of its own quantity, quality, etc. Here, as the individual stands in its own species etc., intermediary differences mediate between entirely general and entirely specific principles. We can say the same about goodness, etc. as about difference. Now goodness is a supremely general principle and when contracted to greatness, etc. it is neither supremely general nor supremely specific. However, we can contract great goodness to a given concrete being which is made of the same great goodness in its form, matter quantity, quality etc. and place this being in its own species. Through individuation, the great goodness that is neither supremely general nor supremely special, mediates between abstract and concrete things, and participates in the nature of both extremes. This naturally allows the artist to find the middle term that naturally stands between the major premise and the minor premise. Through this middle term, demonstrations proceed directly from primordial, true and necessary principles not subject to any exceptions.

8. Third, the middle term stands under its own letter and in its own circle, namely under F, which stands for the middle term and occupies the middle circle. For instance, as we put F under B and above C we consider that F has goodness with difference from B, and greatness with concordance from C. Thus, F stands between B and C, on account of which C transits through a middle term to B, as when we say: "All F is B, but all C is F, therefore all C is B,"

but only with regard to the genus of the middle term. In addition, what we said about camera BFC applies to camera CFD and to camera DFE, etc. The things said here about the middle term provide the artist with very general subject matter for finding many middle terms. The definitions of the principles and the species of the rules clearly show this.

Chapter 3 - The Modes of Proof

9. Proof is a general entity divided into three species, namely demonstration by cause, by equality and by effect. Let us now give an example with the following syllogism: "All animals are substance, but all men are animals, therefore all men are substance." First, we will prove the major premise, then the minor one. We begin with a demonstration by cause. Now an animal is made of differences between various sensual things, because it is elemented, vegetated and endowed with senses and imagination. Hence, it is a substance because it is composed of substantial parts. Because substance stands above and the animal below, the animal is the effect of higher causes, which are its constituting form and matter. However, the animal's substantial parts are below because they are more specific effects of the general principles of form and matter. Thus, we truly conclude, according to the causes, that animals are substance.

10. Let us prove the same with a demonstration by equality. Now general form and general matter are equally primordial causes, as the first species of rule D shows. An animal is caused by its own form and matter consecutively combined with the elementative power, the vegetative power, etc. which are equally principles of this animal. Therefore, an animal is a substance constituted of its own form and matter, which equally descend from equal and supremely general principles, namely prime form and prime matter. The second species of rule D and the first species of rule E show this, along with rule B.

Third, let us demonstrate the same by effect: an animal exists, and because it exists, so do its causes, namely, its constituting form and matter without which it cannot be what it is. Since form and matter constitute substance, it truly follows that this animal is a substance.

11. Now, let us prove the minor premise with the same three species, beginning with proof by cause. An embryo consists of the elementative, vegetative etc. in the womb where it is outlined as it grows into the shape of human limbs, and when the rational soul, which is a substance, is introduced into the embryo, then the soul constitutes a human being from itself and its lower parts. Thus, the animal that is the embryo is transmuted into a human by the human species in which it stands with all its co-essential parts. Therefore, the soul is the cause that causes man to be an animate substance. The first species of rule C clearly shows this.

12. The proof by equality goes as follows: the rational soul has equal co-essential parts, namely intellect, memory and will, as does the embryo, which equally consists of the elementative, vegetative etc. As these principles are substantial and equal, man entirely, equally and substantially consists of these principles when the rational soul joins the human body. Thus, rules B C D E clearly show that man is an animal.

13. The proof by effect is as follows: Socrates exists because he is an animal, without which he cannot exist. We proved the minor premise with the three said species of proof, and among them, the ones that yield the most powerful conclusions are the proofs by cause and by equality; proofs by effect are not as potent because causes have preponderance over effects.

14. Further, just as we gave an example of proofs that man is a substance where we used "animal" as the middle term, we can likewise speak of irrational animals, plants and stones. This shows how the intellect builds science by proving the major and minor premise with this art, which disposes the intellect to find every necessary conclusion, and this is evident from what we have said.

Chapter 4 - Detecting Fallacies

15. The general source of all fallacies lies in the diversion of the middle term. Because F signifies the middle term, F in the middle circle is an instrument used to detect and recognize fallacies by forming cameras, by successively placing F under the letters in the upper circle and above the letters in the lower circle. For instance, place F below B and above C and look at how BC relate to F in fallacies and vice versa, and then place D under F etc. in turn, and you will detect the deviation in the middle term. Now we will give examples of this, and first let us deal with fallacies in the word and then with fallacies in the subject matter.

About Fallacies in the Word - Article I - False Conclusions due to Equivocation or Ambiguity

16. Equivocation is the diversity of meanings of the same word, and given that a word can have various meanings, the fallacy of equivocation arises, as for instance: "All dogs can bark. But the Dog Star is a dog, therefore a star can bark."

17. To refute this, let us refer to camera BFC. B tells us that there is a difference between an animate body and an inanimate one. F says that animate and inanimate bodies cannot be lumped together as if they were of the same species. C tells us that animate bodies have sensual correlatives and that inanimate bodies do not have any sensual correlatives. And thus the artist can tell where the fallacy lies in the faulty syllogism and point out its impossibility. With this knowledge, the intellect knows that a logician cannot stand up against a natural philosopher, especially one using this art to point out impossibilities. For instance, a star cannot possibly belong to the same natural genus as a barking animal.

18. Further, by applying camera DFE and the other cameras, we can detect more flaws in the false syllogism: by the second species of D, a dog can bark because it consists of elementative, vegetative and sensitive powers, but a star cannot bark because it does not have these constituent principles. The second species of rules C and D show this, as does the ladder of the medium, or middle.

Article II: Amphiboly

19. The deception of amphiboly arises from the fact that one and the same sentence can be construed as having two different meanings. For instance, let us take this false syllogism: "Whatever is Aristotle's is owned by Aristotle. But this is Aristotle's book, therefore it is owned by Aristotle."

20. To refute this fallacy, let us refer to camera DFH where D, with its third species, tells us that this book is not owned by Aristotle because it can be owned only by a man joined to the elementative, vegetative, sensitive, imaginative and rational powers, as the second species of rule D shows. Now F signifies the medium of measure, conjunction and continuity in the

subject in which it exists, and H signifies that the presently existing book is not owned by Aristotle because Aristotle is dead. In addition, the same is shown by camera BFG. Here, B shows the difference between a dead man and a living one, and F posits the conjunction between sensual and intellectual, which is non-existent in a dead man. G posits appropriation: although Aristotle did write this kind of book, it is no longer his property, because he is dead.

Article III: The Fallacy of Composition

21. The fallacy of composition is a deception due to the multiple meanings of some sayings whose parts can be differently associated with one another. Here is one such paralogism: "Whatever has the possibility of being white can be white, but black has the possibility of being white, therefore black can be white." To refute this, let us refer to camera DFE, where D indicates contrariety and F says that black and white cannot be constituted by any medium of conjunction between extremes of colour. With E we understand that things are possible only when they consist of their own constituent principles, as the first species of rule E shows, and therefore we find that it is impossible for white to be black. We can also detect the deception by applying camera GFH, where G signifies that anything whose proper habit is white cannot be habituated with black, F tells us that whiteness and blackness do not constitute any medium of conjunction, measure or continuity between extremes, because if they did, they would set up opposition within the object. With H we understand that it is possible that a cloth presently habituated with whiteness can later be habituated with blackness.

Article IV: The Fallacy of Division

22. The fallacy of composition is a deception due to the multiple meaning of a saying whose parts can be dissociated from each another in different ways. For instance, take this paralogism, "All animals are either rational or irrational. But not all animals are rational, therefore all animals are irrational."

23. Let us apply camera CFG to this deception. With C we know that when a statement about one subject is made in concordance with the subject's correlatives as signified by the second and third species of rule C, the statement means one thing. However, on the contrary, when a statement does not respect the subject's correlatives, the meaning of the statement is altered and divided, as shown by the ladder of C in the second figure. With F we know that opposite beings, such as rational and irrational ones, cannot be joined together, measured or compared as members of the same species through any medium of continuity. G tells us that laughter is proper to rational beings, not to irrational ones. The deception can also be detected by using camera CFI, CF tell us the same as above, and I signifies that truth does not truly posit that diverse things are identical, nor does equality posit that they are of the same species or that they occupy the same place at the same time.

Article V: The Fallacy of Accent

24. The fallacy of accent is a deception arising from the fact that the same utterance pronounced with different emphasis can mean different things, as in the following paralogism: "All the spectators at the wrestling match who yell 'Kill Bart!' want Bart to lose. However, some of Bart's most loyal fans are also yelling 'Kill Bart!' Therefore some of Bart's most loyal fans also want him to lose the match."

25. Let us apply camera BFC to this deceptive argument, or paralogism. With B and with the conjunction and measure of F we understand the difference in emphasis, and with C we understand the concordance of different utterances in one meaning. Those who yell "Kill BART!" are encouraging his opponent, but Bart's fans are yelling, "KILL, Bart!" to encourage Bart to defeat his opponent. Camera B also serves to detect the deception because the emphasis is different. Moreover, the voice does not join or measure the words in the same way in both cases; here, F detects a disregard for emphasis that conveys divergent meanings by emphasizing different syllables.

Article VI: The Fallacy of Figures of Speech

25. The deception in the fallacy of figures of speech occurs because some utterance is similar to another utterance, as in the following paralogism: "Everything you saw yesterday is what you see today. But yesterday you saw white, therefore you see white today." Let us apply camera BFG to this paralogism. With B we understand the difference between quiddity and quality while F shows that they are neither joined nor measured to one numerically identical object on account of their diversity. G shows that quiddity has to have its own meaning, just as quality has, and the deception is in the improper appropriation in which the principles do not rest in their proper end. Camera DFH also serves to reveal the deception: D signifies contrary ends whereby quiddity is transformed into quality, and F shows that there is no continuity between a past "now" and the present "now". H indicates time, and by the fourth species of rule C and the first of D, quiddity means one thing while quality means another, because quiddity refers to substance and quality refers to accidents.

About Fallacies in the Subject Matter

27. Fallacies in the subject matter are different from fallacies in the word because the latter have their root cause in the voice whereas the former arise from the subject matter.

Article VII: The Fallacy of Accident

28. The deception in the fallacy of accident arises from the improper identification of two things as one on account of some accidental feature they have in common, as for instance in this paralogism: "I know Socrates, but Socrates is arriving, therefore I know who is arriving." Let us apply camera BFD to this deception. B indicates the difference between sensual and sensual. Now Socrates is one person, and the one who is arriving can be someone else. F indicates that Socrates and the expected one are extremes without any continuous medium between them; by C we understand that Socrates could be sitting by the roadside while someone else arrives. Further, camera GFH reveals the deception: G says that Socrates has his own identity, as does the other man who is arriving, and that the term "is arriving" is falsely attributed to Socrates. F says that Socrates is not joined or identified by any measure to anyone else who may be arriving, and H tells us that while Socrates is sitting, he is not arriving.

Article VIII: The Fallacy of Over Generalizing

29. The deception in this fallacy occurs when a statement made with reference to something is taken in an absolute sense, as in the following syllogism: "Negroes have white teeth, therefore Negroes are white."

30. Let us apply camera CFI to this deception, or paralogism: by the fourth species of rule C we understand that Negroes have white colour in their teeth, eyes and nails, and black colour in their skin. F says that the white colour in Negroes does not extend continuously to the rest of their bodies and I indicates that they are white in some places and black in others. The deception is further unmasked by camera GFK: G tells us that they do have white teeth and it would seem by appropriation that Negroes are entirely white, if we accept this false conclusion. F tells us that a Negro is a subject comprised of many discrete quantities, like the quantity of his teeth and the quantity of his feet, and that his teeth are habituated with white colouring and his feet with black. K tells us that a Negro's teeth are coloured with white and his feet with black.

Article IX: The Fallacy of Ignoring the Elenchus

31. In the fallacy of ignoring the elenchus, the deception arises from ignoring the things needed to define an elenchus and especially the contradiction it entails. An elenchus is a contradictory syllogism, and it can comprise either one or two syllogisms. It comprises one syllogism when the syllogism reaches a conclusion contrary to a previously stated proposition, as occurs when the statement "Some animal is incorruptible" is followed by the syllogism: "All things composed of contraries are corruptible. But all animals are composed of contraries, therefore all animals are corruptible." This conclusion contradicts the previous statement. An elenchus can also be made of two syllogisms whose conclusions contradict each other, for instance, taking the previous syllogism, we add, "No holy thing is corruptible. But some animal is holy, therefore some animal is incorruptible." Thus, an elenchus is always patterned on a syllogism and a contradiction, and whatever contradicts the definitions of syllogism and contradiction also contradicts the definition of an elenchus. Now let us take this paralogism: "Two is the double of one, but two is not the double of three, therefore two is both a double and not a double". This is invalid: so long as we refrain from considering everything in the same respect, there is no contradiction, as we can see with the second species of rule C.

32. Let us apply camera BFC to this deception. B tells us that two and one are different from each other; with F we understand that two has greater discrete quantity than one; C tells us that two agrees with even numbers and three with odd numbers. Camera DFE further reveals the deception: D tells us that two, an even number, is made of two units, by the second species of rule D, and that one is the beginning of numbers according to the first species of rule D. With F we know that two and one are not equally measured by the first species of rule E because two is a double whereas one is not a double.

Article X: The Fallacy of Begging the Question

33. In the fallacy of begging the question, the deception arises from proving something with the same expressed in different words. For instance, take this paralogism: "Rational animals run, but men are rational animals, therefore men run."

34. Let us apply camera EFH to this deception. E shows us that the principle in the major premise has no proof; it is merely a supposition. F says that the major and minor premises are disconnected, because the major premise is a supposition and the minor premise requires a proven major premise. H tells us that rational animals do not always run. In addition, camera EFG further serves to unveil the deception: with G we understand that a true syllogism must

have a proven major premise; F says that the major and minor premises must be connected and measured with proof; I tells us that they do not carry equal weight in the conclusion.

Article XI: The Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent

35. The deception in the fallacy of affirming the consequent occurs when the consequent is deemed identical to the antecedent, as in the following paralogism: "Lions are animals; but you are an animal, therefore you are a lion." This is invalid, because the consequent is not identical to the antecedent.

36. Let us apply camera BFD to this deception. B tells us that lions and rational animals do not belong to the same species, because the difference between sensual and sensual is not the same as the difference between sensual and intellectual. F says that the sensual and intellectual species are joined together in man as his constituent parts. D tells us that the sensual and intellectual species are joined in men but not in lions. Camera DFE tells us more about the deception. D tells us that a supposite consisting of sensual and sensual cannot convert with a supposite consisting of sensual and intellectual. F shows that men and lions are not connected by any continuous medium between extremes. E tells us that men exist in order to understand, which does not apply to lions.

Article XII: Fallacy of the Specious Reason

37. The fallacy of the specious reason occurs when some proposition that merely appears to be a reason but has no valid bearing on the conclusion is inserted between the premises leading to the conclusion. Take the following paralogism: "Soul and life are identical, but death and life are contraries, and generation and corruption are contraries; now if death is corruption, then life is generation, and to live is to be generated." However, this is impossible, because the rational soul is alive, although it is not generated.

38. Let us apply BFC to this deception: with B, we understand the difference between soul and life where life is something universal found in irrational animals made of a continuum of the vegetative and sensitive souls, and also found in man who is made of a rational soul joined to a body. F tells us that the life of the rational soul is not by any means one with the life of irrational animals; with C we understand that in the rational soul, life has great continuation of the intellect, will and memory, which is not at all the case for irrational animals or plants. Camera DFE tells us more about the deception. D says that life in plants and irrational animals consists of corruptible correlative parts. However, this is not so in the rational soul, because it is not made of contrary parts; F says that a specious reason about a supposite is not by any means the same as a true reason, with E we know that the soul lives and has repose in its end, which is God.

Article XIII: The Complex Question Fallacy

39. The deception in the complex question fallacy lies in giving a single answer to a question that inquires about several things, just because they are all included in a single question, as in the following paralogism: "Do you suppose that men and lions are rational animals?" If you answer "no", the reply is, "Men and lions are not rational animals, and therefore man is not a rational animal."

40. Let us apply camera BFC to this deception. With B, we understand that the difference between sensual and sensual is different from the difference between sensual and intellectual. For this reason, a man and a lion cannot be the same. With F we understand that men and lions do not stand within any continuous medium between extremes. C tells us that a man and a lion do not belong to the same species and cannot be the same individual. Camera DFG tells us more about this deception: D tells us that a man consists of three souls, namely the vegetative, sensitive and rational, which is not the case for a lion that consists only of the vegetative and sensitive souls. F says that a man can have a habit of thinking scientifically, but a lion cannot. G says that laughter is a passion proper to man, and that man has substantial intelligibility; lions do not have these things because they are not made for them.

Article XIV: The Fallacy of Contradiction

41. The fallacy of contradiction (which we expounded more broadly in the New Logic discovered through the mode of the General Art) is a deception that arises and derives from the abovementioned fallacies that reach apparently contradictory conclusions where there is no real contradiction. Take the following paralogism: "No stone is sighted, but some stone is sighted, therefore some stone is both sighted and not sighted."

42. Let us apply camera BFC to this paralogism. According to B, there is a difference between a stone that is sighted and stone that is not. Now an invisible stone has no innate visible part of its own, as it is not habituated with the habit of sense. On the other hand, a visible stone is accidentally visible, as the sight habituates itself with its colour and disposition. F tells us that when a stone is invisible, it is not joined to the species of visibility, but when it is visible, it is. C tells us that sight is not active in an invisible stone, and by the fourth species of C, the stone has no passion under the power of sight; but we can say the contrary of all this about a visible stone. Camera FGH reveals more of the deception: with G we know that visibility is not a passion proper to a stone; rather, sight accidentally appropriates visibility to it because colour, shape and disposition are the objects of sight. F tells us that a stone is not joined to the sensitive power; H says that a stone can be sometimes visible and sometimes invisible.

43. We have dealt with the fallacies applied to the rules, so that the deceptions in the fallacies can be known. By the things we said, the intellect knows that a logician using fallacies cannot stand up against a natural philosopher, because if we suppose that the logician is telling the truth, all kinds of impossibilities would follow according to the nature of things, as shown by the nature of the definitions of the principles and rules. Here, the intellect knows that when one logician debates with another logician, they can never reach the end of their debate because they never come down to the realities of things as they deal only with words and likenesses of things with the definition of contrariety. But if the logician debates with a natural philosopher, the truth of the matter is quickly found and resolved, because the logician has no way of denying the experience of his senses, imagination and reason, as we said above.

Chapter 5 - Techniques for Learning

44. The fourth figure is more apt than the others to provide modes for acquiring other sciences more easily and quickly, like Theology, Philosophy, etc. which is done by finding a middle term that is neither entirely general nor entirely specific. Now this science has ultimately general principles as well as ultimately general rules, whereas other sciences have subordinate principles, so that their means are imperfect without this science. This is why people spend a

long time learning them with difficulty and when doubts arise, they have no ultimately general principles that they can artificially invoke, as does an artist of this art.

45. Further, other sciences can be learned with this art by forming cameras with F as the middle term and by expounding on the authorities with the camera according to the way F can apply to the authorities by reducing them to a syllogism following the doctrine given in Chapter 3 above. Let me give the following example: in Theology, we read that God is a pure act. This authority can be proved with two cameras, namely BFC and DFE. Now with B we have goodness and difference. C says that goodness is a great reason with good, great and distinct innate correlatives that are eternal and primordial according to D and repose in their end by rule E. By the second species of rule D and by the first of E, they are necessary, and by F, they are well united and measured infinitely and eternally, and separated from all accidents. This exposition clearly shows that God is a pure act in existence and action.

46. Further, in Philosophy we read that nothing can be made from nothing. Let us expound upon this authority by applying camera DFE. First, with the first species of D we explain that 'nothing' is not a principle because if it was, 'nothing' would be something. The third species says that if 'nothing' was subject to something, it would be something. F also says, or signifies that nothing can be made from 'nothing' and 'nothing' cannot have any middle, for if it had one, it would be something. With E we understand that 'nothing' cannot be a material, formal, efficient or final cause and cannot be habituated with any power, because if it could, it would be something. Thus, the authority has been explained and expounded with the said camera.

47. This does not mean that the world is eternal; rather, it is new and has a beginning, as proved above. In addition, the authority that says the world was created from nothing can be expounded with the same camera. D says that God is primordial in eternity, power and intellect, and by the third species of rule D, God is not subject to his own power, and thus God can understand that the world, that was neither in potentiality nor in actuality in nothingness, was in his power to produce from nothingness. Therefore, it follows that the world is in actuality through creation as God measures his infinite power, intellect, primordality, etc.

48. Further, we read that being and oneness are convertible, as are oneness and good, oneness etc. These authorities can be expounded with camera BFC as well as the other cameras. In addition, B tells us that there are differences between some sensual things and others, as oneness is one thing in a stone, another thing in a plant; another in sentient beings and the same applies to goodness, truth, etc. These kinds of unity, goodness and truth are not convertible, for if they were, difference would be destroyed, and consequently the medium as well as concordance, which is impossible; now there is one mensuration in a stone, and one continuous medium, and one quantity, and another in a plant etc. Now these authorities cannot be taken literally, because the camera cannot enter into the authorities to expound them literally. Nevertheless, it enters with the allegorical sense by using rule G. Now the correlatives of unity are not the same as the correlatives of entity, truth, or goodness in the proper sense but only in an appropriated sense. Here, each principle communicates with the others so that the principles can still be differentiated, concorded and mediated as qualitative reasons, and each principle has its own repose and its own essence and act, and thus there is no contradiction, and rule B consents to this as do all the other rules.

49. We used Theology and Philosophy as examples by expounding and clarifying them with cameras, to show how other sciences can be treated, such as medicine, law, morals etc.

Indeed, if there is any truth in an authority, the cameras of the fourth figure can enter into it with their definitions and species through affirmation or negation, and if they cannot, the authority cannot possibly be true. No authority constituted of primordial, true and necessary principles can contradict reason. This rule is infallible and necessary.

Part 8 - Mixing the Principles and the Rules

1. This part has two parts: the first is about mixing the principles by combining each one with the others in sequence and the second is about the principles combined with the sequence of rules. This eighth part provides a doctrine for knowing each principle by means of the remaining principles, by combining it in turn with the sequence of principles and with all the species of the rules. Thus, if any doubt arises about any principle, you can refer to this part where you can find out the truth by applying the remaining principles and the species of the rules. For instance, let us ask whether some goodness is a substantial being, and whether some moral goodness is a habit that really exists. Now we can refer to the chapters on goodness combined with the remaining principles and with the rules, where we choose the solution that seems the most reasonable according to rule B combined with the other rules and the definitions of the principles. Indeed, this mixture is the center and subject of this art. We already discussed the mixture of principles and rules in the third figure; in this part, we will clarify it sequentially, by combining each principle in turn with the continuous sequence of all the principles and all the rules, so that the intellect can discourse with each principle in turn. Now let us begin the first part.

Section 1 - The Principles Combined with the other Principles in Sequence

Chapter 1 - Goodness Combined With the Sequence of Principles

1. Goodness is in itself a reason for good to do good, and as it is also great by reason of greatness, it is a dual reason for good to produce great good.
2. Goodness is made durable by duration; thus, it is a reason for good to produce enduring good through duration, and since goodness (as we said) is great by reason of greatness, it is a threefold reason for good to do great and durable good.
3. Goodness can exist and act through power. Consequently, the things that goodness has in itself, along with what it has from power, what it has from greatness and what it has from duration constitute a fourfold reason for good to produce and to do great, durable and powerful good. In addition, goodness can mix and multiply in this way with the other principles, though we exclude contrariety and minority, as they cannot give any increase to goodness. To save space, we will not give examples of goodness multiplied by five and by six, etc. Let us now show examples of goodness combined with each principle.
4. Goodness is knowable by wisdom, which is a reason for good to scientifically produce good scientific knowledge.
5. Goodness is lovable by the will, which is a reason for good to produce a good and lovable beloved.
6. Goodness is virtuous because of virtue, which is a reason for virtuous good to produce virtuous good.
7. Goodness is true because of truth, which is truly a good reason for good to do true good.
8. Goodness is glorious in glory, which is a good and glorious reason for good to do glorious good.
9. Goodness is clear without confusion because of difference, which is a good, distinct and clear reason for good to do good that is clearly distinct from itself.
10. Goodness is concordable because of concordance, which is a good and concordant reason for good to produce concorded good concordantly.

11. Goodness is against evil which is its opposite, and concordance is against contrariety because they are opposites. Thus, goodness is well disposed with concordance against malice and contrariety.

12. Goodness carries the meaning of principle by reason of principle, which is a good principal reason for good to produce principal good.

13. Goodness carries the meaning of the middle by reason of the middle, and thus it is a good mediating reason for good to do good by means of the middle.

14. Goodness has a final meaning because of the end, which is a good, ultimate and perfect reason for good to produce perfect good in perfect repose.

15. Goodness has a major meaning because of majority, which is a good major reason for good to do major good.

16. Goodness has an equal meaning because of equality, which is a good and equitable reason for good to do good by equalizing many things.

17. Minor goodness has minor meaning on account of its minor acts, which constitute a good and minor reason for minor good to do minor good in a relative or comparative sense.

18. Goodness was discussed here in combination with every principle in linear sequence. It was discussed at a highly general level so that the artist can find here as many particulars as he wants in the line of goodness.

Chapter 2 - Greatness Combined with the Sequence of Principles

19. Greatness is good because of goodness, and goodness is great because of greatness; together, they give rise to a concrete being called great good.

20. Greatness is durable through duration, and duration is great due to greatness; together, they give rise to a great and enduring concrete being.

21. Greatness can exist and act through power, and power is great because of greatness; together with power, greatness is a reason for a great concrete being with great power to exist and act.

22. Greatness is knowable by wisdom, wisdom is great because of greatness, and together they cause a great and scientific concrete entity with a great act of knowing.

23. Greatness is lovable by the will, and the will is great because of greatness; together, they cause a great beloved concrete being in which they are sustained.

24. Greatness is virtuous by reason of virtue, and virtue is great by reason of greatness. Together, they cause a virtuous concrete entity that sustains them both. This concrete is called a being, while greatness and virtue are essences of said being. Here, we see how several essences compose one being of themselves.

25. Greatness is true by reason of truth, and truth is great by reason of greatness; together, they produce a great, true concrete being in which they are magnified and verified.

26. Greatness is glorious in glory, and glory is great by reason of greatness; together, they produce a subject in which they enjoy magnificent delight.

27. Greatness is distinct because of difference that makes a distinction between the magnifier, the magnifiable and magnifying; and difference is great because of greatness, as they participate in the same subject by magnifying and distinguishing.

28. Greatness is concorded by concordance, and concordance is magnified by greatness; together, they participate in the same subject by magnifying and concording.

29. Greatness is opposed by contrariety, inasmuch as it undergoes transmutation. However, greatness does not naturally oppose itself; and contrariety is great because of greatness: for instance, fire and water are in great opposition through great heating and cooling.

30. By reason of the nature of principle, greatness has its own innate co-essential principles, namely the magnifier, the magnified and the act of magnifying, and principle is magnified by greatness, as it naturally has its own innate principiative, principiable and principiating.

31. The medium is a reason for greatness to mediate, and greatness is a reason for the medium to magnify, so long as they are together in the same subject.

32. Greatness is a cause for the end to be great and the end is a cause for greatness to repose, when they exist in the same subject.

33. Greatness is major because of majority and majority is great because of greatness; this must be so, to enable both to act in their subject, as greatness magnifies and majority majorifies.

34. Greatness has its own innate equal things because of equality, namely the magnifier, magnifiable and magnifying, which equally belong to greatness. Moreover, equality, because of greatness, has its own innate co-essential things, namely a great equalizer, equalizable and equalizing.

35. Majority removes greatness from minority, because in minority, greatness cannot be what it is. This is because minority and smallness are convertible in the subject in which they exist, so that sin, for instance, is nothing; and likewise with accidents, as they cannot exist on their own.

Chapter 3 - Duration Combined with the Sequence of Principles

36. Duration is good by reason of goodness, and goodness is sustained by duration, so that duration is a direct cause of duration while goodness is an indirect or accidental cause of duration, when duration is a reason for good to do durable good.

37. Duration causes greatness to endure, and it is great by reason of greatness; by enduring and magnifying, they participate in the subject in which they exist, provided that nothing stands in their way to impede them.

38. Duration causes power to endure, and power causes duration to exist and act, while they participate in the subject in which they exist, by sustaining and powering it.

39. Wisdom is durable because of duration, and duration is knowable because of wisdom, while they participate in the subject in which they exist with their acts of enduring and knowing.

40. Duration is lovable by the will, and the will is durable through duration, while they participate in the subject in which they exist with their acts of enduring and loving.

41. Duration is virtuous because of virtue, and virtue lasts through duration; thus, in the subject in which they exist, virtue separates duration from vice, while duration prevents the privation of virtue.

42. Duration naturally makes things endure while truth naturally verifies things; and truth is sustained in duration just as duration is verified by truth.

43. Glory lasts through duration and duration is glorious because of glory, so that glory separates duration from punishment while duration separates glory from privation.

44. Duration is clear and without confusion by reason of difference, and difference is durable by reason of duration. Thus, duration has its different sustainer, durable and enduring due to difference, whereas difference has its durable differentiator, differentiable and differentiating due to duration.

45. Duration has its own innate concordant entities through concordance, while concordance has its own innate, durable and permanent entities through duration.

46. Duration contradicts its opposite and destroys it as much as it can, while contrariety destroys duration as much as it can; this is because duration agrees with being, whereas contrariety agrees with non-being.

47. By reason of principle, duration is a natural principle. Just as every durable thing lasts because of duration, so is principle durable because of duration.

48. By reason of the medium, duration has a natural medium, namely the act of enduring which exists in the middle between the sustainer and the durable, and duration makes the medium last in the subject in which it exists.

49. Duration is in perfect repose by reason of the end, and the end endures in the subject in which it exists by reason of duration.

50. Majority produces major duration in its subject, while duration sustains enduring majority in its subject.

51. Equality gives duration an equalizing nature in the equal duration of the co-essential sustainer, durable and enduring, while duration makes equality last in its subject.

52. Minority draws duration closer to nothingness, while duration draws minority closer to being in the subject in which it exists

Chapter 4 - Power Combined with the Sequence of Principles

53. Power is good because of goodness, and goodness can exist and act through power. In accordance with their natural properties, they move each other in the subject in which they exist while the subject moves itself with them so it can exist powerfully and well.

54. Power is great due to greatness, and greatness can exist and act through power. Thus, in the subject in which they exist, each supplies to the other what the other naturally lacks. Nevertheless, at times, something extraneous intervenes and impedes them, because it is a principle of another nature.

55. Power is durable through duration, while duration can exist and act through power; and if duration is eternity, it must necessarily be in existence and action, because there is no newness in eternity.

56. Power is knowable to wisdom, while wisdom can exist and act through power; and if they are mutually convertible, then existence, action and understanding are unfailingly present, but this applies only to God.

57. Power is lovable by the will, while the will can exist and act through power; consequently, the subject in which they are present must necessarily be able to exist, to love and to act.

58. Power is virtuous because of virtue, while virtue can exist and act through power; and thus, the subject in which they are present can exist in powerful and virtuous existence and action.

59. Power is true because of truth, while truth can exist and act through power; and if they are not convertible in the subject in which they exist, the privation of conversion posits that the subject in which they exist is potentially mendacious and idle.

60. Power is delightful because of glory, while glory can exist and act through power; and if they are convertible in the subject in which they exist, then power must be free from punishment and glory must be free from impotence.

61. Because of difference, power is a clear reason without any confusion, while difference can exist and act through power; and if they are convertible in the subject in which they exist, then it necessarily follows that the subject is active in powering and in distinguishing things other than itself.

62. Power can be concerted through concordance, while concordance can exist and act through power, and if they do not mutually convert, the privation of conversion posits the impossibility of powering and concurring in the subject.

63. Power cannot oppose itself because of contrariety, and power cannot make contrariety impotent. In addition, as they are not mutually convertible, the privation of conversion posits some power that is free of contrariety.

64. Power naturally gives rise to things by reason of principle, while principle naturally empowers things by reason of power; and if they are convertible, powering and beginning are free of contrariety and newness.

65. Power naturally mediates through its medium so that powering stands naturally in the middle between the powerer and the powered; and the medium can naturally exist and act through power. Thus, the medium posits the flow of influence from the end and the reflux of influence from the beginning along with knowledge of their respective natures.

66. Power can have repose by reason of the end, and the end can exist and act by reason of power. However, if they are not convertible, there can be no repose in the subject in which they exist.

67. Power naturally majorifies because of majority, while majority naturally powers things through power, and because they are not convertible, the privation of conversion limits them in the subject in which they exist. Here we see how growing things grow up to a point determined by nature and then decline toward decay in old age.

68. By reason of equality, power naturally equalizes the powerer, powered and powering, while equality naturally powers things through power, and if they are convertible, powering and equalizing cannot possibly exist in any other way.

69. Power is close to non-being because of minority, but minority approaches being through power; and thus, minority and power are not convertible, because if they were convertible, then being would be convertible with non-being, which is impossible.

Chapter 5 - Wisdom Combined with the Sequence of Principles

70. Wisdom is good by reason of goodness, and goodness is known by wisdom; if they convert in the subject in which they exist, then they are good reasons for it to act well and understand well, and this cannot be otherwise.

71. Wisdom is great by reason of greatness, and greatness is known by wisdom; if they convert, then the subject in which they exist is comprised of magnifying and understanding, and this cannot be otherwise.

72. Wisdom is durable through duration, while duration is known by wisdom; if this duration is eternity, then knowing and eternalizing are necessarily present in the subject in which they exist, and the presence of their opposites is impossible.

73. Wisdom is powerful due to power, and power is known by wisdom; if they convert, then there is as much powering as understanding, and neither one can be greater or lesser than the other.

74. Wisdom is lovable by the will, and the will is known by wisdom; if they convert, then there is as much loving as understanding in the subject.

75. Wisdom is virtuous because of virtue, and virtue is known by wisdom; if they do not convert, then ignorance and vice could be present in the subject.

76. Wisdom is true because of truth, and truth is known by wisdom; if they do not convert, the truth could be mere belief and understanding could be fallacious.

77. Wisdom is delightful because of glory, and glory is known by wisdom; when they do not convert, knowledge can bring suffering while ignorance is bliss.

78. Wisdom is clear due to difference, which is why its intellective, intelligible and understanding are distinct from one another, for without distinction, wisdom would be confused. Difference is intelligible to wisdom: but without the intellective, intelligible and understanding, difference would not be intelligible.

79. Because of concordance, wisdom has concordant innate parts, namely the intellective, intelligible and understanding that concord in one essence consisting of them; and they concord together while existing as several things so that one thing is not another. This concordance is intelligible by wisdom.

80. Because of contrariety, ignorance is the enemy of wisdom, for it impedes understanding; but wisdom that converts with concordance does not fear contrariety, because contrariety cannot impede its understanding.

81. By reason of principle, wisdom is the original principle of understanding, and principle is intelligible to wisdom; if they convert in the subject in which they exist, then they must necessarily exist, and this cannot be otherwise.

82. As a natural medium, the act of understanding exists in the middle between the intellective and the intelligible; and the middle is intelligible to wisdom.

83. Wisdom can repose in the end, and the end is intelligible to wisdom; if they do not convert in the subject in which they exist, understanding can be without repose, and repose can be without understanding.

84. Because of majority, wisdom can receive greater understanding in itself; however, when it does not naturally convert with majority, wisdom cannot grow to infinity, it can increase only to a finite limit beyond which it cannot go.

85. Because of equality, wisdom has its equal essential intrinsic reasons, namely its innate intellective, intelligible and understanding, while equality is intelligible to wisdom; and this intelligibility combines objectively with the equalizer, equalizable and equalizing.

86. Wisdom, or intellect, do not convert with minority; now if they did convert with minority, understanding would always decrease and wisdom would be better at ignoring than at understanding, which is impossible.

Chapter 6 - Will Combined with the Sequence of Principles

87. The will is good because of goodness, and goodness is lovable by the will; if they convert, the subject in which they exist always does good and loves well, and it can never act in any way contrary to this.

88. The will is great by reason of greatness, and greatness is loved by the will. Thus, the amativity of the will is great, and so is the amability of greatness; and if they are convertible, then amativity and amability are present in the loving of the infinite magnifier, magnifiable and magnifying.

89. The will is durable by reason of duration, and duration is loved by the will; if eternal duration is convertible with the will, then eternalizing and loving must exist from eternity and in eternity.

90. The will can exist and act through power, and power is loved by the will; but if they are not convertible in their subject, then the will can be impotent and power can be unloved.

91. The will is knowable by wisdom, and wisdom is loved by the will; and if they exist in eternal greatness, it follows that understanding and loving must necessarily be present.

92. The will is virtuous by reason of virtue, and virtue is loved by the will; but if they do not convert, then virtue can be hateful and the will can be vicious.

93. The will is true by reason of the truth, and the truth is loved by the will; but wherever the truth and the will are not convertible, the truth can be hated and the will can be false.

94. The will is enjoyable by reason of glory, and glory is loved by the will; and thus, the will is removed from punishment by glory, and glory is removed from hate by the will.

95. By reason of difference, the will contains in itself the distinction among the lover, the lovable and loving, which exist in it clearly without confusion; and difference is loved by the will.

96. By reason of concordance, the will has its innate concordant things, namely the lover, lovable and loving. In addition, concordance is loved by the will; and as it is loved with goodness, greatness, duration, power etc. it must contain a lovable concorder, concordable and act of concurring.

97. With contrariety, the will hates vice and sin, and if the will and contrariety were convertible, the will could never love virtue with concordance.

98. By reason of principle, the will is the origin of loving. This is because every lovable thing is loved by reason of the will; hence, it follows that principle is loved by reason of the will. Here, we see how one being causes another being outside itself, so it can derive something useful from it.

99. By reason of the medium, the will has its innate medium, namely the act of loving; and the medium is loved by reason of the will.

100. By reason of the end, the will is perfect and in repose; however, in this repose it needs to have great duration and powerful loving, without which it finds no satisfaction in the end.

101. By reason of majority, the will has a major act of loving; and majority is loved by the will so it can have a major act.

102. By reason of equality, the will naturally equalizes the lover and the beloved in loving; and equality is loved by the will.

103. By reason of minority, the will is a being close to nothingness, and by reason of nothingness it is close to emptiness and idleness; and if the will and minority were convertible, non-being would be more desirable than being, which is impossible.

Chapter 7 - Virtue Combined with the Sequence of Principles

104. Virtue is good by reason of goodness, and goodness is virtuous by reason of virtue. Thus, virtue, by reason of goodness, is a reason for good to produce good, and per se, it is a reason for virtuous action.

105. Virtue is great in greatness, and greatness is virtuous in virtue, which could not be unless virtue has its virtuficative, virtuficable and virtufying that are of its essence and identical with it.

106. Virtue lasts through duration, and if it is numerically identical with duration, its essence always contains the durable virtuficative, virtuficable and virtufying.

107. Virtue is powerful through power, so it can resist vice and sin: but it cannot resist if man does not want to use his power, because he is vicious and idle.

108. Virtue is knowable to wisdom, and wisdom has virtuous knowledge because of virtue, so long as the act of the will informs loving in the lover. Here, we see how one virtue helps another.

109. Virtue is loved by love, and love is virtuous by reason of virtue. Thus, they convene in loving and virtufying.

110. Virtue is true by reason of truth, while truth is virtuous by reason of virtue; and if they are identical in the subject in which they exist, there cannot be any sin or any falsification in this subject.

111. Virtue is enjoyable by reason of glory, and glory is virtuous by reason of virtue. Here, we see how virtuous beings seek delight in glory.

112. By reason of difference, virtue is clear without confusion, because difference posits a distinction among the virtuficative, virtuficable and virtufying which are identical in essence, and virtue provides difference with the virtue it needs for doing this.

113. By reason of concordance, virtue contains its own innate essential concordant things comprising its single essence, and virtue gives concordance the virtue it needs for doing this.

114. Virtue is against its contrary, namely vice and sin, which it opposes with goodness, greatness etc. whereas contrariety opposes virtue by depriving it of its own habit and of its habits of will, greatness etc.

115. Just as every primordial thing is first by reason of priority, virtue is first by reason of priority; and just as every virtuous thing is virtuous by reason of virtue, principle is virtuous by reason of virtue.

116. Virtue is mediated through means and the means are virtuous by reason of virtue.

117. As virtue finds perfect repose in the end, so do the just seek out repose by reason of virtue.

118. Virtue naturally majorifies by reason of majority while majority has a virtuous essence by reason of virtue.

119. By reason of equality, virtue equalizes justice with prudence, and likewise, virtue equalizes understanding with loving whenever they are equally virtuous.

120. By reason of minority, virtue is sometimes minor just as it is sometimes major by reason of majority; and thus, when it is minor, it agrees with non-being and when it is major, it agrees with being.

Chapter 8 - Truth Combined with the Sequence of Principles

121. Truth is good by reason of goodness, while goodness is true by reason of truth; and if they convert, then the good and the true are always identical, but when they sometimes do not convert in some subject, one may falsely expect to obtain the truth in a way that is neither true nor virtuous. Here, we see that truth and goodness in man are not convertible.

122. Truth is great in greatness, which would not be so unless it had the verifier, verifiable and verifying.

123. Truth endures through duration because the verifier, verifiable and verifying endure in it naturally, and sometimes also morally, when truth acts within itself by means of things external to it, as does radical moisture with nutritional moisture in sentient beings.

124. Truth is powerful by reason of power and if it is identical with power, falsehood has no power over it.

125. Truth is knowable to wisdom, and wisdom seeks out truth so it can truly relate to what it knows.

126. Truth is loved by the will, so that the will can truly have its beloved.

127. Truth is virtuous by reason of virtue, and virtue is true by reason of truth; thus, they participate in verification and in opposing falsification and sin.

128. Truth is enjoyable because of glory, and glory is true because of truth; in this way, just people truly and gloriously strive for everlasting glory.

129. By reason of difference, truth is clear without any confusion; and difference posits that in truth the verifier is one thing, the verifiable is another thing, and verifying is yet another thing while the truth verifies this.

130. By reason of concordance, truth contains innate concordant things, namely the verifier, verifiable and verifying, all concordant in one essence and in plurality, while concordance truly has what it has by reason of truth.

131. Truth is against falsehood, which it opposes with its verifier, verifiable and verifying, and thus it is simply disparate from falsehood.

132. By reason of principle, truth is naturally a principle just as principle naturally verifies by reason of truth. Hence, truth is a principle because every true thing is true by reason of truth.

133. By reason of the middle, truth has verification in the middle between the verifier and the verifiable, and truth makes this true.

134. Truth reposes by reason of the end, while the end is true by reason of truth; and if they are identical in the subject in which they exist, then truth can never be distressing and the end can never be wrong.

135. One truth is greater than another, and one majority is more true than another, because truth and majority are not convertible.

136. By reason of equality, truth has its innate and equal verifier, verifiable and verifying; and by reason of truth, equality truly has what it has.

137. One truth is lesser than another truth, and the minor truth participates more with non-being because it has less being. And the truth verifies this, as does minority in its own way.

Chapter 9 - Glory Combined with the Sequence of Principles

138. Glory is good by reason of goodness. Hence, the goodness of glory is a reason for glory to do good, and glory is in itself a reason for good deeds to be glorious.

139. Glory is great by reason of greatness, but it would not be great without its own glorifier, glorifiable and glorifying. And if its greatness is infinite, then it is infinite in its glorifying.

140. Glory lasts through duration, and if it is eternity, its enduring lasts through eternity where truly no innovation can be present..

141. On account of power, glory is powerful in existence and action, and if it is identical to power, it cannot be defective or idle.

142. Glory is knowable to wisdom, and wisdom is enjoyable by reason of glory. Thus, they convene in rejoicing and knowing.

143. As glory is loved by the will, and as the will is enjoyable by reason of glory, so does the will enjoy desiring and loving. However, if glory and will are not identical in the subject in which they exist, then sometimes the will grieves because it does not have its beloved.

144. Glory is virtuous on account of virtue, while virtue is glorious on account of glory; and thus, virtuous people delight in acquiring virtues.

145. Glory is true by reason of truth, while truth is glorious by reason of glory; and thus the truthful person enjoys his repose in truth and in glory.

146. On account of difference, glory is clearly separate from confusion, as difference posits that the glorifier is one thing, the glorifiable is another thing, and glorifying is another thing; and all this is delightful by reason of glory.

147. By reason of concordance, glory has concordant things that agree in unity and plurality. They are the glorifier, the glorified and glorifying.

148. Glorifying removes glory from punishment, its contrary, from which glory cannot be perfectly removed without glorifying.

149. Principle gives glory reason to initiate something, and the subject in which the glorifier is the selfsame initiator initiates an initiated glorified and united entity from itself; and the initiating entity together with the initiated entity glorify and initiate an act of glorifying and initiating by means of their spiration and of their loving, and this is observed in divine contemplation.

150. Glory ebbs and flows through the middle, while the middle enjoys glorification by reason of glory.

151. Glory reposes in the end, while the end is glorified by glory; and thus the glorifier cannot repose without the glorified and glorifying.

152. Major glory has major delight, and major majority is a image of major delight.

153. Glory could not repose in itself without its innate co-essential equality, because it would not have its own equal glorifier, glorifiable and glorifying.

154. Minority brings glory close to punishment and non-being, and majority removes glory from punishment and non-being.

Chapter 10 - Difference Combined with the Sequence of Principles

155. Difference is good by reason of goodness, while goodness is distinct by reason of difference; and thus, goodness and difference are reasons for the subject in which they exist to produce distinct good by acting distinctly and well.

156. Difference is great by reason of greatness because it causes distinctions to exist between one genus and another, between genus and species, between species and individuals, between one individual and another and between an individual and his act. Thus, difference is great enough to comprehend everything. Greatness is distinct by reason of difference because it posits difference in its own number or genus, and difference posits distinction among the magnifier, magnifiable and magnifying, all of which belong to the essence and nature of greatness.

157. Difference lasts because of duration. Due to difference, duration has its innate distinct things, namely the sustainer, the durable and the act of enduring. And the distinction that converts with eternity lasts from eternity and in eternity as it distinguishes among the eternalizer, eternalizable and eternalizing. This is signified by the most holy Trinity.

158. Difference is absolutely an innate power; it is powerful by reason of power as it can cause distinction among the powerer, powerable and powering, and power can manifest this distinction by reason of difference.

159. Difference is knowable by reason of wisdom. Difference naturally enables wisdom to understand the distinction among the intellective, intelligible and understanding in order to make them intelligible, because they cannot be objectified or understood without difference.

160. Difference is desirable by the will, as it enables the will to have its innate loving nature and to exist as a clear reason along with the lover, lovable and loving. Without this distinction, the will would be a confused reason incapable of loving.

161. Difference is virtuous because of virtue. Due to difference, virtue has its innate distinct things in which it has existence and action. Difference makes virtue stand apart from vice, for without difference, everything would be numerically identical.

162. Difference is true by reason of truth, and truth posits true things as it differentiates them by reason of the true distinction among its verifier, verifiable and verifying, and among the intellective, intelligible and understanding.

163. Difference is enjoyable because of glory, and because of difference, glory can have enjoyment with its glorifier, glorifiable and glorifying, which cannot be in glory without distinction.

164. By reason of concordance, difference has innate concordant things that it receives in itself by distinguishing among the concorder, the concordable and concurring; and difference does this with its own differentiative, differentiable and differentiating. In the subject in which they exist, difference and concordance together posit one selfsame subject common to both, with its own innate concordant and different constituent parts.

165. Innate difference and contrariety differ from one another, and this is because difference sometimes concords with innate concordance by distinguishing, concurring and generating, and sometimes difference acts against concordance with contrariety by

distinguishing, opposing and corrupting, so that the generation of one thing is the corruption of another and vice versa. In addition, this occurs in a similar way in moral matters, as we will show in Chapter 12.

166. By reason of principle, difference has natural priority that makes it a principle general to all differences with its own differentiative, differentiable and differentiating. Without these correlatives, difference cannot stand at the most general level, nor can it have the natural character of a principle.

167. On account of the middle, difference has a medial nature in its own innate medium, namely the act of differentiating with which it tells things apart, and this act of differentiating exists between the differentiator and the differentiable.

168. Difference reposes by reason of the end, and it reposes in distinguishing one thing from another, so as to have subjects in which it can exist and act.

169. By reason of majority, difference is greater in some subjects than in others, because it is greater in substantial essences than in accidental ones; thus, difference has greater action in distinguishing substantial goodness from substantial greatness, than in distinguishing accidental goodness from accidental greatness. When it distinguishes within one essence several things that constitute this essence, difference has major intensive action which is greater than the action it has when it tells one essence apart from another. We see this when we consider the intellective, intelligible and understanding as the innate, natural and essential parts of the intellect. Nevertheless, in distinguishing between one essence and another essence, the intellect acts more extensively.

170. By reason of equality, difference has innate equal things, just as equality has its innate distinct things by reason of difference; and thus they communicate by differentiating and equalizing in the subject in which they exist.

171. By reason of minority, difference is minor, just as it is major by reason of majority; and since minority is a small subject of little quiddity, difference cannot enter into it with its greatness, nor can it differentiate much with minority, for as it enters little, it differentiates little.

Chapter 11 - Concordance Combined with the Sequence of Principles

172. Concordance is good by reason of goodness, while goodness is concordant by reason of concordance; and thus they participate in the subject in which they exist by bonifying and concurring.

173. Concordance is great by reason of greatness, but it would not be great if it lacked its own co-essential concordative, concordable and act of concurring, for contrariety would be greater in opposition to it. However, concordance is greater than contrariety, which is at a disadvantage because it is not a substantial principle. We proved this in the Major Art of Preaching.

174. Concordance is durable through duration, and it is as durable as are its innate constituent concordative, concordable and concurring.

175. Concordance can exist and act through power, while power has its own innate concordant things by reason of concordance, and inasmuch as concordance and power are in mutual accord in the subject in which they are joined, they are removed from contrariety.

176. Concordance is known to wisdom and to the intellect. When the intellect objectifies concordance by understanding its essence and its essential concordative, concordable and concurring, it objectifies and attains concordance better than if it objectifies only its essence; and concordance also communicates itself better to the intellect by concurring with it.

177. Concordance is loved by the will, as concordance does its act in the will so that the lover, the beloved and their loving all convene in one identical essence.

178. Concordance concords the virtues with each other in the subject wherein they exist, and it does this within its own essence and in the essence of virtue, and it could not do this without essence because its act would have no subject to sustain it.

179. Concordance is true by reason of truth, and truth is concorded by concordance; and thus, in the subject in which they exist, their concording and verifying removes them from contrariety and falsehood.

180. Concordance is glorifiable or enjoyable by reason of glory; glory is concordable by concordance, and thus, both reasons seek each other out.

181. Concordance cannot be without difference, although difference can be without concordance inasmuch as it convenes with contrariety. Here, we see that difference is a greater principle than concordance.

182. Concordance and contrariety are opposed because concordance builds up what contrariety tears down, and vice versa. However, concordance is a higher principle than contrariety because it convenes with being by concording whereas contrariety convenes with non-being by opposing.

183. By reason of principle, concordance is general to all concordable things, because principle posits that concordance has one active principle, one passive principle and one mediating principle with which it comprehends all the lesser concordances beneath it.

184. By reason of the middle, concordance ebbs and flows between the concordable and the concordative, and the act of concording is the medium between them.

185. By reason of the end, concordance reposes in the concordative, concordable and act of concording, and it cannot repose without them, just as the end cannot repose without concordance.

186. Concordance is sometimes major and sometimes minor, and this is because in some subjects it concords greater things than in other subjects, for instance, it concords greater things in a man than in a rose, and greater things in a rose than in a stone.

187. Concordance convenes with equality by having its own innate co-essential concordative, concordable and concording without which equality cannot be the subject wherein the end of concordance reposes.

188. Some concordances are less than others are and they are less because they cannot enter into minority with greatness and majority, and so concordance with minority is close to naught and close to contrariety, its enemy.

Chapter 12 - Contrariety Combined with the Sequence of Principles

189. Contrariety is sometimes good by reason of goodness and sometimes evil by reason of malice. It is good by reason of goodness when someone contradicts vice with virtue, and it is good when the elements oppose each other, without which there would be no generation. Contrariety is evil by reason of malice, when an unjust man contradicts virtue with vice, or when disease opposes health, or when death opposes life.

190. Contrariety is great by reason of greatness, because there is great contrariety between God and the sinner, between water and fire, between good and evil, truth and falsehood and so forth.

191. Contrariety lasts through duration but it does not last on its own, for an accident does not exist on its own. It lasts by accident, because it is a privative habit that inclines being to non-being, and because there are contrary beings, such as just and unjust persons, or such as sight and blindness, understanding and ignoring, heating and cooling, joy and sadness and so forth.

192. Contrariety can exist and act through power, because one kind of contrariety is innate and another is moral: innate contrariety as between heat and cold, and moral contrariety which

exists because it is possible to sin, although in sinning, contrariety does not have the power of opposing anything on its own, for it is a habit acquired by man through sinful acts.

193. Contrariety is objectively knowable to wisdom; however, contrariety does not cause any knowledge but rather opposes ignorance to knowledge.

194. Contrariety is desirable in one way, and undesirable in another way. Desirable kinds of contrariety include the contrariety among the elements and the contrariety whereby virtue opposes vice. Undesirable contrariety includes the contrariety of death against life and vice against virtue.

195. Contrariety stands between virtue and vice and communicates with both so that man can oppose vice with virtue, or if he wants, he can oppose virtue with vice. Virtue does not compel anyone to act virtuously, for man has the free will to use virtue for good or for evil.

196. Some contraries are true and others are false, true contrariety opposes justice to injustice whereas false contrariety is an injurious habit opposed to the habit of justice.

197. Contrariety can come with joy or with sorrow; it comes with joy when someone forsakes vice and rejoices in virtue, it comes with sorrow when one is sorry for what he has done.

198. Contrariety has three different modes, as shown in the Major Art of Preaching, in the chapter on contrariety and elsewhere, in the first part of the first distinction.

199. Contrariety opposes concordance with its modes and vice versa, as shown in the said book, in the chapters on concordance and contrariety.

200. By reason of principle, there is naturally an innate contrariety that contains all natural contraries in itself, but moral contrariety is a habit acquired by man, as said above in number 192.

201. Contrariety is mediated in two ways: naturally and morally. It is mediated naturally, just as heating and cooling are mutually opposed. It is mediated morally through good and evil acts, whereby those who do good oppose the evildoers in some way.

202. Contrariety never reposes per se, for if it could repose per se, it would have perfect repose so that contrariety would convene with being through perfection and being would convene with non-being, which is impossible.

203. Some contraries are major and others are minor: major contrariety exists, for instance, between virtue and vice; minor contrariety exists between heating and cooling, etc.

204. In one way, contrariety convenes with equality, as in the elements considered in an absolute sense; in another way, it does not convene with equality: for instance, virtue and vice are utterly incompatible.

205. Generically, contrariety always convenes with minority, because it inclines being to non-being. Hence, the more one becomes aggressive with contrariety, the more one is aggressed in return, placed in peril and tribulation and removed from patience. May God Almighty set us free from this kind of contrariety!

Chapter 13 - Principle Combined with the Sequence of Principles

206. Principle is good by reason of goodness, and by reason of principle, goodness can be called a principle. As everything that is bonifiable or bonified is so by reason of goodness, it is good to initiate good, and if good does not do good, it does evil because it stands against its own nature and the nature of principle.

207. Principle is great by reason of greatness. Everything that is initiable or initiated, is so by reason of principle, and as a great many great things are initiated or initiable, principle must be great. However, it is not great if it does not initiate anything great although is able to do so. Moreover, if greatness and principle convert in the subject in which they exist, then this

subject must necessarily have its own innate acts of infinitizing and initiating. Here, we see that production necessarily proceeds in God's essence through infinitizing and initiating.

208. Principle lasts through duration, and if duration is eternity and principle is identical to eternity, then initiating and eternalizing must necessarily proceed within the subject in which principle and eternity are identical.

209. Principle is powerful because of power, and if principle and power are identical, it follows that principle can initiate as much with its own essence as with the essence of power.

210. Principle is knowable to wisdom, and if wisdom is infinite, eternal and identical to principle, then principle must necessarily coexist with eternalizing and knowing.

211. Principle is loved by the will, but if it is identical to greatness, eternity and will, then this principle must have innate and lovable acts of initiating, magnifying and eternalizing, and this cannot be otherwise.

212. Principle is virtuous because of virtue, and virtue is initiabile because of principle. However, if initiating and virtufying are impeded in the subject in which they exist, then principle and virtue are not identical.

213. Principle is true by reason of truth, and truth is initiabile by reason of principle; and if a principle is identical with truth and eternity, then initiating, verifying and eternalizing must necessarily proceed within this principle.

214. Principle is delightful and glorifiable because of glory, and if it converts with glory, then glorifying and initiating must necessarily convert.

215. Principle is clear and without confusion by reason of difference, and if the principle is intellect, then initiating and understanding are convertible, and difference posits that the intellective is one thing and the intelligible is another, and that the initiator is one thing and the initiabile is another, otherwise, principle and intellect cannot be free of confusion.

216. By reason of concordance, principle is naturally concordant, which it cannot be without the concordance of the initiator, initiabile and initiating.

217. Contrariety opposes principle when it impedes its act of initiating, but in the subject in which principle is identical to power, contrariety cannot impede principle from initiating, as it has no general ability or power to do this.

218. Through the middle, the beginning goes to the end, as it cannot reach the end without a middle; and when the middle is impeded, the power of the beginning and end wanes and the appetite suffers sorrow and toil. However, when goodness, greatness and duration arrive, power increases and the impediment is destroyed.

219. The beginning reposes in the end. However, it cannot repose in the end without initiating and both initiator and initiabile must be of the essence of the beginning. Sometimes, in lower beings, the initiator believes in vain that it can find repose in an initiabile being not of its own essence through an accidental act of initiating. Here, we see that only God is the supreme beginning and end.

220. Some principles are major and others are minor. The major principle is the one that is in act without having been brought out of potentiality, as no potential principle can be greater than one that is in act, because a principle in potentiality is close to naught as compared to a principle in act. Here, we see that God, who is the greatest principle that can be, has his own innate act, namely the initiator, initiabile and initiating, as seen in the divine persons.

221. A principle cannot repose in itself without natural equality, because every principle seeks to have equality within itself through the initiator, initiabile and initiating. However, God reposes in himself, therefore etc.

222. God is a principle, He is the supreme perfect principle, whence it follows that the things whereby God is most removed from minority of principle must necessarily exist in him; therefore the initiator, initiabile and initiating are all present in God.

Chapter 14 - Medium Combined with the Sequence of Principles

223. The middle is good by reason of goodness, and without the middle, the beginning cannot reach the end, nor can there be repose in the end, therefore, goodness is a reason for good to do good by means of bonifying in the middle.

224. The middle is great by reason of greatness, and if there is great distance between the beginning and the end, the middle must be great; however, it is not very great if it is not of the same essence as the beginning and the end.

225. The middle lasts through the duration of the influence of the end and the reflux of the beginning. Moreover, if the middle converts with duration, and if they are eternity, the flux and reflux lasts from eternity as do the mediating and eternalizing.

226. The middle can exist and act because of power, and by reason of the middle, power has a medium in its act of powering.

227. The middle is knowable to wisdom, but is not knowable without a beginning and end.

228. The middle is loved by the will, without which it cannot have the lover, lovable and loving, nor would the beginning have repose if there was no end. In addition, if the middle is convertible with the will, mediating and loving are convertible.

229. The middle is virtuous because of virtue, and virtue transits from the beginning to the end through the middle; and virtue exists in its own middle.

230. The middle is true by reason of truth, and by reason of the middle, truth has its own innate middle in verifying.

231. Without a middle, glory cannot have its act of glorifying, nor can the glorifier have any delight in glory.

232. By reason of difference, the middle is clear without confusion, as is the intellect's innate essential act of understanding, because the intellective is one thing, the intelligible is another and understanding is their act: But if there was no difference between the intellective and the intelligible, the middle would be confused and unclear.

233. Without the concordance of the intellective and the intelligible, understanding could not be a medium, because it would have no means to be one.

234. Sometimes, the middle is impeded by contrariety, and this is because it lacks the influence of the end and the reflux of the beginning in the subject in which they exist, because the subject is not perfect; but as it reaches perfection, contrariety is removed from the subject, as the middle is made perfect.

235. The middle exists because of the beginning, without which it cannot exist; and when it is not perfect, it does not have the natural end, which it acquires as it reaches perfection.

236. The middle reposes in the end because the beginning goes through the middle to reach the end, and the middle goes through the transit of the beginning to the end because the beginning cannot go anywhere without the middle. Here, we see how elemented things and other miscible ingredients enter into mixture.

237. Some means are greater and others are less. A major means is for instance the substantial means that has a substantial beginning and end with which it is one in essence, substance and nature; a lesser means is for instance: an accidental means like running or eating because it is not of the essence of the runner and what is run, or of the eater and the eaten.

238. By reason of equality, the middle stands equally between the beginning and the end: it stands there perfectly when it is of their essence and formally free of all matter. However, it cannot stand equally in the middle if matter is present, given that form is something superior to matter. Nonetheless, in a manner of speaking and in due proportion, the act is said to stand equally between form and matter as it is equally comprised of, or formed by both.

239. No medium existing between matter and form can ever be far from minority, and this is because matter is minor and form is major. Hence, the medium that exists between the formative and formable both free of all matter is simply removed in every way from minority.

Chapter 15 - The End Combined with the Sequence of Principles

240. The end is good by reason of goodness, so that the end is good and goodness reposes in the end. Thus, the repose of goodness is a reason for good to do good. However, if good does not do good, then neither good nor goodness can repose because good is in a state of idleness which is contrary to the end of goodness.

241. The end is great by reason of greatness, and it finally reposes in greatness, but the end is not very great if the reposer, reposable and reposing are not of its essence.

242. The end lasts through duration, and if it converts with duration, it reposes in itself; but if it seeks to repose in a peregrine end, it cannot be the supreme end.

243. The end can exist and act through power, and power can repose in the end. And if they convert, power can repose as much in existence as in action, as in the Godhead where God reposes as much in divine action as in divine existence, and his power is as great in powering as in existing, and likewise with the other dignities.

244. The end is understandable to wisdom, and it is as intelligible in its existence as in its action, without which it is not the supreme end, but a lower end seeking a higher one. Here, we see that all created beings seek, or should seek the supreme end.

245. The end is loved by the will. As it is great, it is greatly desirable, and as it is good, it is well to desire it. In addition, as the will is great, it greatly loves and desires the end; but if it does not do this, it is idle in its greatness and injurious to the end, and because of this it toils without repose.

246. As the end is virtuous because of virtue, so there is repose in virtue.

247. The end is true by reason of truth, and truly acquired repose is free of toil and sorrow.

248. Without glory, there can be no repose in the end, and there can be no rejoicing in glory deprived of its end.

249. By reason of difference, the end is a clear object without confusion. This is because it has its own natural and co-essential perfecter, perfectible and perfecting, without which it would not only be confused but it would also be the end of something other than itself, which is impossible.

250. By reason of concordance, the end has concordant things just as concordance has things that repose by reason of the end.

251. With contrariety, there can be no repose in the end, and this is because the end has a friend in concordance, and an enemy in contrariety.

252. The end is that in which the beginning reposes, and when they convert, the end starts with the beginning, but when they do not convert, the beginning may not repose in the end.

253. Without a middle, the end cannot be a subject of repose for the beginning because without a middle, there is no connection between the beginning and the end.

254. In a major end there is major repose, and the greatest repose is when the reposer, reposable and reposing are of the same essence.

255. Without equality among the reposer, reposable and reposing, the end cannot be a subject in which concordance reposes.

256. With minority, there is no repose in any end, because minority is close to naught, and nothingness brings on toil and sorrow as it is a habit that destroys perfection.

Chapter 16 - Majority Combined with the Sequence of Principles

257. Good majority is a reason for good to do major good, and such goodness is substantial because substance is greater than accident. When good majority produces major good by reason of substantial goodness and majority, it produces major good substantially, and it places this product in the species of majority and goodness.

258. Majority is great, and some greatness is major, whence it follows that majority is a substance, otherwise, it would not be major, nor could substance be greater than accident.

259. Majority lasts through duration, and substantial duration is greater than accidental duration, otherwise, accidents would last on their own and not on account of substance, and they would endure longer by reason of minority than by reason of majority.

260. Majority can exist and act through power, and by reason of majority, power can be major, whence it follows that majority and power can be substantial parts of the subject in which they exist.

261. Majority is known to wisdom, for it is a substantial object, otherwise, majority would not be knowable per se but by accident, which is impossible.

262. Majority is loved by the will, because majority enables the will to have a major object.

263. As majority is the image of the immensity of virtue, some majority is substantial, otherwise, it cannot be an image of immensity because accident is inadequate for this since accident signifies minority just as substance signifies majority.

264. Majority is true by reason of truth and truth is major by reason of majority. Hence, there is some substantial truth, without which truth could only be an accident, and majority could not be true by reason of substantial truth.

265. Majority is delightful by reason of glory, and glory has major delight by reason of majority; therefore, some majority must be substantial so that glory can be greater in substance than in accidents.

266. Majority is free of confusion because difference tells substantial majority apart from accidental majority. Without this distinction, majority would be confused.

267. Without concordance, majority cannot be an image of the immensity of virtue, greatness etc. Therefore, concordance posits that some majority is substantial in existence and action.

268. Majority overcomes minor contrariety with major concordance, but majority cannot overcome major concordance with major contrariety, and this is because majority does not belong to the genus of contrariety. Here, we see how sinners commit sins and incur guilt, because the virtues are positive and have major value while the vices are privative and have minor value.

269. By reason of principle, majority is a principle; and by reason of majority, principle is naturally substantial, otherwise, it could not be major. For a principle to be major it must have innate essential constituent parts, for without them, it would be greater in potentiality than in act, and potential majority could be greater than actual majority, which is impossible.

270. Majority cannot belong to its own genus without majorifying, which is its innate co-essential medium, and likewise, the middle cannot be a substantial being without majority.

271. Majority causes major repose, and so it follows that due to majority, some end is simply and not relatively substantial, because repose exists on account of majority, not minority; and this is so because repose must be removed from conceit, envy and things like that.

272. Without equality, majority could not be an image of the immensity of goodness, greatness etc. because it could not have its own equal co-essential parts, namely the majorifier, majorifiable and majorifying.

273. Majority and minority are respectively opposed in the subject in which they exist, like substance and accident, which are not, however, naturally opposed because substance and accident convene in constituting a third entity, such as a body. Thus, majority per se convenes with being and minority with non-being. Nevertheless, some majority convenes with non-being because it causes sin, or corruption.

Chapter 17 - Equality Combined with the Sequence of Principles

274. Good equality is a reason for good to do good in an equal way; this definition is a source that gives rise to natural and moral justice.

275. Equality is great by reason of greatness, and due to equality, greatness has its own equal innate co-essential parts; the greatness of equality cannot be great without the natural equalization that proceeds within its own innate natural and co-essential equalizer, equalizable and equalizing.

276. Equality endures in duration because the sustainer and the durable are sufficient for the equalizer to make the equalizable and equalizing endure. If eternity and equality were identical in created beings, equalizing and eternalizing would last in them from eternity and in eternity, without any corruption of some things and generation of other things, which is impossible. Here, we see that the world is new and that equality and eternity do not convert in it.

277. Equality is powerful in power, and through equality, power has its own equal innate co-essential things that cause equalizing and powering to proceed within the subject in which they exist.

278. Equality is knowable to wisdom, while wisdom and equality are great in greatness, and hence, equality must exist in actuality with its co-essential equalizer, equalizable and equalizing; and if equality is identical to the intellect, then equalizing and understanding must incessantly proceed within it.

279. Equality is loved by the will, so that the will can have equality in its lover, beloved and loving; and as equality and will are great in greatness, powerful in power and as they repose in the end, they must actually exist.

280. Equality is virtuous by reason of virtue, and virtue has equal innate things by reason of equality. Here, we see that the virtues are equalizable in a virtuous equalization.

281. Equality is true by reason of truth, and as it cannot receive the habit of truth without receiving its nature, equality must imprint its natural habit with truth, and by reason of equality, truth must have its own equal co-essential things.

282. Equality is enjoyable by reason of glory, glory is equalizable with equality; and thus, the glorifier in glory delights in equalizing itself with the glorified and the glorifying.

283. By reason of difference, equality is a clearly manifest reason without confusion, and this is because difference posits that the equalizer is one thing, the equalized is another thing, and equalizing is yet another thing; but if difference was removed from equality, then equality would be emptied of clarity and overshadowed or filled with darkness.

284. Equality has concordant things by reason of concordance, and if equality and concordance convert, they are forever concordant in concurring and equalizing so that contrariety and inequality have no part of them.

285. Equality and contrariety are not friends, because equality is a friend of concordance. Here, we see that justice arises from equality and concordance whereas injustice arises from contrariety and inequality.

286. By reason of principle, equality is a principle; and by reason of equality, principle has its own innate, equal and co-essential things, and if equality and principle convert, they are forever permanent in initiating and equalizing.

287. By reason of the middle, equality naturally mediates, and by reason of equality, the middle naturally equalizes; and thus they join together in equalizing and mediating.

288. Equality is the subject in which the end of concordance reposes, and there is majority in this repose so that the repose is not deprived of major equality simply disparate from minority, for minority does not belong to the genus of repose.

289. By reason of majority, equality is major, and majority essentially and naturally requires its own equal co-essential things that remove it in every way from minority, its enemy. Here, we see how majority exists as a real and natural being outside the soul and independently of the rational mind.

290. Equality and minority are enemies, because there can be no minority where there is equality, for the presence of minority destroys equality; however, inasmuch as some equalities are lesser than others, equality convenes to some extent with minority through which it approaches non-being.

Chapter 18 - Minority Combined with the Sequence of Principles

291. Minority is not close to nothingness by reason of goodness, because goodness is always close to something; but goodness is close to nothingness by reason of minority; therefore, when good does not do good and is idle in its goodness, then goodness is minor and close to nothingness; however, this occurs by accident.

292. Minority does not belong to the genus of greatness, as compared to majority, its contrary; but minority is great inasmuch as it is a substance so that substantial beings can be different in majority and minority.

293. Minority endures in duration in its own genus, but it cannot do so in eternity, which does not belong to the genus of minority. Here, we see that the world is not eternal because if it was, it would have to belong to the genus of some eternity lesser than God's eternity in the same way that the world's goodness is less than God's goodness.

294. Through power, minority can be what it is, but not more than what it is, and the same applies to what minority does.

295. By reason of wisdom, minority is knowable, while wisdom is minor by reason of minority, and I say it is minor when it is in a state of potentiality or idleness, since potentiality and idleness belong to minority, whereas actuality and activity convene with majority.

296. Minority is loved by the will, not because the will loves minority as such, but rather because it wants minority in some subjects in order to appreciate majority in other subjects; for instance, people want hot water in which heat reduces the coldness of water to minority so that they can use it for heating and bathing.

297. Minority is virtuous on account of virtue when virtue compensates for the small size of some minor subjects. For instance, a mustard seed has great virtue in its sharp taste and because it produces a great many seeds.

298. Minority is true by reason of truth, and this is because truth truly posits that minority is close to nothingness, and as minority makes things minor, it posits that some truths are lesser than others.

299. Glory is minor by reason of minority, though it finds no repose in minority; an abundance of glory produces major enjoyment in the subject in which it exists, unless minority impedes it, because minority cannot sustain great enjoyment.

300. On account of difference, minority is a clear reason without confusion, but its clarity is small, as is its genus.

301. As minority participates with concordance, it has several concordant constituent principles, but this concordance is small because it cannot enter into minority with magnitude.

302. Minority opposes majority with contrariety, just as majority opposes minority with contrariety. Here, we see that it is easy to overcome minority. (Chapter 15 #21)

303. By reason of principle, minority is naturally a principle, and so it is a principle general to all minor agents that are of small value.

304. Minority mediates by reason of the middle, as equality and majority decline through the middle toward non-being, which they do not reach without passing through minority and receiving its nature before waning into nothingness.

305. Minority never reposes in itself because it is too close to non-being; but majority can repose because it is major and makes minority its servant.

306. Majority and minority are not and cannot be identical, because majority means being and minority means non-being; but they do convene well in one common purpose in the relation of master and servant.

307. Minority and equality cannot belong to the same species because minority stands between equality and non-being, whereas equality stands between majority and minority.

Section 2 - The Principles Combined with the Sequence of Rules

1. In the third figure, we already combined the principles with the rules. Here, we will maintain a continuous discourse through the straight sequence of the rules to acquaint the intellect with each principle combined with them in turn. In this part we also intend to prove that each principle is general and to demonstrate the general nature of this art by providing evidence that all its principles are general, which will also serve to provide an irresistible defense against its detractors

Chapter 1 - Goodness Combined With the Sequence of Rules

2. Is goodness a general principle? We answer that it is, as shown by *rule B* and by the ladders of the second figure that comprehend everything that is good; these ladders are general and they are good by reason of the goodness which they would not have if there was no general goodness.

3. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what general goodness is. We answer that it is a being that contains in itself every kind of special goodness sustained in specific subjects. With *the second species of rule C* we ask what innate co-essential things goodness has. We answer that it has relative constituent concretes that are co-essential with it and without which it cannot be a general principle. The first species of rule C and the second of rule D prove this. With *the third species of Rule C* we ask what goodness is in other things. We answer that it is a habit that habituates subjects with active or passive goodness and makes them good in action with active goodness and good in passion with passive goodness. With *the fourth species of the same rule*, we ask what goodness has in other things. We answer that it has existence in its subject without which it cannot exist, and that it has action and passion in its subject in accordance with its nature signified by the second species.

4. With *the first species of Rule D* we ask what goodness arises from. We answer that it exists in itself so it can be general and have its own nature indicated by the second species of rule C and the first and second of D. With *the second species of rule D* we ask what contracted goodness consists of. We answer that it consists of itself, inasmuch as it is an innate substance, as signified by the second species of rule C and the first of E. Otherwise, it would not have any natural existence and action of its own, which is impossible. Further, goodness as a natural or moral habit is a figure of combined and diffused substantial goodness, it is a likeness that represents its subject. Now with *the third species of rule D* we ask to whom goodness belongs. We answer that it belongs to the subjects in which it exists, just as a habit belongs to the subject habituated with it, or just as the quantity of a quantified subject belongs to the subject quantified by it, etc.

5. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why there is goodness. We answer that it exists on its own, as shown by the second and first species of rule C. Next, with *the second species of rule E* we ask why there is goodness. We answer that there is goodness so that the other principles can be good on account of it; for without goodness, no principle could be good, just as nothing could be hot without heat.

6. With *the first species of rule F* we ask how much goodness there is. We answer that goodness exists in the quantity in which it is habitually present as a part of its subject. With *the second species of rule F* we ask how much goodness there is. We answer that goodness exists in the quantity of its own concrete correlatives, as we already proved with the second species of rule C, #3.

7. With *the first species of rule G* we ask what the quality of goodness is. We answer that it is a proper accidental or substantial passion in the subject in which it exists. A proper passion indicates a predicate without which the subject cannot be what it is. With *the second species of rule G* we ask what the quality of goodness is. We say that it has the quality of the good habits of the good subjects habituated with it, such as the good sweetness of honey or the justice of a just man.

8. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when goodness exists. We answer that it exists when time is good and goodness moves in good, continuous successive motion through the ladders of the second figure. This answer involves all the species of rule H habituated with time. For the sake of brevity, we leave the application to diligent readers trained in this art. Here, the intellect takes on a heavy load, however, by assuming a greater burden, it becomes all the more lofty and general.

9. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where goodness is. We answer, as we previously said regarding time, that it is in itself, as manifested by the first and second species of rules C and D, and by the principles of the first figure which goodness habituates and situates in itself.

10. With *the first rule K* we ask how goodness exists. We answer that goodness exists as a part of the subject in which it is present, as shown by the ladder of difference and by the second species of rule C along with the first species of rule G. Further, with *the second species of K* we ask how goodness exists in the other principles. The second species of rule C gives the answer, which you can see in the first part of the mixture of principles and in the first column, or ladder which goes from camera BC to camera BK in the third figure. Further, with *the third species of rule K* we ask how goodness exists in the whole and how the whole exists in goodness. We say that it exists in the whole as a habit present in the habituated subject, as depicted in the said ladder. With *the fourth species of rule K* we ask how goodness transmits its likeness outwardly. We say that it operates by means of the mode it has in the second species of rule C where the bonifier in its bonifiable generates peregrine or accidental instances of goodness habituated with goodness, like the good sweetness of honey, or the justice of a just man.

11. With *all the species of the second rule K* we ask with what means goodness is what it is. We answer that it is with itself and with the other principles, and with its correlatives, without which it cannot exist, as the second species of rule C shows, and with which it generates and imprints peregrine instances of goodness. The first and second species of rule D indicate this, as well as the ladder of the third figure that goes from BC to BK, where goodness diffuses its presence and contributes its likenesses.

Chapter 2 - Greatness Combined With the Sequence of Rules

12. Is greatness a general principle? We answer that it is, as we see in the ladder of the third figure that goes from cameras BC and CD to camera CK. If greatness was not a general principle, then goodness, difference, concordance etc. would not have anything to magnify them, and *rule B* proves this.

13. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what greatness is. We answer that it is the principle whose proper function is to magnify things and with which great things cause magnification. This is also corroborated by rule B. With *the second species of rule C* we ask what greatness has in itself. We answer that in corporeal things, it has its own co-essential magnifier, magnifiable and magnifying with which it causes substantial extension in subjects from which quantities arise with which greatness measures itself and the other principles in the corporeal subjects in which it exists. In a great spiritual subject, it causes great acts, namely great understanding, remembering and loving habituated with spiritual greatness, which is a spiritual principle; and the same applies to great bonifying, enduring, judging etc.

as proved by rule B. With *the third species* we ask what greatness is in other things. We answer that greatness is the form informing everything that has great form and great matter, as the first species of rule D indicates. Further, with *the fourth species of rule C* we ask what greatness has in other things. We answer that it has great action and great passion with which it is naturally present in the great subjects in which it exists. The first species of rule D also indicates this.

14. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what greatness arises from. We answer that it exists in itself, and that it is primordial in the act of magnifying. Indeed, if it did not magnify anything, then neither greatness itself, nor any magnified being would have a source to arise from, but this is impossible. In addition, rule B shows this. With *the second species of rule D* we ask what greatness consists of. We answer that it consists of its own connatural correlatives indicated by the second species of rule C. Further, with *the third species* we ask to whom greatness belongs. We answer that it belongs to the subject in which it exists when the subject performs great acts with it in itself and in other things, morally or naturally. In addition, rule B signifies this.

15. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why there is greatness. We answer with the second species of rule C that it exists because it consists of the magnifier, magnified and magnifying, on account of which greatness can naturally be what it is. With *the second species*, we ask why there is greatness. We answer that greatness exists in order to enable the other principles to be great. In addition, all the cameras of the third figure containing the letter C signify this.

16. With *the first species of rule F* we ask how much greatness there is. We answer that its quantity is the same as that of its essence continuously present in subjects, as the third figure shows, in the ladder that goes from BC through CD to CK. With *the second species*, we ask how much greatness there is. We answer that its quantity is equal to what it can comprehend with its correlatives indicated by the second species of rule D. In addition, the quantity of greatness is the same as the quantity of the habits of greatness, which flow from it into the principles that the first and second figures sustain, dispose and enumerate.

17. With *the first species of rule G* we ask what quality greatness has. We answer that it has the quality indicated by the first species of rule C and by the first and second species of rules D, E and F. In addition, rule B attests to this. Now with *the second species of rule G* we ask what qualities greatness has. We answer that it has the qualities of its habits diffused in the discourse of the third figure, through the ladder that goes from BC through CD to camera CK.

18. With *all the species of H* we ask when greatness exists. The answer is that it exists when its subject, in which it is sustained and to which it is joined, exists. In addition, the ladder in the third figure that goes from BC through CD to camera CK proves this, for it involves all the species of rule H, which indicate greatness moved in time and time in great movement. However, it would be too long to explain this here, and we leave it up to artists who know this art.

19. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where greatness is. We answer that it is with all the species of I indicated by the cameras of the third figure. Those who know and diligently scrutinize this art can apply this to the question at hand.

20. With *the species of the first rule K* we ask how greatness exists. We answer that greatness exists by means of the mode it has in rules C, D, E, F, G, H and I as signified by the ladder in the third figure that goes from BC through CD to camera CK.

21. With *the second rule K and all its species*, we ask what means greatness exists with. We answer that greatness exists with its correlatives signified by the second species of rule C, by the first and second species of rules D, E, F, G, H, I and by the first rule K, without which greatness cannot be what it is. Further, it exists with the other principles without which it

cannot be itself, or have its own natural properties in itself and in other things. What we say here is self-evident, and rule B proves it.

22. This discussion of greatness combined with the sequence of the rules shows the human intellect a way to acquire a very general subject for attaining a multitude of great works that greatness causes and performs in the subjects in which it exists. Given all these things, is it any wonder that this general art raises the human intellect to a very general level where it can produce great sciences, and easily discover many new ones?

Chapter 3 - Eternity Combined With the Sequence of Rules

23. We ask if there is eternity. We answer that there is, because otherwise, the world would have given rise to itself or produced itself on its own as something new, so that it would have existed before existing, which is an impossible contradiction. And *rule B* proves this.

24. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what eternity is. We answer that eternity is a being that converts with its infinite goodness, greatness, power and virtue; and this can be proved with the first and second species of D, E and F. With *the second species of rule C* we ask what eternity has in itself. We answer that it has its own substantial and primordial correlatives demonstrated by the first and second species of rules D and E. With *the third species of rule C* we ask what eternity is in other things. We say it is a being that exists before time. Moreover, its definition given above proves this, as well as the first species of rule D. With *the fourth species of rule C* we ask what eternity has in other things. We answer that it has the power to annihilate everything that exists because its power is infinite.

25. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what eternity arises from. We answer that it exists on its own, by reason of its primordial singularity. In addition, B and the first and second species of rule C show this. With *the second species of rule D* we ask what eternity consists of. We say it consists of the eternalizer, eternalizable and eternalizing without which it could not be what it is, and without which it would be empty and idle, so that its being would fade into non-being; and this is made manifest by the second species of rule C and the first of D and E. Now with *the third species*, we ask to whom eternity belongs. We say that eternity does not belong to anybody, because an infinite being can in no way be subject to anything other than itself.

26. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why there is eternity. We say it is because eternity consists of infinite, primordial and substantial correlatives that are co-essential with it, namely the eternalizer, eternalized and eternalizing, without which eternity cannot be what it is or exist on its own. All the species of rules C and D prove this clearly enough. With *the second species of rule E* we ask why there is eternity. We answer that eternity exists so that its goodness, greatness and power can be the prime origin of all origins; and this is made manifest by rule B along with the first species of rule D.

27. With *the first species of rule F* we ask how much eternity there is. We answer that there is as much eternity as can exist outside of time, or else eternity would not be infinitely primordial, continuous and singular outside of time; this can be proved by rule B and the first species of rule C. With *the second species of rule F* we ask what the discrete quantity of eternity is. We say that it is indicated by the second species of rules C, D and E.

28. With *the first species of rule G* we ask about the quality of eternity. We say that it is indicated by its definition and by its signification combined with the second species of rule C along with the other species of the same rule, as well as all the species of D, E and F. With *the second species of rule G* we ask what qualities eternity has. We answer that eternity is the cause of new time, and as such it exists outside time and it precedes movement just as its

substance is outside the intense and extended quantity of the world; and all the species of rules C, D, E and F as well as rule B confirm this.

29. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when eternity is, when it was and when it will be. We say with rules C, D and K that it was before time ever was, so that its eternal duration precedes time, just as its infinite greatness precedes the finite greatness of the world and just as its goodness precedes the world's goodness. Further, eternity is in the "now" in which it has forever been from eternity and in which it will be forever throughout eternity, without any movement or succession; and there cannot be any time at all in such a "now", nor can time belong to the genus of eternity. Further, eternity was when there was no time in the aeviternal subject, so that the immobility of eternity measures and comprehends the world's mobility just as God's immense and infinite substance comprehends the world's finite quantity. And all the rules with their species attest to this.

30. With *rule I* we ask where eternity is. We answer with rules C, D and K and with the other rules that eternity's infinite immensity exists outside heaven just as eternity's infinity and immobility exist outside of time and movement and just as its infinite goodness exists outside of finite goodness. God's eternity is in the world and in all its parts, but not in a localized way, because it is infinite and undivided, as shown by the second species of rules C and D and proved by rule B.

31. With *the rule of modality*, we ask how eternity exists. We answer that its mode is indicated by the second species of rules C, D and E without which eternity would have no mode for existing or acting in accordance with its nature. And all the rules corroborate this.

32. With *the rule of instrumentality*, we ask what eternity exists with. We answer that it is with its essential correlatives indicated by rules C, D and E, and as much with its infinite, singular and simple goodness, greatness, power etc. as with its infinite, simple and singular duration. Thus, eternity's existence encompasses everything in existence, for it is simply an infinite being encompassing finite being. And all the rules concur in attesting to this.

33. We have dealt with eternity combined with the rules, and with the help of eternity's grace, we can discover and know eternity. Now we call this eternity God, and let us praise and honour him in eternity. Amen.

Chapter 4 - Power Combined With the Sequence of Rules

34. We ask if there is an infinite power. We answer that there is, as proved in the chapter on eternity. If infinite power did not exist, then eternity, which is infinite, would not have the means to be infinite. *Rule B* and the third species of rule D prove this. If eternity had no infinite power, then finite power could prevent eternity from existing and power would be a privative habit, subject to an infinite and positive habit, which is impossible.

35. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what infinite power is. We answer that infinite power is a being whose proper function is infinite powering. The first species of rule D shows this, as does rule B. With *the second species of rule C* we ask what infinite power has in itself. We say that it has natural and co-essential correlatives with which it can be what it is. In addition, rule B proves this and the second and third species of rules D and E also bear it out. With *the third species of rule C* we ask what power is in other things. We say that it is a being that causes action and passion in subjects and that enables subjects to have action and passion. And rule B supports this. With *the fourth species of the same rule*, we ask what power has in other things. We answer that it has action as a cause in its effect, and it has passion in subjects in which it is habituated with goodness, greatness etc. Rule B also bears this out.

36. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what power arises from. We answer that it exists in itself, as a general principle. Rule B also proves this. Further, with *the second species of rule D* we ask what power consists of. We answer that it consists of the powerer, powerable

and powering. The second species of rules C and E prove the same. Further, with *the third species of the same rule*, we ask to whom power belongs. We answer that power belongs to the subjects in which it exists and which act with power as active causes in passive ones; this is self-evident.

37. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why power exists. We say it exists because it consists of the powerer, powerable and powering. However, power is an accidental habit in subjects in which it exists, just as whiteness exists because its subjects are white. Further, with *the second species of rule E* we ask why there is power. We answer that power exists in order to enable the other principles to exist and act.

38. With *the first species of rule F* we ask what quantity power has. We answer that power has the quantity it needs to enter into its own nature shown by the second species of C, and to produce one continuous existence in its intrinsic correlatives. The second species of rule C manifests this and rule B attests to it, as do the first and second species of rule D. And with *the second species of rule F* we ask what quantity power has. We say it has the quantity of its concrete correlatives. The second species of rule C, the first and second of G and rule B show this.

39. With *the first species of rule G* we ask what quality power has. We say it has the same quality as its subject's proper passion, like God's infinity and eternity, without which God cannot be what He is. And with *the second species of rule G* we ask what qualities power has. We say that power has the qualities of its subject's habits, like goodness, greatness etc. that can be what they are due to power, just as a judge can be a judge due to power. Rule B clearly shows this.

40. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when power exists. We say that power exists when its definition exists by *the first species of rule C*. By *the second species of C*, power exists when it has its own co-essential correlatives. By *the third species*, power exists when it is a habit in its subject. Further, by *the fourth species of C*, power exists when it has action and passion in its subject. By the first species of *rule D*, power exists when time can exist by reason of power and movement while movement can exist in time. By *the second species of rule D*, power exists when it consists of its correlatives. By *the third species of D*, power exists when it is an instrument of its subject. In addition, by the first species of *the rule of modality*, power exists when it has its own intrinsic mode. By *the second species*, power exists when it is a habit of its subject. By *the third species*, power exists when the correlatives are all within each other and all are in one essence that is in them all. By *the fourth species*, power exists when the other principles are habituated with power and with the likenesses of power. By *the first species of instrumentality*, power exists when it is present with its correlatives. By *the second species*, it exists when one principle exists with another. By *the third species*, power exists when several essences can exist in one common being, where each essence is present in the other essences while one common being exists in them as a whole. Further, by *the fourth species*, power exists when it transposes its likenesses into its subject by means of its essential innate correlatives. Now we see that power exists in time, and that time and movement exist in power. Although this discourse places a heavy load on the intellect, it nonetheless elevates the understanding, and this demonstration is corroborated by all the rules. Indeed, without these rules, the intellect could not rise to such heights.

41. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where power is. We answer that power exists in space in the same way as it exists in time, as described above; for power exists in its definition and in its correlatives through which all possible things are possible and without which nothing is possible. Power exists in subjects in which it is a habit, and in subjects in which it has action and passion. It is primordially located in the things of which it consists and in the subjects to which it belongs. Further, it exists in modality whereby it has a mode for existing,

acting and generating its likenesses; and it exists in subjects that are active and passive with their power. All the said species show this, and rule B proves the same.

42. With *the rule of modality*, we ask how power exists. We answer that power has a mode that enables it to exist and act in subjects, and that enables subjects to exist and act in it as it empowers them to have action and passion. Moreover the species of the rules in continuous straight sequence support this. It would take too long to clarify this here, but readers who possess the method of this art can do it easily.

43. With *the rule of instrumentality*, we ask what power exists with. We answer that it is with its co-essential correlatives, and with all the species of the rules, without which power cannot exist, just as they cannot exist without power. This is sufficiently clear to anyone who is trained in this art. Now we have said enough about power.

Chapter 5 - Wisdom Combined With the Sequence of Rules

44. We ask if some wisdom is a habit. The answer is yes. If wisdom was not a habit, then the intellect would have no means to objectify real and necessary truths, and so it would be naked and impotent, which is impossible. And *rule B* proves this.

45. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what the habit of wisdom is. We answer that it is an instrument proper to the intellect and with which the intellect is well habituated, just as fire is habituated with heat, as a cloaked man is clothed in a cloak and as a just man is clothed with justice. With *the second species of rule C* we ask what wisdom essentially comprises in itself. We answer that it has its own correlatives without which substantial wisdom cannot exist. With *the third species* of the same rule, we ask what wisdom is in other things. We say that it is a habit existing in them. With *the fourth species*, we ask what wisdom has in other things. We say that substantially existing wisdom has a habit in its subject with which it understands its subject well.

46. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what the prime origin of wisdom is. We answer that that it exists on its own, as a primordial principle general to everything that can be known. With *the second species*, we ask what wisdom consists of. We answer that substantial wisdom consists of its essential correlatives, whereas habitual or accidental wisdom is a simple form without any innate constituting correlatives. This is manifested by rule B, along with the second species of rule C and the fourth of K. Further, with *the third species*, we ask to whom wisdom belongs. We answer that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists, just as a mantle belongs to the man wearing it etc.

47. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why there is wisdom. We answer that wisdom, as a substance, exists because it is made of the knower, knowable and knowing; and if wisdom is an accident, then it is because the intellect is habituated with wisdom just as a logician is habituated with logic, and likewise with other things like this. With *the second species*, we ask why there is wisdom. We answer that wisdom exists for enabling the wise to obtain science in a good and prudent manner; and rule B proves this.

48. With *the first species of rule F* we ask what quantity wisdom has. We answer that it has same quantity as that of its habit in the subject in which it exists. With *the second species*, we ask what quantity wisdom has. We say that wisdom has the same quantity as that of its concretes that are habituated with wisdom just as the heater, the heatable and heating are habituated with heat.

49. With *the first species of rule G* we ask what the qualities of wisdom are. We say that it has the same qualities as those of its innate concrete correlatives signified by the second species of rule C and habituated with wisdom. With *the second species* of the same rule, we ask what the qualities of wisdom are. We answer that it has qualities that enable it to habituate

its concrete correlatives with goodness, greatness etc. as manifested by rule B, the third species of rule C and the fourth of K.

50. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when wisdom exists. We say that wisdom exists in the "now" in which it is present, although it is potential in one "now" and actual in another "now", theoretical in one "now" and practical in another "now", depending on how the subject is habituated with time and movement. This is proved by rules C, D and K.

51. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where wisdom is. We answer with all the species that wisdom exists in its subjects just as goodness exists in good things, as heat exists in fire, as justice exists in just people and so forth. In addition, rule B attests to this.

52. With *the rule of modality*, we ask how wisdom exists. We answer that it exists by the modes of difference and property; difference distinguishes the intellect's habit from all other habits and property posits that wisdom belongs to the intellect, so that by the second species of rule C, each correlative of wisdom is habituated with the others and reciprocally, its correlatives are all habituated with one habit. This is shown by rule B and all the species of rule K.

53. With *all the species of rule K* we ask what means wisdom exists with. We say it exists with its own intrinsic correlatives that are habituated with it. Wisdom exists with the act of goodness because it is good, with the act of truth because it is true, with the act of power because it is possible, with the act of the will because it is desirable, with the act of virtue because it is virtuous and with the act of glory because it is delightful.

Chapter 6 - Will Combined With the Sequence of Rules

54. We ask whether the will is immortal. We answer that its essence is immortal because it is not made of compound and contrary correlatives as shown by the second species of rules C, D and E. However, the will is mortal when it is habituated with sin, because it has deviated from the second species of rule E. And *rule B* attests to this.

55. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what the will is. We answer that it is a being whose function is to want or not to want in order to repose in the second species of rule E. With *the second species of rule C* we ask what the will naturally and really has in itself. We answer that it has the lover, the beloved and loving constituted in a substantial relation by means of which the will habituates itself with moral habits that are good or evil, great or small. Rule B also proves this. With *the third species*, we ask what the will is in other things. We answer that in the subject in which it exists, the will is a faculty habituated with virtues or vices through willing and not willing. With *the fourth species*, we ask what the will has in other things. We answer that it has action and passion.

56. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what the will originates from. We answer that it exists on its own, because if it was made of some other pre-existing principle, it would not be primordial to willing and not willing, and it would be stripped of the second species of rule C, which is impossible. With *the second species of rule D* we ask what the will consists of. We answer that it consists of its own consubstantial correlatives indicated by the second species of rule C, without which it would not exist per se but merely as an accident. With *the third species*, we ask to whom the will belongs. We answer that it belongs to man, as he freely moves it to perform its acts of willing and not willing.

57. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why the will exists. We answer that it exists because it is made of its natural correlatives. Moreover, the will exists morally because it is habituated with its own habit when it exists in its subject, like a man wearing his own coat. With *the second species* of this rule, we ask why the will exists. We say the will exists so that lovable beings can be loved. Without it, they could not be generally objectified by the will,

and repose would be devoid of goodness, greatness etc., which is impossible. Moreover, rule B shows this.

58. With *the first species of rule F* we ask what quantity the will has. We say it has the quantity of its essence different from all other essences. With *the second species* we ask what discrete quantity the will has. We say it has the quantity of its essential constituting correlatives indicated by the second species of rules C and D and by the first of E. Rule B further corroborates this.

59. With *the first species of rule G* we ask what the will's proper quality is. We answer that it is a substantial passion proper to the subject in which it exists, as for instance in man, who cannot exist without will. With *the second species*, we ask what appropriated qualities the will has. We answer that the will is either good because of good habits or bad because of bad habits, as it clothes itself with good or evil desires. And rule B shows this.

60. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when the will exists. We say it exists subjectively and objectively when it is combined with all the species of C, D and K. There is no need to further clarify this, for it is manifest enough to an intellect skilled in speculation and trained in this art. In addition, rules B, E, F and G prove the same.

61. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where the will is. We answer with all the species of this rule that it is in the subject in which it exists subjectively and objectively. A diligent application of rules E, F, G and H reveals this clearly enough.

62. With *all the species of modality* we ask how the will exists subjectively and objectively. We say that it is manifestly clear that the will exists in the way in which it combines with all the other rules and their species. However, it would be far too long to expound this here, and so we leave it up to the artists of this art.

63. With *all the species of instrumentality* we ask with what means the will exists. We leave it up to the reader of this art to give the answer, which you can find in the last number of the previous chapter on wisdom. Now we ask with what means the will objectifies its object. We answer that it does so with its innate habit of freedom. It also objectifies its object with its correlatives, because the willing subject, joined to the sensitive and imaginative powers, willingly extracts and deduces peregrine species from things sensed and imagined, to imprint them in his innate desirable correlative. These impressions generate and give rise to things that concupiscence wants or that irascibility rejects, all this by means of the intrinsic act of willing from which peregrine willing or not willing accidentally arise. Now we see that unwillingness is not of the essence of the will because it is caused by irascibility, and irascibility is the opposite of desirability. These considerations raise the intellect to a lofty degree of understanding.

Chapter 7 - Virtue Combined With the Sequence of Rules

64. We ask if virtue is a habit common to the principles, by means of which they have virtuous acts. We answer that it is, as shown by the second species of rule E, which cannot be a subject of repose for the principles unless they have virtue as their common habit. You can also prove this with *rule B*.

65. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what virtue is. We answer that virtue is a habit by means of which the principles have virtuous acts. With *the second species*, we ask what virtue has essentially in itself. We answer that it has its innate constituent correlatives with which it is a source for causing virtuous acts. With *the third species of rule C* we ask what virtue is in other things. We answer that it is a habit in subjects that enables them to perform virtuous acts, just as fire performs its act of heating by means of heat. With *the fourth species* we ask,

what virtue has in other things. We answer that it has its act in subjects habituated with accidental virtue.

66. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what virtue arises from. We answer that it exists on its own, or else it would not be a general principle, which is impossible. With *the second species of rule D* we ask what things virtue is made of. We answer that substantial virtue is made of its substantial correlatives indicated by the second species of rule C, otherwise it would have no basis for existing on its own, nor would it have any nature, which is impossible. With *the third species*, we ask to whom virtue belongs. We answer that virtue existing as an accident belongs to substantial virtue, which is a substance. Rule B proves this.

67. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why virtue exists. We answer that it exists because it is made of its substantial correlatives. However, accidental virtue is an accidental being caused by substantial virtue. With *the second species of rule E* we ask why there is virtue. We answer that virtue exists for enabling the other principles to repose virtuously with it in the end. This is also proved by rule B.

68. With *the first species of rule F* we ask what quantity virtue has. We answer that natural virtue has the same quantity as that of its extension throughout the entire universe. With *the second species of rule F* we ask what quantity virtue has. We answer that it has the quantity of its concretes extended in various ways in subjects of different species. This is also proved by rule B, as well as by the second species of rule D and the first of E.

69. With *the first species of rule G* we ask what the qualities of virtue are. We answer that virtue is a passion proper to its subject. With *the second species of rule G* we ask what qualities virtue has in subjects. We answer that accidental virtue is an appropriated being with which subjects are habituated, like a just man with justice, the power of sight with the distinction of specific colours, the sense of touch with species of heat, cold and so forth, and likewise with the higher powers in their own way. This is signified by rule B, along with the first species of rule D and the second of E.

70. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when virtue exists. We answer that it exists when it is sustained in combination with the species of rule H. We leave this up to the general artists of this art.

71. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where virtue is. We say that it is in every one of its species, everywhere in the universe, in words, in stones, in herbs, in every subject habituated with it and in every act caused by virtue. Ultimately, the maximum virtue dwells in the prime cause and converts with it.

72. With *the modal rule signified by K* we ask how virtue exists. We answer that it exists in the way that substantial virtue clothes itself in accidental virtue and reaches out through it to perform peregrine acts by subjectively infusing its likenesses and objectively receiving a reflux of the likenesses of objects into its own passion where it imprints and characterizes these likenesses and makes them virtuous. Here, the intellect is heavily burdened and exhausted, but nonetheless it is raised aloft, as signified by rule B.

73. With *the rule of instrumentality*, we ask what are the means with which virtue exists. We say that virtue exists with its correlatives, and that one virtue exists with another virtue, as seen in the line constituted of the elementative, vegetative, sensitive, imaginative and

intellective virtues, where one virtue attracts species through another virtue in mutual participation. Rule I, the second species of rule E and rule B also prove this.

Chapter 8 - Truth Combined With the Sequence of Rules

74. We ask if created truth converts with its unity. We answer that it does not, because if it did, it would be much too similar to the truth of God, which does indeed convert with its unity. It would further convert with goodness, greatness, duration etc. and thus it would extend itself beyond time and place, which is impossible. *Rule B* shows this.

75. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what truth is. We answer that it is an incorruptible being; if it was corruptible, there would be an impossible contradiction whereby it would be existent and non-existent at the same time. With *the second species of rule C* we ask what truth contains in itself essentially and naturally. We answer that it has its correlatives without which it cannot exist and with which all things are verifiable; and without the essence of truth, no being can be true, as shown by the first species of rule D. Further, with *the third species of rule C* we ask what truth is in other things. We answer that truth is the cause that makes beings verifiable. With *the fourth species of rule C* we ask what truth has in other things. We say it has a habit for verifying the subjects in which it exists.

76. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what the origin of truth is. We say it exists of itself, so that falsehood, its opposite, is not pre-existent to it and so that truth can repose in its essence. The same is shown by the second species of rule C. With *the second species of rule D* we ask what things truth consists of. We answer that it consists of its correlatives, otherwise its habit would have no foundation from which it could reach out and verify the other principles. With *the third species*, we ask what the habit of truth belongs to. We answer that it belongs to its own substantial foundation that sustains it; and rule B shows this.

77. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why there is truth. We say that it exists because it is made of its substantial correlatives. With *the second species*, we ask why there is truth. We say that there is truth so that the other principles can be verified by it.

78. With *the first species of rule F* we ask what quantity truth has. We say that it has the quantity in which the other principles are verified by it. With *the second species*, we ask what quantity truth has. We say that truth has quantity inasmuch as it is habituated with its own habit with which it causes peregrine acts. And this is clearly shown by rule B.

79. With *the first species of rule G* we ask what the quality of truth is. We answer that truth in itself is a habit proper to the subjects in which it exists and with which it verifies the other principles. Further, with *the second species*, we ask what the quality of truth is. We say it is an appropriated habit, with which the intellect truly and really attains real principles that are truly understood, remembered and loved, and that really exist.

80. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when truth exists. We answer that it exists when time is sustained in combination with the species of truth, for in the absence of truth, neither time nor its species can be true in any way.

81. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where truth is. We answer that it is outside of falsehood, and that it exists throughout all the species of I, for these species could in no way exist without truth. Further, truth exists in all elemented, vegetated, sensed and imagined things and in all things objectified by souls and by angels. In God, there is infinite and eternal truth in existence and action. Rule B also clarifies this.

82. With *all the species of modality*, we ask how truth exists. We answer that it exists with the same mode as that of difference, concordance and the other principles. Difference posits that in creatures, truth is one principle, goodness is another, greatness is another etc. and that in the essence of truth, the verifier is one thing, the verifiable another thing, and verifying is yet another thing; and that one kind of truth is substantial and another kind is accidental or

habitual. Moreover, property posits that substantial truth has its proper habit through which it obtains accidental truth whereby it verifies other beings. In addition, concordance assists in this, so that truth can multiply its likenesses. Rule B also shows this.

83. With *all the species of instrumentality*, we ask by what means truth exists. We answer that substantial truth exists by means of its correlatives, whereas habitual truth exists on its foundation in substantial truth. Moral truth exists by means of goodness and virtue, and it cannot exist by means of evil and vice, because they are privative habits with which falsehood exists. No likeness of truth can exist in falsehood, otherwise, truth would be composed of opposites and involve contradictions, which is impossible.

Chapter 9 - Glory Combined With the Sequence of Rules

84. With *rule B*, we ask if glory is a general and real principle. We answer that it is, otherwise, the universe would be emptied of the second species of rule E and all the principles would be deprived of enjoyment and repose, which is impossible.

85. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what glory is. We answer that glory is an essence without which nothing can be enjoyed. With *the second species*, we ask what glory has in itself essentially and naturally. We answer that it has its correlatives, namely the glorifier, the glorified and glorifying with which and in which all things are glorious and delightful. This is also signified by the first species of rule D. With *the third species of C* we ask what glory is in other things. We answer that glory as a habit is an instrument of substantial glory with which substantial glory conditions the other principles to seek enjoyment and repose. With *the fourth species of this rule*, we ask what glory has in other things. We answer that it has action and passion as it finds repose and enjoyment in the subjects in which it exists; and here we see how form enjoys being active and matter enjoys being passive, as is obviously the case between males and females, and as it is shown by the second species of rule C.

86. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what the origin of glory is. We answer that it exists on its own, so as to be a primordial principle comprising all that is enjoyable, or else appetite and delight would be deprived of the essence of glory, which is impossible. This is manifested by rule B. With *the second species of rule D* we ask what glory consists of. We answer that it consists of its correlatives without which glory as a habit would have no subject sustaining it. With *the third species of D* we ask what glory belongs to. We answer that habitual glory belongs to substantial glory.

87. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why glory exists. We answer that it exists because it is constituted of its correlatives. With *the second species*, we ask why there is glory. We say that it is to enable habitual glory along with substantial glory to place the other principles in bliss and repose.

88. With *the first species of rule F* we ask what quantity glory has. We answer that it has the quantity with which it exists in its being, as an abstract in its concrete. With *the second species*, we ask what quantity glory has. We answer that it has the same quantity as its correlatives and habits with which it reproduces species in repose in the same way that the intellect uses its habits to reproduce species in its understanding. Here we see how the principles help each other to reproduce species.

89. With *the first species of rule G* we ask what the proper quality of glory is. We answer that glory as such is a proper passion of the subjects in which it exists. With *the second species*, we ask what the qualities of glory are. We say that appropriated glory has the qualities of the principles that are habituated with glory and repose in it.

90. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when glory exists. We say that it exists when time is sequentially combined with all the species of rule H moving successively from one

"now" to the next, while the glorifier enjoys one species in one "now" and another species in another "now" as glory puts its innate glorifying into practice by reproducing peregrine glorifying in its own intrinsic glorifiable. All the species of rule H prove this.

91. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where glory is. We answer that it is present in its correlatives and in itself. Primordial glory exists in the habits with which it is habituated, it exists in its mode because it is modal, in its instruments because it is instrumental, in goodness because it is good, in greatness because it is great, and it is present in all subjects in which there is appetite and repose. Rule B proves this as well.

92. With *the rule of modality*, we ask how glory exists. We say that it exists in the way its correlatives are all within each other while the glorifier places the other principles in good, great, etc. repose in its intrinsic glorifiable that delights in giving them its likenesses. This is also signified by the second species of rule C.

93. With *the rule of instrumentality*, we ask with what means glory exists. We answer that it exists with its correlatives; and substantial glory exists with its habit with which it habituates the other principles, it exists with innate goodness because it is naturally good, and with moral goodness as when a good man delights in doing good with justice, prudence etc.

Chapter 10 - Difference Combined With the Sequence of Rules

94. Is difference a real and general principle? We say that it is, as *rule B* shows. Otherwise, the world would not naturally consist of its parts, which are primordially different due to difference, concordant due to concordance and contrary due to contrariety, none of which could be without primordial difference. Without difference, the world would be emptied of primordial concordances and contrarieties, of the second species of rule E and of all natural appetite and repose. Moreover, as all things would want to have the same identity, the world would not be what it is. We therefore conclude that the answer to this question must be affirmative.

95. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what difference is. We say that it is the cause of a plurality of things through its act of differentiating. Rule B proves this, as does the scales of difference in the second figure and in the third figure from camera BC through to camera BK, where difference causes many things, as it is diffused and combined. With *the second species*, we ask what difference has essentially and naturally in itself. We answer that it has its correlatives, namely the differentiator, the differentiated and differentiating without which it cannot exist and by means of which it contains all its differentiated species within itself. With *the third species of C* we ask what difference is in other things. We say that difference is a being that differentiates peregrine differences in its essential differentiable, and that causes plurality habituated with difference. With *the fourth species*, we ask what difference has in other things. We say that it has plurality that is habituated with it just as hot coals are habituated with heat. In addition, this is manifested by rule B.

96. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what the prime origin of difference is. We say that it exists on its own. Otherwise, all things would appear as one and identical, which is false. In fact, I do not want to be you, nor do I want to be a stone etc. nor vice versa. Further, with *the second species of rule D* we ask what things difference consists of. We say it consists of the differentiator, differentiable and differentiating that are consubstantial with it and with which it differentiates all things through its own habit. Without difference, nothing can exist per se, or have any foundation, nor can there be any distinction between substance and accidents. With *the third species of the same rule*, we ask what difference belongs to. We say that habitual difference belongs to substantial difference. This is proved by rule B.

97. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why difference formally exists. We answer that it exists because it is made of its essential correlatives. Now with *the second species of this*

rule, we ask what the final purpose of difference is. We say it exists so that many things can exist that cannot exist without it. Moreover, if the world was deprived of difference, it would be emptied and annihilated, as it would neither exist nor have any purpose.

98. With *the first species of rule F* we ask what the quantity of difference is. We say that there are two most general kinds of difference: one is substantial and causes substantial differences that differ substantially because difference diffuses itself in them by reason of mixture. In addition, there is another, habitual difference, with which substantial difference differentiates principles from one another. With *the second species of rule F* we ask what quantity difference has. We answer that it has quantity inasmuch as it extends into its correlatives; just as difference clothes quantity by encompassing it within its genus, so does quantity measure difference by encompassing it within its genus. Rule B also shows this.

99. With *the first species of rule G* we ask what the quality of difference is. We answer that in itself, difference is a part of the world without which the world cannot exist. With *the second species* of this rule we ask what the appropriated qualities of difference are. We say that it is a passion appropriated by the world, whereby substantial difference habituates other principles that are not of its own genus. Rule B also shows this.

100. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when difference exists. We say that difference, as a primordial principle, existed at the outset when the world was created. Just as the world was created with its parts, namely space, movement, time etc., so was it created with its difference, as we already said. And further, just as difference exists in the present 'now', it will exist in another 'now' in eternity, for it cannot exist without these 'nows'. We have said enough about difference related to time, as shown by rule B and all the species of rule H.

101. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where difference is. We say that it exists in all the species of I, and this is self-evident. Moreover, difference exists in space because space is different from quantity, time etc. In addition, difference exists in space because without space, difference could not be a passion proper to the world.

102. With *the rule of modality*, we ask how difference exists. We answer that it exists in the way it is present in its correlatives, and in the way it clothes the other principles with itself. A writer has a way of writing by moving his hand, so that the hand moves the pen, the pen moves the ink and the moving ink shapes the letters; likewise, difference has a way of differentiating things substantially from each other through their successive movement. This can be further demonstrated with all the species of the rules.

103. With *the rule of instrumentality*, we ask with what means difference exists. We answer that it exists by means of its correlatives and of the habit with which it clothes the other principles as it diversifies them. And difference exists by means of goodness, greatness etc. and by means of movement, quantity, quality etc. Difference cannot exist without these principles, and by means of difference, the principles are what they are because if they were deprived of difference, the principles would not be what they are.

Chapter 11 - Concordance Combined With the Sequence of Rules

104. With *rule B*, we ask if concordance is substantial. We answer that it is, so that the entirety of substance can be composed of its substantial parts, otherwise, the entire essence of form would not be concordant with the entire essence of matter in constituting a third substantial entity, so that this third substantial entity would be completely emptied of mixture and composition, which is impossible. We therefore find that concordance is a substantial part of the subjects in which it exists. Moreover, this is obvious by rule B.

105. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what concordance is. We answer that it is the essence whose proper function is to concord, for without it, no being can be concorded or concordable. With *the second species of rule C* we ask what concordance naturally and

essentially has in itself. We say that it has its correlatives, namely the concorder, the concorded and concurring. Further, with *the third species of this rule*, we ask what concordance is in other things. We answer that it is concordant in contrariety, as when fire heats water, which is its opposite element. Concordance is distinct by reason of difference, it is simply sustained in its own correlatives and even in contrariety. Moreover, concordance is present materially in rule D, formally in rule E, quantitatively in rule F, qualitatively in rule G, chronologically in rule H, locally in rule I, and it is modally and instrumentally present in rule K. With *the fourth species*, we ask what concordance has in other things. We say that it has existence, action and nature in its correlatives. Concordance has what it has materially in rule D, formally in rule E, and so on with the remaining rules in their own way as we said above under the third species or rule C. In addition, this can be demonstrated by rule B.

106. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what concordance arises from. We answer that it exists on its own as a primordial entity, otherwise, it would be made of something else that preceded it, not of its own genus and nature, which is impossible. With *the second species*, we ask what things concordance consists of. We say that it consists of its own correlatives, in which it can exist substantially. With *the third species of the same rule*, we ask what concordance belongs to. We answer that habitual concordance belongs to substantial concordance, as a coat belongs to the man wearing it. And rule B clearly shows this.

107. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why concordance formally exists. We say that it exists by reason of its correlatives. Here, we see that substance is its own substantial *raison d'être*. Now let us ask again, why does concordance formally exist? We say that habitual concordance exists because substantial concordance clothes itself with it, like a man wearing a coat. Here, the intellect knows why concordance is what it is, why it has quiddity, and it makes a science of this. With *the second species of rule E* we ask about the purpose of concordance. We answer that concordance exists so that the other principles can repose in it. Rule B also shows this.

108. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the quantity of concordance. We answer that it has quantity in two ways: first, it has the quantity of its substance and secondly, it has the quantity of its habit, just as a man wearing a coat has the quantity of his substance as well as the quantity of his garment. Further, with *the second species* we ask about the discrete quantity of concordance. We answer that it has the quantity of its correlatives, and rule B also shows this.

109. With *the first species of rule G* we ask about the quality of concordance. We say that it has the quality of a proper passion in the subject in which it exists. Here, the intellect recognizes the great and necessary connectedness between subject and predicate. With *the second species*, we ask about the appropriated qualities of concordance. We say that concordance has the qualities of its passions by reason of goodness, greatness etc. And this is clear and self-evident.

110. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when concordance exists. We answer that it exists when it is combined with all the species of rule H. Moreover, just as concordance exists in time, so is time sustained in concordance and sequentially combined with it through concurring. This is self-evident to artists well versed in this art.

111. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where concordance exists. We answer that it is present in all the species of I. Concordance is present wherever it can be defined, it is present in its correlatives and it is present wherever it contradicts contrariety. It exists wherever it has its act, wherever it is primordial, wherever it is constituted and wherever it is subjective, modal or instrumental.

112. With *all the species of the rule of modality*, we ask how concordance exists. We say that it is in the way it has of combining with the subjects in which it is present, and that concordance is present in every species. As a crystal looks green when it is placed on a green

object and red when placed on a red object, likewise, concordance receives goodness in one way when it is combined with goodness, and it receives greatness in another way when combined with greatness, and so forth. The same applies to the species of the rules. This is plainly self-evident.

113. With *the rule of instrumentality*, we ask what means concordance exists with. We say that it exists with its own constituting correlatives; it exists with all the species of the rules, and it is good with goodness, great with greatness etc. This is self-evident.

114. We have combined concordance with the rules. By following what was said here, we can contradict the contrariety of vice by means of concordance. This very general rule has great moral power against sin.

Chapter 12 - Contrariety Combined With the Sequence of Rules

115. With *rule B*, we ask if contrariety is a substantial principle. We answer that it is not substantial but accidental, as we said in Part 8, section 1, chapter 11 #173 about concordance combined with the principles, in chapter 12 #191 about contrariety, and in part 5 #26 about the Table. Indeed, if contrariety was substantial, it would impede concordance and prevent it from being predominant in the conjunction of form and matter in substance; and no principle could repose in the second species of rule E, which is impossible, as the second species of rule C clearly shows.

116. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what contrariety is. We answer that contrariety is the essence without which a being cannot oppose another being. With *the second species* we ask what contrariety has in its own essence. We answer that it has its accidental correlatives, namely the opposer, opposed and opposing without which it cannot exist as a habit in various ways in different subjects. With *the third species*, we ask what contrariety is in other things. We say that in concordance, contrariety is an opponent that impedes concurring by opposing it. With *the fourth species* we ask, what does it have in other things? We answer that it has a corrupting nature, just as concordance has a generating nature. Rule B also shows this.

117. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what the origin of contrariety is. We say that it exists on its own, because it is primordial: if it was not primordial, it would be something derived from pre-existing concordance, which is impossible, as shown in #106 of the previous chapter. With *the second species*, we ask what things contrariety consists of. We say that it consists of the encountering of objectified qualities such as heat and cold, dryness and moisture, lightness and heaviness, light and darkness, health and illness, life and death, justice and injury, affirmation and negation, generation and corruption and things like these. With *the third species* of rule D we ask what contrariety belongs to. We answer that it belongs to the subjects in which it exists. And rule B makes this clear.

118. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why contrariety exists. We say that it exists because subjects are habituated with it, as heat exists because its subject is hot and clothed in heat. Deafness exists because some people are deaf; injury exists because some people are injurious, and so forth.

119. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the continuous quantity of contrariety. We say that it has the quantity of the subjects habituated with it. With *the second species*, we ask about the discrete quantity of contrariety. We say that it has the quantity of the subjects that are discretely habituated with it, like the igniter, the ignited and igniting habituated with contrariety. Rule B bears this out.

120. With *the first species of rule G* we ask about the proper quality of contrariety. We answer that it is a passion proper to the subject in which it exists, such as the contrariety of the world, which is innate. With *the second species*, we ask what an appropriated quality of

contrariety is. We say that it is a passion appropriated by the subject in which it exists, as when a sinner habituates himself to sin against virtue. Other examples are deafness, sadness and things like that. Rule B bears this out.

121. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when contrariety exists. We answer that it exists when its subject is habituated with it. Further, it exists when its subject performs practically, modally and instrumentally, and this is self-evident.

122. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where contrariety exists. We answer that it is present in the species in which it performs its act, as in the generation and corruption of elemented things, in the opposition between willing and not willing, between good and evil, and in every privative habit. This is self-evident.

123. With *the rule of modality*, we ask how contrariety exists. We say that contrariety has a way of placing opposites together to expel concordance from the subjects in which it exists; it has a privative mode as it deprives concordance of its acts by opposing it; contrariety has a way of impeding things from fulfilling their purpose; and a way of developing perseverance. This is obvious and needs no proof.

124. With *the rule of instrumentality*, we ask with what means contrariety exists. We say that it exists by mixing opposites together in the subject in which they are present. In addition, it exists with privative habits: just as concordance with its essential correlatives is a cause of being, so is contrariety with its accidental correlatives a cause of non-being. Moreover, just as concordance and generation produce being, so does contrariety cause non-being through deviation from the end; and so forth.

Chapter 13 - Principle Combined With the Sequence of Rules

125. With *rule B*, we ask if some principle is substantial. The answer is yes, for otherwise, substance would not belong to the genus of principle but it would be a privative accident; and thus substance would not exist on its own, but by accident, which is contrary to rules B, C, D and E. Therefore, etc...

126. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what principle is. We say that it is the essence without which nothing can initiate anything. With *the second species*, we ask what it has in itself essentially. We answer that it has its substantial correlatives in which all peregrine principles are initiated. With *the third species*, we ask what it is in other things. We answer that principle is active in the initiator and passive in the initiable as they both join in initiating; and a habitual principle is set in motion in the initiable part of the substantial principle habituated with it. With *the fourth species*, we ask what a principle has in other things. We answer that a formal principle has action in matter while matter is passive under it. Also, a principle has mobility from the agent and has repose in the end. Rule B clearly shows this.

127. With *the first species of rule D* we ask about the origin of principle. We say that it exists on its own so as to be primordial, or else it would not be a general principle. With *the second species*, we ask what things it consists of. We say that a substantial principle consists of the efficient, formal, material and final causes; and accidental principles consist of likenesses of substantial principles that unite to compose corporeal principles with quantity in quantified things, quality in qualified things etc... With *the third species*, we ask what a principle belongs to. We say that habitual principles belong to substantial principles just as clothes belong to those who wear them. Rule B shows that this must be so.

128. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why a principle exists. We say that it has a dual existence. First, a substantial principle exists because it is constituted of the initiator, initiable and initiating. Secondly, a principle exists as an accident when substantial principle is habituated with it. Here, the intellect builds science and understands the origin of proofs from the cause and proofs from the effect. With *the second species*, we ask about the final purpose

of principle. We say that its purpose is to sustain in itself other principles that are subalternate to it, due to its supremely general nature. This is self-evident.

129. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the continuous quantity of principle. We answer that it has the quantity of its essence, as manifested by the middle between extremes. With *the second species*, we ask about the discrete quantity of principle. We say that it has the quantity of its correlatives that are distinct due to difference, concordant due to concordance and identical in essence, as proved by rule B. We experience this in man, in whom the elementative is one principle, the vegetative is another, the sensitive is another, the imaginative is another, the rational is another; and all five together under the number five are one man.

130. With *the first species of rule G* we ask about the qualities of principle. We say that the proper principle we are investigating is supremely general, whereas the appropriated principles are peregrine, acquired and subalternate, as proved by the second species of rule G.

131. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when principle exists. We say that it is when its correlatives, with which it is is a supremely general principle, were present and it existed when the subalternate principles like quantity, quality and the other predicates existed. Moreover, principle is present when a path habituates the mover, the movable and the motion as they successively transit from one 'now' to the next 'now' in one place and from one 'now' to another 'now' in a another place to generate motion that converts with the path. And all the species of rule H show this.

132. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where principle exists. We say that it is in its correlatives because it exists in itself, and it is in every subalternate principle as a cause in its effect; and it exists in the movement with which it is habituated, and in the disposition in which it is disposed, both modally and instrumentally, as proved by rule B.

133. With *the rule of modality*, we ask how principle exists. We answer that it exists as a causal principle by reason of its constituting correlatives, and that it exists as a habitual principle due to the way in which the causal principle habituates other peregrine principles with its own habit to constitute principles in which it reproduces its likenesses. This is self-evident.

134. With *all the species of instrumentality*, we ask with what means principle exists. We answer that principle exists with its constituting correlatives and with its nature, without which it cannot exist. And general principles exist by means of the supremely general substantial principle along with the supremely general habitual principles that clothe them, and with the final principle that disposes them. The second species of rule C clarifies this.

Chapter 14 - Medium Combined With the Sequence of Rules

135. In the substance of the world, is there one supremely general medium? We answer that there is, otherwise, there would be no subalternate media. Thus, the world would be void of the medium of continuation, measure and conjunction, nor would concordance exist, nor would the beginning have a subject through which it can transit to reach repose in the end. Thus, there would be no movement, and many other impossible things would follow, as shown by *rule B*.

136. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what the medium is. We say that it is the subject in which the beginning and end meet and join, so that the beginning can repose in the end. Moreover, the supremely general medium is the cause of all corporeal media. With *the second species*, we ask what the medium essentially has in itself. We say that it has its correlatives, namely the conjoiner, conjoined and conjoining, and that it has the connection of extremes in a continuum. Angle F in the second figure signifies this. With *the third species*, we ask what the medium is in other things. We answer that it is the conjunction of form and

matter in substance, and it is the act of igniting in fire, heating in heat, vegetating in plants, sensing in the senses, imagining in the imaginative, reasoning in the rational power, moving in movement, generating in generation and so forth. With *the fourth species*, we ask what it has in other things. We answer that it has a habit with which it is habituated to cause secondary acts that do not belong to its own genus. Rule C. signifies and manifests all this.

137. With *the first species of rule D* we ask about the origin of the middle. We answer that it exists as a general principle on its own. With *the second species*, we ask what things it is made of. We answer that it is made of the essence of the form and matter in which it exists, and of movement and things like this. With *the third species*, we ask what the middle belongs to. We say that it belongs to the whole subject in which it exists. This is self-evident and manifested by rule B.

138. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why the middle exists formally. We say that it is by reason of its constituting correlatives, as manifested by the second species of rule C. With *the second species*, we ask for what end the middle exists. We say it exists to enable subjects to be full and continuous, and to enable the predicates to have secondary acts so that for instance, substance can substantiate, quantity can quantify, the agent can act, the mover can move, and so with other things in their way -- the delineator can delineate, etc. -- for the powers cannot find repose without these acts. This is self-evident and clarified by rule B..

139. With *the first species of rule F* we ask what quantity the middle has. We say that it has the quantity of its continuation in the subject in which it exists, as in the act of joining in conjunction, of generating in generation, of racing in a race, of composing in composition. And man is a third intermediate party constituted of the body and the soul, and so with other things like these. With *the second species*, we ask about the quantity of the middle. We answer that it has the quantity of the parts of the entire medium, like igniting, aerificating, aqueificating and terreificating which constitute one common medium in elementing, and likewise with other things in their own way. This is clear enough.

140. With *the first species of rule G* we ask about the quantity of the middle. We answer that it has the quality of the proper passion of the subject in which it exists, like igniting in fire, racing in a race, and things like these. With *the second species*, we ask about the qualities of the middle. We say that a nail joining two boards is an appropriated means, and so is the act of heating with hot water, and things like these. This is self-evident.

141. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when the medium exists. We answer that it exists when its subjects exist, such as joining, measuring, continuing, moderating and working artificially. Moreover, rule B shows this to the diligent reader of this art.

142. With *all the species of rule I*, we ask where the medium is. The answer is that it exists in all subjects in which it is present, as for instance in man who is in the soul and in the body, and in the act of igniting in fire, in the act of moving in movement, of moderating in modes, of instrumenting in instruments and so forth. This is manifest to anyone who has a good grasp of this art.

143. With *the rule of modality*, we ask how the middle exists. We answer that it exists in the way in which form is active and matter is passive, and in the way in which fire heats, plants vegetate, the senses perceive and the imagination imagines objects, and the rational power pursues reasoning. All these modal media are parts with which agents have modes modally, medially and morally. This is self-evident.

144. With *all the species of instrumentality*, we ask what the middle exists with. We answer that it exists with its correlatives between the extremes it joins, like generating between the generator and the generated, bonifying between the bonifier and the bonifiable, racing between the racer and the raced, and so forth. This is self-evident and clear by rule B.

Chapter 15 - The End Combined With the Sequence of Rules

145. With *rule B*, we ask if there is an ultimate end. We answer that there is, or else the middle would be determined by the beginning but not by the end. Consequently, movement would continue into an infinite future where the beginning would never reach an end of repose, which is impossible and contrary to the first species of rule D and the second of E.

146. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what the end is. We answer that it is the principle without which there is no repose. With *the second species*, we ask what it has in itself essentially. We answer that it has its correlatives, namely the reposer, reposable and reposing in which all the other principles repose. With *the third species*, we ask what it is in other things. We answer that it is good in goodness, great in greatness, it is different from all the other principles in difference and it is concordant in concordance with all the other principles except contrariety. With *the fourth species* we ask what it has in other things. We answer that in goodness, the end has a good habit of disposing all the other principles; and in difference, it has an act that is different from the acts of all the other principles. This is self evident, and shown by rule B.

147. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what the end originates from. We answer that it exists on its own, because otherwise, principles would have nothing in which to repose, and their nature would be emptied of movement and appetite, which is impossible. With *the second species*, we ask what the end consists of. We say that it consists of its correlatives, as said in the second species of rule C. With *the third species*, we ask what the end belongs to. We answer that the created end belongs to the uncreated end as well as to the subject in which it exists and which is habituated with it like a man wearing clothes. Here, the intellect recognizes that proof by the cause is more potent than proof by the effect.

148. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why the end exists. We answer that it is by reason of its constituting correlatives, and this is a proof by the cause. However, according to the effect, we say that the end exists because its subject is habituated with it, like a man wearing a coat as a habit. With *the second species*, we ask for what purpose the end exists. We answer that it exists so that all the other principles can finally repose in it.

149. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the quantity of the end. We answer that it has quantity inasmuch as its subject is habituated with it. With *the second species*, we ask about the quantity of the end. We answer that it has the quantity of its correlatives habituated with quantity. However, this applies to the created end and not to the uncreated end, whose correlatives cannot be quantified because they are infinite. Then there is the end of privation, which is the source of all privative habits like deafness, malice and so forth. There is also the end of termination, whereby the ultimate end differs from all the other principles such as created goodness, greatness etc. each in its own way. Otherwise, all the principles would be one identical number and the world would be void of the end of termination, and consequently it would also be void of natural movement and appetite, which is impossible.

150. With *the first species of rule G* we ask about the quality of the end. We answer that it has the quality that the proper quality of its subject can have, like the will that has the quality it can have through lovability which is the proper passion of will, or like power through possibility, and so forth. Now with *the second species* we ask about the appropriated qualities of the end. We say that it has the qualities it can have through appropriated passion. For instance, will has an appropriated quality in detestability, and the intellect has an appropriated quality in ignorance, and likewise, power has an appropriated quality in impossibility since impossibility does not naturally arise from power, and so with other things in their way, such as deafness, injustice, injury and things like these in man. Rule B manifests this.

151. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when the end exists. We answer that it exists when it is present in all the species of its rules, in which it cannot exist without time just as

time cannot exist without an end. Rule B signifies this to the subtle understanding of the intellect.

152. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where the end is. We say that it exists in the entirety of its species as well as in its primordially and in its correlatives. The end is a perverted habit in privation and injury, and a righteous habit in achievement and justice. Subtle investigation makes this clear.

153. With *all the species of modality*, we ask how the end exists. We answer that it exists in the way in which difference posits that its correlatives are distinct from those of all the other principles. In addition, it exists in the way in which concordance accords the end with all the other principles except contrariety. It exists in the way in which the medium mediates between the end and all the other principles. Moreover, the end exists in the way in which appetite seeks ultimate repose, and likewise with the other principles in their own way.

154. With *all the species of instrumentality*, we ask what means the end exists with. We answer that it exists with its correlatives and with all the species of its rules without which it cannot exist. The good end exists by means of goodness, like a good man clothed in a good coat, and it is desired by appetite, and so forth.

Chapter 16 - Majority Combined With the Sequence of Rules

155. We ask if majority is a primordial principle in its own genus. We answer that it is, by *rule B* and the first species of rule D; otherwise, it would exist by accident, so that substance, which is prior to and greater than accident, would not exist on its own, but by accident, which is impossible.

156. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what majority is. We answer that it is a being that exists per se and without which no major act is possible. With *the second species* of rule C we ask what majority has in itself, essentially and naturally. We say that it has its constituting correlatives. With *the third species*, we ask what majority is in other things. We say that it is a habit under which subalternate majorities are disposed, like the substantial and accidental majority of goodness. In addition, it is a being distinct from all the other principles in the subject in which it exists. Without this distinction, all the principles would be one and identical, without any equality, minority or relation, which is impossible because the world cannot be void of these things. With *the fourth species*, we ask what majority has in other things. We answer that it has its own major act that gives rise to generating, moving, growing and things like these.

157. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what majority arises from. We answer that it exists on its own, because if it did not, then it would consist of either equality or minority, as it belongs to the genus of relation. With *the second species*, we ask what things it is made of. We answer that it is made of its correlatives, namely the major active part, the major passive part and the major act in which the essence of majority is rooted and sustained. With *the third species*, we ask to what it belongs. We answer that it belongs to the subject in which it exists because the subject is clothed with its habit. All these things are clear and manifest.

158. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why majority exists. We say that it exists because its essence naturally and essentially contains its concretes. With *the second species*, we ask for what purpose majority exists. We answer that it is so the other principles can be subalternate to its genus and find repose in it.

159. With *the first species of rule F* we ask what quantity majority has. We answer that it has the quantity of its continuous presence in the subject in which it exists. With *the second species*, we ask what quantity majority has. We say that it has the quantity of the subalternate majorities that stand beneath it. Rule B signifies this.

160. With *the first species of rule G* we ask what quality majority has. We say that it has the quality it can obtain from the proper passion of the subject in which it exists and without which the subject cannot exist. With *the second species* of the same rule, we ask what qualities majority has. We say it has the qualities it can have through the appropriated passions present in the subject in which it exists, for instance, some men are greater in size, or have more intensely white colour, or are more just in justice than others.

161. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when majority exists. We answer that it exists when it is present in all the species of its rules in which it is sustained and clothed. This is clear to the diligent reader.

162. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where majority exists. We say that it exists in major subjects, habits, places and so forth. All the species of rule I clarify this.

163. With *the rule of modality*, we ask how majority exists. We answer that it exists in the way in which difference differentiates its major correlatives. It also exists in the way in which concordance brings its correlatives into major agreement. In addition, it exists in the way in which it has major appropriation by rule G, and so forth. And all these majorities exist under their general majority, just as particular instances of white stand under universal whiteness.

164. With *all the species of instrumentality*, we ask what majority exists with. We say that it exists with its correlatives and with major habits with which subalternate majorities are habituated, such as major acts that reflect the likenesses of majority.

Chapter 17 - Equality Combined With the Sequence of Rules

165. We ask whether some equality is a supremely general principle. The answer is yes, as we can see in the subalternate and individuated equalities of plants that belong to the same species, and this is also manifest in the equal individuation of fruits. Rule B shows this as well.

166. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what equality is. We say that it is the being whose proper function is to equalize. With *the second species* we ask what it has in itself essentially. We say that it has its own innate constituting correlatives, namely the equalizer, equalized and equalizing. With *the third species*, we ask what it is in other things. We say that it is both active and passive because it is equally constituted of form and matter. In addition, with *the fourth species* we ask what equality has in other things. We say that it has its habits with which individuals are equally clothed, like apples on an apple tree that equally belong to the same species, and likewise with elemented things, as well as beings endowed with sense, imagination and reason, and with mechanical arts, liberal arts and moral science.

167. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what equality arises from. We answer that it exists on its own, otherwise the subalternate equalities would not have their own genus without which they cannot exist. With *the second species*, we ask what things equality is made of. We answer that it is made of its substantial correlatives without which it has no way of being what it is and without which no peregrine equalities can exist. With *the third species* of the same rule, we ask what equality belongs to. We say that the equality of acts belongs to the equality of powers, for instance, the equality of understanding, remembering and willing belongs to the equality of intellect, memory and will, and the same applies to the senses. This is self-evident.

168. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why there is equality. We answer that it exists because it is made of its equal, substantial, true and necessary correlatives that enable the production of proof by the cause and of proof by the effect. With *the second species*, we ask for what purpose equality exists. We answer that it exists in the soul so that God can be equally remembered, understood and loved by it; and in the senses so that objects can be equally sensed, and so forth.

169. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the quantity of equality. We say that continuous equality has the quantity in which it is sustained in its subjects. With *the second species*, we ask about the quantity of equality. We answer that it has the quantity in which it exists in its correlatives and in their corresponding peregrine numbers. This is self-evident.

170. With *the first species of rule G* we ask about the proper quality of equality. We say that it has the quality it obtains from the proper passion of the subject in which it exists, for instance, the equality of substance, form and matter; and the innate equalities of sentient beings, etc. With *the second species*, we ask about the appropriated qualities of equality. We say that it has the qualities it obtains through the appropriated passions of its peregrine subjects in which it exists; for example, two logicians who are equally versed in logic, two judges who are equal in justice, two men wearing coats are equally clothed, and so forth.

171. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when equality exists. We say that it exists when it is truly sustained in its concretes by all the species of H, just as traveling stands equally between the traveler and the travelable; and the present stands equally between the past and the future, and so with other things in their way.

172. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where equality is. We answer that it exists in itself because it consists of its correlatives, and it exists in the subject in which it equally combines action with passion. It exists in goodness, greatness etc. in which it exists equally to make the principles equal; it exists in difference which makes its correlatives equally distinct; it exists in concordance which makes its correlatives equally concordant; and it exists in modality so that its correlatives can exist modally; and it exists in instrumentality so that they can exist instrumentally. All this is clear by rule B.

173. With *the rule of modality*, we ask how equality exists. We say that it exists in the way it is present in its correlatives; and in the way that justice, weight, measure and proportion are present, both naturally and artificially, in the subject in which it exists. This is self-evident enough.

174. With *all the species of instrumentality*, we ask what equality exists with. We say that it exists with its correlatives, and by means of difference whereby the agent tells things apart; and it exists with concordance with which the agent equally concords things; and it exists with its own property with which it causes habits proper to itself, and so forth, as we see in elemented and vegetal beings etc. Rule B signifies this.

Chapter 18 - Minority Combined With the Sequence of Rules

175. We ask if there is one kind of minority that is substantial and another kind of minority that is accidental. We answer that there is, otherwise the substantial relation that exists between majority and minority would be destroyed, and all principles would be equal, and there would be no real relation of majority to minority between substance and accident, which is impossible. Rule B proves this.

176. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what minority is. We say that it is the being whose proper function is to decrease and to move away from majority. With *the second species*, we ask what minority naturally has in itself. We answer that it has its innate correlatives in which it exists and with which other principles are diminished as minority divides and annihilates the subjects in which it exists. With *the third species*, we ask what minority is in other things. We say that it is a consumptive entity that seeks the proximity of nothingness. With *the fourth species*, we ask what it has in other things. We answer that it has minor essence, minor being, minor nature, quantity, quality etc. This is self-evident.

177. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what minority arises from. We say that it exists on its own so as to be a general principle without which subalternate minorities cannot belong to the genus of minority. With *the second species*, we ask what substantial minority consists

of. We say that it is made of its correlatives without which it cannot naturally exist. Accidental minority exists on its own as a habit that clothes substantial minorities, and minorities in the powers belong to the genus of accidental minority. With *the third species*, we ask what minority belongs to. We answer that it belongs to the agent that causes minorities by means of the principle of minority. Rule B shows that these things are self-evident.

178. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why minority exists. We answer that it exists by reason of its correlatives due to which it is a principle in its own genus. With *the second species*, we ask why minority exists. We answer that it exists so that minor beings can belong to its genus, without which there would be no movement, division, generation, corruption and privation. This is clear and self evident enough.

179. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the quantity of minority. We answer that it has the quantity in which it stands outside the genus of majority and equality. With *the second species*, we ask about the quantity of minority. We say that it has the quantity of its correlatives, of its subalternate minorities and of the individuals that belong to its genus.

180. With *the first species of rule G* we ask about the quality of minority. We answer that it has the quality that it obtains from the proper passion of the subject in which it present, as one substance is lesser than another one due to its proper passion without which it cannot exist. With *the second species*, we ask about the qualities of minority. We say that it has the qualities of the minor predicates appropriated to it, such as minor quantity, quality etc.

181. With *all the species of rule H* we ask when minority exists. We say that it exists when it is really sustained by all the species of rule H in the concretes of its own genus, and it exists in practice when things are diminished. All this is clear to the diligent reader.

182. With *all the species of rule I* we ask where minority is. We answer that it exists within itself in its innate constituent correlatives. It exists in subjects composed of minor substance with minor accidents, like a man clothed in a smaller coat, or water that is not very hot, or a horse in a minor race, and so forth, or a man with minor methods, or a craftsman with a lesser craft.

183. With *the rule of modality*, we ask how minority exists. We answer that it exists by means of the mode it has through its correlatives to be lesser in existence and action than any other principle, like some man who morally has a mode for existing in lesser virtue and doing little good; and like a horse that sometimes does not run very fast. This is clear and self-evident.

184. With *the rule of instrumentality*, we ask what minority exists with. We answer that it is with all the things that belong to its genus and come together in a subject in which it exists with minor essences and with minor acts of the powers, such as lesser running, heating and so forth.

185. We have dealt with the principles combined with the sequence of the rules. Now the things said about them here provide a doctrine with which you can sequentially combine other implicit or peregrine principles. This doctrine makes the intellect very general for finding many media and for investigating true conclusions.

Part 9 - The Nine Subjects

1. Everything that exists is implicitly contained in nine subjects outside of which nothing else exists, and we want to include the nine subjects in this art as a means to make the art general, because they are general to all things. We can get to know the nine subjects by combining them with the sequence of principles and rules. And if any doubt arises about anything regarding these subjects, you can apply the question to its appropriate subject. We will explain this further on, as we give examples in the treatise on application. First, let us deal with the first subject, or God signified by B.

Section 1 - the First Subject

2. This subject divides in two main parts. The first part discusses God in combination with the sequence of principles. The second part discusses God in combination with the sequence of rules.

The first part divides into five parts.

The first deals with investigating the divine dignities or reasons.

The second deals with their intrinsic and consubstantial acts.

The third deals with the infinity of the dignities.

The fourth deals with the infinity of their acts.

The fifth part deals with God discussed in combination with the principles.

The second main part divides into ten rules, as shown.

Now let us begin with the first part.

Chapter 1 - Investigating the Divine Dignities

3. First, we suppose that God exists, and we will prove this in the second main part of this section, chapter 6 article 1.

- God exists, and his existence is good; but his existence cannot be good without goodness just as coloured things cannot be coloured without colour: therefore, his goodness must exist for his existence to be good.
- God exists, and his existence is great, for if it was not great, He would not be qualified to be God; hence, it follows that divine greatness is a real being.
- God exists, and his existence is eternal; otherwise, if He had a beginning, He would not be qualified to be God; therefore eternity exists, without which there can be no eternal being.
- God exists, and as He exists, He has the power to exist; therefore power exists, without which God cannot exist.
- God exists, and He knows himself; otherwise, his being would not be qualified to be God; therefore divine wisdom exists, without which God cannot know himself.
- God exists, and He loves himself; otherwise, He would not be worthy of being God; therefore, divine love exists, without which God cannot love himself.
- God exists, and his existence is virtuous; otherwise, God would be vicious and his being would not be qualified to be God; therefore divine virtue exists, without which God cannot be virtuous.
- God exists, and so his existence is true; otherwise, if it was false, He would not be qualified to be God; therefore divine truth exists, without which God cannot be true.

- God exists, and his existence is glorious, because if it was not glorious, He would not be qualified to be God; therefore divine glory exists, without which God cannot be glorious.

4. We have proved that the divine dignities really exist, because God cannot be God without them; and thus we can enumerate them, as each exists in its own numerical identity. This is because God would not exist if each dignity did not have its own numerical existence. Consequently, for God to exist, there must be several real reasons or dignities in him. However, they are not different in essence as they are all the same divine essence so that each dignity is essentially each of the other dignities, otherwise goodness would be great by accident and vice versa, and we can say the same about the other reasons. Here, the human intellect recognizes that God, inasmuch as He considers his essence as One, does not consider a plurality of reasons; but inasmuch as He considers that He cannot exist without a plurality reasons, He really enumerates them. Just as man, when considering himself as one, does not consider himself as several beings; but inasmuch as he considers that he cannot exist without several reasons, he really enumerates them and recognizes that he is comprised of many things.

5. We inquired into the divine dignities and found that in God they are co-essential and substantial from eternity and in eternity. The final purpose of their existence is within themselves and not outside, for otherwise they and God would exist by accident, which is impossible. Now this argues against certain Saracens who believe that they have an elevated and subtle knowledge of God when they say that God is One and as such has no dignities in himself, but only has them for acting in creatures. In other words, He is good in order to create good creatures and great in order to create great creatures, eternal so that creatures can be durable etc. Their statements involve an obvious contradiction, because if things were as they say, then if God was infinite due to his dignities, He would create infinite and eternal creatures, which He does not do, for as they themselves say, the world is new and limited in size. They imply a further contradiction when they call God the prime cause, because He would not be the prime cause if his reasons were only meant for the world, and thus God would exist with his dignities for the sole purpose of enabling the world to exist, which is a totally absurd thing to say.

Chapter 2 - The Intrinsic Acts of the Divine Reasons

6. We hear that a power is useless if it does not come into actuality. In addition, we know powers by their acts, and we know acts by their objects. This means that the divine dignities have acts, for without acts they would be infinitely and eternally useless, and God would neither know his dignities, nor would God objectify himself; thus it would follow that God would not exist by reason of his dignities. This is false, as was proved in the previous chapter.

7. Further, if divine goodness and the rest of the dignities had no acts, they would be idle, empty and void of any kind of final purpose, which is impossible and contrary to rule E and to the second species of rule C. Therefore, the divine dignities have their own intrinsic, co-essential and natural acts.

8. Further, if the dignities did not have co-essential acts, each one would be a privative act. Just as blindness is a privative act because it does not have the act of seeing, likewise, divine goodness would be a privative act if it did not have its own intrinsic, co-essential act of bonifying. The same would apply to greatness if there was no magnifying act, to eternity if there was no eternalizing, to power if there was no powering, to wisdom if there was no knowing, to will if there was no willing, to virtue if there was no virtuifying, to truth if there was no verifying, and to glory if there was no glorifying. In addition, God would not qualify

as God if He had privative co-essential habits, which is impossible: therefore, the divine dignities have their own real, intrinsic and co-essential acts.

9. In addition, we argue as follows: all perfect goodness has an act; but divine goodness is perfect, therefore it has an act. Further, no goodness is perfect without an act; but divine goodness is perfect, therefore, it is not perfect without an act. We can say the same about divine greatness and eternity and we conclude through affirmation and negation that the divine dignities have their own intrinsic and co-essential acts.

Chapter 3 - The Infinity of the Divine Reasons

10. Divine goodness is a reason for good to produce good. We already proved in chapter 2 that it has its act of bonifying. Hence, just as greatness is the being by reason of which goodness is great, so is goodness the reason for good to greatly produce great good. And as eternity is the reason for goodness and greatness to last eternally, so is goodness the reason for good to produce great and eternal good; but goodness cannot be such a reason unless it is infinitely immense: therefore, infinite goodness must necessarily exist.

11. Divine greatness exists (as proved in the first chapter) and it has its act of magnifying. Now eternity is the being by reason of which greatness endures; and power is that by reason of which greatness can exist and act; consequently, there must be an infinitely immense subject whose act of magnifying can diffuse from eternity through eternity, and we call this subject 'infinite magnitude'.

12. Eternity is a measurement that exists once and all at once, it has nothing before it and nothing after it and its subject is eternal from eternity and in eternity. Thus, eternity is an infinite reason; and this good and great entity can exist due to power.

13. Power exists (as we proved in chapter 1) with its act of powering, and power can exist and act infinitely; so it necessarily follows that infinite power exists; for without power, eternity cannot have an infinite act or an infinite essence.

14. Divine wisdom or intellect exists, as we proved above in chapter 1. Eternity is that by reason of which wisdom lasts while wisdom can exist and act through power and power can be immensely diffused through greatness. And the infinity of intellect is good by reason of goodness, and lovable by reason of the will. For these reasons, the existence of the divine intellect's infinity is so necessary that it cannot be otherwise.

15. Divine will exists as does its act, as we proved above in chapters 1 and 2; and if it is infinite from eternity and in eternity, it is infinitely intelligible. However, it would not be infinitely intelligible if it was finite, so that the divine intellect would be neither lovable nor loved from eternity and in eternity. Moreover, this would violate the definitions of goodness, greatness etc., which is impossible; therefore we have proved that divine will is infinite.

16. Divine virtue exists as does its act, as we proved above in chapters 1 and 2. If it is infinite, well and good; but if it is not infinite, then it is vitiated on account of some vice that impedes it from being infinite, and consequently all the other reasons are vitiated, as they allow virtue to be finite while they themselves are infinite. In addition, because a finite being cannot extend itself as much as an infinite one, it is patently clear that the remaining divine dignities would be partly vitiated and partly not, which is utterly impossible; therefore, divine virtue is infinite.

17. Divine truth exists as does its act, as we proved above in chapters 1 and 2; if it is true that goodness, greatness etc. are really infinite reasons, then truth must necessarily be infinite; otherwise, the infinity of the remaining reasons could not be true because they would not have what it takes to be true.

18. Divine glory exists and so does its act, as we proved above in chapters 1 and 2. However, the essence of this glory is either finite or infinite, or partly finite and partly infinite.

If it is absolutely infinite then all is well and there is no inconvenience for itself or for the other dignities. However, if it was partly finite and partly infinite, this would entail the utmost inconvenience, for none of the other dignities would have an infinite subject of glory and repose, and the finiteness of glory would be a privative habit that would punish the other dignities, which is utterly impossible. Therefore, it necessarily follows that divine glory is infinite.

Chapter 4 - The Infinity of the Acts of the Divine Reasons

19. Divine goodness is a reason for good to produce good while goodness is great by reason of greatness, eternal by reason of eternity, able to exist and to act through power, it is understood by the intellect, loved by the will, virtuous by reason of virtue, true by reason of truth and glorious by reason of glory. It necessarily follows that the bonifying act of goodness must be infinite just as goodness is infinite and just as all the other divine reasons or dignities are infinite.

20. God's greatness is infinite and it has an act, as said above in chapters 1 and 2. Therefore, its act of magnifying is either infinite or finite. If it is infinite, all is well, but if not, then it is like a tree in which the elementative is more extended than the vegetative because there are sometimes dry branches at the extremities of a tree where the vegetative power is absent and only the elementative power is present. The same would happen to infinite greatness if its act was not infinite but finite, which would posit evil against goodness and smallness against greatness. Consequently, magnifying and eternalizing could not convert, all the acts of the other divine dignities would be absent from the act of greatness and the act of greatness would be absent from them, which would make them small. If this was so, then the infinity of essence would repose in the finiteness of its act far removed from an infinite act and contrary to its nature. Thus, infinite essence would repose better in a small act than in a great one. However, this is dissonant with reason and contrary to the infinity of the act of bonifying, whose existence we proved in the previous number. We therefore conclude that divine magnifying is infinite.

21. Eternalizing exists, as proved above in chapter 2, and so do infinity and eternity. Now the act of eternity, namely eternalizing, is either finite or infinite. If it is infinite, all is well and there is no inconvenience. But if it was finite, then there would be great inconvenience because eternalizing would be limited by time and consequently eternity would be subject to time from eternity and in eternity, which is utterly impossible and contrary to the infinity of the divine dignities that we discussed in the previous chapter. We therefore conclude that eternalizing is an infinite act.

22. Powering is the act of power, as proved in chapter 2; but powering is either infinite or finite: if it is infinite, all is well because just as finite powering convenes with finite power, so likewise and much better does infinite powering convene with infinite power whose existence was proved above in chapter 1. However, if it was finite, there would be some inconvenience because created powering would be competent to exercise infinite power. Thus, divine power and created power would degenerate and deviate from their nature. Further, bonifying, magnifying and eternalizing could not be infinite acts because no reason can give what it does not have; and this would entail a contradiction where the acts of bonifying, magnifying and eternalizing that are infinite as proved in numbers 1, 2 and 3, could not be infinite. Now this is an untenable contradiction and we therefore conclude that divine powering is an infinite act.

23. Divine understanding is either infinite or finite. If it is infinite, all is well, but if it is finite, there is great inconvenience. Divine understanding would not encompass the infinite essence of intellect. It would be partly subject to ignorance, a privative habit of ignoring the infinity of the acts of the divine reasons, which would set up evil against goodness and

smallness against greatness. We therefore conclude that divine understanding is an infinite act.

24. Divine loving, or willing, is either infinite or finite. If it is infinite, all is well. But if it was finite, then the infinity of the divine reasons and of their acts would not be infinitely lovable nor would it be loved, so that the intellect's infinity and that of its act would not be infinitely lovable, and same can be said about the infinity of goodness, etc. which is impossible. We therefore conclude that divine loving is infinite.

25. The act of divine virtue is either infinite or finite in the essence and numerical identity of virtue. If it is infinite, all is well. But if it was finite, then it would be infinite in the essence and numerical identity of the other dignities (because they are infinitely virtuous) and not in its own identity, which is utterly impossible.

26. The act of divine truth is either infinite or finite in the essence and numerical identity of truth. If it is infinite, all is well. But if it was finite, it would have to be infinite in the essence and numerical identity of the other dignities because they are infinite, and not in its own identity. This is utterly impossible.

27. The act of divine glory is either infinite or finite in the essence and numerical identity of glory. If it is infinite, all is well. However, if it was finite, then it would be infinite in the essence and numerical identity of the other dignities because they are infinite, but not in its own identity. This would be utterly absurd and impossible, as no act can be greater in anything other than itself.

Chapter 5 - God in Combination with the Principles

28. In this chapter we will discuss God in combination with the principles in two modes. The first mode is intrinsic and deals with his essence; the second mode is extrinsic and deals with his enjoyable relations with creatures. We will discuss God in these two ways in each article. Thus, with God's help, the human intellect can have knowledge of God's essence, its intrinsic operations and how it relates to creatures.

Article 1 - God in Combination with Goodness

29. God is good and He is his own goodness; hence, it follows that goodness is a reason for him to necessarily produce good. This is because goodness and God convert in natural unity, as the definition of goodness shows. Just as the vegetative power with its conditions for vegetating is a reason for it to necessarily produce vegetated being in a plant, so likewise God in his intrinsic goodness has his conditions for producing bonified being; therefore God produces intrinsic bonified being, and He does this with his infinite bonifying throughout the entirety of his infinite goodness.

30. God knows that He is good in producing bonified being and He considers that it is good to produce created good that can understand, love, remember and praise his intrinsic bonification, so that God can bonify these powers when they objectify him well. For this purpose, He created the powers of intellect, will and memory in angels and in rational souls along with all their respective conditions so that they can perfectly enjoy God and acquire good merit. Here, the human intellect recognizes the prime intention that God had in creating good creatures.

Article 2 - God in Combination with Greatness

31. God is great, and He is his own infinite greatness whereby He has infinite magnified being without which He cannot have his infinite greatness or his infinite act. And since

greatness is that by reason of which goodness and eternity are great, these dignities with their acts concur in producing infinite magnified being that is bonified, eternalized etc. so that each dignity has its infinite act in infinitely magnified being.

32. God knows that He is great and infinite in existence and action. He knows that He is well ordered and disposed to create great created being so much so that He would produce infinite created being if created being had the capacity to receive infinite greatness, just as fire, given a sufficient quantity of firewood, would magnify and expand its flames all the way up to the lunar sphere. Thus, God created great creatures like heaven, angels, rational souls and other creatures similarly clothed in the habit of greatness. Here, the human intellect recognizes one great created being who is greater than all creatures; I do not propose to explain or demonstrate this here because this is a general art, as we already said.

Article 3 - God in Combination with Eternity

33. God is eternal and He is his own eternity. Thus, God necessitates his own production of the eternalized being without which eternity cannot be infinite with an infinite act. All the dignities with their acts concur in this act so that eternalized being is infinitely bonified, magnified etc. and the dignities actually exist and have their acts in eternal infinity. This sublime production arouses great wonderment in the human intellect.

34. As God thus considers his eternalizing, He understands with regard to himself that He is disposed and ready to produce the world from eternity and in eternity, but that He cannot create the world from eternity, because the world does not have that which exists even before the world began to exist. Indeed, the world is finite just as heaven is finite, for it does not exist from eternity and it is not immensely infinite because its body is clothed in the habits of quantity, surface, shape and movement. Nevertheless, heaven can exist in the eternal aevum so that angels and humans can know, love, remember and praise God's supreme production.

Article 4 - God in Combination with Power

35. God is powerful, and He is his own power. Thus, God necessarily produces an infinite empowered being so that his power can be infinite with an infinite act. Just as divine goodness, greatness etc. can exist and act infinitely through power, so do all the other dignities with their acts concur in producing an empowered being that is bonified, magnified etc.

36. God knows that He is powerful in existence and action; He knows that He is disposed and ordered for producing created power that is neither infinite nor eternal. Now God knows that his intrinsic power is both absolute and ordered, but that his extrinsic power is only ordered. For God does not produce creatures from his own nature, but He produces them as an effect, like a real man who paints a mural of a man who does not belong to his own nature. Thus, the human intellect knows what God intended when He made created powers; namely, that creatures could use these powers to understand, love, remember and praise God. Therefore, the human intellect knows that an infinite, intrinsically empowered being is the cause of all finite and extrinsically empowered beings.

Article 5 - God in Combination with Wisdom

37. God is wise, He is his own intellect and his own wisdom. And by reason of this wisdom the wise One understands that He must necessarily produce a being that is understood in the infinity of his wisdom by infinite understanding throughout the entire infinite essence of his intellect; just as fire with its natural appetite must necessarily produce ignited being by

igniting it throughout its entire essence. Thus, all the divine reasons concur in producing an infinitely understood being by an act of production in which every dignity naturally has its infinite act.

38. As God thus knows himself, He knows that it is worthy and just that there be created intellect to know and honour his infinite intellect, and so He created intellect in angels and men. But the human intellect wonders, given that God created it for understanding the supreme intellect, why created intellect ignores it. Then, it realizes that sin is the cause that makes evil angels and sinners deviate from the purpose for which they exist.

Article 6 - God in Combination with Will

39. God is willing, and He is his own will. Therefore, He knows that with his infinite willing, He must necessarily produce an infinite desired or beloved being throughout the entire infinite essence of his will, and consequently He produces exactly what He knows and wants. And as all the other dignities are lovable, they concur with their acts in producing an infinite beloved so that every dignity can have an infinite act in the beloved that is bonified, magnified etc.

40. As God thus knows and loves himself, He makes created will by which the beloved can be understood, loved, remembered and praised above everything else; so that the infinite beloved can love created will, reward it and give it glory in eternity. Here, the intellect knows the origin of God's justice, for God knows that He is disposed to create, and He knows that He is disposed to justify and to reward. Moreover, the intellect knows the origin of divine mercy, with which God knows that He is disposed to forgive, inasmuch as the sinner has remorse for his sin and promises to do what he can in reparation.

Article 7 - God in Combination with Virtue

41. God is virtuous, and He is his own virtue along with its co-essential, natural acts. Just as God loves the fact that He must necessarily produce an infinite beloved, so does He also know and love the fact that He must necessarily produce an infinitely virtuous being. All the dignities with their acts concur in this, as all are virtuous with infinite virtue, and cannot possibly be otherwise than the way they are.

42. As God thus loves and knows himself intrinsically, He inclines himself toward loving and knowing that He is ordered and disposed to create natural virtues that are signs and figures of infinite, eternal etc. virtue; and through these created virtues, the infinite, eternal etc. virtue can be known, loved, remembered and praised. Further, He creates the moral virtues (that we will deal with later on, in the ninth subject) because they are paths to paradise where God can reward man with virtuous glory.

43. While the intellect considers these things, it wonders why people in this life are not more morally virtuous than vicious, given that the virtues originate in supreme virtue, which is not the case for the vices? Then it recognizes that this is because men have the free will to do either good or evil, and they are more inclined to heed their sensitive powers and love them more than they love their power of reasoning.

44. The intellect then asks why God permits this to happen, given that He is virtuous, spiritual and not sensual. Then the intellect recognizes that this has to be so in order to provide God's justice with subjects in which it can act. Now we must know that the free will is inclined toward two divergent directions: on the one hand, it does good with its created good part while on the other hand, it does evil and commits sins with the non-created evil part. The non-created part accidentally arises from non-created nothingness because man was made from nothing and consequently he is inclined to return to nothingness, which is contrary

to being. Here we see that the free will partly convenes with being and partly with non-being or nothingness (which is the same), and that both inclinations are equal.

45. The intellect asks why God created man although God knew that man would sin. Now it realizes that God endowed man with free will, whereby man can refrain from sin and hate sin if he wants to. Indeed, if God did not create man, He would violate his own justice by not providing it with a subject in which to act.

Article 8 - God in Combination with Truth

46. God is true, and He is his own truth; and thus He truly loves and knows the fact that He must necessarily produce an infinite verified being through his entire essence. He produces this being through his essence so that his infinite verifying can sufficiently enjoy itself from eternity and in eternity, and so that the other dignities can enjoy infinite and eternal acts through this verified being.

47. As God thus loves and knows that he must necessarily produce an infinite true being, so does He also love and know that He can truly create natural created truth along with moral created truth so that the infinite verified being can be understood, loved, remembered and praised by it. Now the intellect wonders and asks where mendacity comes from. Then it realizes that it arises from the nothingness from which man was created, like a falling stone drawn toward the earth's center by its weight.

Article 9 - God in Combination with Glory

48. God is glorious, He is his own glory and thus He knows and loves to know that He must necessarily produce an infinite glorified being produced from infinite glory. Now it cannot be produced from any other essence, for all the other essences are finite and new. Nor can it be produced from nothingness, because that would make it finite and new, which is impossible. In addition, all the other dignities with their acts concur in this infinite glorified being, so that they can have their glorious acts in it.

49. While God knows and loves to know that He must necessarily produce an intrinsic infinite glorified being, He also knows and loves to know that it is glorious to create extrinsic glorified being placed in aeviternity so that the supreme and infinite glorified being is understood, loved, remembered and praised by it while the infinite glorified being bestows glory upon it. Here, the intellect wonders and asks why God did not dispose all men to understand and remember him and receive glory from him? Now it remembers the chapter on justice that deals with free will: if men were unable to sin, then they would not be able to love very much. Great is the love of one who can refrain from loving and who can choose to love or not to love. Moreover, if there was no punishment, glory would not be as well known because an opposite is known through its counterpart.

Article 10 - God in Combination with Difference

50. The human intellect remembers the ladder, or scale of difference in the second figure, and finds that the difference that exists in God is neither between sensual and sensual nor between sensual and intellectual because it is not corporeal. Indeed, it is difference between intellectual and intellectual beings that exist in one and the same essence. Here, we realize the meaning of what we said about the principles of the first figure in the previous chapters, for without difference or distinctness, the divine dignities or reasons cannot have infinite acts. We clearly see this in goodness: the bonifying act of goodness cannot possibly exist without difference between the bonifier and the bonified; just as acting cannot exist without difference

between the actor and the acted, so likewise bonifying cannot exist without the said correlatives.

51. Here, the intellect asks if the said difference posits many essences in God. Upon consideration, it recognizes that this is not so, because there is no more than one goodness in God. This is because the bonifier, who is goodness in its entirety, produces in itself the entire infinite and eternal bonified being, so that bonifying and eternalizing are produced from the entirety of both. Here, the intellect realizes the clear difference without confusion that exists in infinite goodness. It posits that the bonifier is one number, distinct from the bonified and bonifying. The bonified is another being distinct from the bonifier and bonifying, and likewise, bonifying is another being distinct from the two others. Each one exists in its own numerical identity while all three nonetheless exist as one identical essence; otherwise, the difference among them would be confused, which would make eternity deficient and thus, none of the three said correlatives would keep its own number, which is impossible. In addition, divine intellect would be deficient, for it would not know the different roles of the bonifier, bonified and bonifying; any deficiency in these two dignities would incur deficiencies in all the other dignities and their acts and would transform them into privative habits, which is impossible. However, we must rightly understand that this difference is not above the said dignities, nor is it above the said correlatives, namely the bonifier, the bonified and bonifying, but it is an essentially and equally identical reason with them as it differentiates just as goodness bonifies, greatness magnifies etc.

52. While God knows that in himself He has the said difference whereby his reasons are clear and able to have infinite acts, He also knows that it is good to create differences that enable the existence of many creatures who can understand, remember, love and praise his reasons. Here, the intellect knows what causes the existence of a multitude of things that are different in genus, species and individuality.

53. Further, the intellect asks if the difference between God and man is real or if it is a merely intentional concept of the rational soul. It knows that God and creatures are really different by reason of the co-essential and natural difference intrinsic to God on the one hand, and the co-essential and natural difference intrinsic to creatures on the other hand. Without these differences, they would not be really different, but they would differ by reason of a merely intentional difference conceived by the rational soul, which is utterly impossible: therefore, God and man are clearly differentiated by differences that are real and not merely intentional.

Article 11 - God in Combination with Concordance

54. God is concordant, and He is his own concordance whereby his dignities concord in unity and plurality. As his goodness bonifies, as his greatness magnifies, as his eternity eternalizes etc. they all concord in one identical essence that is one nature and one Godhead; and they concord in plurality because there is a plurality of reasons: the bonifier, the magnifier, the eternalizer etc. are one number, the bonified, the magnified, the eternalized etc. are another number and bonifying, magnifying and eternalizing etc. are another number. They are all related and all refer to one absolute being, namely God.

55. As God thus considers himself by reason of difference and concordance, He creates one world by reason of his unity. In addition, by reason of his plurality He creates a variety of things comprising the numerous signifiers that constitute one world as shown in the ladder of concordance. He creates one substance made of form and matter, He creates one man made of body and soul, He creates the conjunction between them, and He creates one intellect with its correlatives that are similar to one syllogism made of two propositions and one conclusion.

And likewise with other similar things: and He does this in order to reflect and to demonstrate his concordance and to enable us to praise and to serve him.

Article 12 - God in Combination with Contrariety

56. God opposes, but He is not contrariety. He opposes sin by giving penance to sinners, but He causes contrarieties as an effect, as shown in the ladder of contrariety. God himself is not contrariety; rather, He is infinite concordance enjoying its own infinite and eternal act.

57. Here, the intellect wonders why God allows contrariety to exist although He is infinite concordance. We answer that contrariety exists between God and the sinner to enable God's justice to exercise its act in the sinner: now just as a mirror is disposed to receive all the figures reflected in it, so is God disposed to torment sinners. Further, if God did not create natural contrarieties, the world would not be what it is.

58. Again, the intellect wonders: if there is infinite willingness in God's will, why does God not want certain things? To understand this, the intellect gets help from the example given above: just as a mirror receives the likenesses of black and white, so does God love virtuous men by willing and so does He hate sinners by not willing.

Article 13 - God in Combination with Principle

59. God commences, and He is his own commencement. In his goodness, God commences but is not commenced, He is the bonifier before whom nothing else existed. He is both commenced and commencer in the bonified being that proceeds from the bonifier, and He is commenced but does not commence in his co-essential bonifying that does not commence anything in the nature of his goodness, but is only commenced by the commencer and the commenced, just as loving is commenced by the lover and the beloved.

60. Now God sees himself as a perfect principle and He proceeds to create the world from nothingness so that individuals generate other individuals, one man begets another man, one plant produces another plant similar to itself, which they do by means of substantial and natural initiating. He also creates another principle, as in the knower who causes objective knowledge while the knower together with this knowledge accidentally cause the act of knowing whereby the intellect can acquire science. We can say the same about the will clothed in the habit of love.

Article 14 - God in Combination with Medium

61. The means of measurement in God are the bonifying in his goodness, the magnifying in his greatness etc., and because He is infinite, He is his own means for measuring himself inasmuch as He is just as infinite in his intrinsic action as He is in his existence. In this measuring, the measurer and the measured join together in one continuous and absolute measure.

62. God knows that He is a means of measurement and He proceeds to measure the causes caused by himself, as shown in the definition of medium as well as in the ladder of medium proposed in the second figure. For instance, acting is a medium existing between the actor and the acted, and loving between the lover and the beloved.

Article 15 - God in Combination with the End

63. God is his own end, and He is not a privative end. However, in this end, there are many termini. For instance in his goodness, the bonifier is one terminus, the bonified is another terminus and bonifying is another terminus, while the three all repose in the same singular goodness.

64. God knows himself with respect to the end and He proceeds to create many ends in the world, such the habit of goodness, which is one moral end with which the bonifier clothes itself while producing the bonified product as a further end. The same applies to bonifying in its own way; and the three termini all repose in one goodness which is their end. Nevertheless, when man inclines toward sin, the habit of goodness is stripped away from him along with its termini, and then man deviates from his end, and this is why he falls into aeviternal distress.

Article 16 - God in Combination with Majority

65. God is greater than the world and everything the world contains, for his reasons are infinite and they have infinite acts. In addition, because He is greater than the world in goodness, greatness etc. his majority exists before the world existed. Just as God is greater than the world with his substance, He is also greater than the world with his eternity, because the world exists in newness. Further, as divine substance is greater than accident, it exists before the world's accidents existed. Here, the intellect knows that the world cannot exist eternally.

66. As God thus knows his majority, He proceeds to create majorities by means of which his majority signified in the ladder of the second figure is known and loved.

Article 17 - God in Combination with Equality

67. In God there is equality, as we see in his co-essential goodness etc. where the bonifier has two substantial actions because it bonifies the bonified and the bonifying, where the bonified has one passion from the bonifier and one action whereby it bonifies the bonifying, and where bonifying has two passions, as implied. In addition, just as divine goodness is infinite and has an infinite act, which we already proved above, so is divine equality infinite and removed from all accidents, for no accident can exist in an infinite being.

68. As God thus considers his equality, He goes on to create finite substantial equality as well as accidental equality. He creates substantial equality so that we can know infinite equality through its likeness. He also creates accidental equality so that we can know infinite equality through its unlikeness, as we know opposites through their counterparts.

Article 18 - God in Combination with Minority

69. In God there is no minority, because He is infinite and eternal majority, or else an opposite would be identical to its counterpart, which is impossible. Thus, God operates by majorifying and not by minorifying. However, as the world cannot exist at all without minorities, God is disposed to create minorities in the world, so that through finite minorities, we can know his infinite majority, as we know opposites through their counterparts. Hence, the intellect knows the God is absolutely major by reason of eternity, whereas the world is minor by reason of minority and newness.

70. God knows that He is more disposed to create majority than to create minority, and so He creates minorities to serve majorities. For instance, the human body exists to serve the

soul, all corporeal things exist to serve the human body and leaves and flowers exist to produce fruit; and likewise with other secondary intentions that are subject to primary intentions.

71. We have investigated God with the said explicit principles in order to get to know him, and as we gave examples with explicit principles, we can do the same with implied principles by following the mode we followed.

Chapter 6 - God in Combination with the Rules

Article 1 - God in Combination with Rule B

72. We ask if God exists. To investigate and prove God's existence, we want to mix the principles with the rules following the method of the art. Here, we choose the subject of eternity and apply it to the remaining principles. We will prove God's existence with eternity first, and then with eternity applied to the other principles, as shown in the following process. Eternity exists. Without eternity, the world would have arisen from itself. Thus, it would have existed even before existing, which is impossible. A being cannot arise from itself. Therefore, eternity exists, and consequently, so does its concrete, namely eternal being, because an essence cannot exist without its concrete, or vice versa.

73. Infinite duration exists and its infinity is good. Hence, it follows that goodness is a reason for eternal being to do good from eternity and in eternity throughout its infinitely good duration. Therefore, an infinitely good being exists, whose goodness is its reason for doing good infinitely and eternally. We call this being 'God', the above reasons clearly prove that God exists, and if the human intellect follows the method of this art, this proof is irrefutable.

74. Eternity exists as already proved above; and it is as immensely and infinitely great in magnitude as its magnitude is infinite in duration or eternity. Now the eternal being that exists as the subject of the said eternity and greatness is the One we call God, Who must necessarily exist for the above reasons which prove that the existence of infinite end eternal being is absolutely necessary.

75. Eternity exists as proved above, and because it exists, infinite power exists without which eternity cannot be infinite, for power is the reason why eternity can exist and act infinitely. The subject of the said eternity is the One we call God.

76. Eternity exists and its infinite being is intelligible, so it follows that some eternal being is alive, or has life, without which it cannot be eternally intelligible, and this eternal and infinite being is the One we call God.

77. Eternity is infinite duration, and it is lovable; so it follows that eternal being has life, without which it cannot be loved from eternity and in eternity. This eternal and beloved being is the One we call God.

78. Eternity is infinite and therefore it is virtuous, because without infinite virtue, it cannot be virtuous at all. Hence, it follows first that eternity's virtue is infinite so that no vice can be pre-existent to it, and secondly, it follows that eternity has an act, namely eternalizing, in which all the principles of the first figure have eternal acts. For instance, goodness has its act of bonifying, eternity has its act of infinitizing or eternalizing, power has its act of powering, etc. otherwise, eternity's virtue would be idle and virtuous at the same time, which is impossible. This eternal and virtuous being is the One we call God.

79. Eternity exists, and as it is infinite, an infinite and glorious being must exist as well as infinite glory without which no eternal, glorious and infinite being can exist in any way. In this being, eternalizing and glorifying exist in the end, for without them, eternal being would be in eternal pain, which is false and impossible. And this being in whom there is a procession of eternalizing and glorifying is the One we call God.

80. Eternity exists, its intrinsic co-essential reasons are clear without confusion and its concrete is eternal being that is good in goodness, great in greatness, powerful in power etc. These reasons are not different from each other in existence, but only in action. Now this eternal being's intrinsic goodness, greatness etc. are one identical essence so that eternity is good, great etc, per se and not by accident. And the reasons for action are clear because eternity is a reason for eternal being to produce eternal being, and for greatness to produce great being etc. and thus, eternalized being is produced by reason of eternity. Hence, it

necessarily follows that in eternity's essence there is a good, great and productive eternalizer, distinct from the good, great and eternalized product, and that both are distinct from eternalizing, bonifying and magnifying while existing as one essence through co-essential relation, or else the relations would be confused. Now this eternal and absolute being is the One we call God.

81. Eternity exists, and consequently eternal being exists, and this eternal being's intrinsic co-essential reasons convene in unity and plurality. Just as eternity is infinite duration, its goodness is infinite bonification, its greatness is infinite magnification, its power is eternal powering, its intellect is infinite intellection, its will is infinite volition etc. and all are one good, great etc. being who has an infinite act of bonifying through goodness, magnifying through greatness etc. and this is the being we call God.

82. Eternity exists, and consequently eternal being exists. And because eternity is infinite, it follows that eternal being is infinite, and as this being is good, no finite being can contradict eternal and infinite being or prevent it from doing what is eternally good, great etc. nor can this eternal being contradict itself in any way, given that its co-essential reasons are infinite and have infinite acts., and we call this being by the name of God.

83. Eternity exists, and time exists; but eternity is infinite duration, whereas time cannot be infinite duration, because time cannot be without movement, while eternity is motionless. Hence, it follows that eternity is a primordial and ultimate principle, absolutely pre-existent to time. Now this being who exists as the prime and ultimate principle is the One we call God.

84. Eternity exists as an absolutely infinite essence, whence it follows that its inner act of eternalizing mediates between the eternalizer and the eternalized; otherwise, eternity would be infinite in existence but finite in action, and this would mean the absolute destruction of eternity, which is impossible. And this eternity indwelt by essential eternalizing is the being we call God.

85. Eternity exists, it is infinite in existence as well as in action and its end is equal to its existence, given that its infinite existence disposes it to infinite action by the eternalizer, the eternalized and eternalizing. The eternity which is its own ultimate end, we call God.

86. Eternity exists, and it is the greatest duration that can be, with the greatest goodness that can be and with the greatest magnitude that can possibly be, while minority cannot contradict these reasons or prevent them from being infinite in existence and action; and this major duration is God.

87. Eternity exists, and consequently eternal being exists, and the intrinsic and co-essential goodness, greatness etc. of this eternal being are equal to eternity, so that its goodness, greatness etc. are as infinite in bonification as is eternity is infinite in duration. We call this eternal being God.

88. Eternity exists, and because it is infinite duration, it is infinitely removed from minority which is finite, it is infinitely removed from any finiteness that is less than eternity and from any kind of minor existence and action.

89. We posited God's existence with all the principles. We can also prove it with the principles by making syllogisms as follows. "No infinite being is without infinite power; eternity is infinite being, therefore eternity is not without infinite power; the being with infinite power is not heaven or anything contained in it, and this is why we call this infinite being God. Further, no infinite being is without infinite powering; eternity is an infinite being, therefore eternity is not without infinite powering".

90. We solved the question of whether God exists and we proved that He does by means of the principles and rule B; in this way we can learn about his existence and intrinsic action with the help of his grace. However, we can apprehend these things only in part, we cannot totally comprehend them because God is infinite and our intellect is finite.

Article 2 - God in Combination with Rule C

91. With the first species of rule C we ask, "What is God"? To gain better knowledge of God through his definitions, we want to define him with necessary and substantial definitions in which subject and predicate are convertible as neither can be without the other on account of the natural conjunction between both. For instance, if we ask "What is substance?" the answer is that substance is being that exists per se; and if we ask "What is being that exists per se?" the answer is that it is substance.

- 92. God is the being whose intrinsic reasons are convertible; the being whose intrinsic reasons are convertible is God.
- God is the being whose divine reasons have infinite acts. Infinite goodness has an infinite act of bonification, infinite magnitude has an infinite act of magnification, etc. and the being whose intrinsic goodness etc. have infinite acts is God.
- God is the being whose co-essential goodness is its reason for doing infinite and eternal good; the being whose co-essential goodness is its reason for doing infinite and eternal good is God.
- God is the being who cannot be without infinite reasons; the being who cannot be without infinite reasons is God.
- God is the infinite bonifier who cannot be without an infinitely bonified being and an infinite act of bonification; the infinitely bonified being and the infinite act of bonification who cannot be without an infinite bonifier is God.
- God is substance free from all accidents; substance free from all accidents is God.
- God is absolute being not dependent on anything; absolute being not dependent on anything is God.
- God is the being who needs nothing outside himself; the being who needs nothing outside himself is God.
- God is the being who cannot be otherwise than the way He is: the being that cannot be otherwise than the way He is, is God.
- God is the being who fulfills his entire purpose with his whole being: the being who fulfills his entire purpose with his whole being is God.
- God is the being who can act entirely within himself and of himself: the being who can act entirely within himself and of himself is God.
- God is the being who is unsurpassed by any majority; the being who is unsurpassed by any majority is God.
- God is the being who is aware that He is in action with his entire being: the being who is aware that He is in action with his entire being is God.
- God is the being for whom it is impossible not to be: the being for whom it is impossible not to be is God.

93. We defined God with 14 reasons in which the subject and predicate are necessarily convertible as shown by rule B, and definitions like these greatly help to clarify the human intellect's knowledge of the divine essence and its intrinsic and natural acts.

94. We can also make accidental descriptions of God, describing God as the creator, ruler, first cause, first mover, saviour, etc. Nevertheless, these descriptions do not clarify the understanding nearly as much as the above substantial definitions do.

95. With the second species of rule C we ask, "What does God essentially and naturally have in himself?" The answer is that He has co-essential, substantial and natural correlatives. For instance, on account of his goodness, He has an infinite bonifier, bonified and act of bonifying; on account of his greatness He has an infinite magnifier, an infinite magnified and

an infinite act of magnifying, and on account of his eternity He has the eternalizer, the eternalized and the act of eternalizing. Without these correlatives, we cannot make the above reasons or definitions of God, nor can our intellect know anything about the divine essence. Without the correlatives, the reasons or dignities would be empty, idle and defective and each one would be a privative habit. Consequently, divine being would be wanting in dignity because its reasons would lack perfection, for the intrinsic natural relationship within Godhead would perish if God did not intrinsically have these things.

96. With the third species of rule C we ask, "What is God in other things?" The answer is that He is the first cause of his effect, and He is the prime mover, ruler and governor who does absolutely whatever He pleases with his effect, without the least resistance from it.

97. With the fourth species of rule C we ask, "What does God have in other things"? We answer that outwardly, God has absolute power and dominion over creatures with which He does whatever He pleases, as an absolute cause in its effect. God also has the ultimate judgment of creatures as He is their creator and ruler who is disposed to judge sinners in accordance with their deeds. God created creatures to serve him, and this is the ultimate purpose of creatures.

Article 3 - God in Combination with Rule D

98. With the first species of rule D we ask, "What is God's origin"? We answer that God exists on his own, for a being that has infinite reasons with infinite acts cannot originate from any pre-existent being, and must be pre-existent to all beings that are different from it in essence; for instance, divine goodness is primordial to all other goodness just as infinite being is primordial to finite being. We can say the same about divine greatness, eternity etc. Here the human intellect knows that God is a pure act.

99. With the second species of rule D we ask, "What does God consist of"? We answer that He consists of his correlatives as previously described. For instance, divine goodness, which is God, consists of its bonifier, bonified and bonifying, and the threesome belongs to the selfsame goodness as a concrete belongs to its essence, or man to his humanity, or a lion to his leoninity etc. Here, our intellect knows that in God there can be no smallness, no malice and no newness.

100. With the third species of rule D we ask, "To whom does God belong"? We answer that He is not subjected to anyone or to anything else, because He is infinite and eternal. Nonetheless, in Paradise He is subjected to all the saints who receive objectified glory from him.

Article 4 - God in Combination with Rule E

101. With the first species of rule E we ask, "Why does God exist"? We answer that He exists formally through his constituting correlatives and consequently He exists through his co-essential reasons and because the subject and predicate convert in him, as proved above in his definition, just as substance exists by reason of its constituting matter, form and conjunction. We can also liken this to a syllogism whose middle term joins its upper and lower parts. Further, God exists because his infinite reasons convert in essential identity, for all of them are but one singular divine essence. Moreover, God exists because all his dignities have infinite acts and the subject and predicate essentially convert in his definition, as shown in article 2. Here, the intellect knows that God is immutable, and that his existence cannot be otherwise than the way it is.

102. With the second species of rule E we ask, "Why does God exist"? We answer that He exists for his own absolute purpose, given that an infinite and eternal being cannot be subject

to any finite purpose. Now it is clear that God exists for his own absolute purpose and for no other purpose, for each correlative of his dignities is for the other correlatives and each one is so that the others can be, otherwise, none of them could have infinite goodness, greatness etc. Further, God exists so that his action can exist, and vice versa. God's intrinsic co-essential reasons exist so that with them He can have infinite intrinsic acts to make his action as infinite as his existence. Here, the intellect recognizes the error of those who say that God uses His reasons only for acting in a finite, extrinsic and accidental way, as an efficient cause in an alien subject. This is obviously wrong, because without co-essential and natural reasons with infinite intrinsic acts, God could not be the supreme and infinite being as He would not be supremely good, great, eternal, powerful etc. per se, but on account of something else. Thus, a man, a lion or a rose would have a greater purpose than God has, for they all seek their own natural purposes so that they can be what they are. This clearly shows how blatant the said error is.

Article 5 - God in Combination with Rule F

103. We ask, “What quantity does God have”? We answer that there are two kinds of quantity: real quantity and numerical quantity. Real quantity is like bodily size, but numerical quantity is like counting one, two etc. And real quantity signifies continuous quantity, whereas numerical quantity signifies discrete quantity. God does not have a body, therefore He has no real quantity (though all corporeal beings have quantity) but God has a continuous essence, goodness etc. There is no way for quantity to exist in an infinite subject, just as time and movement can in no way be present in eternity.

104. Numerical quantity can exist in God by reason of his correlatives. For instance, in divine goodness, the bonifier is aware of himself as one distinct entity who knows that the bonified is another entity distinct from himself. In addition, both the bonifier and the bonified know that the act of bonifying is still another entity distinct from them both, so that numerical quantity arises in them, namely: one, two and three. Here, the intellect wonders if three correlatives are sufficient for divine goodness, or if there should be more of them. But it remembers divine unity and singularity by reason of which God is one and singular, just as He is good by reason of his goodness, great by reason of his greatness etc. so that it is sufficient to have one singular non-bonified bonifier, one singular bonified bonifier and one singular act of bonifying by the bonified non-bonifier. However, if there was a fourth number here, then unity and singularity would perish because the fourth number would have to be either a non-bonified bonifier, or a bonified bonifier, or a bonified non-bonifier; this evil redundancy set against the nature of infinite goodness would vitiate and oppose the great eternal virtue of God's infinite goodness, it would act against the glory of divine goodness and it would be an evil, privative habit like deafness, ignorance etc. which is impossible.

105. Further, the intellect considers the origin of numbers in numerical quantity, where the second unit arises from the first unit and the third unit arises from both, just as a logical conclusion arises from two propositions. Three is a perfect number that implies every kind of number by including an odd and an even number, two is an even number and three is an odd number. This clearly shows that a fourth unit would be superfluous, and a fifth unit etc. would be superfluous as well because in three, we already have odd and even numbers. Moreover, the fourth unit would disconnect from the second unit, which is a medium, or middle term between the first unit and the third. The mode of the first figure shows this, as the middle term is where the predicate of the major premise and the subject of the minor premise join together so that subject and predicate naturally convene in the conclusion, as in this syllogism: all animals are substantial, but all men are animals, therefore all men are substantial. Here the intellect realizes that in divine goodness the number three is sufficient for the divine essence

and that no greater or smaller number is necessary. However, species contain more than three individuals, as for instance one man, two, three, four men etc. in the human species and it is obviously right to enumerate them with many units or numbers.

Article 6 - God in Combination with Rule G

106. With the first species of rule G we ask, “What qualities does God have”? Here, we must answer that He has the qualities of his properties or reasons along with their own co-essential acts, so that He is good through his goodness, great through his greatness, eternal through his eternity and so forth with the other reasons. Further, goodness is a reason for good to produce good, and this goodness is great through greatness and eternal through eternity. Therefore, goodness is a reason for God to have the proper quality of producing good, great, infinite and eternal being, even more than heat is a reason for fire to have the quality of heating its good, great and durable heated matter. In addition, the correlatives in the second species of rule C signify this, for without such proper substantial qualities, God could not have his own being, or exist on his own, because He would have none of his own intrinsic, infinite and eternal acts. Further, He could not create anything in any subject outside himself by appropriation because all appropriated qualities must arise from some proper quality, as when air and water are heated by the heat proper to fire.

107. With the second species of rule G we ask, “What qualities does God have”? We say that God has appropriated qualities through his outward description, whereby He is the creator, governor, saviour etc. God is disposed to be just and merciful, compassionate and benign, as the efficient cause in its effect from which it is different in essence and nature.

Article 7 - God in Combination with Rule H

108. We ask whether God exists in time. The answer is that He does not exist in time in the proper sense, but by accident. An eternal being with an eternal act cannot exist in time, any more than an infinite being can exist in quantity or the number six in the number five or an evil essence in a good essence, or sight in blindness, or hearing in deafness, or understanding in ignorance etc. All these things are obvious through rules C, D and K to the subtle and diligent reader, to whom we leave this exercise, for the sake of brevity.

Article 8 - God in Combination with Rule I

109. We ask, “Does God exist in a locus”. We answer that God does not exist in any locus in the proper sense, but by accident. Just as eternity cannot exist in time, goodness cannot exist in malice and a truly understanding intellect cannot exist in ignorance, likewise, God in his infinity and immensity cannot be located in any locus. Indeed, God's infinity and immensity are virtues whereby He enfolds and penetrates every locus. Thus, it is obvious that He is immensely and infinitely inside and outside every locus, free of all quantity and surface. In addition, rules B, C, D, and K prove this.

Article 9 - God in Combination with the Rule of Modality

110. With the first species of rule K we ask, “How does God exist, and how does He act”? We answer the first question by saying that God has a mode for being what He is in the mode of his natural co-essential reasons. We saw this in #109 of article 8 in answer to the question of where God is. In answer to the second question, it is obvious for those who know this art, that God has a mode for acting with his correlatives. God acts with his goodness that is a

reason for producing good, with his greatness that is a reason for producing magnificence and with eternity for producing eternal being; hence, his goodness is a reason for good to produce good, great, eternal being etc. which it does intrinsically, within its own essence and nature without any accident.

111. Further, God has a mode for acting outwardly by reason of the conversion of his dignities: as God created the world, his intellect understood this creation, his will willed it, his power powered it and his goodness bonified it, for it was good to create the world. And God did this instantaneously, without any succession of the divine reasons. By the very the same mode, God performs miracles as He judges, forgives, bestows graces and so forth. He wants to act objectively and He knows his act as His power empowers it and his truth verifies it. The created subject is obedient to this kind of act, because finite being cannot resist infinite being.

Article 10 - God in Combination with the Rule of Instrumentality

112. We ask, “With what does God exist and act”? We answer that He exists with his co-essential correlatives and equal reasons without which He cannot be what He is, nor can He be the supreme being, just as a man cannot be a man without a soul, a body, a head etc. If God was supreme without his goodness, He would have no natural way of separating himself from evil, and thus He would not be supreme, but instead He would be the lowest of the low, which is impossible. If He was supreme without immensity, He would not have the wherewithal to be removed from quantity; if He was not eternal, He could not segregate himself from time; if He was not powerful per se, He could not exist per se and likewise with the remaining reasons. In addition, because He exists per se, as proved above in article 4 #102, it is therefore obvious that He exists with his own co-essential reasons, without which God cannot be supreme.

113. God acts intrinsically with his reasons, as we see in his correlatives indicated by the second species of rule C. Moreover, He acts extrinsically with his reasons and his correlatives as a cause producing effects, but not naturally, for He inclines himself morally to produce his effect just as a just man is inclined to judge with justice, or a logician to syllogize with reason and so forth.

114. We have discussed God in combination with the sequence of the rules. According to what we explicitly said about him, the artist can discuss God by using implicit principles reduced to the explicit ones, as we did. We dealt at length with the first subject because it covered a vast amount of material. However, we will not deal as extensively with the remaining subjects because their material will not be as vast, and also because we will know the other subjects by reason of what we said about the first subject. This is signified by the soul’s eternal home: indeed, by objectifying God, the saints in Paradise know everything that there is to know.

Section 2 - the Second Subject

Chapter 1 - Angel in Combination with the Principles

1. An angel's goodness is a reason for it to do good. Inasmuch as this reason is great, it is a reason for it to do great good, and as it is durable, it is a reason for it to do durable good etc. However, I am not saying that one angel produces or engenders another angel, for if this was so, the angel would empty itself because its newness, finiteness and indivisibility are entirely independent of length and breadth. An angel has in itself a good act of understanding, loving and remembering the natural principles. Moreover, angels exchange good words with each other. However, the intellect wonders, given that angels have no tongue or organ of speech,

how can this conversation be carried on? Then it remembers that their conversation is nothing but a good act of mutual understanding, loving and remembering, entirely good by reason of their goodness.

2. An angel's greatness is the reason why its goodness and duration are great; hence, it follows that goodness is great on account of its correlatives without which it would not be great. Now the intellect wonders: given that an angel does not produce or engender another angel, what does an angel bonify? Then it remembers that the angel bonifies the acts of the other principles in its own intrinsic bonifiable, in the same way that the intellect makes the other principles understandable and understood in its own intrinsic intelligible.

3. An angel's duration is the reason why the angel is durable along with its principles and their intrinsic acts; and its principles with their acts endure instantaneously without any succession among them. Now the intellect wonders what an angel's sustenance is, given that it receives neither nourishment nor growth from the outside? Then it remembers that the angelic nature is not composed of contraries. Moreover, if the Sun, which is a corporeal being, can last without nourishment, so can an angel and far more so because it is a pure spirit denuded of surface.

4. An angel's power is the reason why it can exist and act. Now the intellect wonders: given that an angel has no organism, what instruments does it use to act? Then the intellect remembers that the angel uses the correlatives of its power as though they were instruments to power his act. Just as heat is an accident with which fire can act to heat things; so likewise, and even much more so, the correlatives of an angel's power are the means whereby it can exist and act, because they are its own consubstantial correlatives. Here, the intellect understands that the consubstantial principles of angels are, as it were, their instruments. Now it realizes the reason why angels are on a higher level than lesser beings.

5. An angel's intellect is the reason whereby it understands things with its correlatives as it is intelligent, or active in understanding by means of its intellective part in its intelligible part wherein it understands other beings. No wonder an angel can do this if we consider that fire, which does not have the lofty virtue of an angel, can heat the other elements in its innate ignifiable part. Further, our intellect wonders how angelic intellect can understand species, since it does not reproduce any species through the senses and the imagination. Then it remembers that angelic intellect is an instrument of understanding, as it were (although it is consubstantial to the angel, just as its other principles are consubstantial to it) in the same way that a man's will is an instrument of willing, and even much more so. A human cannot will anything without using corporeal organs, whereas angels are loftier creatures than men, for they can understand things without the adjunction of any organ.

6. An angel uses its will as if it were an instrument, although it is not truly an instrument because an angel's will is its natural means for willing, and with its will it does the lovable deeds signified to it by the supreme order. Now the intellect wonders: why can angelic will love things without sensing or imagining them? Then it remembers its own rough and gross nature, which it has because it is joined to the senses and to the imagination; for an angel's will can approach objects without sensing or imagining them far better than the vegetative appetite of a plant can approach objects without sensing or imagining them.

7. An angel has virtue with which it is naturally active in its principles inasmuch as they are virtuous by reason of virtue; and it has virtuous acts that are good in goodness, great in greatness, etc. Now the intellect wonders: how does an angel acquire accidental virtues? Then the intellect remembers that an angel clothes itself in the habits of virtue by objectifying objects with its virtuous understanding and loving and by doing just, prudent and charitable acts; in this way, angels help us to resist sin and to oppose the evil angels by transmitting announcements to us from the supreme Prince, by reporting our prayers to Him and by praying for us.

8. By reason of its indwelling truth, an angel truly understands, loves and remembers far better than does a man who truly understands, remembers and loves with his soul, truly imagines with his imagination and truly senses things with his senses. Here, the intellect wonders how an angel can truly understand men with their colours, their justice or injustice, since it has no eyes. Then it remembers that a peasant once wondered why the king possessed wealth and honour whereas he, the peasant, was poor and without honour.

9. An angel's own innate glory is as it were an instrument with which it is glorious, just as its will is as it were an instrument with which it loves itself, and its goodness is as it were an instrument with which it is good. Now the intellect wonders: why are angels glorious, since they derive no enjoyment from the senses or the imagination? Then it remembers that man enjoys greater glory by objectifying, understanding, remembering and loving the supreme object than by objectifying lesser beings by means of the senses and the imagination.

10. An angel's co-essential difference is the reason why it consists of several numerically different principles. Now the intellect wonders: what causes this difference, given that things like colour, taste, shape and so on do not differentiate an angel's innate principles. Then it remembers that sound is not an object of sight, nor is colour an object of hearing etc.

11. An angel's own innate concordance is the cause for its numerous principles to convene in one substance that is good in goodness, great in greatness, etc. However, the intellect wonders how this can be, until it remembers that in every elemented thing many elements convene in one elemented compound ignited and heated by fire, moistened and aerified by air, cooled and aqueified by water and dried and earthified by earth.

12. An angel is not composed of contraries for it naturally stands outside the elements just as it stands outside of points, numbers, figures and such. Now the intellect wonders: if good and evil angels are not composed of contraries, then what causes them to oppose each other? Then it remembers that a good angel is clothed in the habit of the prime end, whereas an evil angel is expelled from it. And now the intellect realizes how awesome this opposition is in the sempiternal aevum.

13. An angel is an effective efficient cause by reason of principle. Its form consists of its active parts, namely of its essential bonifier, magnifier, etc. and its matter consists of its bonifiable, magnifiable etc. without which it cannot receive its natural end so it can be what it is without the adjunction of any essence other than its own. But there is another end that is supreme, namely God most holy in whom the angel reposes as it understands, loves and remembers and as it bonifies, magnifies etc. its understanding, loving and remembering. But the intellect wonders how an angel can have various natural properties if its essence is indivisible and inalterable. Then it remembers that the sun cannot be divided or altered inasmuch as it is removed from movement and succession.

14. An angel is a medium or subject whose end influences its principles and whose principles flow back to the end, as each principle measures itself with the others to the full extent of its being so that they all form one complete substance. Now the intellect wonders: since an angel has no linear quantity, how can it have measurements and how can it consist of several principles? Then it remembers that spiritual quantity subsists in its subjects without any points or lines, and that without quantity one angel could not have a greater essence or a greater act than another angel has while some angels could not receive greater glory from God than other angels receive.

15. The end of an angel consists in two modes: natural and supernatural. In the natural mode, an angel naturally has a good, great etc. purpose in doing good and great deeds; in the supernatural mode, the angel's end is in its supreme object that is supremely intelligible, lovable and honourable. Angels cause God to be loved, understood and remembered, but they do not make him good, great etc. and this is why memory, intellect and will in the essence of an angel have a loftier end than the end of its other principles. But the intellect wonders how

there can be majority and minority in an angel, since all the principles in its essence are equal. Then it remembers what we just said about the angel's object.

16. Angels belong to a species higher than the human species. Just as a magnet attracts iron by means of its species, so likewise angels, as they belong to a higher species, have knowledge of things below and though they have no organs, angels have power over these things. But the intellect wonders how this can be, until it remembers that even if these things are difficult to understand, it is not difficult for angels to do them because angels belong to a species higher than the human species.

17. An angel's memory, intellect and will are equal so that it can equally objectify God with its understanding, loving and remembering. This is because God is to be equally remembered, loved and understood; and this is good, great etc. because the contrary would give rise to great evil in duration, power etc. which is impossible. Here, the intellect wonders why an angel's remaining reasons are not equal in existence and action to its memory, intellect and will. Then it remembers the solution to the question given above in #15.

18. An angel has innate minority because it is created, new and finite since God created it from nothingness. Due to this minority some angels are habituated to sinful deeds by their own free inclination. Now the intellect wonders: what makes them inclined to sin? Until it remembers that the evil angel is inclined to sin by its hatred, whereas the good angel is inclined toward the virtues by its love for them.

Chapter 2 - Angel in Combination with the Rules

19. With rule B we ask if angels exist. This rule combined with the principles shows that they do exist; and to give examples of this proof by mixing the principles, let us go back to some things we said in part 8, section 1, chapter 1 about goodness. At the beginning of this chapter, we say that goodness is a reason for good to do or to produce good, and as it is great in greatness, there is a dual reason for good to produce great good, and divine wisdom knows this because it is good and great. Hence, as divine will is equal in greatness to divine goodness, wisdom etc. it wills that there be angels, and therefore angels exist.

20. In #4 of said chapter, we say that goodness is knowable to wisdom. Divine goodness is knowable and as such it is lovable to the full magnitude of its knowability and lovability; consequently, its act is knowable and lovable, and so is its effect, namely the angels; therefore, angels exist because they are a great and good effect, indeed the greatest and best effect that can exist among created beings. And if angels did not exist, knowing the effect of divine goodness would be a mere possibility, or something potential that the divine will does not want to become actual, which is impossible and contrary to the lovability of the effect of God's goodness, therefore etc.

21. In #5 of said chapter we say that goodness is loved by the will etc. Indeed, if angels exist, then the entire universe is perfectly complete. In the universe we have inanimate bodies like stones, animate bodies like plants, men, lions, and then there is spirit joined to a body, or the rational soul, so that we must also have spirit that is higher and closer to God because it is not joined to a body, and this is known to divine wisdom. If there were no angels or spirits that are not joined to bodies, then the divine will would prevent them from existing because it would not want them to exist. This would be contrary to the great action of divine goodness in things above but not in things below, which is impossible and contrary to the knowability of divine wisdom, and so we have proved, with reference to higher causes, that angels do exist.

22. We proved with three reasons that angels exist, which is sufficient here for the sake of brevity. We showed that the mixture of principles is a subject matter where the artist can discover many things at will and apply them to the issue at hand.

23. With the first species of rule C we ask what an angel is. We answer with the first species that an angel is the creature most similar to God because it is a spirit not joined to a body, who can act upon things below without using any physical organs and so forth.

24. With the second species of rule C we ask what innate, natural and co-essential things an angel has. We answer that it has its innate constitutive parts, like its innate goodness, greatness etc. with the exception of contrariety, which is not an innate quality of angels. As an angel has its innate goodness with its natural bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying, and as it has greatness along with the other principles, it also has its innate actions and passions. With its actions it acts both inwardly and outwardly, and with its innate passions it inwardly receives what comes from outside, as when it receives peregrine intelligibilities in its own innate intelligibility.

25. With the third species of rule C we ask what an angel is in other things. We answer that it is active and passive when it acts upon things below with understanding and loving etc. The angel's power carries out the desires of its will while its intellect understands them and its memory remembers them; and all this proceeds without any intervening succession and without any phantasma, but with the help of the divine goodness, greatness etc. received in God's close presence from which the angel passionately receives causal influences; and this passion is the angel's salvation and perfection. To the contrary, an evil angel suffers passions from outside when it is unable to commit sinful deeds, and it suffers the most intense passions when it is void of its final purpose and empty of divine grace.

26. With the fourth species of rule C we ask what an angel has in other things. We answer that an angel has power in things below whereby it acts without using touch, sight, hearing or imagination. It has this power due to its presence in the things in which it exists in the same way that a soul joined to a body has power over the lower faculties because it is joined to them. Good angels also have glory in God and in the other holy angels, whereas evil angels have suffering, but it would take too long to enumerate all these things here.

27. With the first species of rule D we ask what an angel originates from. We answer that it exists on its own and does not derive from anything else, so that its innate goodness, greatness etc. constitute its own indissoluble innate principles and so that its essence is permanent and incorruptible. Nonetheless, we say that God created it.

28. With the second species of rule D we ask what an angel consists of. We answer that an angel consists of its own innate principles, namely its natural goodness, greatness etc. Each principle has a triple presence in the angel: goodness has its bonificative, bonifiable and bonifying, and greatness has its magnificative, magnifiable and magnifying etc. These principles are essentially different so that an angel is composed of its goodness, greatness etc. as well as of all its "tives", namely the bonificative, magnificative etc. that constitute one common form in the angel with which it is active, and of all its "ables", namely its bonifiable, magnifiable etc. that constitute one common matter with which it is passive. All its "ings" such as bonifying, magnifying etc. constitute one common act with which it causes intrinsic acts, and all three unite and compose its substance spiritually, independently from any corporeal matter.

29. With the third species of rule D we ask to whom an angel belongs. We answer that it belongs to God because it is God's creature; but a good angel belongs to God with blessings, glory and glorification whereas an evil angel belongs to God with contradiction, pain and sorrow.

30. With the first species of rule E we ask why angels exist. We answer that an angel consists of its natural principles as we said above in the second species of rule D. As the principles combine with each other, they necessarily compose one common being just as the joining of a soul to a body must compose a man and the joining of the elementative to the vegetative must compose a vegetal being.

31. With the second species of rule E we ask why angels exist. We answer that angels exist for the ultimate purpose of understanding, loving, remembering and honouring God. In addition, they exist to complete the universe, because without angels, a part of the universe would be empty, as we proved above in rule B #21.

32. With rule F we ask about the quantity of an angel. We answer that an angel has the quantity that the being of its essence has; its being has continuous quantity inasmuch as it is one substance, and it has discrete quantities because its composition consists of many principles. The second species of rule D, which asks what an angel consists of, shows that this is true.

33. With rule G we ask what qualities an angel has. We answer that an angel has two kinds of qualities, namely innate proper qualities, and appropriated qualities that are not innate to it. What we call proper qualities are its own constitutive, natural and substantial goodness, greatness etc. The angel's acquired goodness, greatness, justice etc. are what we call appropriated qualities. In an evil angel, the appropriated qualities are malice, envy, iniquity etc.

34. With rule H we ask about time and angels. We say that an angel exists in time because it has a beginning in time without which it could not begin, and this is because something that is and was not cannot exist without time. In addition, an angel exists in time through its participation in aeternity without any succession or movement; but when it acts externally, it acts in different "nows" when it does on Sunday what it did on Saturday, and it exists at one time when it is in Rome during the day, and at another time when it is in Paris at night. However, when it leaves Rome and arrives in Paris, it travels without any movement or succession; just as it needs no eyes to see colours, so it needs neither movement nor succession to travel, but it can be wherever it wants to be.

35. With rule I we inquire about angels and locus. We answer that an angel exists in a locus because it was created in a locus, but it does not occupy space in its locus because a locus cannot be occupied without lines, angles and figures, things of which all angels are completely independent. It is in a locus, because when it is in one place, it is not in another place. It exists in the locus where it acts, it cannot act in a locus without being present in it, and this is because it acts with its essence and without any organs.

36. With the first rule K we ask how an angel exists and how it acts. We answer that an angel derives its mode of existence from the composition of its principles as shown in the second species of rule D, #28. In addition, it has a way of acting with its principles whereby it causes outward acts by causing bonified being with its goodness, empowered being with its power and so on with the other principles.

37. With the second rule K we ask what an angel exists and acts with. We answer that it exists and acts with the aggregate of its own natural principles, as shown in the second species of rule D, #28. As it acts with them, it understands with its intellect, loves with its will, remembers with its memory, and if it is good, it bonifies with its goodness, and empowers with its power etc. To the contrary, an evil angel perverts its understanding, remembering and loving along with the acts of its other principles. An angel acts inwardly and outwardly with its principles so that its act causes what is inside to exist outside, just as a man mentally gives rise to the words he utters outwardly.

Section 3 - the Third Subject

Chapter 1 - Heaven in Combination with the Principles

1. In this chapter, we will deal with heaven and its innate constitutive principles with which it acts as an efficient cause in producing its effects in things below. Heaven is good in

its natural goodness and great in its natural greatness, and thus its goodness and its greatness are reasons for it to act well, greatly and naturally in things here below as it moves itself and other things as well. To those who say that heaven sometimes has an evil action, as with the influence of the evil planet Saturn, I reply that it does so by accident, and because things below do not receive its influence well, due to opposition among the elements. This is why Saturn sometimes causes monstrosities in things here below with excessive dryness and cold.

2. Heaven is great and durable: it is great in essence and action, and it is durable because it is incorruptible and unalterable, so that apart from God, no other being can constrain it or impede its movement.

3. Heaven is durable per se because duration is its innate quality.

4. Heaven is powerful per se, because its power is an innate quality. Just as its duration is good and great, so is its power good and great. Now we clearly realize that heaven can move on its own so that its goodness, greatness etc. are not deficient in power, nor is power deficient in them.

5. As heaven has its own natural and co-essential circular movement, it also has a natural co-essential instinct to govern its orderly movement and the acts of its principles, which it could not do without instinct. It has one instinct with one planet and another instinct with another, for instance, Leo has one instinct with Saturn's dry, cold, diurnal and evil qualities and its affinity with lead and with Saturdays; and Leo has another instinct with Jupiter's moisture, goodness, its affinity with tin and with Thursdays, and so forth.

6. Heaven has instinct as we said above in #5, and it has appetite, with its appetite it moves itself and things below to arouse their appetite for itself; and it has one appetite with one planet and another appetite with another planet, as in the example we gave above in #5 with regard to instinct.

7. Heaven has appetite and virtue. Its appetite is naturally and co-essentially its own and so is its virtue; and just as its appetite is good in its goodness and great in its greatness, so is its virtue; and just as heaven expresses one appetite with Leo, another appetite with Virgo, another with Saturn and another with Jupiter, so does it express a different virtue with each of them.

8. Heaven is virtuous as we said above in #7, and it is intrinsically true per se. Just as it is virtuous in its innate virtue, so is it true in its innate truth and by means of this truth it makes objects of appetite come true with the concurrence of power, instinct etc.

9. Heaven is true as we said in #8, and it has innate enjoyment. I say that this enjoyment is not vegetative, sensitive, imaginative or rational, but motive. Just as a plant naturally enjoys vegetating, so does heaven enjoy moving itself and things below; and just as the vegetative power's enjoyment is imperceptible to the senses and to the imagination, so is the delight of heaven imperceptible to them, for only the intellect can attain it.

10. Heaven has enjoyment as said in #9, and by reason of difference, there is no confusion in its enjoyment. This difference is heaven's own innate principle whereby it makes and causes many differences while enjoying itself, but this difference is not perceptible to the senses because it is a general principle.

11. Heaven is comprised of many differences just as a whole is comprised of many parts; and concordance is one of its own co-essential principles with which it causes many concordances, so that heaven is one substance containing many things in difference and concordance.

12. Heaven has innate concordance, as said in #11. As it is incorruptible, it has peregrine contrariety that is not co-essential to it, but that is an instrument with which it produces oppositions in things below, as between hot and cold, moist and dry, diurnal and nocturnal qualities etc. causing monstrosities, thunder, lightning, disease, misfortune and things like that. Contrariety as such is not a co-essential principle of heaven, but concordance is one of its

principles as said above in #11. Heaven does more in things below by according them than by opposing them to each other, so that there is more health than illness and more fortune than misfortune, and men are born more often with two eyes than with one eye, and so with other things in their own way.

13. Heaven has its own innate principles as we said, with which it effectively initiates things below by means of natural beings below, such as the elements with their qualities and properties. As heaven acts on elemented things, so does it act on vegetal and sentient beings. Greatness concurs in this by magnifying heaven's power, instinct, appetite, virtue etc. and giving rise to the influence of things above on things below and its reflux from things below up to the Moon. This proceeds continuously, because heaven is always in continuous movement.

14. Heaven has its own innate co-essential medium with which it causes lower media. Celestial bonifying causes earthly bonifying, and celestial movement causes the movement of the earth.

15. Heaven has a medium as we said, through which and with which its principles transit to the end where they repose. The repose of heaven is in moving itself and things below because this is the purpose for which it was created.

16. Heaven has a major final purpose, which is to serve man so that man can serve God and its ultimate end cannot be any higher than this. However, subject to this major end, heaven has its own innate major end, namely moving, just as the vegetative has its major purpose in vegetating and the sensitive has its major purpose in sensing.

17. We discussed heaven's majority, and its major equality is the equality of its own co-essential principles. Heaven's equality is less than the equality in the soul because heaven has no intellect, no memory and no will, nor can it earn any merit.

Chapter 2 - Heaven in Combination with Rule B

18. We ask if heaven exists from eternity. We answer that it does not, as signified by rule B and by the single question in part 5: "is the world eternal?" To further clarify this science, art and doctrine we intend to give an example of its application in this chapter about heaven. The things we say here about heaven provide a doctrine for artists with which they can also make judgments about other matters. To avoid prolixity, we will apply only the letter B to the other letters in the alphabet of this art up to K. Just as we combine B with the other letters, we can also combine the other letters with each other.

19. **BC** - If heaven existed from eternity, it was not created from nothing because it has always existed. It is not made of anything else, as beyond heaven there is no matter from which it could be made, nor is there any such matter within heaven because its greatness contains all things. Thus, divine goodness is not a reason for God to make a good heaven or to create the goodness of heaven because heaven is eternal; and likewise, God's greatness does not cause the greatness of heaven. Hence it follows that the world in its goodness, greatness etc. is not an effect of God so that there is a difference between God's goodness and the goodness of heaven, without any concordance (that should rightfully exist between a cause and its effect), and likewise with greatness. Contrariety, injury and avarice arise along with the privation of concordance between God's goodness and the goodness of heaven and between God's greatness and the greatness of heaven, so that God's goodness is not a reason for him to produce a good and great effect, since God does not consent to the reason of his goodness. As all these things are impossible, it follows that heaven is created and new.

20. **BD** - If heaven is eternal, then there is a plurality of eternities, namely God's eternity and the eternity of heaven. Heaven's eternity implies infinite eternities, like those of its innate goodness, duration etc. and those of its circles and revolutions. Thus, injury and gluttony have existed in humankind as long as justice and prudence, and malice and contrariety as long as goodness and concordance; and there never was a first man, nor will there ever be a last one. Hence, divine goodness is deficient because it is not a reason for God's goodness to rightfully precede evil and for God's eternity to precede the eternity of heaven. Moreover, it follows that there is no afterlife because all the matter contained by heaven cannot suffice for accommodating the resurrected bodies of the dead (as we intend to prove) so that God's justice is defective and impeded from rewarding the just and punishing the unjust in eternity, all of which is imputable to injury and malice. Further, God's fortitude would wane while lust would wax eternal. As all these things are impossible, it follows that heaven is new and has a beginning.

21. **BE** - If heaven is eternal, it has power to be eternal on its own, because eternal being has never been in potential existence, nor is it potentially non-existent. Thus, God's power is not the cause of heaven's power, nor is God's goodness the cause of heaven's goodness. Moreover, God's power cannot deprive heaven of power because heaven would govern itself on its own so that conceit, and consequently sin, would be eternal; hence, it would follow that heaven would be an end unto itself and God would not be its end, given that the privation of the cause deprives the effect. As all these things are evil, injurious, full of conceit and opposed to rule B, we have demonstrated that they are impossible and that the answer to this question must be negative.

22. **BF** - If heaven is eternal, then time is eternal so that God's eternity does not precede time, which is contrary to justice and faith. Thus, acedia is eternal, giving rise to eternal injury. Divine wisdom knows this and divine goodness is a reason for God to do good by destroying these evils; but God does not consent to this reason, while his wisdom knows that He is being injurious, lazy and evil. All these things are impossible, therefore, etc.

23. **BG** - If heaven is eternal, either there is one eternal will general to all human wills, and from which all the other particular wills materially derive, or else God creates individual human wills. If there is one general will, it is indivisible and individual wills are eternally corruptible; (nor is there an afterlife, as shown by the impossibilities pointed out in camera BD #20). This does injury to the individual wills that love God, and God's justice has no power of judgment over them in eternity, nor has it any power over the wills that hate God, that hate hope and love envy. The individual wills, once corrupted, can never return to being, because the general will cannot provide enough matter to accommodate them all, considering what we said in camera BD; but these things are contrary to God's justice and goodness, and therefore there cannot be any eternal general will. However, if individual wills were created by God, and if heaven was eternal, creation would not have any repose as there would never have been a first will or a second one and there never would be a last one, which presents the same inconvenience as shown in camera BD #20. Therefore, etc.

24. **BH** - If heaven is eternal, then the virtues and the vices have existed from eternity, and there is more vice than virtue. Now divine goodness and charity are reasons for God to make virtues greater than vices; but if God does not consent to these reasons, He is injurious and contrary to his own charity and justice; as this is impossible, the opposite must be true.

25. **BI** - If heaven is eternal, its eternity is equal in duration to God's eternity so that truth and falsehood, patience and impatience are equally eternal. As all these things are contrary to divine goodness, justice and truth, it follows that heaven is new, and that divine goodness and truth rightfully precede the duration of heaven with their eternity, just as divine immensity and infinity precede the limited and finite goodness and truth of heaven.

26. **BK**. - If heaven is eternal, then the liberal and mechanical arts have existed from eternity and never has there been repose in this life in which compassion and inconstancy are just as eternal as are hammers and tongs. Moreover, this life does not exist for the purpose of the afterlife because one eternity does not cause another eternity, nor does it repose in another eternity. Hence, this life is merely minority close to nothingness that never fully comes to naught. As all these things are evil, injurious and contrary to divine goodness and justice, it necessarily follows that heaven is new and created.

Chapter 3 - Heaven in Combination with Rule C and the Other Rules

27. With the first species of rule C we ask what heaven is. We answer that heaven is the prime mobile, and the body that has the greatest magnitude and greatest movement. Beyond heaven, nothing is mobile. It is a body that moves on its own, because it has the greatest mobility of all bodies so that movement begins naturally from heaven and remains within it; and it is the source from which all other movements arise like streams from a fountain.

28. With the second species of rule C we ask what heaven co-essentially and naturally contains in itself. We answer that it has in itself its own co-essential and natural motivity, mobility and moving, so that motivity is its form, mobility is its matter and moving is its act with which it causes extrinsic acts; and it has its innate goodness and greatness etc. as well as stars, planets, signs and other such co-essential parts in itself.

29. With the third species of rule C we ask what heaven is in other things. We answer that heaven is active, moving and influential in the elements and elemented things from which it receives no passion at all because of its great activity and motivity. As such, heaven neither increases nor decreases. Now the intellect wonders: how can heaven have such great motivity without undergoing any subjective alteration or change? Then it takes strength in considering that God's infinite power can cause such an effect at will.

30. With the fourth species, we ask what heaven has in other things. We answer that heaven has natural rulership over the elements and elemented things with which it causes natural mobilities in the regions below such as the four seasons, successive days and hours, thunder, lightning, wind, rain, snow, monstrosities, disease and things like that. Heaven can do this because things below receive from it the mobilities and influences by means of which it produces its effects.

31. With the first species of rule D we ask what heaven arises from. We answer that heaven exists on its own, because it is not made or derived from any pre-existing matter; and as it exists primordially on its own, it is incorruptible due to its primordality while it moves forever with its own movement.

32. With the second species of rule D we ask what heaven consists of. We answer that heaven consists of its own co-essential parts such as its innate goodness, greatness etc. The second species of rule D shows this.

33. With the third species of rule D we ask to whom heaven belongs. We answer that it belongs to God as an effect belongs to its cause. Since it is in God's possession, it causes effects in things below in the way in which God wants it to cause them.

34. With the first species of rule E we ask why heaven exists. We answer that heaven exists because it consists of its own co-essential parts, such as its innate goodness, greatness

etc. except contrariety, which is not a co-essential part of heaven because if it was, then heaven would be corruptible. Further, it exists because its innate celestial form is joined to its innate celestial matter, so that heaven is necessarily produced from both just as a man is produced when a soul is joined to a body.

35. With the second species of rule E we ask why heaven exists. With regard to its final purpose, we reply that heaven exists in order to be a cause in things below of motivations that dispose man to exist and to serve God.

36. With rule F we ask about the quantity of heaven. We answer that heaven has continuous and discrete quantity: its continuous quantity is circular, as its shape shows; and its discrete quantity exists, for instance, in the concavities formed by the eighth sphere and by the spheres of Saturn and of the remaining planets.

37. With rule G we ask about the qualities of heaven. We answer that heaven has proper and appropriated qualities. The proper qualities are its innate goodness, greatness etc. and its movement, shape and quantity etc. The appropriated qualities are, for instance, heat, dryness, cold, moisture, masculinity, femininity and so forth. We say that its appropriated qualities are in it because it acts on things below by means of them. For instance, we say that the Sun is hot and dry because it heats and dries things.

38. With rule H we ask about heaven and time. We answer that the essence of the eighth sphere exists in the present in which it God created it, like a circle that essentially exists without any succession, but causes time in things below with its movement, for instance, as Saturn moves successively from one “now” into another “now”. And from the eighth sphere to the sphere of fire there is only one day, but from the sphere of fire to the sphere of earth there are many days and many nights due to the presence and absence of the Sun so that the Sun is the cause that produces numerous days, nights, hours etc.

39. With rule I we ask about heaven and locus. We answer that the eighth sphere exists in the locus where God created its essence, and the same with Saturn etc. However, due to movement and to the existence of several cyclical circles located between the eighth sphere and the sphere of fire, heaven is located in many places in many directions. Saturn, for instance, is at one time in Aries and at another time in Taurus, and likewise, the Sun is in one locus of heaven at one time and in another locus at another time, artificially causing day in some places and night in other places.

40. With the first rule K we ask how heaven exists. We answer that heaven's mode comprises the particular modalities of its own essence, or of its innate parts, such as its goodness, greatness etc. and its habit, disposition and so forth.

41. With the second rule K we ask what heaven exists with. We answer that it exists with its own natural constitutive parts, such as its goodness, greatness etc. with which it causes circular and cyclic phenomena along with instances of mobile goodness, greatness etc.

Section 4 - the Fourth Subject

Chapter 1 - Man in Combination with the Principles

1. Man's own innate goodness is a reason for him to do specific good, and everything that man does as a member of the human species, he does either in a natural or in a moral way. Spiritual and corporeal goodness are joined in man by reason of his soul and body so that these dual reasons naturally give man reason to do good with his objectifying, understanding, loving and remembering; and to do good with his body by procreating, sensing and imagining so that good works proceed from both the body and the soul, as we see in the liberal and mechanical arts.

2. Man's own innate greatness, like his goodness, is of a dual nature and man does what he does greatly with greatness just as he does it well with goodness.

3. Man's own innate duration is a reason for his goodness, greatness etc. to last in a dual way, as said above in #1; moreover, man acts naturally through necessity and he acts morally at will.

4. Man's own innate power is, just like his goodness, dual in nature (as we said); and since man can exist and act through his power, it is clear than he can act in accordance with his species. Here, the intellect understands how man has specific freedom to act.

5. Man's own innate intellect is specific to each man, and with it, he understands things in a specific way; it does not descend from any other intellect that generates it, nor is it essentially identical to any other intellect. Otherwise, it would be engendered in man and then annihilated or corrupted after a man's death; it would be confined within time, locus, quantity, surface, division, succession and movement; and it would be disposed and configured in points and lines, which is impossible, because all these things are physical or corporeal in nature. Here, the intellect realizes how evil and false are the statements of those who think and assert that there is only one intellect shared by all men. From what we said, our intellect realizes that the human body's natural instinct is joined to the human intellect in the way we described in the paragraph on goodness. The intellect has a mode for rendering intelligible species in its own intelligible part by means of the sensitive and imaginative powers, and it builds science from these intelligible species.

6. Man's own innate will is a specific power with which he does specific lovable acts. However, this will does not descend from some general will, because if it did, its essence could be generated and corrupted just like the intellect's could, as said above. Thus, human freedom would perish because the will would be necessarily compelled to act in accordance with its general principle, just as the body has appetites that higher causes compel it to have by necessity, such as its appetite for food when it feels hunger, for drink when it feels thirst, for warmth when it feels cold and so forth. Further, if all men shared one single will, all men would seek out the same objective, and the rational soul would die when a man dies so that there would be no afterlife and neither God's justice nor God's mercy would have any subject on which to act. This is impossible and an utterly absurd thing to say. Further, the body's appetite and the will are joined together, as we said about goodness, so that the will renders species from the sensitive and imaginative powers by willing just as the intellect does by understanding. We can say the same in its own way about memory, as it is a part of the soul.

7. Corporeal and spiritual virtues are joined in man; and because the spiritual virtue is above, it informs and perfects the lower virtue. Here, the intellect sees how moral virtues arise from spiritual virtue and corporeal virtue just as substance arises from form and matter. We will discuss the virtues in the ninth subject.

8. Man's truth is spiritual and corporeal, and because spiritual truth is higher, it perfects the lower truth. Hence, the intellect realizes that just as the senses truly sense things with sight, hearing etc. so does the soul truly attain the essences of things through remembering, understanding and loving. Otherwise, the soul would do more in things below with its lower virtues than in things above with its higher virtues, which is utterly absurd and contrary to intellectual reason. And the intellect greatly rejoices in realizing this.

9. In man, spiritual and corporeal glory are naturally joined in a natural conjunction of both spiritual and corporeal enjoyment. Hence, it follows that the soul enjoys acting in the body and the body enjoys being acted upon while man enjoys all of this. Here, the intellect sees how man finds enjoyment in moral dealings.

10. In man there is a conjunction of spiritual and corporeal differences, and this is why the intellect understands things in one way through hearing, in another way through seeing etc. and reciprocally, the body is acted upon in one way by the intellect, in another way by the will

and in another way by memory. By what we said, the intellect realizes how it builds science with its discourse, as the will builds a science of love and as memory builds a science of remembering.

11. The body and the soul enter into the composition of man when they join together in him while the soul remains in its own essence, as does the body. Here, the intellect realizes how the body and the soul convene in objectifying the same objects, as the body sees them, hears them etc. while the soul understands, remembers and loves them.

12. The human body is composed of four elements, whereas the soul is not made of opposites because it is incorruptible. In addition, because the soul and the body join in man, he is consequently subject to direct and natural oppositions in the body and indirect, accidental oppositions in the soul. Here, the intellect realizes that all sin is accidental. The soul and the body join together in man so that he is an efficient cause that moves form in matter toward an end, which he does by moving the soul in the body. Now the intellect knows how man is an efficient, material, formal and final cause.

13. In man, the soul and body join and this act signifies a conjunction that is a medium made of influences from the soul and the body. This medium consists of connatural and substantial understanding, willing and remembering, elementing, vegetating, sensing and imagining, without which there would be no substantial conjunction in man. In addition, man lives as long as this natural conjunction lasts in him, and he dies as soon as it dissolves. Here, the intellect knows how the soul and the body join and measure their acts with their own proportionate dispositions whereby the soul influences the body and the body sends its influence back to the soul while man exists as a subject and as the third number in the middle. Now the intellect understands how the root moisture and the nourishing moisture exist in man. The root moisture is made of primordial principles, points and lines that join with the soul. Nourishing moisture is its instrument - like the shuttle in a weaver's loom - as the movements of the elementative, vegetative, sensitive and imaginative powers induce points and lines. Their influence flows back and forth to keep the root moisture alive and growing with what it receives from outside and transmutes into its own species through the vegetative as the vegetative transmutes food into flesh, nerves and bones, and drink into blood, and food with drink into marrow, phlegm, choler, melancholy, brains, tears, saliva and sweat.

14. In man there is a natural conjunction of spiritual and corporeal ends for which man exists: he exists for a spiritual end by reason of his soul and for a corporeal end by reason of his body. In addition, moral ends arise and come forth from the soul and the body with which both find the enjoyment that is their repose.

15. The human soul is a major substantial image and the body is a lesser image than that of the soul. In the body, the imagination is a greater image than the sensitive power because it objectifies the sensitive power and contributes to its movement in a secondary way. In turn, the sensitive power is a greater image than the vegetative in which it is rooted and sustained; and the vegetative is a greater image than the elementative because it is founded on the elementative. Now the intellect realizes that there are greater and lesser accidental powers just as there are greater and lesser substantial powers.

16. In man the body and the soul are not equal, for the soul has higher principles and the body has lower ones; nonetheless they are joined so that the soul is entirely in the body and conversely, to make an equal composition and conjunction in man.

17. Man is a creature whom God brought forth from nothingness. As such, he is clothed with minority and he has to deal with minor things. As body and soul join in man, so does man move toward inferior mores with his soul and toward minor natural things with his body while he composes his morality by means of both body and soul. Here, the intellect sees how the soul is inclined toward sin, which is a thing so small that it has no essence, it is nothing

but a privative habit that deviates its subject from his intended purpose. Now the intellect knows what sin is, how it grows and what its origins are.

Chapter 2 - Man in Combination with the Rules

18. With rule B, we ask if we can know more about man through affirmation than through negation. The answer is that we can, because an affirmative statement defines the subject with its naturally connected predicate, as when we say that man is a rational animal. On the other hand, a negatively attributed predicate provides no definite information about the subject, as when we say that a man is not a stone, or that a man is not a plant. Further, a true affirmation always posits something that exists in the subject, whereas a true negation always removes something from it, and even a false negation has a way of removing something from a subject. Moreover, affirmation is prior to negation, as an antecedent is prior to a resultant. Therefore, an affirmation can obviously tell us more about man than a negation can.

19. A man who does not know what a man is must be neglecting his status as a human being. Now let us learn more about human existence by defining man extensively with 30 definitions. Indeed, just one definition is strictly sufficient for defining man by simply saying “a man is the being of his essence”. Nonetheless, we will clarify our understanding by expanding our definitions. Twenty-eight of the following definitions refer to the 18 principles and 10 predicates of this art, and the last two refer to what man does. In every definition, the predicate naturally connects to its subject.

20. What is a man? Let us use the first species of rule C to answer this question.

1. First, we answer by saying that a man is an animal about whom we can predicate more different species of goodness than we can predicate about any other kind of animal.

2. Man is the animal who has a greater variety of species of greatness than any other animal has.

3. Man is the animal who has one incorruptible part.

4. Man is the animal endowed with more powers than any other animal.

5. Man is the animal who produces intelligible species with his organs.

6. Man is the animal who produces lovable species with his organs.

7. Man is the animal who practices the virtues and the vices.

8. Man is the animal who truly uses the liberal and mechanical arts.

9. Man is the animal who enjoys a greater variety of enjoyment than any other animal does.

10. Man is the animal in whom there are more differences than in any other animal.

11. Man is the animal in whom there are more concordant things than in any other animal.

12. Man is the animal in whom there are more oppositions than in any other animal.

13. Man is the animal in whom nature operates with more principles than in any other animal.

14. Man is the animal through whom all corporeal things serve God.

15. Man is the animal who exists for a purpose greater than that of any other animal.

16. Man is the animal who belongs to the topmost animal species.

17. Man is the animal who contains more equalities than does any other animal.

18. Man is the animal who can become more evil than any other animal.

19. Man is the substance that comprises more things than any other substance does.

20. Man is the substance that contains more different species of quantity than any other substance does.

21. Man is the substance that has innate spiritual and corporeal qualities.

22. Man is the substance that has more innate relations than any other substance has.

23. Man is the substance that has innate spiritual and corporeal actions.
24. Man is the substance that has innate spiritual and corporeal passions.
25. Man is the substance that clothes itself with either virtue or vice.
26. Man is the substance that maintains an upright posture in walking and sitting.
27. Man is the substance that has one innate part which is independent of succession in time.
28. Man is the substance in which the rational soul and the body are located within each other.
29. Man is a man-producing substance.
30. Man is a being that reproduces its species.
21. With the second species of rule C we ask what man has co-essentially in himself. We answer that man has substance and accidents without which he cannot exist. In addition, he has the innate correlatives of his principles; and he has innate accidentally acquired habits.
22. With the third species, we ask what man is in other things. We say that man is a reproducer of man in a woman, while the woman nourishes the seed, moves it and makes it grow with nourishment supplied from outside. I saw an egg placed under a hen, and there was a hole about the size of a coin in one part of the shell. In the middle of the inner membrane, there was one drop of blood about the size of a grain of millet. From this drop, slender red hairlines came out, disposed like a spider's web, while the drop moved on its own and moved the web as well, just like a spider does in the middle of its web. Moreover, man is habituated in habits, located in places etc.
23. With the fourth species, we ask what man has in other things. We answer that he has science in his habits, shape in his posture, motion in his body and location in space.
24. With the first species of rule D we ask about man's origin. We answer that his body comes from his earliest ancestors, but his soul does not. For instance, his intellect does not descend from any other intellect, as we already proved above in chapter 9, #5.
25. With the second species of rule D we ask what man consists of. We answer that he consists of his soul and his body. In addition, his soul consists of spiritual principles and his body consists of corporeal principles.
26. With the third species of rule D we ask to whom man belongs. We answer that he belongs to God. Also, some men belong to other men as the slaves of their masters, and a sinful man belongs to the world, the flesh and the devil.
27. With the first species of rule E we ask why man exists. We answer that he exists because he is made of his soul and body, and this conjunction of soul and body necessarily brings him into being.
28. With the second species of rule E we ask why man exists. We answer that man exists in order to understand, remember and love God and receive everlasting blissfulness from him. Man also exists as a medium through whom and with whom all corporeal creatures serve God by serving man. In addition, he exists in order to reproduce his species.
29. With the first species of rule F we ask about man's continuous quantity. We answer that it is the same as the continuous quantity of his substance.
30. With the second species of rule F we ask about man's discrete quantity. We answer that it is the same as the quantity of his discrete parts. Then we ask how much good or evil there is in man. We answer that man is as good or evil as his habits are good or evil.
31. With the first species of rule G we ask about man's proper qualities. We answer that he has qualities of his own without which he cannot exist such as visibility, shape and so forth.
32. With the second species of rule G we ask about man's appropriated qualities. We say that man is good, great etc.

33. With rule H we ask: when does man exist? We answer that he exists when God creates a rational soul in a body, whereupon the body enters into the human species. He exists now, in the present, not in the past or the future. In addition, man can be known by combining this present "now" with rules C, D and K. We leave this up to subtle and diligent readers for the sake of brevity.

34. With rule I we ask where man exists. We say that man exists in his humanity, outside of which he has no way of existing. In addition, man exists in the space where he is located and contained, as signified by rules C, D and K.

35. With the first rule K we ask about how man exists, and how he expresses his likeness outwardly. In answer to the first question we say that he exists in the way that his parts come together to compose him. To the second question, we answer that man has ways to express his likeness outwardly by procreating and by drawing forth letters and figures from his mind with the motion of his hand and his pen, and so forth.

36. With the second rule K we ask what man exists with. We say that it is by means of his first parents. In addition, he exists with his primordial principles, both essential and accidental, without which he cannot exist. Moreover, he is just with his justice, and a writer with his hand, and so forth.

37. Further, let us ask, with what are the human intellect - as well as the memory and the will - universal and particular? We say that they are universal with the soul's universal principles, like spiritual goodness, greatness etc. And they are universal with its universal correlatives indicated by the second species of rule C. They are particular with the particularities of objects with which they are practical as they produce intelligible species one after the other.

Section 5 - the Fifth Subject

Chapter 1 - The Imaginative Power Combined with the Principles

1. The imagination is a power with which man imagines peregrine imaginable things in his intrinsic imaginable part, by forming some likeness or likenesses previously present to the senses, or likenesses similar to these.

2. The imagination is good as it produces a good effect. Without the imagination there would be no science of past things, nor would animals know how to return to their watering holes and so forth.

3. The imagination has greatness with which it magnifies its other principles, and we see this in the things we imagine at will.

4. The imagination is durable, for its objects last as long as the imagination objectifies them. Just as spiritual objects last in the rational soul's memory outside imagination, so do sense objects last outside the senses of irrational animals in their imagination. Here, the intellect recognizes that just as the rational soul complements man's lower powers, so does the imagination of irrational animals complement their lower powers.

5. The imagination has power over the senses because the power of imagination descends to the lower powers in order to act with them in itself, just as the root moisture descends to the nourishing moisture in order to live on it.

6. The imagination has natural instinct, as we see in irrational animals with their survival skills and their avoidance of harm; for instance, goats instinctively avoid wolves.

7. The imagination has appetite with which it seeks out imagined objects. Here, the intellect realizes that the imagination has an instrument that enables it to exercise its act and attain its objects.

8. The imagination has a virtue with which it attracts species from the senses and places them in its innate imaginable where it characterizes them and makes images of them.

9. Truth is an instrument of the imagination for truly attaining its object, but the imagination is sometimes deficient in truth when it behaves like an agent unable to act either because it has no instrument or because it does not know how to use the instrument it has.

10. The imagination causes joy or sadness in the subjects in which it exists.

11. The imagination has difference with which and through which it acts in diverse manners in its subject just as a mirror receives diverse images in its innate difference.

12. The imagination concords with the subject in which it exists, as when a mother enjoys imagining her son, or imagining his likeness acquired by her imagination.

13. With contrariety, the imagination contradicts or resists the subject in which it exists, as when a mother hates to imagine the death of her son.

14. The imagination is an efficient principle; though it transmits nothing outside of itself, it finds its material in sense objects whose likenesses it derives from sense impressions by means of its form which is its imaginative part so that it can finally repose in its object.

15. In man, the imagination is a medium existing between the powers of sense and intellect, and the imagination enables the intellect to acquire likenesses of things that can be sensed or imagined. Here, the intellect realizes that it first acquires species through the senses, and then from these species it draws other species in an extra sensory way, or without using the senses. In an irrational animal, the imagination is not a medium, but it is the highest extremity or the form that habituates the animal's life and makes it complete; however, in the human body, the rational soul plays this role.

16. The imagination naturally reposes in its own end, which is the imagined object, or else, imagining would not be an act proper to imagination.

17. There is majority in imagination because its substantial goodness is greater than its accidental goodness and its intrinsic act is greater than its extrinsic act. It is also greater when it imagines a lion than when it imagines a goat, and it is still greater when it objectifies a great man, or a greater man, or the greatest man of all.

18. The imagination has equality in its correlatives indicated by the second species of rule C. Were they not essentially equal, they could not be equal in attaining their object, which is impossible.

19. By reason of minority, the imagination is close to naught and it tends toward this minority by objectifying minor objects.

Chapter 2 - The Imaginative Power Combined with the Rules

20. We ask if the imagination is corporeal in nature. We answer that it is. In fact, the imagination cannot objectify an object that does not have the characteristics proper to sense objects, such as lines, figures, points and so on.

21. With the first species of rule C we ask what the imagination is. We answer that we already gave its definition in the previous chapter, at the beginning of this subject, #1. However, as the imagination is a difficult thing for the intellect to grasp, we want to define it with 10 definitions taken in the broad sense so our intellect can know it better, and the definitions refer to the 10 predicates. Now for the first definition:

1. The imagination is a part of animate substance with which this substance is imagined.

2. The imagination is a power with which animals imagine things that have size and quantity.

3. The imagination is a power with which animals imagine the qualities of things, and when quality joins quantity, then an animal imagines quantity and quality together, as in a long and green piece of wood.

4. The imagination is a power with which animals attain imaginable objects in their intrinsic imaginable by means of the correlatives of imagination.

5. The imagination is active with its imaginative part that exists by reason of the form moved by animals in order to move objects in the intrinsic imaginable of the imaginative power.

6. The imagination is passive in its imaginable part as in its matter, so that objects can be characterized and imagined in this imaginable part.

7. The imagination is a habit of animals with which they render imaginable species.

8. The imagination is a power disposed in an animal's head in the middle of a membrane in which images of objects appear to its imaginative, like the images of eyes appearing in a mirror.

9. Imagination is a power that exists in time due to the subject in which it exists, without which it can neither exist nor attain any objects.

10. The imagination is a power that exists in a locus in which it can imagine objects.

We defined the imagination with the 10 predicates and we can define the other powers of the body in the same way.

22. With the second species of rule C we ask what the imagination has in itself. We answer that it has correlatives without which it cannot exist, namely the imaginative, the imaginable and imagining.

23. With the third species of the same rule, we ask what the imagination in other things is. We say that it is a disposition in man with which the intellect disposes itself to objectify lower objects; and the senses dispose themselves with the imagination to sense things; and the imagination is the form and complement of irrational animals.

24. With the fourth species of rule C we ask what the imagination has in other things. We answer that it has an object in the subject in which it exists. Moreover, it has power to discover sense objects by drawing species from them with its light, namely its imaginative part. It investigates species which it places and clarifies in its own co-essential imaginable as in a crystal whose transparency takes on the colour of the object on which it stands, or as in a mirror clothed with the species before it.

25. With the first species of rule D we ask what the imagination originates from. We answer that it exists on its own, as a specific species.

26. With the second species of rule D we ask what the imagination consists of. We answer that it consists of its matter and form with which it is active and passive in the subject in which it exists.

27. With the third species of rule D we ask whom the imagination is subjected to. We say that it is subjected to man and to man's soul, but it is subjected to an irrational animal as a part belonging to its whole.

28. With the first species of rule E we ask why the imagination exists. We say that it exists because it consists of its parts, namely the imaginative, imaginable and imagining.

29. With the second species of rule E we ask why the imagination exists. We say that it exists for enabling animals to objectify objects by imagining them while they are absent from the senses. The senses dispose themselves in proportion with the imaginative to sense their objects when they become present, as a carpenter imagines the shape of a box in order to bring it from potentiality into act, or when a bird gets ready to fly when it has to.

30. With the first species of rule F we ask about the continuous quantity of the imaginative power. We answer that it has the quantity of its essence extended into its correlatives, along with its quantity as a habit of the subject in which it exists, like a coat whose size fits the man wearing it.

31. With the second species of the same rule, we ask about the discrete quantity of the imaginative power. We say that it has the quantity of its distinct correlatives. Here the intellect wonders why the imagination increases or decreases its act, as when a man imagines that a small stone is the size of a mountain. Then the intellect reflects upon itself and considers that in irrational animals, the imagination imagines objects as having the same size and shape as shown by the senses, and not otherwise. For instance, when a goat imagines a wolf, it cannot imagine that it is as big as a mountain, for if a goat could expand its imagining in this way, it could also build science, which is impossible. However, since the imagination is subject to the higher power of the intellect, the intellect uses it beyond the senses, as when it compels the imagination to visualize a wolf the size of a mountain.

32. Here, the intellect sees how Geometry measures the heights and depths of heaven. Likewise, it uses Arithmetic to enumerate infinite parts with the help of Geometry, by dividing one part into two, and so on into infinite parts. The intellect also understands how logicians use second intentions in conjunction with first intentions. Further, it realizes that something that was never present to the senses is present in the intellect, for instance: the senses have never witnessed a wolf as big as a mountain. After realizing all these things, the intellect understands that its essence is another essence totally removed from corporeal essences and their conditions, and it rejoices greatly in this, because it understands that it is immortal and incorruptible.

33. With the first species of rule G we ask what the imagination is a property of, and what is proper to imagination itself. The answer to the first question is that the imagination is a property of the animal to which it belongs. In answer to the second question, we say that it is proper to the imagination to objectify likenesses of sense objects when the senses are absent from them. Now the intellect wonders: since the imagination has no senses such as hearing, sight etc. how can it attain any likenesses of sense objects? Then it remembers how a magnet attracts iron by means of its species, and how rhubarb attracts choler by means of its species, and likewise how animals, in the absence of the senses, attract species or likenesses by means of their own species through the imaginative power.

34. With the second species of rule G we ask about the appropriated qualities of imagination. We say that they are the likenesses drawn from sense objects and transposed into the imagination, such as the colours of coloured objects, the quantities of quantified objects, the sound of a bell, the coldness of water, etc. with which the imagination objectifies its objects by imagining them.

35. With all the species of rule H we ask when the imagination exists. We answer that it exists so long as an animal exists, because an animal cannot be without imagination any more than it can be without senses. And we leave the discourse on the imagination with the species of H up to the diligent reader, for the sake of brevity.

36. With rule I we ask where the imagination imagines its objects. We answer that it imagines them in its own essence, namely in its intrinsic and consubstantial imaginable part, apart from which and without which no imaginable thing can be imagined. Just as hot things cannot exist without heat, so an imagined object cannot be imagined anywhere else than in the imagination's intrinsic consubstantial imaginable, which is a subject universal to whatever can be imagined. We will not deal here with the discourse on imagination through the species of I, but we leave it up to the diligent reader for the sake of brevity, as we said above in rule H.

37. With the first rule K we ask how the imagination objectifies its objects. At first sight, this question is difficult for the intellect to answer because the process is not accessible to the senses; but then it remembers the four species of rule K with which it intends to solve this question. In animals, the sensitive and imaginative powers are parts that are compounded together and have one compound organ in common. Each power exists in the other so that the imagination draws likenesses from sense objects by means of the sensitive power and it objectifies its objects with these likenesses, just as fire mixed with water draws likenesses from water with which it heats flesh, as for instance when the imagination imagines the process of sexual intercourse.

38. With the second rule K we ask what instruments the imagination imagines its objects with. We answer that it imagines them with the organ wherein it resides, which is a membrane inside the head as we already mentioned above in #21, the eighth definition. It attains objects by means of the complexion of this membrane, which is melancholy because the back of the membrane is coagulated by the restrictive quality of cold that acts like a lead coating on the back of a mirror by blocking transparency in that area. The front part of the membrane faces the forehead, and it is porous due to the dryness that is the proper quality of earth whereby it draws things out and absorbs them. The forehead is the locus where humans discover species by means of the human intellect whereas irrational animals do that by instinct, and these species are presented to the front of the membrane by the intellect or by instinct. The intellect and the instinct present these species to the front of the membrane by means of their own species just as a magnet attracts iron with its species; and then the membrane colours, paints and clothes itself in images with its species just as a mirror does. The imagination also attains objects through the disposition of the senses along with its own disposition and the proportion between both, through its appetite and the objectification and discovery of species, through its descent to sense objects, its withdrawal from the sense object and its ascent back into itself by means of the sensitive power. It attains objects by means of the nourishment it derives from species, and there are yet more ways in which the imagination is said to attain its objects. Now the intellect realizes that just as it is very intensely preoccupied and burdened with its objects, so is the imagination also greatly preoccupied and burdened with its own objects in its own way.

Section 6 - the Sixth Subject

Chapter 1 - The Sensitive Power Combined with the Principles

1. The sensitive faculty is a power with which animals sense things and with which they are sensed; the sensitive power of animals comprises a common sense and particular senses.

2. The sensitive power is good because it causes a good act of sensing with its goodness, and when greatness is added, it causes good and great sensing.

3. The sensitive power is great because it causes a great act of sensing, as perceived in coitus or in touching hot iron or boiling water.

4. The sensitive power lasts by reason of duration in the subject in which it exists with innate goodness, greatness etc.

5. With its power, the sensitive faculty can exist and act. Here, the intellect realizes that an animal senses things by means of its species just as a magnet attracts iron by means of its species.

6. The sensitive power has an innate instinct, for instance: humans instinctively fear snakes on sight, just as goats are afraid of wolves; and a kitten with its eyes not yet open uses touch instinctively to seek out its mother's nipples that it imagines with appetite. Here, the intellect knows what kind of principles dispose the imagination to imagine objects.

7. The sensitive power causes animals to have an appetite for sensing things so that it can exercise its acts through the animals in which it exists.

8. The sensitive power has a virtue for sensing things, and this is clearly noticeable in its particular senses; just as the sense of sight cannot see anything at all without light and space, likewise, it cannot see anything at all if it is not clothed and disposed in the habit of its own innate virtue.

9. The sensitive power senses things truly by reason of truth, just as a hand holding a hot iron truly feels heat. Here the intellect realizes that it truly understands its object, or else the sensitive faculty, which is below the intellect, would have a superior act while the intellect, a faculty higher than the sensitive faculty, would have an inferior act, and this is impossible. And this impossibility is a source of great joy to the intellect.

10. Animals enjoy sensing things with the sensitive power, we know this when we see a beautiful shape or hear a beautiful song and things like these.

11. By reason of difference, the sensitive power has particular senses that are determined by means of the organs with which it differentiates sense objects. For instance, colour is an object of sight, sound is an object of hearing and so forth. Now the intellect wonders whether objects are judged by the common sense or by the particular senses. Then it remembers that the water of a fountain is essentially one in itself as well as in the numerous streams into which it divides, wherein it disposes and forms one shape in one stream and another shape in another stream; likewise, the common sense is disposed and configured in a different way in each specific organ.

12. The sensitive faculty has innate concordance whereby the power, the object and the act all convene in one entity, i.e. in the sensitive faculty, which is their essence whose correlatives are indicated the second species of rule C. Here, the intellect sees how things are sensed by the senses using the peregrine habits with which they are habituated so that coloured objects are attained by the sense of sight, whereas fragrant objects are attained by the sense of smell.

13. In the sensitive faculty there is accidental contrariety, like bitterness to the taste or roughness to the touch and so on. Now the intellect wonders: what is the cause of contrariety in the senses? Then it remembers that the sensitive faculty is a composite of four elements that cause contrary qualities, habits, dispositions, actions and passions in elemented things; moreover, every plant and animal acts according to its own species so that apples manifest sweetness while wormwood manifests bitterness etc. The intellect also considers the fact that ailments of the senses cause deformities, as when sweet food accidentally tastes bitter to a sick man.

14. Disposed as a principle, the sensitive faculty is an efficient cause that causes things like the taste of food and the sweet enjoyment of coitus. The sensitive faculty is a form that is present in every animal and that the animal moves in matter so as to dispose this matter to receive passions for the purpose of obtaining some sense object such as some coloured thing, or something that has a certain smell etc. In addition, animals are sensed by the sensitive faculty just as coloured things are coloured with colour and fragrant things are perfumed with fragrance.

15. The common sense is the middle whereas the particular senses are extremes, just as a circumference is peripheral to its center, just as a disposition is peripheral to the things disposed in it, and just as a habit is peripheral to what is habituated with it. Here, the intellect realizes that the common sense is a cause of sense objects inasmuch as they are sensed by the common sense using its particular senses as instruments: for instance, an apple is sensed by the common sense using taste, smell, sight, touch and the affatus that calls it an apple while the ear hears the word "apple". The sensitive power exists between the imaginative and the vegetative, like a line between two points. The imaginative power is grafted and founded upon the sensitive power just as the sensitive power is grafted upon the vegetative, so that the

imaginative can imagine the conditions of the vegetative by means of the sensitive. This is shown by the definition of the middle and by its ladder in the second figure.

16. The sensitive power has an innate end toward which it moves even as it moves toward sense objects by using its instinct, its appetite and its other innate principles just as a man uses his eyes and feet to move to his destination. Here, the intellect realizes that the sensitive faculty acts with its innate principles.

17. Some sensitive powers are greater than others, which is accidentally due to the species of the subjects in which they exist. For instance, by reason of the higher quality of the site where it is disposed, the water of some fountain has greater qualities of coldness, taste and purity than the water of some other fountain has. Eagles have a greater sense of sight than other animals, vultures have a greater sense of smell, dogs have a greater sense of hearing, and humans have greater senses of taste and touch than other animals have.

18. The equality of power, object and act in the sensitive faculty resides in the intrinsic equality of its correlatives, namely the sensitive, sensible and sensing. However, no such equality exists between an object and a peregrine act, as for instance between the objective taste sensed in an apple and the subjective sensation of taste caused by the act of tasting it.

19. Some sensitive faculties are inferior to others, due to the subjects in which they exist. For instance, the sense of taste in non-predatory birds is not as developed as it is in birds of prey. The same can be said about the remaining senses in their own way, as signified in the chapter on majority.

Chapter 2 - The Sensitive Power Combined with the Rules

20. We ask whether the sensitive power is generated or created. The answer is that it is generated; this is clear if we consider the fact that without the sensitive power an animal could not sense its corporeal conditions, and it would have to sense them in the imagination but not in itself, if the sensitive power was not grafted onto its natural foundation in the vegetative power. Moreover, unless the sensitive power is generated, Martin cannot be the son of John in accordance with their species, which is impossible. Now the intellect wonders: when a man dies, where does the sensitive faculty go and where does it reside? We say that it returns to its universal principles wherein it miraculously retains its own identity so that the resurrection of humans can take place and so that God's justice and mercy can have a subject upon which to act.

21. With the first species of rule C we ask what the sensitive faculty is. The answer to this was already given above, in chapter 1, #1.

22. With the second species of the same rule we ask what the sensitive faculty has co-essentially in itself. We answer that it has its correlatives that constitute the common sense.

23. With the third species of the same rule we ask what the sensitive faculty is in other things. We say that it is a being that causes sensed beings with which it senses things, as sight causes coloured things to be objects of sight inasmuch as they are seen by it, and as the sense of smell causes things to be objects of smell inasmuch as they are smelled by it.

24. With the fourth species of the same rule we ask what the sensitive faculty has in other things. We say that it has its objects, for instance, sight has objects with colour and shape, and the sense of smell has odorous things. And it has knowledge of its objects so it can make judgments about them.

25. With the first species of rule D we ask what the sensitive faculty originates from. We answer that it originates in its own principles, namely the first parents from whom it derives and who engendered it. Otherwise, one animal would not be another animal's offspring, which is impossible.

26. With the second species of rule D we ask what the sensitive faculty is made of. We answer that it is made of its own form and matter, so that it is active with its form and passive with its matter.

27. With the third species of rule D we ask to whom the sensitive faculty belongs. We answer that it belongs to the animal in which it exists, as an instrument belongs to the agent using it, because animals use it to sense things, to survive and to generate other animals.

28. With the first species of rule E we ask why the sensitive faculty exists. We answer that it exists because it is constituted of the conjunction of its form and matter.

29. With the second species of rule E we ask why the sensitive faculty exists. We answer that it exists so that its instinct and appetite can have natural acts, and so that animals can have the skill to survive. Further, it exists so that the imaginative faculty can draw species from it, and exercise its act by imagining sense objects.

30. With the first species of rule F we ask about the quantity of the sensitive faculty. The answer is that it has the quantity of the objects it senses. Now the intellect wonders: how can it be continuously present in the subject in which it exists and in subjects that have hair, nails and bones that do not sense anything? Then it remembers its discrete quantity signified by the second species of rule F. Further, the intellect wonders: since the sensitive faculty has no points, lines or shape, how can it have quantity? Then it remembers that a crystal placed on a coloured object takes on its colour; likewise, the sensitive faculty takes on, as a habit, the quantity of the subject in which it exists, while its punctual and linear quantities reproduce their species in the sensitive faculty just as a coloured object placed under a crystal reproduces its colour in the crystal. Here, the intellect sees how one habit is situated above another.

31. With the first species of rule G we ask what is proper to the sensitive faculty. We answer that it is the act of sensing with which it senses things on its own as well as with its own organs, namely the ears, the eyes etc. with which it senses things, and these organs are its instruments.

32. With the second species of rule G we ask what the appropriated qualities of the sensitive faculty are. We answer that the appropriated qualities of the sensitive faculty are the objects of the senses inasmuch as they are acquired externally and introduced into the sensitive faculty, for instance when a coloured stone is sensed by the sense of sight, or when an apple is sensed by the sense of smell, and so forth. Here the intellect realizes that the sensitive faculty reproduces its species just as the imaginative faculty does.

33. With rule H we ask how the sensitive faculty exists in time and in movement, as it has no points and no lines. We answer that it exists in time and in movement by means of the subject in which it resides. This is proved by rules B, C, D and K as the diligent reader can see, and this clarification is sufficient for the sake of brevity.

34. With rule I we ask where the sensitive faculty senses things. We answer that it senses objects in its intrinsic sensible part, which is of the essence of the sensitive faculty, for without this sensible part, no object can be sensed. Here, the intellect wonders how stones and other such objects can be sensed though they are not located in the essence of the sensitive power and though they have no senses; nor do they have any direct contact with the eyes, for if they did, the sense of sight would attain substance and the sense of hearing would attain the bell itself, so that irrational animals could perceive substance and build science, which is impossible. However, the intellect remembers how a rose spreads its fragrance through the air that comes into contact with this rose, and likewise, how the sight reproduces its species in the air that comes into contact with the eye and with the coloured objects it senses. This is enough about rule I, for the sake of brevity.

35. With the first rule K we ask how the sensitive faculty senses things. At first approach, the intellect has difficulty in answering the question because this process cannot be sensed, whereas the intellect wants to clarify it by using the senses. However, it descends to the

imagination that can imagine this process, and to memory that can remember rule K. Now the intellect answers this question and says that the sensitive faculty has a process for sensing things by the combined action of its instinct, its appetite, its virtue and its other principles with which it draws and gathers from objects the likenesses by means of which it objectifies the same objects. For instance, the sense of sight draws and collects from a coloured object a likeness into which it introduces its own likeness, and it perceives the coloured object by means of these likenesses.

36. With the second rule K we ask what the sensitive faculty senses things with. We answer that it is with its species, just as a magnet attracts iron with its species. And it senses things with its natural instruments, such as sight, hearing etc. Moreover, it senses things by means of acquired species with which it senses peregrine objects, and by means of its instinct, its appetite, its virtue and its ability to move its organs to sense things.

Section 7 - the Seventh Subject

Chapter 1 - The Vegetative Power Combined with the Principles

1. The vegetative power is good, as we see in plants that are good in themselves and in the animals that live on plants and cannot survive or be what they are without them.

2. The vegetative power is great, for it enfolds and encompasses all vegetation and everything that is rooted in the vegetative power. Now the intellect asks if the vegetative power in animals and plants is the same power. We reply that it is the same general power present in many different species in a diversity of subjects, and it is diversified on account of them but not on its own account. To say that the vegetative power is plural per se would amount to saying in other words that unity is plurality and plurality is unity, which is impossible. Thus it is obvious that it is the same genus though it is diversified into many different species in various subjects.

3. The vegetative power is durable through its own specific duration. But the intellect wonders: what makes it durable even though the subjects in which it exists are corruptible? Then it remembers that the elementative power makes the vegetative power durable, just as the oil in a lamp makes the flame durable.

4. The vegetative power is powered with its own specific power wherein all the vegetal powers of plants and animals are planted and rooted.

5. The vegetative power has instinct by means of which every vegetated being is committed to its own specific work of clothing itself in its own specific habit, disposition, quantity, quality and so forth.

6. The vegetative power has an appetite for turning elemented things into vegetated things just as the sense of sight has an appetite for turning coloured things into objects sensed by it. This appetite is general to all the appetites in the vegetative genus.

7. The vegetative power is habituated, quantified, qualified etc. with virtue, as we see in plants. Everything that comes to a plant from the earth, water, air and fire in which it is planted is transmuted by the plant into its own species, which it does by taking solid and liquid nourishment. The vegetative also has virtues in plants that physicians have learned to know by experience.

8. By reason of truth, the vegetative power truly vegetates and has its true conditions, such as true substance, quantity, quality etc. without which it would not be planted in its own truth.

9. The vegetative power enjoys preserving its existence and reproducing its species, as we see in plants that procreate as much as they can to avoid non-being.

10. The vegetative power is planted and rooted in difference, so that there are many species belonging to its genus. However, the intellect wonders: why is the colour green more general than any other colour in plants? Then it remembers that earth and water compose the colour green, and that the vegetative is planted, rooted and nourished chiefly in these elements. The intellect also wonders why figs do not grow a hard shell as nuts do; and why is this rose red while this lily is white? Then it remembers greatness, by reason of which difference is great.

11. The vegetative power has concordance so that its species have things in which they agree, for instance, garlic and pepper agree in heat, lettuce and squash agree in coldness etc. and many things convene in colour, disposition, and so forth. The same can be said in its own way about the vegetative in animals. And the vegetative always proceeds by vegetating the dominant complexion of the subject in which it exists.

12. Contrariety is a subject in which the vegetative power is planted so that contrariety can cause corruption just as concordance causes generation. The intellect asks why realgar kills animals whereas wheat keeps them alive, and why garlic and squash have opposite qualities. Then it remembers the greatness in which the vegetative power's contrariety is planted.

13. The vegetative power is a principle with which vegetating composites transmute one species into another. In addition, vegetative form is a principle by means of which composites transmute old forms into new ones and old matter into new matter, and they do this in order to produce vegetated beings in which vegetal species are engendered and reproduced.

14. The vegetative power is a general medium that exists between the elementative and the sensitive powers, like a line between two points. The vegetative power is grafted on and planted in the elementative power, and in turn, the sensitive power is grafted on the vegetative. And the sensitive power, as the end, stands above the vegetative and influences it while the vegetative reciprocates by sending its own influence with its own specific principles back to the sensitive. Moreover, because the vegetative stands above the elementative, it influences it and the elementative reciprocates by influencing the vegetative. Here, the intellect knows the process whereby plants and animals survive, feed and grow with the vegetative and on the vegetative, with the elementative and on the elementative. This point of knowledge is useful to physicians. The intellect also realizes that a tree is a means, a subject, and an instrument with which and in which the vegetative performs its acts while its principles also perform their acts - like water entering into a vase through one hole and leaving it through another hole - and the vegetative power does this through the mode of generation, corruption and privation.

15. In the vegetative power, the end has the species shown in the angle of the end in the second figure. The end of privation is the cause of corruption in the vegetative. And the sensitive and elementative powers are the termini of the vegetative in which the vegetative is terminated. The end of perfection is the object and the subject of the vegetative power.

16. The vegetative power in plants makes some plants bigger than others, and in animals too, the vegetative makes some animals bigger than others; for instance, a lion can be bigger than other lions or bigger than some other animal like a goat or a hare etc. This is for the purpose of enabling the vegetative power to be planted in majority, with reference to the majority of the ten predicates and of the principles of this art. Now the intellect wonders why a big tree can potentially exist in a tiny seed. Then it remembers how a spark issues from a stone struck with iron, and that a great flame potentially exists in this spark, depending on the material available to it. And the intellect wonders why some fruits of the same tree are bigger than others, as they all belong to the same species; and it asks the same about leaves. Then it remembers the spark in the previous question, and right away the solution becomes clear.

17. There is equality in the vegetative power, so that many plants and many other things can be equal, like this lion and that lion that both equally belong to the same species. Pepper

and garlic are equal in their degree of heat, many apples in the same apple tree have equal fragrance, taste and colour, and so forth. Indeed, this cannot be so unless the vegetative power is planted and rooted in equality.

18. The same things can be said about minority and the vegetative power as we said about majority, because majority and minority are related. By reason of minority, the vegetative power can be reduced to non-being, because it exists now but did not exist before it was created.

Chapter 2 - The Vegetative Power Combined with the Rules

19. With rule B we ask if the vegetative power is accessible to the senses. We answer that it is accessible to the senses in a one way because it is joined to, or composed with the sensitive power in the subjects in which it exists. In addition, it is accessible in another way through the voice, when the affatus names the vegetative and the hearing hears this name. However, the other senses cannot sense the vegetative power at all. Here, the intellect realizes that the affatus is a sense that delivers an audible signal to the ear after having sensed an object.

20. With the first species of rule C we ask what the vegetative power is. We answer that it is a power that transmutes one species into another, as we see in animals in which it transmutes food into flesh, and in plants in which it transmutes the elementative into itself.

21. With the second species of rule C we ask what the vegetative power has in itself essentially and consubstantially. We answer that it has its constitutive correlatives with which it does its work, which are its vegetative, vegetable and vegetating. Now the vegetative vegetates all peregrine vegetable objects in its innate vegetable part, just as the sensitive faculty senses all peregrine sensible objects in its innate sensible part, and just as the heater heats all peregrine heatable objects in its innate heatable part.

22. With the third species of rule C we ask what the vegetative power is in other things. We answer that it is the foundation of the sensitive faculty, and it is founded in the elementative. With reference to the predicates, it is identified with the subject in which it exists so that it is a substantial part of the substance in which it exists, while the vegetative power's quantity depends on the quantity of the elementative power, and the same can be said about its quality, relation etc. Here the intellect realizes that the vegetative power stands above the elementative; however, the intellect wonders whether this relation is accidental until it remembers that substantial relation uses accidental relation as an instrument and habit by means of which it is active in the subject in which it exists when substance acts through its accidents.

23. With the fourth species, we ask what the vegetative power has in other things. We answer that it has its substance in the substance of the elementative power, it has its quantity in the quantity of the elementative power, and so on with the other predicates. Here, the intellect sees how the vegetative power is disposed and located in the elementative.

24. With the first species of rule D we ask what the vegetative power originates from. We say that it arises in its own specific principles by means of which it acts.

25. With the second species, we ask what the vegetative power is made of. We say that it is made of its correlatives.

26. With the third species, we ask to whom the vegetative power belongs. We answer that it belongs to the subject in which it exists, as a part belongs to its whole and as an instrument belongs to an agent. The vegetative power is a part of an animal through which and with which it lives and acts, and likewise, plants live through the vegetative power and with the vegetative power.

27. With the first species of rule E we ask why the vegetative power exists. We answer that it exists because it is constituted of its consubstantial parts, namely its correlatives.

28. With the second species of rule E we ask why the vegetative power exists. We answer that it exists so that vegetated things can exist and so that it can live, feed, grow and transmute one species into another through generation.

29. With the first species of rule F we ask if the vegetative power has continuous quantity in a subject in which it exists. We answer that it does, so that it can be in continuous motion.

30. With the second species of rule F we ask if the vegetative power has discrete quantity. We say that it does, so that it can be in successive motion. However, the intellect wonders: how can the vegetative power have both continuous and discrete quantity in the same subject? Then, it remembers that it has continuous quantity in its essence, and discrete quantity in its correlatives.

31. With the first species of rule G we ask about the property proper to the vegetative power. We answer that its proper quality is the general quality from which all particular qualities descend; for instance, the hot qualities of pepper and garlic descend from the general quality of heat, and the coldness of lettuce and squash descends from the general quality of cold, etc. As the properties proper to the vegetative power derive from general elemental qualities, so does the quantity of the vegetative power derive from the general quantity of the elementative. We say that the general property or quality of the vegetative power is that of transmuting one substance into another substance.

32. With the second species of rule G we ask what the appropriated quality of the vegetative power is. We answer that it is the transmutation of species, which proceeds as the elementative appropriates its quantity, quality etc. to the vegetative power; and vegetation, inasmuch as it is effected by the movement of heaven, is an appropriated quality of the vegetative power.

33. With rule H we ask how the vegetative exists in time. But the intellect has difficulty in answering this, until it remembers that the vegetative receives influence from the elementative whereby it exists in time and movement as well as in quantity, quality etc. This is because the elementative essence is punctual and linear, which is not at all the case with the vegetative. This is signified by rules C, D and K to the diligent reader.

34. With rule I we ask where the vegetative vegetates vegetated things. The answer is that it does this in its own intrinsic and consubstantial vegetable part, apart from which and without which it cannot vegetate, just as the heater deprived of its intrinsic heatable part cannot heat anything. The vegetative power's locality can be known with rules C, D and K. And the vegetative power attains substance because it participates with substance through its contact with it.

35. With the first rule K we ask how the vegetative vegetates vegetated things. We say that it vegetates them by means of the mode of its correlatives. The vegetative places in its intrinsic vegetable part the form and matter that come to it from the elementative; and in this vegetable part it turns one substance into another as the vegetative strips the elementative form and matter it acquired externally and clothes a new vegetated being with new form and matter. And many other processes concur with this one, such as the process of proportioning, the processes of generation, corruption, privation, growth and so on, as the vegetative power places one part in another, the parts in the whole and conversely while the whole transmits its likeness to the things it assimilates.

36. With the second rule K we ask what the vegetative vegetates vegetated things with. We answer that it vegetates them with its own correlatives, namely its co-essential vegetative, vegetable and vegetating parts; the vegetative, in its intrinsic vegetable part, vegetates all peregrine vegetated things through the act of vegetating. In addition, it vegetates with the principles of this art, namely goodness, greatness etc. The things said here about the

vegetative are sufficient, although much more can be said about it; everything that can be said about it is implicitly contained in what we just said.

Section 8 - the Eighth Subject

Chapter 1 - The Elementative Power Combined with the Principles

1. The elementative is a power with which the elements enter into composition and it is the substrate of all elemented things. The elementative power is good because without it, corporeal things would be idle and deviated from the end for which they are meant, and the world would be incomplete. Inasmuch as it is good, it is a reason for good to good.

2. The elementative is a great power encompassing many things within its greatness. Moreover, its greatness greatly magnifies its duration, its goodness etc.

3. The elementative lasts as long as the corruption of one element is promptly and without delay followed by the generation of another element, so that no species are absent, nor any of their conditions, because no element is corruptible in its essence.

4. The elementative is a powerful species that is what it is and that does what it does. It has no shortage of this power, for the elementative can element elemented things just as the vegetative power can vegetate vegetated things, just as the sensitive faculty can perceive sense objects, and just as the imaginative faculty can imagine imaginary things.

5. The elementative has a general instinct from which the instincts of species descend, followed by the instincts of individual elemented things. We know this by our experience of the four seasons of the year, namely spring, summer, autumn and winter when the elementative works in different ways as it also does in the four directions, namely in the east, the west, the south and the north. The same can be said about plant and animal life. In addition, the elementative power has an instinct for receiving virtue from the planets and from the eighth sphere. Now the intellect knows why each element acts in accordance with its species.

6. The elementative has an appetite for elementing elemented things so that the appetites of the elements enter into mixture and composition, wherein some elements have an appetite for ascending and other elements have an appetite for descending, and thus the elementative is the substrate of elemented things. Here the intellect sees what causes the elements to move through generation, corruption and privation.

7. The elementative has a general virtue from which the special virtues of the elements descend, and these virtues are the foundation of the virtues present in vegetated and sentient beings. But sometimes its virtue is deficient because of oppositions between elements.

8. The elementative has true conditions whereby one species does not transmute itself into another species. Now we know what depresses alchemists and makes them weep.

9. The elementative naturally enjoys elementing things, just as the vegetative power enjoys vegetating and just as the sensitive power enjoys sensing. Because of this, the elementative expands and reproduces its acts as much as it can, so as to provide great enjoyment to the elements. Here the intellect sees what causes intense heat, taste, colour and things like this.

10. With its difference, the elementative has different subjects in which it is diffused, as in the four masses that are accessible to the senses, like this flame, this air, this water, this earth that we use. The elementative is also present in metals, plants and animals where it is not at all accessible to the senses, but only to the imagination and the intellect. Here, the intellect knows how some philosophers become deceived and say that the elements do not exist in elemented things actually, but only potentially and virtually.

11. By reason of its concordance, end, goodness, greatness, power, instinct, appetite and virtue, the elementative exists in the four masses and in elemented things in a less intense and more dispersed state, to allow for temperament among contrary qualities. Water with its coldness mortifies fire, fire with its heat mortifies water, air with its moisture mortifies earth, and earth with its dryness mortifies air, so that the elementative can generate elements by elementing, just as the digestive power digests digestible matter and just as a blacksmith softens iron with heat to make a nail. Here, the intellect knows that concordance is a general cause of elemented things.

12. The elementative is habituated and disposed in contrary qualities, namely heat and cold, moisture and dryness, lightness and heaviness, rarity and density; so that contrariety can cause corruption in elemented things.

13. In the elementative, there are four principles: the elementing entity is an efficient principle that introduces form into matter to produce elemented things in the end. The principles of this art, namely goodness, greatness etc. concur in this process, as does the movement of heaven that causes the elementative to move in things below. Moreover, the ten predicates are in the elementative, which is diffused in them as well as in the principles and rules of this art. The principles are in the elementative in a more objective way, whereas the rules are in it in a more subjective way. Here, the intellect realizes that the principles objectify the elementative whereas the rules sustain it.

14. The elementative mediates between the simple elements and compound elemented things, just as the particular senses mediate between the common sense and sense objects. Here the intellect recognizes the source of elementative movement, the points from which it flows back to its source and the subjects through which it runs its course.

15. The end purpose of the elementative is in having and generating the elemented things in which it reposes. The elementative has no other appetite beyond this; for if it did have an appetite for anything more than its elemented product, its elemented product would not be its own proper goal, so that it would repose more in something that does not come out of its own nature, than in something that does. Thus, a blacksmith would find more satisfaction in the nails that he produces than in his own son whom he has engendered, and a lion would find greater satisfaction in hunting than in generating offspring, which is impossible. Therefore, it is clear that the ultimate purpose of the elementative is in having and generating the elemented things in which it reposes. Now the intellect knows that the elementative reposes in elemented things just as the vegetative power reposes in vegetated things, just as the imaginative reposes in imagined things and just as the intellect reposes in the things understood by it

16. In its subjects, the elementative has a major presence of one quality and a minor presence of other qualities; for instance, it is present in pepper with more heat than dryness, more dryness than moisture and more moisture than cold. Here the intellect knows the process whereby the elementative produces subalternate degrees in its subjects; however, the pattern of youth and old age is not the same, for here the elementative is greater in the middle than in the extremes, just as the Sun has a greater and hotter effect at noon than it has in the morning or in the evening.

17. The elementative is disposed in equality. The elementative has quantitatively equal essences so that there can be proportionality in elemented things and so that this rose and that rose can equally belong to the same species. Likewise with other things in their way: for otherwise, the elements would corrupt each others' essence and nature, or one element would transmute another into its essence, as if a rose could transmute a lily or a violet into its own essence.

18. The elementative is disposed in minority, because its principles were brought forth from nothingness by creation, and when the elementative exists in minor elemented things, its habits and disposition are of minor quantity, quality etc.

Chapter 2 - The Elementative Power Combined with the Rules

19. We ask if the elementative power is essentially different from elemented things. We answer that it is not, because if it was essentially different, the elements would not have a subject in which they could enter into composition, and the elementative would arise not from generation but from creation. Moreover, the qualities of the elements would be altered as they migrated into new subjects; for instance, the heat of fire in a stone would not belong to the same subjective species as the heat of fire in the sphere of fire, which is impossible; just as the quality of humanity is not different from that of the soul and the body inasmuch as they are joined, because humanity consists of both of these things in conjunction and not of either one by itself; likewise, the elementative is not different from the conjoined elements that make it up.

20. With the first species of rule C we ask what the elementative is. We answer that its definition was already given above, in #1 of the previous chapter.

21. With the second species of rule C we ask what the elementative has in itself, essentially and consubstantially. We say that it has its correlatives of which it is made and with which it acts in elemented things, as in stones, flames, plants and animals.

22. With the third species of rule C we ask what the elementative is in other things. We say it is an instrument enabling the elements to act in elemented things. In addition, it is what it is in the ten predicates. Moreover, it is the foundation of the vegetative power. Further, the elementative potentiality of fire is an image of God's infinity and eternity, for if fire had an infinite amount of fuel, it could burn infinitely and eternally, but since it does not have it, this potentiality remains as a merely finite disposition for lack of an infinite amount of combustible matter.

23. With the fourth species, we ask what the elementative has in other things. We say that in the subjects in which it exists it has its matter, its form, its quantity, quality, movement and so forth as we see in plants and animals.

24. With the first species of rule D we ask what the elementative originates from. We say that it originates from its primordial principles disposed in elemented things, and elemented things are made of these universal principles along with universal form and universal matter.

25. With the second species of rule D we ask what the elementative is made of. We say that it is made of its own specific form and matter with which it can act according to its own species by elementing elemented things.

26. With the third species of rule D we ask to whom the elementative belongs. We say that it belongs to the subjects in which it exists as a part belongs to its whole, as we can see when a plant elements another plant while engendering it.

27. With the first species of rule E we ask why the elementative exists. We answer that it is because it is made of the composition of elements in elemented things, and because through its mediation elements enter into composition in elemented things.

28. With the second species of rule E we ask why the elementative exists. We say that it exists for enabling elemented things to exist and so that the vegetative, sensitive and imaginative powers can be founded upon it and nourished by it.

29. With the first species of rule F we ask if the elementative has continuous quantity. We answer that it has, so that its continuous quantity can be general to the individual quantities that are delineated and sustained in it.

30. With the second species of rule F we ask if the elementative has discrete quantities. We answer that it has, as we see in individual elemented things with numerically different quantities or sizes. In addition, its quantity is punctual, because it is made of the conjunction of the four elements.

31. With the first species of rule G we ask about the proper quality of the elementative power. We answer that it has the proper qualities of its elements, for instance, choler is elemented and has the proper quality of heat.

32. With the second species of rule G we ask about the appropriated quality of fire. We say that dryness is its appropriated quality because it receives dryness from earth; and with the exception of heat, the remaining qualities are also appropriated, because fire receives them from the other elements.

33. With rule H we ask how the elementative exists in time. We answer that it exists in time in view of the 'now' in which it is present. In addition, it exists in time because it is in motion as it augments, alters and moves the subject in which it exists from place to place.

34. With rule I we ask where the elementative is. We say that it is in elemented things, but in a subjective way, unlike sight that is objectively present in coloured objects. Now if the elementative was not present in elemented things, either there would be no qualities in them, or the qualities would have no subject, which is impossible, as we see in a flame, that contains heat, or in ice that contains cold and so forth.

35. The intellect wonders if the dryness of earth and the coldness of water are present in the sphere of fire, for they belong to the lower elements, and moisture resists and opposes earth's dryness while the heat of fire opposes the coldness of water. Then it remembers that if all four elements were not present in the sphere of fire as well as in every one of the remaining elemental spheres, the general mixture of elements would be destroyed along with the mixtures particular to elemented things, because the destruction of a universal is followed by the destruction of its particulars.

36. Moreover, fire, which is hot per se in its own sphere and dry because of earth, would be dry per se. Air, which is moist per se and warm because of fire, would be warm per se. Then water, which in its own sphere is cold per se and moist because of air, would be moist per se. Likewise, earth, which is dry per se in its own sphere and cold because of water, would be cold per se. Thus, each element would have two general qualities. There would be two warm, two moist, two cold, and two dry qualities, resulting in eight elements in accordance with these supposed qualities, namely two igneities, two aereities, two aqueities and two terreities. This is an absurd thing to say, just as it would be absurd to state that there are two general whitenesses, two general vegetative essences and two general sensitive essences.

37. Further, natural appetite would be destroyed as it would be deprived of an object, fire would not seek out other fire, nor would fire have any appetite for earth given that it would be dry per se, and the same can be said about the other elements in their own way. In addition, appropriated quality would be destroyed, along with the second species of rule G that signifies this quality. Moreover, the ascending and descending appetites of movement would be destroyed, bringing about the destruction of nature because it would have no subject to sustain it. The elementative itself would be destroyed, as well as all elemented, vegetated and sentient beings. The entire sublunar body would be totally deprived of its final purpose, so that the intent of nature would be a privative natural habit like blindness is to the sight, or deafness to the hearing. All these things are utterly impossible. Thus, rule B and the definition of truth show that all the elements are mixed together in their spheres, in their masses and in all elemented things where they exist in a greater degree of mixture and composition. In plants, the elements are in composition with the vegetative power, and in animals they are in composition with the sensitive and imaginative powers by means of the elementative coming into composition with them.

38. Now the intellect wants to know the process through which earth, which is here below, can ascend to the sphere of fire up above although there is air in between, and air opposes earth. Likewise, how can fire descend if water stands in the way and opposes it. Then it remembers the ladder of concordance depicted in the second figure. Fire descends through its affinity with air as it gives its heat to air, and air descends through its affinity with water as it gives its moisture to water. Thus, fire descends to water through heated moisture, and water descends to earth by giving it its moistened and heated coldness, and earth ascends to fire by giving it its cooled, moistened and heated dryness. The qualities never leave their own subjects in the process of ascent and descent while the elements ascend and descend along with them, giving rise to circular motion and mixture.

39. With the first rule K we ask how the elementative is made of the mixture and composition of the four elements. Then, the intellect recalls what we just said in the previous paragraph, where the solution to this question is implicitly signified. This is sufficient, for the sake of brevity.

40. With the second rule K we ask with what means the elementative elements elemented things. We answer that it is with the appetite and instinct of its constitutive principles, as it moves in accordance with the natural definitions of the principles and rules through which it runs its course. The elementative also elements elemented things by imprinting itself in the ten predicates as its movement is impelled along by the general movement of heaven. This matter requires a lengthy clarification, and this clarification is accessible enough to those who know this art.

Section 9 - the Ninth Subject, about Instruments

1. The ninth subject deals with technique. It has three species: the first pertains to the moral arts, the second to the liberal arts and the third to the mechanical arts. At this point we will deal with the first species, or the moral arts, and we will come to the second and third species in the eleventh part of this book, which is about application. Note that we can consider moral issues in two ways - with reference to the virtues and with reference to the vices. We will first deal with justice, which belongs to the genus of virtue.

Chapter 1 - Justice Combined with the Principles

2. Justice applies to virtue, which is its genus as well as one of the principles of this art, and justice also applies to equality. These principles combine with the principles and rules as shown in the eighth part of this book where we deal with mixture; and justice applies to virtue and equality according to the way they combine with the sequence of principles and rules. Particulars apply to their universals in compliance with their universal conditions. Now, to shed more light on justice we want to combine it with the principles and rules of this art.

3. Justice is a habit with which the just act justly. Because goodness is a reason for good to do good, it is just for good to do good; and thus, when it acts, it acts well and justly, which shows that justice arises from the reason of goodness. Here, the intellect realizes that justice arises when its act arises and that goodness disposes justice inasmuch as it is a reason for good to do good.

4. Greatness is that because of which goodness, duration etc. are great, so that greatness is a great disposition of justice, goodness and duration, and if good does good that is great and durable etc. then justice is a great habit made of goodness, greatness, duration etc. Here, the intellect sees the process through which justice connects to its principles and how it arises from them.

5. As goodness, greatness etc. are durable through duration, so is justice durable through duration, so long as injury does not intervene. Here, the intellect sees the process whereby the habit of justice continues to exist even while a man is exercising some other virtue, or while he is asleep. Thus, the intellect is moral and practical.

6. Goodness is a reason on account of which good does good, and greatness disposes goodness to be great, duration disposes it to be durable, power is a reason that enables good to exist and to do good, and justice is disposed to participate in this action, so that when good does good, justice arises and is moved from power into act.

7. Justice is intelligible to the intellect and loved by the will, so that the intellect and the will objectify justice; as justice arises the acts of justice remain in potentiality; now justice is governed by duration, power etc. And truth, goodness and greatness dispose justice to be intelligible and lovable, given that truth is intelligible and all good is lovable, and when justice is understood and loved with the dispositions of goodness, truth, greatness etc. it is then brought from potentiality into act.

8. Justice is a virtue belonging to the genus of virtue that comprises many virtues. As goodness, greatness etc. together give rise to virtue, so does justice arise by the same process that general virtue arises from. Here, the intellect recognizes the process by which particulars are ruled and directed by their universals. Legislators should be glad to know this, for it is an infallible rule general to all legislation.

9. There can be no justice without truth. Through its connection to truth, we can know justice by the same process whereby we know truth by combining it with the principles and rules, as shown in the previous chapter on the mixture of principles and rules. Here, the intellect realizes that justice is easy to know by means of the discourse made with truth in combination with the sequence of principles and rules.

10. Goodness, greatness etc. have enjoyment and repose in glory, which they cannot have without justice; and thus, conscience does not disturb their enjoyment because this enjoyment is just. Hence, it follows that enjoying the repose of a conscience at rest is a clear sign of justice.

11. By reason of difference, justice has two species, namely weight and proportion. Justice is intensive in weight, and extended in proportion. Hence, some cases require intensive judgment and others require extended judgment, according to how each subject of judgment is ordered and ready to receive judgment.

12. Justice arises in the concordance of the principles, and so it lives. Thus, when the concordance of all principles in one judgment is clear, justice and its conditions are also clear; for if the cause is clear, the effect is also clear.

13. Injury is the enemy of justice, because injury is a privative habit; and as concordance is friendly to the principles, justice is a positive habit. Consequently, whenever injury manifests its negative habits that deprive the principles, we recognize justice by its positive habits, for an opposite is known through its counterpart.

14. Justice means, or signifies essence; law signifies the existence of justice, and as existence sustains essence, so does law sustain justice. This shows that the judge, per se, is the efficient cause of justice, that justice is the formal principle, and that law is the material principle because law is informed by justice; ultimately, judgment is the final principle when repose is found in judgment.

15. Justice mediates between the plaintiff and the defendant, while the judge gives to each party its lawful due by reason of justice; and justice cannot mediate without judging, nor can it mediate without bonifying, magnifying etc. so as to combine judgment with goodness, greatness etc.

16. The end purpose of justice is in the repose of the principles, for there can be no repose without justice. Hence, it follows that justice is an ultimate subject in which the principles are

at peace, and with which the judge establishes peace between the plaintiff and the defendant by giving to each his due.

17. Justice is greater in substance than by accident. Hence, it follows that its major majority is substantial and its major minority is accidental: the major majority exists with major goodness, greatness etc. and the major minority exists with minor goodness, greatness etc. Therefore, in adjudicating cases, a judge must recognize which justice is major or minor, based on his knowledge of substantial and accidental justice. This knowledge is most necessary for making findings, for justice may in some cases stand substantially on the side of the plaintiff and accidentally on the side of the defendant, or vice-versa, as we see in the comparison of subsistence to well-being, where subsistence implies necessity whereas well-being implies contingency. Here, the intellect realizes that necessity does not abide by any law.

18. Equality is a habit of justice, and equality is more general than justice. Hence, as we said earlier, we treat justice in the same way as we treated equality in the treatise on the principles. Here, the intellect sees that it is good and equitable to render to each one his due with goodness, greatness etc.

19. In legal cases, one instance of justice is minor as compared to another, and minor justice is more distant than major justice from the greatness of goodness, duration etc.. Here, the intellect sees that a judge in his judgments of various cases can recognize minor justice by the minor goodness, greatness etc. that accompany it.

Chapter 2 - Justice Combined with the Rules

20. With *rule B* we ask whether or not justice that has been corrupted in a man reverts to its identical previous state when injury is corrupted. We reply that it does not, for just as matter is proportioned and disposed successively whereas form is introduced into matter instantly, so is a moral habit disposed and proportioned successively and perfected instantly, and thus, when a habit is corrupted, it is corrupted instantly.

21. With the *first species of rule C* we ask what justice is. We answer that it is the form whose proper function is to judge. With the *second species of rule C* we ask what justice has in itself co-essentially and substantially. We answer that it has its moral correlatives, namely the justifier, justifiable and justifying whereby it is a habit. Now the intellect wonders if justice remains present as a habit even while a man is not exercising it because he is asleep or busy practicing some other virtue. We reply that it does, because justice is not corrupted so long as injury does not intervene. With the *third species of rule C* we ask what justice is in other things. We answer that it is the cause of causes and it is the mutual connection among the other virtues; for instance, patience and humility are in just agreement. With the *fourth species of rule C* we ask what justice has in other things. We answer that it has objects in justly objectified causes. In addition, it bears the imprints of the principles, the rules and the ten predicates.

22. With the *first species of rule D* we ask what justice arises from. We answer that justice arises from the dispositions of the principles, the rules and the ten predicates that it substantiates. With the *second species of rule D* we ask what justice consists of. We answer that it is made of its own specific form and matter that descend with their own distinct properties from general virtue so that the just can justly apply it to judgment. With the *third species of rule D* we ask to whom justice belongs. We answer that it belongs to the just, as a coat belongs to the one wearing it.

23. With the *first species of rule E* we ask why justice exists. We answer that it exists because it is constituted or collected from the active, passive and functional correlatives of the principles, namely the justifier, bonifier, magnifier etc. the justifiable, bonifiable, magnifiable

etc. and justifying, bonifying and magnifying etc. while the properties of justice are disposed in its correlatives as it enters into its own specific form and matter. Just as the same quality, such as coldness, has one specific form in a rose and another specific form in a violet, so likewise the selfsame virtue has one species of form and matter in justice, another species in prudence and so forth. With *the second species of rule E* we ask why justice exists. We reply that it exists so that the principles from which it descends can act correctly in causes, and ensure peace and public good in the city.

24. With the *first species of rule F* we ask about the quantity of justice. We answer that it has continuous quantity because its habit is continuous and does not consist of points or lines, for it is not subject to corporeal conditions of increase and decrease. Nevertheless, its acts are sometimes great, sometimes small, just as the same hammer can deal out heavier or lighter blows according to the will of the agent wielding it. With the *second species of rule F* we ask about the discrete quantities of justice. We reply that they are the quantities it has by reason of difference: justice has one quantity in the judge, another in the plaintiff and another in the defendant, just as water takes on one shape in a circular vase, another shape in a triangular vase etc.

25. With the *first species of rule G* we ask about the proper qualities of justice. We reply that it has the qualities it derives from goodness, greatness etc. without which it cannot exist. With the *second species of rule G* we ask about the appropriated qualities of justice. We say it has the qualities it can derive from its association with the other virtues whose acts it justifies.

26. With *rule H* we ask how justice exists in time. We answer that it does not exist in time or in movement through successive subjects as does a ship moving continuously from place to place. Justice exists in its subjects without any succession of time, like a man sitting in a continuously moving ship. Now we have said enough about time, for the sake of brevity.

27. With *rule I* we ask how justice can exist locally, since justice does not consist of points and lines. We reply that it exists locally in the way just described in rule H, as justice exists accidentally in space by means of the subjects in which it is present. For the sake of brevity, this is enough about locus.

28. With the *first rule K* we ask how justice exists. We reply that it exists in the way it is collected from its principles and is disposed in its correlatives with the definitions of the principles and the disposition of the rules with their species. The things we previously said about justice signify this.

29. With the *second rule K* we ask what justice exists with. We say that it exists with its specific constitutive form and matter, with difference that divides general virtue into many habits, with its own properties that specify its matter and make it specific to itself and to nothing else, with its own form and none other, so it is an entirely specific virtue. In addition, it exists with the agent who acquires it, with goodness because it is good, and likewise with the other principles it cannot be without.

Chapter 3 - Prudence Combined with the Principles

- When a man perseveres in the cause of goodness as the reason for good to do good, he then wears the habit of prudence, but when he does not persevere in the cause of goodness, he is imprudent.
- A man is prudent when he disposes his goodness with greatness so that it is a good and great reason for good to do great good.
- A man who perseveres with enduring prudence in his dealings acts with prudence and with this prudence he performs additional related acts of prudence..
- Prudence can act with power because prudence can obtain and govern power.
- Prudence is a scientific habit through understanding and a habit of faith through believing.

- Prudence is a habit due first of all to love and only secondly to fear, because fear is an after-effect of love.
- Whenever prudence is good, it is virtuous; but when it is evil, it is vicious.
- With truth, prudence is true, and with falsity, it is false.
- Prudence prepares great glory with little grief.
- Prudence establishes distinctions, but imprudence sows confusion.
- Prudence associates virtues with virtues, but imprudence associates vices with vices.
- Prudence contradicts ignorance as its enemy, but imprudence contradicts understanding as its enemy.
- Prudence preserves the original disposition of causes, but imprudence corrupts and destroys this disposition.
- Prudence disposes a proportioned medium between the beginning and the end, but imprudence does the opposite.
- A prudent man finds repose in final perfection, but an imprudent one finds toil in final imperfection.
- Major prudence comes with major goodness and greatness, but major imprudence comes with major malice.
- Prudence equalizes its acts with equal causes, whereas imprudence wants to equalize them with unequal ones.
- Prudence expels imprudence with majority, whereas imprudence expels prudence with minority.

Chapter 4 - Prudence Combined with the Rules

32. We ask whether or not prudence depends solely on knowledge. We say that it does not, because a man who believes in true causes is also prudent.

33. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is prudence? We say that prudence is a habit with which a prudent man chooses greater good over lesser good, and opens himself to good contingencies while he turns away, or segregates himself from bad ones. With *the second species of rule C* we ask what prudence essentially has in itself. We say that it has its correlatives, without which a prudent man cannot act. With *the third species* we ask what prudence is in other things. We answer that it is good in good things and evil in evil ones; and it is strong in virtue and weak in vice. With *the fourth species* of the same rule we ask, what does prudence have in other things? We say that it has merit in virtue, but guilt in sin.

34. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what prudence arises from. We answer that it arises in imaginary constructs that the intellect acquires through diligence and experience in order to avoid toil and find repose in the end. With *the second species of D* we ask of what prudence consists. We say that it consists of its own specific active and passive correlatives. With *the third species of rule D* we ask to whom prudence belongs. We say that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists, as a coat belongs to the person wearing it.

35. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why prudence exists. We reply that it exists because it is made of its active and passive correlatives. With *the second species* we ask why prudence exists. We say that it exists to be of practical use to the prudent person for attaining repose.

36. With *the first species of rule F* we inquire about the continuous quantity of prudence. We say that as a habit, prudence has the same continuous quantity as that of a coat on the person wearing it. With *the second species of rule F* we inquire about the discrete quantity of prudence. We say that it has discrete quantity due to the difference among its correlatives.

37. With *the first species of rule G* we ask about the proper passion and quality of prudence? We answer that it is foresight. With *the second species* we ask about the appropriated quality of prudence. The answer is that it is good in good men, and evil in evil men.

38. With *rule H* we inquire about prudence and time. Rules C, D and K give the answer as they show how prudence exists in time because of what it is and what it consists of, and how it acts in time when a prudent man prudently times his acts.

39. With *rule I* we ask, where is prudence? We say that it is in rules C, D and K without which it has no way of existing in any subject. In addition, it exists in prudent deeds done by men who act prudently.

40. With *the first rule K* we ask how prudence exists. We say it exists in the way prudent men give it being by collecting the likenesses of its constituent principles and rules.

41. With *the second rule K* we ask what prudence exists with. The answer is that it exists with foresight, diligence, science or belief, disposition and proportion, and it cannot be without them.

Chapter 5 - Fortitude Combined with the Principles

- 42. Subject to the reason of goodness, fortitude is nourished, located, disposed, proportioned and conditioned.
- With great goodness, magnitude, duration etc. except contrariety and minority, fortitude is impregnable and unassailable.
- With the duration of goodness, greatness etc. long-standing fortitude acquires new fortitudes for itself.
- Fortitude can do all things with the power of goodness, greatness etc.
- Fortitude is stronger through understanding than through believing.
- Fortitude is stronger with love than with fear.
- No virtue can be strong without fortitude.
- With truth, fortitude brings boldness and victory.
- The enjoyment of fortitude makes a man magnanimous.
- 43. Fortitude diversifies its acts with the other virtues.
- Fortitude has major concordance with major virtue.
- Fortitude in sin is a privative habit.
- Fortitude has specific principles that enable it to have specific acts.
- Fortitude is a medium that exists between the different virtues.
- With the ultimate end in view, fortitude brings boldness and victory.
- Fortitude is greater because of substantial things than because of accidental ones.
- Fortitude is stronger with equitable causes than with inequitable ones.
- With major vice, fortitude is minor and can even be attacked and defeated by it.

Chapter 6 - Fortitude Combined with the Rules

44. Is fortitude stronger in prosperity than in adversity? We reply that it is, because in prosperity it goes into battle armed with alacrity and love, whereas in adversity it bears the arms of patience and fear.

45. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is fortitude? We say that fortitude is a habit that builds fortifications against the vices. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does fortitude have in itself co-essentially? The answer is that it has its correlatives with which it functions as a habit. With *the third species* we ask, what is fortitude in other things?

We say that it is good in goodness, great in greatness etc., as one virtue accidentally becomes the habit of another virtue. With *the fourth species* we ask, what does fortitude have in other things? The answer is that it has a good act in goodness, a great act in greatness, a just act in justice etc. just as goodness is strong in fortitude etc.

46. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what fortitude arises from. The answer is that it arises from the acts of the higher faculties, namely understanding, loving and remembering. With *the second species*, we ask what fortitude consists of. The answer is that it is made of its own active and passive principles with which it can have its specific act. With *the third species* we ask, to whom does fortitude belong? We say that it belongs, as an instrument, to the subject in whom it exists.

47. With *the first species of rule E* we ask, why does fortitude exist? We say that it exists as an acquired habit. With *the second species* we ask, why does fortitude exist? We reply that it exists in order to enable the other virtues to be victorious over the vices.

48. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the continuous quantity of fortitude. We answer that it has quantity inasmuch as it is an acquired habit. With *the second species of rule F* we ask about the discrete quantity of fortitude. We answer that it has discrete quantity with which it can increase or decrease its acts.

49. With *the first species of rule G* we ask about the proper qualities of fortitude. We say that it has virility or courage with which it remains as permanent in its continuous quality as man is permanent in his laughability. Here, the intellect realizes that its essence neither increases nor decreases. With *the second species of rule G* we ask about the appropriated qualities of fortitude. We say that they are justice etc. As justice is strengthened by fortitude, so is fortitude justified by justice. Here, the intellect sees that a virtue can expand or diminish its acts through its appropriated qualities inasmuch as they are instilled in it.

50. With *rule H* we ask, when does fortitude exist in time? The answer is that it exists in time as signified by rules C, D and K. With the third species of rule C it is mobile in its subjects and moves successively following the successive motion of the subject in whom it exists. With the fourth species, it has newness; and so on with the other rules in their way.

51. With *rule I* we ask, where is fortitude? We say that it is in victory, as an active cause in its effect, as shown by the third species of rule C. Likewise; we can apply rules D and K in their own way to this question.

52. With *the first rule K* we ask, how does fortitude exist? We say that it exists its way of diffusing itself throughout the other virtues where it reproduces likenesses of itself.

53. With *the second rule K* we ask with what fortitude exists. We say that it is with the principles and their definitions, and with the other virtues, especially with power, will, hope and charity without which it cannot exist.

Chapter 7 - Temperance Combined with the Principles

- 54. Temperance that perseveres with a good cause has a good act.
- With greatness, temperance is great and has a great act.
- The longer temperance lasts, the less toil it brings.
- Temperance can have no power without the power of the other virtues.
- Temperance manifests itself through its acts.
- Temperance is lovable in words, expenditure and food.
- Temperance is the most frequently needed virtue.
- Truth motivates acts of temperance.
- Temperance brings repose, health and enjoyment.

- 55. Temperance always distinguishes between the greater and the lesser as it chooses equality.
- Temperance accords equal things to one end.
- Temperance opposes gluttony more than anything else does.
- Temperance must be strong in the beginning so that through the middle it can reach the end.
- Temperance is a measure of the middle that reduces what is too big and increases what is too small.
- In the end, temperance has repose after toil.
- Major temperance comes with major virtue.
- Temperance equalizes its act with equal things.
- Temperance suffers when it is disabled by minority.

Chapter 8 - Temperance Combined with the Rules.

56. Do all the virtues need temperance? We reply that they do, so that they can have temperate acts.

57. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is temperance? We reply that temperance is the virtue that enables one to act temperately. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does temperance essentially and naturally have in itself? We say that it has its correlatives without which it cannot be what it is and with which it habituates the subject in whom it abides. With *the third species of rule C* we ask, what is temperance in other things? We answer that in agents it is a measure with which their acts are measured and tempered. With *the fourth species* we ask, what does temperance have in other things? We say that it has its acts in the principles, and an act that is just in justice, prudent in prudence, strong in fortitude etc.

58. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what temperance arises from. We say that it arises from the likenesses of the acts of the soul, namely likenesses of understanding, loving and remembering. With *the second species of rule D* we ask what temperance consists in. We say that it consists in the temperate acts of the imaginative and sensitive faculties of the subjects in whom it is present. With *the third species of rule D* we ask, to whom does temperance belong? The answer is that it belongs to the subject whose habit it is.

59. With *the first species of rule E* we ask, why does temperance exist? We say that temperance exists because temperate reasoning, imagining and sensing give rise to it. With *the second species of rule E* we ask, why does temperance exist? We answer that it exists to enable the subjects that that it habituates to have temperate acts.

60. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the continuous quantity of temperance. We say that it has quantity inasmuch as it is a measure existing between plus and minus. With *the second species of rule F* we ask, what discrete quantity does temperance have? We say that it has discrete quantity with which it increases and decrease its acts.

61. With *the first species of rule G* we ask about the proper quality of temperance. We say that it is abstinence. With *the second species of rule G* we ask about the appropriated qualities of temperance. We reply that they are goodness, greatness, equality and justice.

62. With *rule H* we ask, how does temperance exist in time? We reply that it exists in time in the same way as the subject in whom it is present exists in time, while temperance is a habit with which the subject performs his acts..

63. With *rule I* we ask where temperance is. We reply that it exists in the subject in whom it is present, like a coat on a man wearing it, or as an efficient cause in its effect.

64. With *the first rule K* we ask how temperance exists. We say that it exists in the way that man uses the acts of the higher faculties of understanding, remembering and loving to

temper the acts of the lower faculties such as imagining, speaking, eating etc. In addition, rules C, D and K signify this.

65. With *the second rule K* we ask, what does temperance exist with? We say that it exists with justice, prudence etc.

Chapter 9 - Faith Combined with the Principles

66. We shall discuss analogy in this chapter to see how faith is above and the intellect is below. First, let us discuss goodness. The intellect cannot objectify God as fully as He can be objectified. Therefore, divine goodness is a reason for God to show himself to the human intellect through belief, for the benefit of the intellect. Then the intellect objectifies God and believes that He is one, infinite and eternal, the creator, redeemer and so forth; and the intellect does all this beyond its own natural capacity. This kind of objectification is what we call holy faith, and it is a good and admirable thing.

67. God is a great object, due to his greatness the intellect cannot naturally objectify him and this is why God magnifies the intellect so that it can act far beyond its natural capacity by simply believing. Thus, faith ascends above intellect just like oil rising above water; when the intellect realizes that God is one, it believes through faith in God's unity much more than it can understand that God is one, for the intellect rises to much loftier heights through effortlessly believing in God than through its effort to understand.

68. Faith lasts due to God-given duration, whereas understanding lasts as an acquired science. This clearly shows that faith is above and the intellect is below. However, when a man habituated with faith commits sins of avarice or lust etc. then faith remains present in the subject although it is in an ill-proportioned and distorted state because the subject is not well disposed toward justice, prudence etc. just as a donkey is not worthy of silken garments.

69. The prime cause is more powerful than the second cause. When the second cause is empowered by the first, it can do things beyond its own natural capacity. Hence, the intellect's belief in the prime cause is due first of all to the prime cause, whereas the intellect itself can understand the prime cause with the help of belief, as Isaiah said: "If you will not believe, you shall not understand". (Isaiah Ch.7 v.9) Consider someone who was not a philosopher at first, but became one later on. While he was not a philosopher, he believed in God's existence, and when he became a philosopher, he understood that God exists; at this point, the intellect rose through understanding to the level it had previously reached through believing. However, I do not say that faith perished when this happened. Faith always rises to a higher degree through believing in God's existence than through understanding it, like oil floating on top of water in a vase. If we pour more water into the vase, the water ascends to where the oil was and the oil ascends to a loftier place than where it was before.

70. God is intelligible by nature. God causes the human intellect to understand many things naturally while habituating it with faith to help its understanding to ascend by means of faith; indeed, the intellect can better rise to the prime cause, which is God, with two habits than with one alone, just as it can do more with prudence and fortitude than with prudence alone.

71. Hence, when the intellect understands the prime object, faith disposes the intellect to understand it just as charity disposes the will to love it, and just as the will cannot love the prime object without charity, likewise the intellect cannot understand the prime object without faith. And as charity does not perish when the will loves the prime object, faith does not perish when the intellect understands the prime object. Indeed, a faculty does not contradict its disposition to rise aloft and grow strong.

72. Faith is a virtue and as such it is a habit of the intellect. Otherwise, faith cannot be a virtue or a habit, just as charity cannot be a habit unless it has the will as its subject. Just as

charity makes the will rise aloft to a virtuous love of its object, so does faith makes the intellect rise aloft to a virtuous understanding of its object.

73. With truth, faith is a habit of the intellect, and when it understands the prime object, it understands it with truth, for it cannot understand it without truth; thus, truth is a principle common to faith and understanding. However, the belief of faith is truly above the intellect's understanding, which is beneath it. Thus, when the intellect ascends to a higher truth, faith also ascends to a higher level of truth, because the habit is on top of the person wearing it, as when a man wearing a coat climbs a mountain, his body is under the coat and the coat is on top.

74. The intellect can understand God only with effort, just as a man climbing a mountain can climb it only with effort. But when the intellect rises aloft to God through faith, it does so without any effort, instead, it enjoys the presence of God through belief; and given that a faculty's performance is better when it is effortless than when it takes effort, the intellect reaches a higher level by believing in divine glory than by understanding it.

75. When the intellect believes, it does not make necessary methodical distinctions, for it understands things in a broad and confused way; but when the intellect truly understands, then it understands through necessary reasons and without confusion. Therefore, the intellect believes instantly whereas it understands successively, which shows that the intellect is loftier when it believes than when it understands, and this is because its act reaches beyond its natural capacity when it believes, just as water acts beyond its own natural capacity when it heats things.

76. Faith is a God-given habit, and as God created it, God governs it. Clearly, the intellect cannot govern this kind of habit because it is beyond the reach of its natural capacity. However, it disposes itself to submit to faith, for fear of offending God by not believing in him. This is how the concordance between understanding and believing arises.

77. Any law that claims belief should be true, just as it should be good in goodness, great in greatness etc. Consequently, the true law must be the one in which faith rises to the highest truth and most strongly opposes the vices. Here, the intellect can see which one of these laws, namely the Christian, the Jewish and the Moslem law, is true.

78. In the beginning, faith disposes the intellect to understand by the process of rule B. When the intellect reaches some degree of understanding, faith disposes it in a corresponding degree of belief to enable it to raise its understanding further. Thus, the intellect ascends through successive degrees until it attains the prime object where its understanding ultimately reposes. However, on the pilgrimage through this mortal life, belief is the intellect's primary guide.

79. Faith is a means for the intellect to earn merit and rise aloft to the prime object. God instils faith into the intellect so that faith is as it were one foot that the intellect uses for climbing; and since the intellect naturally has another foot, namely understanding, it climbs upward like a man using both feet to climb a ladder. First, he puts the foot of faith on the first rung, and then the foot of intellect follows. Likewise, on the second rung, the foot of faith comes first as the intellect continues to ascend gradually with faith coming first and understanding in the second place. Similarly, in debate, doubt or supposition comes first, followed by affirmation or negation.

80. The intellect's final purpose is not in believing but in understanding. Nonetheless, faith is the intellect's instrument that enables it to elevate its understanding through belief. Just as an instrument stands between a cause and its effect, so does faith stand between the intellect and God, as God instils faith into the subject, enabling it to repose in the prime object even during this mortal life.

81. The faith that is greatest in goodness, greatness etc. as well as in hope, charity etc. must be true, and any faith contrary to it must be lesser and false, otherwise positive

principles would succumb to privative ones, which is impossible. Here, the intellect sees that the faith that has major virtue and a greater object is truly the greater faith.

82. The faith that believes in greater equality among the divine reasons must be true, while the faith that posits inequality among them must be false. In God there is no before and after, because divine goodness, greatness etc. must have equal correlatives just as the intellect and the will have equal correlatives. Here, the intellect knows which faith is true.

83. The intellect cannot elevate its understanding through minor faith, but only through major faith. Here, the intellect realizes that greater understanding is not opposed to greater belief, just as one foot is not opposed to the other when climbing a ladder and one foot is not opposed to the other foot when running.

Chapter 10 - Faith Combined with the Rules

84. If the intellect could understand the things that it can believe through faith in God, would faith thereby perish along with merit, for we hear that there is no merit in having faith in things proven by reason and experience. The answer to the question is no, because faith ascends above the intellect, as we showed in #67 of the previous chapter. The merit of faith is prior and the merit of reason is posterior: indeed if they were both on the same level, the saying would be true.

85. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is faith? We answer that it is a virtue given to us by God for enabling us to believe in the things that we cannot understand without it. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does faith have in itself essentially? We answer that it has its correlatives with which it functions as a habit. With *the third species* we ask, what is faith in other things? We answer that faith is a habit that exists in the intellect above the intellect's scientific habit. For instance, in tasting a sample of wine from a barrel, the intellect scientifically concludes from taste that the wine in the barrel is the same as the wine in the sample. However, just as wine can become altered in time, the intellect does not have scientific certainty based on understanding, but it believes that the wine is the same as the sample. In addition, faith is good in goodness, great in greatness etc. With *the fourth species* we ask, what does faith have in other things? We answer that it has intelligibility in the intellect because the intellect understands it, lovability in the will because the will loves it and memorability in memory because memory remembers it.

86. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what faith arises from. We answer that it exists on its own, as a creature. With *the second species*, we ask what faith consists of. We answer that it is made of its active, passive and functional principles that make it a specific virtue. With *the third species of rule D* we ask, to whom does faith belong? We reply that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists, like a coat to the one wearing it.

87. With *the first species of rule E* we ask, why does faith exist? We reply that it exists because its cause exists. With *the second species of rule E* we ask, why does faith exist? We say that it exists in order to enable the intellect to believe what it cannot understand on its own, just as the imaginative faculty exists to enable man to imagine the things he cannot sense with the senses.

88. With *the first species of rule F* we ask, what continuous quantity does faith have? We reply that it has quantity inasmuch as man can objectify objects with it. In addition, it has continuous quantity because it is an indivisible habit. With *the second species* we ask, what discrete quantity does faith have? We answer that it has the quantity of its correlatives with which it expands or reduces its act.

89. With *the first species of rule G* we ask, what is the proper quality of faith? We say it is belief, which belongs to no other virtue. With *the second species of rule G* we ask, what are

the appropriated qualities of faith? We say that they are its goodness, greatness etc. These qualities belong to the other virtues as well as to faith.

90. With *rule H* we inquire about faith and time. With the third species of rule C we say that it exists in time because it is new in time. By the fourth species of rule C, it has corruption in time when man does not have the faith to believe the things he used to believe about God, and it resurrects at the time when man reverts to believing what he used to believe about God. Faith exists in time because its act is sometimes great and sometimes small. It exists in time as it sometimes objectifies one object, and sometimes another. Likewise, rules D and K apply here in their own way.

91. With *rule I* we ask how faith exists. We say that it exists according to the way the prime object presents itself to the intellect, while the intellect believes and objectifies the prime object above its ability to understand it.

92. With *the first rule K* we ask how faith exists. We say that it exists in the way in which the prime object presents itself objectively to the intellect while the intellect transcends the natural reach of its understanding by objectifying the prime object through belief.

93. With *the second rule K* we ask what faith exists with. We reply that it exists with a power, an object and an act. Faith exists with the power of intellect that uses it effectively and morally; faith exists with an object, namely God, without whom it cannot exist; and faith exists with its act of believing. Here, we wonder where faith goes when the intellect understands instead of believing? We say that faith then remains present as a habit in the selfsame intellect, and that belief exists in potentiality until it moves into act when the intellect believes.

Chapter 11 - Hope Combined with the Principles

94. Hope is a habit of memory with which the memory can ascend to the prime object through hoping, just as the intellect can ascend through believing. First, let us consider goodness. It is good for memory to remember God as much as it naturally can, and when it cannot go any further naturally, hope helps it morally as God presents himself as an object to memory by reason of his goodness, and memory objectifies God by hoping just as the will ascends toward God with charity by loving. This is of great benefit to the memory.

95. Memory is greater with two acts than with one act alone, i.e. it is greater with hoping and remembering than it is with remembering alone; and therefore God's greatness magnifies the human memory whenever man is greatly disposed to remember God by means of the habit of hope, so that when the memory cannot remember God, it can hope in God. This is a great thing for memory.

96. Hope lasts in its subject along with the subject's disposition to remember God for his goodness, greatness etc. However, when the memory is not disposed to remember God and when the sin of distrust is its habit, hope fails because it has no subject to abide in.

97. Memory can remember with its own power, and it can hope in God through hope by means of God's power. Thus, by analogy, the power of hope is above, and the power of memory is below so that the power that is below ascends to the object by means of the power coming from above, just as the power of understanding ascends by means of the power of belief.

98. When a sinner at the hour of death remembers his great sins and God's great justice, his understanding and remembering are on the brink of despair. Nevertheless, hope, a habit of memory, ascends toward divine mercy when God presents himself as an object to the hopeful sinner, at which time the sinner stops despairing, but he cannot do this unless hope is a habit of his memory.

99. When a man is at war, or at sea with a great fortune or in great need of something, at such a time his will is so dissipated and broken by intense fear that it cannot raise its loving aloft toward God. However, memory objectifies God through hope and arouses the will to love God with charity so that the will is comforted and consoled by memory. The same happens with the intellect in its own way, when it can find no remedy other than to hope in God.

100. Hope makes the memory virtuous, as charity makes the will virtuous. The will without charity is vicious, as is the memory without hope. As the memory and the will mutually help each other, the memory helps the will with hope and the will helps the memory with charity, so that both are virtuous.

101. Hope is true with truth and false with falsity. Here, the intellect realizes that when a sinner can avoid sin, but does not want to, and merely proposes to avoid it, at that time he believes he has hope, but has none. Now hope cannot coexist with sin in the same subject.

102. A sinner finds delight in hope, but without hope, he suffers grief and sorrow, because with faith, he can love, but without faith, he can only hate. Here, the intellect realizes that a sinner ascends to loving God through hope, but without hope, he descends to hate and despair, as loving and hoping deteriorate into hate and despair. Who can imagine the sadness and sorrow that such a sinner feels.

103. Between remembering and hoping there is a difference similar to the difference between understanding and believing, this is because hoping is above and remembering is below, since remembering is a natural act, but hoping is a moral act.

104. Hoping and remembering are in mutual agreement; remembering prepares hoping (on the condition that hoping proceeds with goodness, greatness etc.) and hoping gradually raises the level of remembering so that hoping can in turn ascend with the ascent of remembering, just as a coat goes up the hill at the same time as the man wearing it goes up.

105. Legitimate hope opposes spurious hope inasmuch as they cannot coexist in the same subject without objective contradiction. Legitimate hope is hope that stands with goodness, greatness, truth and so forth against malice and falsehood. Spurious hope stands on the side of malice and falsehood against goodness, truth etc. Here, memory feels sorrow as it remembers that so many sinners are habituated with spurious and false hope.

106. In the beginning, the man who hopes in God is the efficient cause, hope is the formal cause, the things the man remembers comprise the material cause, and the supreme object is the final cause, as in the end remembering subsists after hoping.

107. Hope is a medium between the sinner and God, and it acts as a messenger for them both, as through hope, God instils hope in the sinner and the sinner reciprocates with his good, great etc. remembering of God.

108. When a sinner or a defective man remembers God without hope, he does not find any repose in such remembering because his remembering is not at a level where he can repose; however, when hope comes into play, then remembering ascends to a level where it can repose.

109. The hope that is greater by reason of goodness, greatness etc. is a sign and the light of the true faith, or law: now a minor faith and law cannot stand with major hope, but major hope stands in major faith or law, or else there would be an opposition in the object. Here, the intellect sees which people follow the true law.

110. Hoping and remembering can be in the supreme object at the same time, but not equally because hoping is prior and remembering is posterior. Likewise, willing and loving can be together in the same subject, but loving is prior, because it is a habit, whereas willing is posterior because charity habituates it, as a mountain climber's coat covers him.

111. With minority, memory has the act of remembering and with majority, it has the act of hoping, and so when it wants to elevate its act without hoping, its appetite deviates; now

ascent belongs to the genus of majority, and so when memory believes it is ascending, it is actually descending. Here, the intellect sees how sinners fall into despair, because a power cannot ascend with a minor act, but only with a major one.

Chapter 12 - Hope Combined with the Rules

112. We ask if hope is a habit of memory. We reply that it is, because in times of need the memory comforts and consoles the intellect and the will; and remembering ascends to the supreme object through hoping just as the intellect ascends through believing and just as the will ascends through loving. Hope does not belong to the genus of certainty, which belongs to the genus of science; and hope does not belong to the genus of will, because the will wants many things it has no hope of having. Hence, as hope belongs neither to the genus of intellect nor to that of the will, it belongs to the genus of memory, as the soul only comprises the three said powers. Moreover, faith belongs neither to the genus of imagination nor to that of sense.

113. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is hope? We answer that hope is the virtue whose proper function is to hope. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does hope have in itself essentially? We say that it has its specific correlatives with which it acts in accordance with its own species. With *the third species of rule C* we ask, what is hope in other things? We answer that it is a specific virtue among the other virtues. In addition, hope is a messenger that brings consolation, comfort, counsel and so forth. It is good in goodness, great in greatness etc. Hope is imaginable by the imagination and sensible by the senses, and it is an indivisible habit in its subject. With *the fourth species of rule C* we ask, what does hope have in other things? We reply that it has hoping in the act of remembering, just as charity has loving in the act of willing and faith has believing in the act of understanding. In addition, it has a good act that is good in goodness, great in greatness, just in justice etc.

114. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what hope arises from. We answer that hope exists on its own, because it is a created habit. With *the second species of rule D* we ask what hope consists of. We say that it is made of its specific likenesses derived from the correlatives of memory, of which it is a habit. With *the third species of rule D* we ask, what does hope belong to? We answer that it belongs to memory, as an instrument belongs to an agent.

115. With *the first species of rule E* we ask, why does hope exist? We answer that it exists because its cause exists, as daylight exists because the sun is above the horizon. With *the second species of rule E* we ask, why is there hope? We say that hope exists to enable memory to elevate its act of remembering in times of need to console, assist, comfort, and counsel the intellect's understanding and the will's willing, so they can ascend to the supreme object.

116. With *the first species of rule F* we ask, what continuous quantity does hope have? We reply that it has great continuous quantity as it exercises a great function in consoling and comforting the other powers while elevating them to the supreme object; and its quantity is indivisible, because it does not consist of points or lines. With *the second species of rule F* we ask about the discrete quantity of hope. We say that hope has discrete quantity because of its correlatives with which it has different characteristics whereby it increases or decreases its acts at will.

117. With *the first species of rule G* we ask, what is the proper quality of hope? We answer that it is the act of hoping, which is proper to hope alone. With *the second species of rule G* we ask, what are the appropriated qualities of hope? We say that they are goodness, greatness and other things like these.

118. With *rule H* we inquire about hope and time. We answer that hope exists in time because it is a new habit that depends on the past. It exists in the present because it exists and

because it has its act. In addition, it encompasses future time in its hoping. Rules C, D and K signify this. Here, the intellect realizes that hope is a very great habit.

119. With *rule I* we ask, where is hope, and where does it have its act? We say that hope has its act in the recallability of memory, without which it cannot have it, because without recallability, only the privative act of forgetting can remain. Rules C, D and K signify this.

120. With *the first rule K* we ask how hope exists and how it is destroyed. We say that it exists in the way that memory has of disposing its act with the principles and the other virtues whenever a man in a time of need who cannot help himself with the other virtues obtains help instead from God's goodness, mercy, charity and the like. However, hope is destroyed when sin enters into the subject against God's mercy and charity so that the sinner loses hope and falls into despair.

121. With *the second rule K* we ask what hope exists with. We reply that it exists with the disposition of the subject in whom it is present along with the habits of the principles and virtues, and above all with the supreme agent who creates hope and clothes the subject with its habit.

Chapter 13 - Charity Combined with the Principles

- 122. Charity is a habit of the will, and by reason of its goodness it elevates the will to love divine goodness more than itself.
- By reason of its greatness, charity does all things for the common good.
- With its duration, charity makes loving endure with goodness, greatness etc.
- The will overcomes all things with the power of charity.
- With great duration, charity disposes the intellect to understand the supreme intelligible.
- Because God is supremely lovable, the will elevates its loving with charity to love God more than itself.
- God is lovable per se, but God per se is subject neither to belief nor to hope; therefore, charity is a loftier virtue than the other virtues.
- Charity lives with truth and thus it overcomes the objects of the imagination and the senses.
- Charity delights in all things.
- 123. Charity makes no distinction between private and common good.
- Charity reduces all things to one good and concordant end.
- Charity does not find an opponent.
- The will is in love first because of charity, and secondly due to willing.
- Charity is the medium that exists between the lover and his beloved.
- Charity finds repose in all things.
- The law that provides for major charity is greater and more true than any other law.
- Charity equalizes all good things.
- Charity is debilitated by minority.

Chapter 14 - Charity Combined with the Rules

124. We ask if charity is a habit of the will. We reply that it is, so that with charity the will can love God more than itself and love its neighbour as itself.

125. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is charity? We answer that charity is the virtue with which the will ascends to loving God and its neighbour beyond its natural capacity. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does charity have in itself co-essentially? We reply that it has its own specific correlatives with which it is a specific virtue.

With *the third species* we ask, what is charity in other things? We say that it is good in goodness, great in greatness etc. and it is the empress and governor of all the other virtues. With *the fourth species* we ask, what does charity have in other things? We answer that it has all that it wants in all things.

126. With *the first species of rule D* we ask from what charity arises. We answer that it exists on its own because it is a creature. With *the second species of rule D* we ask of what charity consists. We answer that it is made of likenesses of the correlatives of the will, which we discussed in the chapter about the will. With *the third species of rule D* we ask, to whom does charity belong? We answer that it belongs to the will whose habit it is.

127. With *the first species of rule E* we ask, why does charity exist? We say that it exists because it is an effect caused by God. With *the second species of rule E* we ask, why is there charity? We reply that charity exists for enabling the will to love its God, its friends and its enemies beyond its capacity. Now the intellect realizes why charity is the highest virtue.

128. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the continuous quantity of charity. We answer that the quantity of charity is admirable because with it the will loves God and also loves its friend and its enemy. With *the second species of rule F* we ask about the discrete quantity of charity. We answer that it has discrete quantity due to the differentiation of its correlatives with which it expands or diminishes its act at pleasure, while its continuous quantity exists without any division, increase or decrease, given that charity as a habit is not made of points and lines.

129. With *the first species of rule G* we ask, what is the proper quality of charity? We answer that it is charity's own specific act of loving. With *the second species of rule G* we ask, what are the appropriated qualities of charity? We say that they are goodness etc. because charity is good etc. and justice because charity is just, etc.

130. With *rule H* we inquire about charity and time. With the third species of rule C we reply that charity exists in time without succession inasmuch as it is a spiritual habit. However, it is in succession due to the subject in whom it exists and into which it instils the flux and reflux of its acts as it changes its objects. Rules C, D and K signify this.

131. With *rule I* we ask, where is charity? We reply that it exists subjectively in its subject and objectively in its object. Rules C, D and K signify this.

132. With *the first rule K* we ask, how does charity exist? We reply that it exists in the way that it issues from the will as a likeness and combines with the principles except contrariety and minority, and in the way that the species of the rules sustain it, since God is its cause and the will is its subject when its disposition is free of sin.

133. With *the second rule K* we ask what charity exists with. We reply that it exists with the agent, namely God who causes it, and with the will as its subject, and with the principles and rules in their own way, and with the other virtues without which it cannot exist.

Chapter 15 - Patience Combined with the Principles

- 134. Patience is a habit of the will, and the will overcomes its own malice with the goodness of patience
- With great patience, the will subdues anger.
- With duration, patience endures in opposing impatience.
- Patience overpowers everything with compassion, charity and humility.
- Patience arises from, lives on and feeds on intelligent deliberation.
- Patience and charity belong to the genus of humility.
- The virtue of patience is more elevated under charity than under any other virtue.
- Ire can never stand up against true patience.
- Through suffering, patience acquires joy and delight.

- 135. Patience makes no difference between the one who vituperates and the one who is the object of vituperation.
- Patience is associated with charity, compassion and humility.
- Patience takes no interest in revenge.
- Patience suffers passion in the beginning; but it has action and victory in the end,.
- Patience is a medium between toil and repose.
- A man habituated to patience is always at peace.
- Major toil makes patience a major virtue.
- Prosperity and adversity are equal for patience.
- A man with minor patience is in major peril.

Chapter 16 - Patience combined with the rules

136. Is the virtue of patience absolutely stronger than the vice of impatience? We answer that it is, because patience is a positive habit of virtue while impatience is a privative habit. Here, the intellect sees how people fall into sin.

137. With *the first species of rule C* we ask what patience is. We reply that patience is the virtue that moves the will to love suffering beyond its capacity. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does patience have in itself co-essentially? We say that it has passive likenesses of the principles with which it suffers. With *the third species of rule C* we ask, what is patience in other things? We reply that patience is a habit that subdues and pacifies adversaries in litigation. In addition, prudence consoles patience when nothing else can be done. With *the fourth species of rule C* we ask, what does patience have in other things? We answer that initially it has action on the will and as a result, will has action upon itself.

138. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what patience arises from. We reply that it arises from the likenesses of all the principles except contrariety. With *the second species of rule D* we ask what patience consists of. We answer that it is made of its specific active and passive correlatives with which it is a specific virtue. With *the third species* we ask, to whom does patience belong? We say that it belongs to the will that accepts suffering with patience.

139. With *the first species of rule E* we ask, why does patience exist? We reply that patience exists because charity, justice, prudence, fortitude and humility cause it to exist in a will that is disposed and proportioned so that patience can make this will submit to another will. With *the second species of rule E* we ask, why is there patience? We reply that patience exists for enabling the intellect and the will to choose useful alternatives through continuous deliberation.

140. With *the first species of rule F* we ask, what is the continuous quantity of patience? We reply that it has continuous quantity because it is an indivisible habit not made of points or lines. With *the second species of rule F* we ask about the discrete quantity of patience. We reply that it has discrete quantity because it consists of many different kinds of suffering.

141. With *the first species of rule G* we ask, what is the proper quality of patience? We reply that it is passibility, a quality proper to patience alone, given that a patient man is passible by virtue of patience. With *the second species of rule G* we ask, what are the appropriated qualities of patience? We say that they are goodness, greatness etc. and victory, justice etc.

142. With *rule H* we ask about patience and time. We reply with the third species of C that patience is new in time. With the fourth species of rule C it exists in succession in time as it undergoes one kind of suffering at one time and another kind at another time and so forth, as signified by rules C, D and K.

143. With *rule I* we ask about patience and locus. We answer that patience is located in the passive correlatives of the principles so as to be a specific virtue or habit through them and with them. Rules C, D and K signify this.

144. With *the first rule K* we ask, how does patience exist? We answer that it exists in the way in which it is collected from the passive correlatives of the principles with deliberation in times of need, to prevent the rise of anger and impatience. Rules C, D and K signify this.

145. With *the second rule K* we ask what patience exists with. We reply that it exists with deliberation by the intellect and the will, and with the victory of goodness, greatness etc. except contrariety. In addition, it exists with the other virtues to which it is connected and without which it cannot exist.

Chapter 17 - Compassion Combined with the Principles

- 146. With the goodness of compassion, the will is disposed to suffer on account of the suffering of one's fellow man.
- The greatness of compassion moves the will to feel great sorrow on account of the hardships of its friends and even of its enemies.
- Compassion lasts with charity, humility, patience and kindness.
- With the power of compassion, the will can cause sighing in the heart, tears and weeping in the eyes, and sadness in the soul.
- The intellect understands that charity, humility, patience, kindness, sighing and tears are signs of compassion.
- Compassion is lovable because it enables the will to eradicate its own cruelty.
- Along with charity, humility etc. compassion displays itself as a virtue.
- True compassion is true medicine for the soul.
- To the compassionate will, its suffering and sadness are its glory and delight.
- With its habit of charity, compassion makes no difference between its own good and the common good.
- With compassion, a compassionate man comes to a peaceful agreement with his enemies.
- With charity, humility, patience and kindness, compassion contradicts pitilessness, its enemy.
- Compassion is a humble principle in form, sighs and tears are its matter and action is its end.
- Compassion is at the heart of charity.
- Compassion does not exist without its act. Here, the intellect realizes that the compassionate will is delighted when the compassionate man grieves, weeps and sighs.
- The law that gives rise to the greatest compassion must be the true law.
- To a compassionate person, the suffering of his fellow man and his own suffering are equal.
- With minor signs, compassion shows that it is minor.

Chapter 18 - Compassion Combined with the Rules

148. Is charity a habit of compassion? We reply that it is. This is because charity is prior due to its supreme object, whereas compassion is posterior due to its lesser object.

149. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is compassion? We say that compassion is the virtue that moves the will to suffer on account of the suffering of one's fellow man. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does compassion have in itself co-essentially? We say that it has its correlatives that make it a specific virtue. With *the third species* we ask,

what is compassion in other things? We reply that compassion is a virtue signified by signs such as charity, humility, kindness, patience, sighing, weeping etc. just as wine for sale is signified by a sign displayed on a tavern. With *the fourth species* we ask, what does compassion have in other things? We reply that compassion has its signs in a compassionate man just as pitilessness has its signs in an uncompassionate man.

150. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what compassion arises from. We answer that it exists on its own, because it is an acquired habit. With *the second species of rule D* we ask what compassion consists of. We say that it is made of the matter signified by its signs. With *the third species* we ask, to whom does compassion belong? We answer that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists, as an instrument to an agent.

151. With *the first species of rule E* we ask, why is there compassion? We answer that compassion exists because its causes exist, and a cause must have an effect. With *the second species of rule E* we ask, why is there compassion? We answer that compassion exists so that man can be compassionate toward his fellow man when he sees him in poverty, or in hardship, or begging for mercy for what he has done.

152. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the continuous quantity of compassion. We say that compassion has the quantity signified by its signs. With *the second species of rule F* we ask about the discrete quantity of compassion. We answer that it has discrete quantity with which it increases or decreases its acts without increasing or decreasing the continuous quantity of its essence.

153. With *the first species of rule G* we ask, what is the proper quality of compassion? We answer that it is compassionateness toward the suffering of one's fellow man. With *the second species of rule G* we ask, what is an appropriated quality of compassion? We say that it is sorrow, because sorrow is a common form, as are charity, humility, and the other signs of compassion.

154. With *rule H* we ask about compassion and time. We reply that compassion exists in time when its signs signify its presence. Rules C, D and K signify this.

155. With *rule I* we ask about compassion and locus. We reply that it is in the compassionate man and in the signs that signify compassion.

156. With *the first rule K* we ask, how does compassion exist? We say it exists in the way in which a compassionate man acquires it with charity, humility, patience and kindness.

157. With *the second rule K* we ask what compassion exists with. We answer that compassion exists with its signs just as a blacksmith exists with his tools such as his anvil, his furnace, his hammer and tongs etc.

158. We have dealt with the nine virtues, and as we dealt with them with the principles and rules, conversely, we can likewise deal with the vices that are contrary to them, namely injury, imprudence, cowardice, intemperance, infidelity, despair, cruelty, impatience and pitilessness.

Chapter 19 – The Vices - Avarice Combined with the Principles

- 159. With its malice, avarice impedes goodness from being a reason for good to do good with good things.
- With its greatness, the act of avarice magnifies malice, duration and power.
- As long as avarice lasts, so does its insatiable act; and for this reason the avaricious man believes that by amassing wealth he can find repose, even though he cannot.
- The power of avarice is a habit that deprives generosity of power, just as deafness deprives the power of hearing, and this is why the avaricious man has no repose in his power.
- Just as faith elevates the intellect to believe in truth above and beyond its capacity, so does avarice elevate the intellect to believe in falsehood above and beyond its capacity, this is why the avaricious man believes that he is generous.

- Just as charity exalts the will so it can love above and beyond its capacity, so does avarice elevate the will so that it loves future possessions and finds no repose in what it already has.
- The more possessions an avaricious man has, the more virtuous he believes he is.
- An avaricious man believes that truth is falsehood and vice versa, just as an infidel does, for avarice convenes with falsehood whereas generosity convenes with truth.
- An avaricious man takes no pleasure in what he has, and even complains that he is needy; nor is he pleased with the things he hopes for, because he does not have them yet.
- 160. An avaricious man makes no distinction between avarice and generosity, because he believes that avarice is indeed generosity.
- An avaricious man cannot reach any agreement with any virtuous man, because avarice contradicts all of the virtues.
- The richer an avaricious man becomes, the more he contradicts his fellow man by opposing the final purpose of his goods.
- An avaricious man perverts positive principles into privative ones, so that the more he believes that he is at peace the more he struggles; he is like a man who believes he can see better with blinded eyes than with normal ones.
- The avaricious man connects and measures all things with his avarice.
- The avaricious man finds repose in privation, he is like a hungry man who enjoys his hunger.
- With major wealth, the avaricious man is that much more avaricious. Obviously, the more he has, the more he wants to have.
- The avaricious man does not equalize things fairly, because avarice stands in the extremes.
- Minor avarice is accompanied with minor signs, and major avarice with major signs.

Chapter 20 - Avarice Combined with the Rules

161. Is avarice subjectively a very general sin? We reply that it is, because it craves for many different objects.

162. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is avarice? We reply that avarice is the sin that deviates good things from their intended purpose. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does avarice have in itself co-essentially? We answer that it has privative correlatives, just as generosity has positive ones. With *the third species of rule C* we ask, what is avarice in other things? We say that in an avaricious man it is a privative habit with which he brings poverty, sadness and toil upon himself, just as a man wearing a heavy, oversized coat burdens himself with tediousness and toil. With *the fourth species of rule C* we ask, what does avarice have in other things? We reply that in an avaricious man it has hard and perverted dealings. An avaricious man habituated with a privative habit finds no rest either in his own wealth or in that of others, instead, he finds nothing but toil and anxiety.

163. With *the first species of rule D* we ask, what does avarice arise from? We reply that it exists on its own; avarice it has no nature, nor is it a creature because it is a sin and not a virtue. With *the second species of rule D* we ask, what is avarice made of? We answer that it is made of a moral defect in man, such as the natural defect of deafness; just as deafness is a privative habit opposed to the positive habit of hearing, so is avarice opposed to the positive habit of generosity. Here, the intellect sees what sin is made of. With *the third species of rule D* we ask, to whom does avarice belong? We reply that it belongs to the avaricious man, just as a coat belongs to the one wearing it.

164. With *the first species of rule E* we ask, why is there avarice? We answer that avarice exists because a man refuses to be generous, just as a man's nudity exists because he refuses

to wear clothes. With *the second species of rule E* we ask, why is there avarice? We answer that it exists to prevent people from being generous or satisfied with their possessions.

165. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the continuous quantity of avarice. We say that it has continuous quantity because it is a continuous habit of the avaricious man, a habit he wears like a coat.

166. With *the second species of rule F* we ask about the discrete quantity of avarice. We say that it has discrete quantity whereby it can increase or decrease its acts at will.

167. With *the first species of rule G* we ask, what is the proper quality of avarice? We say that it is its insatiability. Here, the intellect realizes that the more an avaricious man has, the more he wants to have. With *the second species of rule G* we ask, what are the appropriated qualities of avarice? We answer that they are poverty, sadness, toil, and things like these.

168. With *rule H* we ask about avarice and time. We answer that the avaricious man is habituated with avarice in the past, present and future time: he has remorse about the past, because he thinks he could have acquired more possessions; he is presently toiling over his current possessions; and he feels sorry that he cannot use his future possessions. Rules C, D and K signify this.

169. With *rule I* we ask, where is avarice? We answer that it is present in its privative habits that signify and represent it, namely in malice, envy, falseness, inconstancy and things like these. Rules C, D and K signify this.

170. With *the first rule K* we ask, how does avarice exist? We answer that it exists in the mode of unwillingness, because the will is unwilling to be generous.

171. With *the second rule K* we ask, with what does avarice exist. We answer that avarice exists with the lower faculties opposing the higher ones, namely with the imaginative and sensitive against the power to understand, love and remember while the three rational powers also disfigure themselves with their greed for things that can be sensed and imagined.

Chapter 21 - Gluttony Combined with the Principles

- Although the glutton harms himself by eating and drinking too much, he nonetheless believes that he is benefiting himself.
- With greatness, the glutton magnifies the harm he does.
- A glutton's troubles last far longer than his enjoyment.
- The power of gluttony cannot help the gluttonous man to resist gluttony.
- Gluttony is a sin that disposes the intellect to believe it is not a sin.
- Gluttony is a vice that disposes the will to desire excessive food and drink.
- Gluttony is a sin that simply opposes all the virtues.
- Gluttony is a deceitful vice, with which man deceives himself until it leads to his illness and death.
- Gluttony gives enjoyment to the sense of taste but trouble and pain to the sense of touch.
- The glutton confuses and darkens all his higher and lower faculties.
- The glutton joins excessive eating to excessive drinking.
- Gluttony contradicts good manners, health and wealth.
- Gluttony brings joy in the beginning but sadness in the end.
- A glutton measures neither his food nor his drink.
- The glutton finds no repose in gluttony.
- Excessive eating and drinking characterize the glutton's major enjoyment.
- The glutton does not measure things fairly because he does not equalize his appetite with his digestive and retentive powers.
- A less gluttonous person is closer to health, a more gluttonous one is closer to illness.

Chapter 22 - Gluttony Combined with the Rules

174. Does the habit of gluttony belong to the will more than to the intellect? We answer that it does. The glutton's will makes him crave for food and drink, but he distinguishes between more and less with his intellect. Hence, it follows that the intellect paves the way for gluttony through ignorance while the will does the same through appetite.

175. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is gluttony? We answer that gluttony is the sin whereby the glutton eats and drinks too much. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does gluttony have in itself co-essentially? We say it has its privative correlatives that are opposed to the positive correlatives of temperance, just as an abnormal man has correlatives that are opposed to natural correlatives. With *the third species of rule C* we ask, what is gluttony in other things? We answer that gluttony is ill-mannered at the table, laughable in individuals, deceitful in society; and in man it is laziness, disease, pain, wanton squandering of wealth, and sin in his guilty soul. With *the fourth species of rule C* we ask, what does gluttony have in other things? We answer that it has domination in the subject in whom it exists; just as a man prepares for suffering through obedience, so does the glutton prepare for enslavement through gluttony.

176. With *the first species of rule D* we ask what gluttony originates from. We answer that it does not arise from any source because it is a sin, and sin is nothing, and nothing does not come from anything; obviously, gluttony does not originate from anything. With *the second species of rule D* we ask, what does gluttony consist of? We say it consists of a moral defect in man, just as deafness consists of a defect in natural movement. With *the third species of rule D* we ask, to whom does gluttony belong? We answer that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists, just as a coat belongs to the one wearing it.

177. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why gluttony exists. We answer that it exists because the glutton has adopted it as a habit and is now wearing it like a coat. With *the second species of rule E* we ask, why is there gluttony? We say it exists so that it can turn a man into a laughing stock, lazy, poor and sick; and sometimes it can even kill him and send him to hell.

178. With *the first species of rule F* we ask, what continuous quantity does gluttony have? We say it has great continuous quantity inasmuch as it is indivisible and the glutton can never satisfy it. With *the second species of rule F* we ask, what discrete quantity does gluttony have? We answer that it has as much quantity as the number of times the glutton practices it while increasing or decreasing its acts at will.

179. With *the first species of rule G* we ask, what is the proper quality of gluttony? We say that it is an insatiable craving of the soul for taste, a craving beyond the soul's natural capacity. Here, the intellect sees how gluttony elevates the intellect's appetite above its capacity, just as fire makes water rise beyond its capacity by heating it. With *the second species of rule G* we ask, what are the appropriated qualities of gluttony? We say that they are, for instance, bad manners, derision, poverty, inebriation, and so forth. Here, the intellect sees that the first species has to do with the soul and the second species has to do with the body; for this reason, gluttony begins first in the soul and then proceeds to the body.

180. With *rule H* we ask about gluttony and time. We answer that it is a new habit in time. In addition, it exists in time because it concerns the past when the gluttonous man regrets not having drunk and eaten more. Likewise, it exists in the present because the time when it can be practiced is now. It also concerns the future, because there is a constant desire to eat and drink. Moreover, it also concerns the future in hell, where gluttons suffer untold eternal hunger and thirst.

181. With *rule I* we ask, where is gluttony? We answer that it is a privative habit in its correlatives and in the men in which it exists. Rules C, D and K signify this.

182. With *the first rule K* we ask, how does gluttony exist? We answer that just as temperance exists in a positive mode, so does gluttony exist in a privative mode, for the glutton eats and drinks without order or measure.

183. With *the second rule K* we ask about gluttony's means of existence. We say that it exists by means of its cause, just as a coat exists by means of the tailor who made and adorned it.

Chapter 23 - Lust Combined with the Principles

- Through the goodness of the sense of touch, lust injures and depraves the goodness of chastity.
- By the great sweetness of touch, lust magnifies the rational faculty's greatness of guilt. Here, the intellect sees how conscience is awakened.
- The durable physical pleasures of lust bring about durable punishment in hell.
- Lust subjects spiritual power to corporeal power. Here the intellect sees how a lecher is ensnared by lust.
- Lust perverts the intellect into believing it is not a sin, just as avarice perverts the intellect into believing it is not a sin. Here, the intellect understands the obstinacy of sinners.
- With the beauty of a woman's face, lust ensnares the lecher into loving her base and fetid parts.
- A man deeply ensnared by lust believes that he is highly virtuous, but a free intellect is greatly astonished at such a false belief.
- Lust is a deceitful habit because it begins with beauty and ends in turpitude. In addition, it considers that evil is good.
- Due to the pleasure a lecher derives from seeing, hearing, imagining, thinking and touching things in this mortal life, he forsakes the glory of paradise and earns endless punishment for all his faculties in hell.
- A lecher makes no distinction between feminine beauty and turpitude.
- The lecher accords beauty and depravity to one purpose and goal.
- The lecher opposes lust to chastity so he cannot experience the bliss of chastity; but he does not believe that he is actually doing this.
- Lust begins with the senses and reproduces sense perceptions in the imagination until the rational faculty gets involved in sin.
- A libidinous intention affects the senses and the senses respond to this intention; they do this by means of the imagination, until reasoning is perverted into sin.
- A lecher first enjoys beauty, and then proceeds to base and fetid acts.
- Major lechery displays and demonstrates itself through major signs.
- Both the man and the woman are equally guilty of lust when they equally love one another in their lubricious acts.
- Lust is not as great in the body as it is in the soul, because it is prepared in the body and completed in the soul.

Chapter 24 - Lust Combined with the Rules.

186. Does lust arise in the imagination sooner than in the senses? We say it does, given that the imagination is closer to the rational faculty than the senses are.

187. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is lust? The answer is that it is the sin whose proper function is fornication. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does lust have in itself essentially? We answer that it has its own correlatives that make it a specific vice. With *the third species* we ask, what is lust in other things? We answer that it is an intensive sin in the soul and an extended sin in the body. Here, the intellect sees how lust exists without succession in the soul but with succession in the body. With *the fourth species* we ask, what does lust have in other things? We answer that it sits above anyone dominated by it, just as a coat sits on top of the person wearing it.

188. With *the first species of rule D* we ask, what does lust arise from? We answer that it exists on its own, because as a sin it originates in nothingness and as such it is nothing. With *the second species of rule D* we ask, what does lust consist of? We say that it consists of moral deformity, given that it is a privative act in the moral sense just as deafness is one in the natural sense. With *the third species* we ask, to whom does lust belong? We answer that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists, just as a coat belongs to the person who wears it.

189. With *the first species of rule E* we ask why lust exists. We answer that it exists because it has been acquired as a habit. With *the second species of rule E* we ask why lust exists. We answer that it exists in order to inhibit chastity, just as deafness exists in order to inhibit hearing, and just as water is heated to inhibit cold.

190. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the continuous quantity of lust. We answer that it has continuous quantity because it is an indivisible habit. With *the second species of rule F* we ask about the discrete quantity of lust. We answer that it has as much discrete quantity as it is able to increase or decrease its acts. Here, the intellect realizes that in the same essence and habit there can be discrete quantity due to a number of different acts.

191. With *the first species of rule G* we ask, what is the proper quality of lust? We answer that it is the specific quality that makes it a specific vice, just as heat is the proper quality of fire. With *the second species of rule G* we ask about the appropriated quality of lust. We answer that it is the heat that swells up lustful flesh.

192. With *rule H* we ask about lust and time. We answer that lust goes through a time of preparation by the senses and by the imagination, and it manifests later on through concrete acts by reason of its conception in the soul. Rules C, D and K signify this.

193. With *rule I* we ask about the location of lust. We answer that it exists in the senses and the imagination that are its instruments, and it exists in the soul as an essential habit. Rules C, D and K signify this.

194. With *the first rule K* we ask, how does lust exist? We answer that it exists according to a way of seeing, touching, hearing and imagining, and according to the way the soul conceives and orders it.

195. With *the second rule K* we ask, what does lust exist with? We answer that it exists with perverted morals, just as hot water is perverted by heat to a state contrary to its natural coldness, or just as the intellect is perverted by ignorance or the hearing by deafness.

Chapter 25 - Conceit Combined with the Principles

- By reason of its malice, conceit debases the subject in whom it exists just as humility elevates the subject in whom it exists.
- Great conceit diminishes its subject just as humility magnifies its subject.
- The duration of conceit prepares its subject to suffer endless torment in hell.
- The power of conceit cannot stand up against the power of humility.
- A conceited man is one who believes that his natural talents and wealth are of his own doing.
- A man who loves himself more than God is conceited.
- When a conceited man is criticized, he believes that he is virtuous and that his critic is vicious.
- Conceit is a deceitful habit: when it believes it is ascending, it is actually descending. Moreover, when it believes that it is telling the truth, it is uttering falsehoods.
- A conceited man is never satisfied with anyone, nor is anyone ever satisfied with him.
- The conceited man sees no difference between his own conceit and someone else's humility.
- Conceit contradicts all the virtues.
- Conceit is a principle that debases higher values and elevates lower ones.
- Conceit poses an impediment in the middle between the beginning and the end, and this is why it never ascends but only descends instead.
- A conceited man is never satisfied.
- Major conceit displays major signs.
- The conceited man finds no one who is his equal, and does not want to associate with anyone.
- Conceit about one's body is minor conceit, but conceit about one's soul is major conceit.

Chapter 26 - Conceit Combined with the Rules

198. Does conceit have more to do with the intellect than with the will? We say that it does, because it is first conceived by the intellect and subsequently loved by the will.

199. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is conceit? We say that it is the vice that descends to the extent it believes it is ascending. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does conceit have in itself co-essentially? We answer that it has in itself its own privative correlatives that are opposed to the positive correlatives of humility. With *the third species of rule C* we ask, what is conceit in other things? We say that it is judgmental in the intellect, discriminating in the will, conservative in memory, and it is the empress and the root of all sins. With *the fourth species of rule C* we ask, what does conceit have in other things? We answer that it has debasement in the subject in whom it exists, just as the soul has motion in a body that runs.

200. With *the first species of rule D* we ask, what does conceit come from? We answer that it comes from its correlatives that are the privative correlatives of humility, just as night is the absence of light and deafness is the absence of hearing. With *the second species of rule D* we ask, what is conceit made of? We answer that it is made of its specific correlatives that make it a specific vice. Here, the intellect sees that the first species has to do with the absence of the contrary to conceit, whereas the second species has to do only with conceit itself. With *the third species of rule D* we ask, to whom does conceit belong? We say it belongs to the subject whose habit it is.

201. With *the first species of rule E* we ask, why is there conceit? We say it exists due to its subject's lack of humility, just as blindness exists because the sense of sight is absent. With *the second species of rule E* we ask, why is there conceit? We answer that it exists to prevent humility from existing, just as fire exists in a choleric temperament to prevent water from attaining its purpose in it.

202. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the continuous quantity of conceit. We say that conceit has continuous quantity because it is an indivisible habit that is generated in an instant and corrupted in an instant. With *the second species of rule F* we ask about the discrete quantity of conceit. We answer that it has discrete quantity because it consists of a number of privative principles, namely the privation of goodness, the privation of greatness etc.

203. With *the first species of rule G* we ask about the proper quality of conceit. We say that it is undue ascent. With *the second species of rule G* we ask, what is the appropriated quality of conceit? We say it is well-deserved and violent descent. The contrary can be said about humility.

204. With *rule H* we ask about conceit and time. With the first species of D we answer that conceit exists in time beginning with the moment when humility is corrupted in a subject and supplanted by conceit, for the generation of one means the corruption of the other. Rule K signifies this.

205. With *rule I* we ask, where is conceit? We say that it is in the subject in whom humility was present, or should have been present.

206. With *rule K* we ask, how does conceit exist? We say that it exists in a way contrary to humility, just as love exists due to attraction and hate exists due to repulsion.

207. With *the second rule K* we ask what conceit exists with. We answer that it exists with the privation of humility, of obedience, of justice and so forth, and also with all the other things that are said about it.

Chapter 27 - Acedia Combined with the Principles

- The acedious man is lazy in doing good, but when it comes to doing evil, he is swift and solicitous.
- The acedious man is solicitous in avoiding whatever is useful for the common good.
- Acedia lasts with conceit, laziness, wrath and so forth.
- Acedia impedes men who propose to do good and to avoid evil, but cannot do so because their power is shackled by acedia.
- Acedia alters and infects the intellect and makes itself undetectable.
- Acedia renders the will lazy in loving good, but solicitous in loving evil.
- Acedia considers laziness as a virtue and diligence in doing good as a vice.
- Acedia is indolent in dealing with truth, but solicitous in dealing with falsehood.
- The acedious man enjoys himself with privative habits, but not with positive ones.
- Due to intellectual acedia and laziness, the acedious man does not differentiate things in his science, but confuses them instead.
- The acedious man associates all his higher and lower faculties to all the vices, because he is lazy in putting his faculties to work for acquiring virtues.
- The acedious man opposes diligence in virtue with solicitude for vice.
- Acedia perverts positive principles into privative ones, and this is why the acedious man grumbles, pretends that he can foresee the outcome of things, gives superfluous advice, reprehends good deeds and is hostile to accomplishment; besides, he binds form and corrupts matter so that his acts are characterized by indolence.

- Acedia poses an impediment in the middle so that legitimate principles cannot find repose in the end.
- The acedious man finds repose in opposing any accomplishment, although he finds it very hard to accomplish anything, because acedia is hostile to final perfection.
- Major acedia is the source of all the vices.
- With acedia, the acedious man brings the acts of all the vices equally into play to fortify his acedia against the love of virtue.
- Minor acedia is associated with minor diligence, but not at all with major diligence.

Chapter 28 - Acedia Combined with the Rules

210. We ask if acedia is a deadly sin. The answer is yes, because it impedes all the acts of the virtues. Now the intellect wonders: given that acedia is a deadly sin displayed through many signs and figures, why do people know so little about it? Then it remembers that most humans are clothed in the habit of acedia.

211. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is acedia? The answer is that acedia is the vice on account of which the acedious man grieves over the good fortune of his fellow men and rejoice in their misfortune. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does acedia have in itself co-essentially? The answer is that it has its own correlatives made of the privative correlatives of charity, given that a charitable man rejoices in the good fortune of his fellow men and is grieved by their misfortunes. With *the third species of rule C* we ask, what is acedia in other things? The answer is that it is lazy and malevolent toward doing good, but it is solicitous, swift and selective in doing evil. With *the fourth species of rule C* we ask, what does acedia have in other things? The answer is that it has its acts in every vice.

212. With *the first species of rule D* we ask, what does acedia arise from? The answer is that it comes from an absence of charity, which had been and should still be present in the subject. With *the second species of rule D* we ask, what is acedia made of? The answer is that it consists of its own privative correlatives that make it a specific vice, just as deafness consists of its own privative correlatives that make it a specific deformity. With *the third species of rule D* we ask, to whom does acedia belong? The answer is that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists, just as deafness belongs to a deaf man.

213. With *the first species of rule E* we ask, why is there acedia? The answer is that acedia exists because it has been acquired as a habit, just as daylight exists because the sun is shining above the horizon. With *the second species of rule E* we ask, why is there acedia? We say that it exists in order to impede charity from having subjects in whom it can exist, because acedia is a privative habit that opposes the positive habit of charity and attempts to defeat its purpose.

214. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the continuous quantity of acedia. We say that it has continuous quantity throughout all the other vices it gives rise to. With *the second species of rule F* we ask about the discrete quantity of acedia. We reply that it has discrete quantities due to the different vices in which it acts in different ways.

215. With *the first species of rule G* we ask, what is the proper quality of acedia? We answer that it is laziness without which it cannot act. With *the second species of rule G* we ask, what is the appropriated quality of acedia? We say that it is malevolence and iniquity with which the acedious man rejoices in evil and is grieved by good.

216. With *rule H* we ask about acedia and time. We answer with rule C that it is lazy in time so that the subject in whom acedia exists does nothing useful with his available time.

217. With *rule I* we ask, where is acedia? The answer is that it is in the laziness of the soul, of the imagination and of the sensitive faculty as they all neglect to do good and love to do evil.

218. With *the first rule K* we ask, how does acedia exist? The answer is that it exists in a way opposed to the mode of charity; charity exists by loving what is good for one's neighbour and hating what is bad for him, whereas acedia exists in opposition to this.

219. With *the second rule K* we ask, what does acedia exist with? The answer is that it exists with the privative habits of the virtues, namely with injury and imprudence, along with laziness, wrath and so forth.

Chapter 29 - Envy Combined with the Principles

- 220. The envious man has an unreasonable craving for things that do not belong to him, which is bad for his spiritual life. If he was aware of this, he would no longer be envious.
- The greatness of envy coexists with the greatness of the other vices, so that it cannot be defeated by the greatness of any single virtue.
- The duration of envy lasts together with the duration of the other vices, so that it cannot be defeated without the duration of the virtues.
- The power of envy is rooted in the power of the other vices so that it cannot be defeated without the power of charity together with the power of the other virtues.
- Envy perverts and alters the envious intellect, which is unaware of this, though it can recover by understanding what envy is.
- Envy distracts the will from the supreme object; however, the will can recover if it is induced to objectify the supreme object.
- The envious man has no virtues, but he has vices; if he wants to acquire virtues, let him change what he has into what he does not have.
- The envious man does not have the truth, but he has falsehood instead; thus he deceives himself, but he can recover by stopping his self-deception.
- Once the envious man has obtained his coveted object, he remains unsatisfied because his conscience troubles him. However, he can recover if he follows the dictates of his conscience.
- 221. Envy drives the covetous person to commit as many different acts as he commits with the other vices; but he can heal himself by frequently enumerating these acts.
- Envy does not agree with any of the virtues, and the cure consists in realizing this fact.
- Envy contradicts the virtues with privative habits, and the cure consists in opposing the vices with positive habits.
- Envy begins with sense objects, it is prepared in the imagination and completed by the spiritual faculties, and the cure consists in defeating the impressions of the senses and the imagination by using the power of the spiritual faculties.
- Envy is a standard whereby the envious man measures injury, imprudence and so on, but the cure is in applying the standards of justice, prudence and so forth.
- The envious man has no repose in the coveted objects that he strives to acquire with effort; he can be cured if he desists from this striving until he recovers his peace of mind.
- Major envy brings major strife to the envious man, but he can recover if he enables major charity to perform major acts.
- Envy equalizes all the acts of the other vices with its acts, and the cure consists in equalizing the acts of all the virtues with major acts of charity.
- The envious man thinks that his possessions are minor and that the coveted things he does not have are of major importance; the cure consists in inquiring into the usefulness and purpose of these things.

Chapter 30 - Envy Combined with the Rules

222. Objectively, is envy a sin more general than avarice? The answer is yes, because the avaricious man does not objectify as many things as the envious man does; the avaricious man objectifies only the things he believes he has, whereas the envious man objectifies all kinds of things that he cannot possibly have.

223. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is envy? We say that envy is the sin that gives the envious man an unreasonable craving for things that are not his. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does envy have in itself co-essentially? We reply that it has its own privative correlatives that make it what it is. With *the third species of rule C* we ask, what is envy in other things? We reply that in the envious man envy is a habit that keeps him in constant labour, sorrow and grief. With *the fourth species of rule C* we ask, what does envy have in other things? We say that in the envious man it has the uppermost leading position; for the envious man is always shrouded with envy that he wears like a cape.

224. With *the first species of rule D* we ask, what does envy originate from? We answer that envy arises from its own privative correlatives, just as blindness arises from its own privative correlatives. With *the second species* we ask, what is envy made of? We answer that it is made of its specific correlatives that make it a specific sin, just as deafness consists of its own privative correlatives opposed to the correlatives of hearing. With *the third species* we ask, to whom does envy belong? We answer that it belongs to the subject whose habit it is, just as malevolence belongs to the will, forgetfulness to memory and ignorance to the intellect.

225. With *the first species of rule E* we ask, why is there envy? We answer that it exists as an effect produced in the envious man, just as deafness is an effect caused by the absence of hearing. With *the second species of rule E* we ask, why is there envy? We answer that it exists so that the subject in whom it is present can have suffering and toil until he earns endless sorrow and sadness in hell.

226. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the continuous quantity of envy. We answer that it has continuous quantity inasmuch as the envious man can measure avarice, lust, gluttony etc. with the standard of envy. With *the second species of rule F* we ask about the discrete quantity of envy. We answer that it has discrete quantity because it is capable of committing a great number of different individual acts.

227. With *the first species of rule G* we ask, what is the proper quality of envy? We say it is a passion that the envious man has for coveting the belongings of others. With *the second species of rule G* we ask, what are the appropriated qualities of envy? We say that they include injury that is opposed to justice, imprudence that is opposed to prudence and so on with the other virtues.

228. With *rule H* we ask about envy and time. We say that envy exists in time because it is a new habit of its subject, because it performs different acts at different times, because its subject is in different places at different times etc.

229. With *rule I* we ask, where is envy? We reply that it exists in the soul that fabricates it, in the imagination that gives it shape, and in the senses where it is signified and formed.

230. With *the first rule K* we ask, how does envy exist? We reply that it exists in the way in which the subjects in whom it resides engage in corrupt dealings as they unreasonably objectify the possessions of others.

231. With *the second rule K* we ask, with what does envy exist? We answer that it exists with the privative habits of which it consists, such as malice, injury and so forth.

Chapter 31 - Ire Combined with the Principles

- Ire moves the will to hate good without any deliberation, and this is why deliberation is the remedy.
- Ire lays everything waste with great fury, though the remedy consists in great forbearance and deliberation.
- As long as ire lasts, so do its acts. The remedy consists in persistently focusing the mind on some other object.
- The combined powers of patience, forbearance and deliberation defeat the power of ire.
- Ire confuses the intellect by taking away its understanding. The remedy consists in restoring understanding to the intellect.
- Ire perverts the intellect into hating what it should love; the remedy consists in practicing forbearance until loving regenerates the will.
- Ire makes the will vicious; the remedy consists in making the will virtuous through forbearance.
- Ire stops the intellect from understanding the truth, but the remedy consists in patiently understanding the truth.
- The irate man suffers from his hatred, and he can be healed by finding repose in loving.
- The irate man makes no distinction between his own evil and the evil that is present in others. The remedy consists in making this distinction.
- The irate man associates vices with vices; his remedy consists in associating virtues with virtues.
- The irate man contradicts patience with anger; his remedy consists in resisting ire with patience.
- Ire arises in hate, but love dispels it.
- Ire measures without measure, the remedy consists in measuring in a measured way..
- No one finds repose in ire, but everyone finds repose in patience.
- It takes major patience to defeat major wrath, but not vice versa. Here, the intellect realizes that virtue is absolutely stronger than vice.
- Ire equalizes the acts of the intellect and of the will with fury, while the remedy consists in equalizing them with forbearance, patience and charity.
- Minor patience defeats minor ire.

Chapter 32 - Ire Combined with the Rules

234. Is ire a sin more general than any other sin? The answer is yes, because fury totally deprives the intellect of deliberation.

235. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is ire? We say that ire is the sin with which the will hates good and loves evil, without any deliberation. With *the second species*, we ask, what does ire have in itself essentially? We answer that it has its correlatives that its fury confuses. With *the third species* we ask, what is ire in other things? We say that ire is a bond that shackles the will to irrational hatred, the intellect to ignorance and memory to forgetfulness. With *the fourth species of rule C* we ask, what does ire have in other things? We answer that it has dominion over the will because it commands the will to hate good and to love evil. Ire also has dominion over the intellect and memory, as it compels the intellect to ignore and memory to forget.

236. With *the first species of rule D* we ask, what does ire arise from? We reply that it does not arise from anything because it is a sin, and morally speaking, sin does not arise from anything. With *the second species of rule D* we ask, what is ire made of? We reply that it is

made of its specific correlatives that make it a specific sin. With *the third species* we ask, to whom does ire belong? To which we answer that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists.

237. With *the first species of rule E* we ask, why is there ire? We reply that ire exists because it is present in a subject in whom charity, patience and forbearance are absent. With *the second species of rule E* we ask, why is there ire? We say that ire exists so that the virtues cannot act.

238. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the continuous quantity of ire. We reply that it has continuous quantity inasmuch as it disables all acts of charity, patience, forbearance along with justice, prudence, etc. With *the second species of rule F* we ask about the discrete quantity of ire. We say that it has discrete quantity inasmuch as it increases or decreases its acts.

239. With *the first species of rule G* we ask, what is the proper quality of ire? We say it is fury, which is proper to ire alone. With *the second species of rule G* we ask, what are the appropriated qualities of ire? We say that they include impatience, lack of forbearance, and so forth.

240. With *rule H* we ask about ire and time. We reply that ire exists in time as a new habit that reproduces its acts in time.

241. With *rule I* we ask, where is ire? We reply that it resides in the will with its hatred, in injury with its injurious acts etc. It is also in motion, because the more it is stirred up, the more vigorously it reproduces its acts.

242. With *the first rule K* we ask, how does ire exist? We say that it exists by perverting the intellect, the will, the memory and the imagination; and the perversion induced by ire exists due to its fury and lack of deliberation.

243. With *the second rule K* we ask, with what does ire exist? We answer that it exists with objects of the senses and of the imagination along with a perverted soul and with the privative habits of the principles, such as malice and so forth.

Chapter 33 - Falsehood Combined with the Principles

- 244. The false man deceives himself as he deceives others; the definition of goodness shows this.
- Falsehood cannot be detected by its own greatness, but it can be detected by great truthfulness.
- Falsehood lasts so long as it is not detected, but once it is detected, it is dispelled.
- Falsehood has no power against understanding, but it has power over believing, so that prudence is its enemy.
- Falsehood deceives the intellect through belief.
- Falsehood disguised as truth makes itself lovable, although truthfulness ultimately uncovers and reproves falsehood.
- Falsehood hypocritically pretends to be a virtue, but prudence destroys it and reveals its true nature.
- Falsehood does not act truthfully, and consequently it is uncovered by truthful action.
- Falsehood is uncovered when it promises enjoyment but brings grief instead,
- 245. Falsehood does not distinguish between things, but confuses them instead; thus, it is uncovered by drawing distinctions.
- The false man associates sense objects and their meanings so as to deceive the imagination and the intellect, whereas truthfulness, with its concordance, explodes falsehood.
- Falsehood contradicts the purpose of contradicting falsehood.
- Falsehood reveals itself when it brings enjoyment at first, but sadness in the end. .

- Falsehood reveals itself when it sets aside the middle that is disposed between the beginning and the end.
- Falsehood can be recognized when the false man has repose in the beginning and toil in the end.
- Major falsehood is detected by major truthfulness.
- Falsehood can be recognized when the false man equalizes likenesses and unlikenesses.
- Falsehood is clearly uncovered by means of minor truth.

Chapter 34 - Falsehood Combined with the Rules

246. Is falsehood as strong as truthfulness? The answer is no, because truthfulness is a positive habit whereas falsehood is a privative habit.

247. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is falsehood? We answer that it is the sin with which man deceives and is deceived. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does falsehood have in itself co-essentially? We answer that it has its own correlatives of which its essence consists. With *the third species* we ask, what is falsehood in other things? We say that it is deceptive in sense objects whose meaning it perverts, it is deceptive in the imagination because of the intellect's ignorance, and ultimately it is an enemy. With *the fourth species* we ask, what does falsehood have in other things? We say that it has its acts in privative principles that are opposed to positive principles.

248. With *the first species of rule D* we ask, from what does falsehood arise? We answer that it exists on its own, because it is a sin. With *the second species* we ask, what is falsehood made of? We say that it is made of its own specific privative principles that make it a specific sin, just as deafness consists of its privative correlatives that make it a specific deformity. With *the third species of rule D* we ask, to whom does falsehood belong? We answer that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists.

249. With *the first species of rule E* we ask, why is there falsehood? We reply that it exists because of a lack of truthfulness in its subject. With *the second species* we ask, why is there falsehood? We answer that it exists for the purpose of deceiving men, just as an instrument exist so that things can be done with it.

250. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the continuous quantity of falsehood. We answer that it has continuous quantity inasmuch as its subject can act with it. With *the second species*, we ask about the discrete quantity of falsehood. We say that it has discrete quantity due to its privative principles.

251. With *the first species of rule G* we ask, what is the proper quality of falsehood? We answer tat it is deception, because this is its specific act. With *the second species* we ask, what are the appropriated qualities of falsehood? We say that they are lies, hypocrisy and so forth.

252. With *rule H* we ask about falsehood and time. We answer that it exists in time because it is a new habit and has its acts in time.

253. With *rule I* we ask, where is falsehood? We answer that it is found in liars, hypocrites and deceivers.

254. With *the first rule K* we ask, how does falsehood exist? We answer that it exists through methods of feigning, deceiving, lying and so forth.

255. With *the second rule K* we ask, with what does falsehood exist? We answer that it exists with dissimulation, deception and so forth, as shown by what we said

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Chapter 35 - Inconstancy Combined with the Principles

- 256. Constancy is a habit on account of which goodness is a reason for good to do good, and inconstancy is a sin that impedes this.
- Great constancy overcomes inconstancy.
- So long as inconstancy is present, constancy is absent.
- The power of inconstancy cannot overcome the power of constancy.
- With inconstancy, the intellect's understanding cannot be strong.
- Constancy is not lovable if it is accompanied by inconstancy.
- Constancy accompanied by inconstancy is not a virtue.
- Constancy and inconstancy cannot both be true at the same time.
- Inconstancy does not belong to the genus of enjoyment, but to the genus of grief.
- 257. Constancy reveals and distinguishes differences, but inconstancy hides and darkens them.
- Constancy has no general or specific concordance with inconstancy.
- Due to the nature of inconstancy, it must be resisted from the very first, because it is difficult to resist it later on.
- Because constancy is prior, all inconstancy is posterior.
- Constancy joins things together, whereas inconstancy splits them apart.
- A constant person finds repose in constancy, whereas inconstancy causes toil for the inconstant person.
- Major inconstancy cannot be placed or ranked above major constancy.
- Because of the free will, either constancy or inconstancy can equally be chosen, but they cannot be measured equally.
- Minor inconstancy is easily defeated by major constancy.

Chapter 36 - Inconstancy Combined with the Rules

258. Does the habit of inconstancy belong more to the will than to the intellect? The answer is yes, because the will is more changeable than the intellect, given that the intellect proceeds through discourse, whereas the will can change suddenly; and thus the intellect knows that the remedy against inconstancy consists in restraining the sudden fluctuations of the will by making the will participate in the intellect's discourse.

259. With *the first species of rule C* we ask, what is inconstancy? We answer that it is a deviated offshoot of constancy. With *the second species of rule C* we ask, what does inconstancy have in itself co-essentially? We say that it has its correlatives that make it what it is. With *the third species* we ask, what is inconstancy in other things? We answer that it is a ruler of the will, disobedient to the intellect, timid in the imagination and unstable with regard to sense objects. With *the fourth species* we ask, what does it have in other things? We answer that it has a lack of will power in the will, and it has deception in its promises.

260. With *the first species of rule D* we ask, from what does inconstancy arise? We say that it exists on its own, because it is a sin. With *the second species of rule D* we ask, what is inconstancy made of? We answer that it is made of its specific privative principles that make it what it is. With *the third species* we ask, to whom does inconstancy belong? We say that it belongs to the subject whose habit it is.

261. With *the first species of rule E* we ask, why is there inconstancy? We say that it exists in the subject in whom it resides due to his lack of constancy, just as heat exists in water because of the absence of cold. Considering this, the intellect can see in what way natural habits resemble moral habits. With *the second species of rule E* we ask, why is there

inconstancy? We say that it exists to prevent constancy from existing. Here, the intellect realizes that sin amounts to naught, because it is opposed to being.

262. With *the first species of rule F* we ask about the continuous quantity of inconstancy. We say that it has continuous quantity inasmuch as it impedes constancy. With *the second species of rule F* we ask about the discrete quantity of inconstancy. We answer that it has discrete quantity because the will can frequently be altered in practice.

263. With *the first species of rule G* we ask, what is the proper quality of inconstancy? We answer that it is alteration of the will. With *the second species* we ask, what is the appropriated quality of inconstancy? We answer that it is faintheartedness.

264. With *rule H* we ask about inconstancy and time. We reply that it exists at the time when it alters and habituates the will. In addition, it exists at the time when the inconstant will acts against constancy.

265. With *rule I* we ask, where is inconstancy? We answer that it resides in weak will power, in lack of perseverance and in other places mentioned above.

266. With *the first rule K* we ask how inconstancy exists. The answer is that it exists in a way contrary to the way of constancy, because the latter proceeds with rational discourse, deliberate choice, prudence and above all with fortitude.

267. With *the second rule K* we ask what inconstancy exists with. We answer that it exists with sudden change, with the cause whose effect it is, and with lack of constancy, just as shadow is due to a lack of light.

268. We have discussed the nine subjects in sequential combination with the principles and rules of this art. As we dealt with them here, so can the artist deal artificially with other related peregrine subjects, each in its own way.

Part 10 - About Application

1. This part is divided into 15 parts, which deal with the application of:

1. Implicit and explicit terms
2. Abstract and concrete terms
3. The first figure
4. The second figure
5. The third figure
6. The fourth figure
7. The definitions
8. The rules
9. The table
10. The evacuation of the third figure
11. Multiplication with the fourth figure
12. The mixture of principles and rules
13. The nine subjects
14. The hundred forms
15. Questions

Now let us begin the first part.

Chapter 1 - Applying Implicit and Explicit Terms

2. Implicit and explicit terms apply as follows: take the terms contained in the question - for instance, let us ask whether God exists. The term "whether" in this question calls for the application of B, and B involves goodness and difference; thus, the artist can get help from the terms represented by B. He can also apply other terms implied by the question and that are explicit terms of this art, such as greatness, eternity etc. If God exists, He does so through infinite greatness and eternity, so that without infinite greatness, eternity etc. God cannot exist, and this constitutes camera BCD. The artist can then discourse with these terms to prove or disprove God's existence following the way the three terms combine with the principles and the rules.

3. If the question contains two explicit terms - as when we ask if God is eternal - we can refer to another term implied by this question, namely power. Now if God is eternal, He has the power to be eternal, and if He is not eternal, he does not have the power to be eternal.

4. Further, if the question contains three explicit terms - as in asking if it is good that God be as infinite in his greatness as in his eternity - we obtain camera BCD, where B implies goodness, difference and 'whether'; C implies greatness, concordance and 'what'; and D implies eternity, contrariety and 'of what'. Further, these terms imply the definitions and the species of the rules so that the entire camera applies to the proposition at hand in reaching a conclusion. Examples such as the ones we just provided can be applied to other issues as well.

5. Further, if we ask whether God is actually greater because of his intellect than because of his eternity, "greater" applies to majority just as "lesser" applies to minority, given that "lesser" belongs to the genus of minority and "greater" belongs to the genus of majority.

6. If we ask whether God is as powerful because of his power as he is powerful because of his will, we can refer to equality, a term that implies comparison, just as "greater" implies majority and "lesser" implies minority.

7. If we ask whether God is just, we shall refer to virtue, because justice belongs to the genus of virtue. We can refer to goodness, given that it is good for God to be just. The same applies to other questions in their own way.

Chapter 2 - Applying Abstract and Concrete Terms

8. This application works in four ways. First, it applies when the terms contained in the question have substantial abstractness and concreteness, for instance igneity and fire, where igneity is a substantial essence and fire is a substantial concrete term.

Secondly, it applies when both the abstract and the concrete terms are accidental. For instance, take 'quantity' and 'quantum'. I take 'quantum' to signify a habit that is accidental, or an accident.

Third, it applies when the abstract term is substantial and the concrete term is accidental, as in igneity and heat, where I take 'heat' to signify an accidental habit.

The fourth way is when the abstract is accidental and the concrete is substantial, as in 'whiteness' and 'something white', by 'something white' I mean a body habituated with whiteness, and this body is a substance and not an accident.

These four methods are all implied by the terms of the question, and vice versa. Thus, they should be applied to the conclusion, so that the intellect is not deceived by any alteration in the middle term.

Chapter 3 - Applying the First Figure

Here the application proceeds as described in the part about the first figure, by making affirmations in a circular way and interchanging the subject and the predicate: for instance "good greatness, great goodness" etc. But if the subject and predicate are not convertible, we use negation, for instance, take "greatness" and "eternity" - now there is some greatness that is not eternity, and vice versa; and some goodness is not great because some goodness is small, and likewise with the other terms in their own ways.

Chapter 4 - Application of the Second Figure

10. The second figure applies with its triangles and the ladders placed above the angles, and the ladders imply entirely general principles, entirely specific principles and subalternate principles. Difference can be an entirely general principle that has nothing else above it; difference can be an entirely specific principle, as in the difference between this stone and that plant, and difference can be a subalternate principle as in the difference between sensual and sensual etc. Further, this ladder implies the ascent and descent of the intellect, for without these ladders the intellect has no way to ascend and descend.

11. Let us also note that the terms of the second figure can be explained according to their positions in the figure, as described in part two of this book. Further, we say that the second

figure can be applied to the first, for instance by placing difference between different kinds of goodness etc. as shown in the third figure.

Chapter 5 - Applying the Third Figure.

12. This is how questions are applied to the third figure. If the subject matter of the question has to do with B, then apply C to B, and if applying C to B is not sufficient, apply D to B and so on all the way to camera BK. Take the meanings of the cameras and use affirmation and negation, so that the conditions and meanings of the letters are preserved. In addition, if the subject matter of the question has to do with C, apply the other letters to C as we did with B. The same can be done with DE etc. This application is infallible and highly general.

Chapter 6 - Applying the Fourth Figure

13. Here is the way to apply questions to the fourth figure. If the subject matter of the question has to do with camera BCD, then apply it to this camera. If the subject matter has to do with BCE rather than with BCD, then turn the inner circle and place E under C to form camera BCE. Now, take the meanings of the letters to solve the question, and the things we said about these letters apply to the remaining ones. This application is more general than that of the third figure, because each camera contains three letters. Moreover, it is general to the degree that it contains all the cameras of the table.

Chapter 7 - Applying Definitions.

14. The method of this art requires that the artist define the terms contained in the question, be they implicit or explicit. For instance, if we ask whether God is infinite, then the respondent must define God and infinity as follows. God is a being so perfect that He needs nothing outside himself. Infinity is a being that must have its own infinite correlatives without which it cannot exist at all. Further, we can say that goodness is a being because of which good can do good, and we can likewise say that greatness is a being because of which great beings can do great things, and the same with the other principles, each in its own way.

15. Further, a term contained in a question can be defined in several ways, by going through the species of the rules. Thus, by *the first species of rule C*, man is a rational animal. By *the second species*, man is an animal who has his own correlatives, namely the hominificative, hominificable and hominifying, just as fire has its own innate ignificative, ignificable and ignifying. By *the third species*, man is an animal who works with mechanical tools, for instance he practices arts like writing, horseback riding etc. By *the fourth species* of this rule, man is the animal who has ownership of and dominance over irrational animals and plants. By *the first species of rule D*, man's sensitivity ranks first in nobility among sentient beings. By *the second species*, man is a being made of a soul and a body. By *the third species*, man is a being to whom irrational animals, plants etc. are subjected. By *the first species of rule E*, man is a substance by reason of his humanity. By *the second species*, man was created to serve God with the help of the vegetal and animal worlds. By *rule F*, man is a being whose quantity is continuous throughout the elementative, vegetative, sensitive, imaginative and rational powers of which he consists. The five powers, by reason of difference, are discrete parts of man. By *rule G*, man is the being whose proper function is to produce man, and he is a being who can laugh, write, ride on horseback and so forth. By *rule H*, man is a being who exists in time, as he understands, reads and so forth. By *rule I*, man is a being who tills vineyards and who prays to God in church. By *the rule of modality*, man is a being who has ways of

mechanizing his work and of generating another man. By *the rule of instrumentality*, man is a substance that generates another man through the help of a woman, and he is a being who makes nails with a hammer, and so forth. This provides a doctrine that enables one to make diversified definitions of the same thing so as to make the thing known through true definitions in ways in which it was not known before. Therefore, the artist must define things in such a way as to keep the definitions intact.

Chapter 8 - Applying the Rules

16. When inquiring into an uncertain issue, the artist must apply the question to the sequence of the rules. A crystal placed on a red surface receives a red colouring, when placed on a green surface, it receives a green colouring, and likewise with other colours. Similarly, when an unknown term is combined with the rules and their species in sequence, the unknown term is coloured and clarified by the species of the rules in which it is placed subjectively and objectively; by thus applying the species of the rules, the intellect obtains knowledge of issues that it did not have before. In the previous chapter, we gave an example of how to define man by the rules, now for further clarification we want to give an example of how to combine nature with the sequence of rules.

17. With the first species of rule C we say that nature is an essence sustained in its natural concrete state and moved by its natural movement in which it reposes. With the second species of rule C, nature is an essence with natural correlatives, namely the naturizer, naturizable and naturizing without which it cannot exist. By the third species, nature is active and passive in the subjects in which it exists with its act of naturizing. By the fourth species, nature has action, passion and an act in the subjects in which it exists through the natural agent with its natural form, matter and end, and with its natural instruments.

18. By the first species of rule D, nature is a primordial essence. By the second species, it is made of its correlatives that ascend to the essence, and its concreteness is derived from them through descent and contraction. By the third species of the same rule, nature belongs to the subjects in which it exists as they naturally make use of it.

19. By the first species of rule E, nature exists because it is a being comprised of its constituent correlatives. By the second species, nature exists for enabling other beings to exist and act naturally.

20. By rule F, nature is an essence that has continuous and indivisible quantity, and its concretes make up its discrete quantity.

21. By rule G, nature has its own actions and passions, as does the nature of fire in the act of heating; and it has appropriated actions and passions, as in hot water that has the heater, the heatable and heating in itself.

22. By rule H, the intellect recognizes that nature exists in time both continuously and successively, continuously because of its continuous quantity, and successively because of the discrete quantities in which nature exists in time.

23. By rule I, nature is located in its locus, just as the content is in its container, or the doer is in the doable; and it is sustained and moved in the subjects in which it exists.

24. By the rule of modality, nature has modes for mixing, generating, corrupting and so forth.
25. By the rule of instrumentality, nature exists with its instruments, as substance does with its accidents, or a mechanic with his tools, and so forth.
26. When nature is thus combined with the species of the rules in sequence, it becomes known to the intellect, because the species signify what nature is in existence and action. As we dealt with nature, so can we deal with other abstract or concrete things according to their properties. Because we cannot say the same things about the realm of the miraculous as what we said about nature, when the intellect discourses on the miraculous with the sequence of rules, it can discover what it is by considering its opposite, given that the miraculous enters into the species of the rules in a way that is contrary to the way in which nature enters into them. Here, the intellect sees how an opposite can be known through its counterpart by applying the rules.

Chapter 9 - Applying the Table

27. Applying the table consists in applying the terms of the question to the table. If the terms of the question have to do with the first column, namely BCD, then the question must be applied to the first column; for instance if we ask whether it would be a great and good thing for the world to exist from eternity or if we ask whether there is an eternal act. Given that goodness is a reason for good to do good, greatness is a reason for this act to be great, and duration makes this act last from eternity and in eternity, there must be some infinite act.
28. Further, if the terms of the question have to do with the second column, namely BCE, for instance if we ask why the greatness of the goodness of power exists, we reply that it exists on account of the correlatives of goodness, greatness and power, and so with the other columns in their way.
29. Moreover, each column can be applied to the other columns, for instance, the second column is applicable to the first and the third columns because it has BC in common with both, and the other columns are interconnected in this way. Here, the intellect realizes that all the columns can be applied to one identical conclusion, and thus it understands that it has reached a high level of generality through this highly general application.
30. Further, if we ask whether the world is eternal, then the second camera of the first column, or BCTB, applies to the camera above it and to those below, all the way to camera TBCD. This is because 'eternity' is an explicit term of the question.
31. If we ask whether the world's power is infinite, we can get the answer by applying column BCD in the same way as we applied it to the question about the world's eternity. The answer is negative, for just as there would be major inconvenience if the world existed from eternity, so would there be major inconvenience if the world had infinite power.
32. Further, if we ask whether one angel produces another angel, we can get the answer by applying BCD because there is a great difference between the essence of an angel and that of a man or a rose. Now the human body exists within the general matter of the elements. Hence, one man can produce or engender another man, and one rose can produce another rose, but this is not the case with angels, for an angel has not the wherewithal to produce another angel, as it is not derived from one identical general angelic matter, but each angel is ultimately

primordial. The examples we gave with the table can be applied to many other things in their own way.

33. Applying the table requires that the species and rules of the cameras be preserved, and that the things they signify with regard to the issue at hand and its conclusion be applied through affirmation and negation, while distinguishing what is convenient from what is inconvenient, as shown in the above examples.

Chapter 10 - Applying the Evacuation of the Third Figure

34. The evacuation of the third figure is done as follows: apply the explicit terms of the question to the evacuation of the third figure, and to the camera most relevant to these terms. If we ask whether it is a great good that goodness and greatness have substantial correlatives and whether these correlatives are in good and great concordance, the question applies to camera BC and it is solved with the help of what we said about this camera in part 6, chapter 1. Likewise with other questions, depending on the way their terms can enter into a camera, by using them to make affirmative and negative statements so as to distinguish what is convenient from what is inconvenient.

35. Further, a general question can be applied to a particular one and conversely, for instance if we ask whether goodness has great innate correlatives. This question is applied to the following one, namely whether the goodness of Socrates or of this rose has great innate correlatives. Then the questions are applied to camera BC, where you find the answer already signified by the things we said in that chapter.

36. Further, we ask what the correlatives of greatness consist of, and what the correlatives of Socrates consist of. These questions are applied to camera CD and the general question is applied to the particular question, and then the solution can be found, as it is clarified and signified by what we already said about the camera, and likewise with the other cameras. We will give an example of this in part eleven, which deals with questions.

Chapter 11 - Applying the Multiplication of the Fourth Figure

37. We said in part seven that the multiplication of the fourth figure is done in five ways, namely, by finding the middle term, by proving the major and minor premises, by exposing fallacies, and by following the doctrine whereby other arts can be learned easily. If the artist wants to multiply many reasons for the same conclusion, he can apply the method we used for multiplying reasons with the fourth figure, because this is a universal method that regulates and clarifies particular methods, for the particular is reflected in the universal and conversely. Now this should suffice because the matter has already been made clear enough.

Chapter 12 - Applying the Mixture of Principles and Rules

38. This chapter is divided into two parts: the first deals with explicit principles, and the second deals with implicit principles that we apply to the explicit ones and to the loci of the rules of this art. These implicit principles are called the hundred forms, and we include them to provide the human intellect with more support for seeking out many conclusions by means of the art. However, we do not intend to say much about these forms, to avoid prolixity. But the things we do say about them enable the artist to go ahead and combine each form with the entire sequence of rules, using the same process we followed in combining the explicit principles with the rules. Now let us begin the first part about applying the hundred forms.

39. If the question contains explicit terms of this art, for instance if we ask whether there is a good, great and eternal being, we refer to the chapters on goodness, greatness and eternity and see how goodness and the other principles combine with the sequence of principles and rules and then we reach a conclusion by making affirmative and negative statements in keeping with the nature of the principles, so that the principles and rules are not violated. The intellect discovers the truth about the subject of its investigation as it clarifies it by means of this discourse. In addition, examples like the ones we gave with goodness, greatness and eternity can likewise be made with the other principles. This is sufficient for the first part, for the sake of brevity.

Chapter 13 - Applying the Nine Subjects

We already covered the nine subjects, and if there is a question about God, apply it to the first subject and follow its discourse about God so that the affirmative or negative conclusion agrees with the text. If there is a question about angels, apply it to the second subject with its discourse on angels and solve the question in a way that agrees with the text. The same applies to each remaining subject in its own way.

Chapter 14 - Applying the Hundred Forms

41. We call these the hundred forms and we consider them in the abstract. Some are ultimately general and others are subalternate. Each form has its own concrete assigned to it for clearer understanding, as everything that exists is either concrete or abstract, and nothing can exist outside of these categories. Now let us begin with entity.

Article 1 - Entity

42. Entity is an implicit term of this art defined in the same way as we defined the explicit principles. The artist applies the definitions of goodness, greatness etc. as follows: just as goodness is the cause on account of which good does good, so is entity the cause on account of which one thing causes another thing. Just as greatness is the cause on account of which goodness is great, so is entity the cause on account of which goodness is a thing, and likewise with the other principles. ‘Thing’ is the concrete of entity, and it is implicit in the second species of D and in the first of E, while its constituent parts are implicit in the second species of C. Thus, we can apply any question about “thing” and “entity” to the explicit principles and rules, and we can solve it by the same process that we applied to goodness, greatness etc.

Article 2 - Essence

43. As entity and thing are convertible, so are essence and being convertible, and we can say the same about essence and being as we said about entity and thing. If we ask whether there is any difference between essence and being, we can refer to difference, an explicit term, and solve the question by combining difference with all the principles and rules to show clearly beyond doubt that the answer is yes. This difference exists because essence is above by abstraction and its concretes are below by contraction. Consequently, there is an obvious difference between essence and being, and rule B agrees with this.

Article 3 - Unity

44. Unity is the form whose function is to unite. It applies to goodness, greatness etc. because it is good, great etc. As unity is good in goodness and great in greatness, so is goodness one unit in unity, and greatness is another unit caused by the same unity, and likewise with the other principles. Here, the intellect realizes that difference distinguishes goodness and greatness as distinct principles, where each principle has its own unity. Thus, if difference is an explicit term in a question, we refer to the discourse about goodness, greatness and difference and formulate the answer in accordance with what is said there. The concrete of unity is implicit in the concretes of goodness, greatness etc. since 'good' is one unit, 'great' is another unit, and each unit has its own constituent correlatives. This applies to the second species of rule D and the first of E, and the correlatives as such apply to the second species of rule C and the first of D.

Article 4 - Plurality

45. Plurality is a form assembled from a number of things different in identity, as shown by the second species of rule C, which is its source. Plurality applies to the explicit principles, because it is good, great and eternal. As plurality is good in goodness and great in greatness, so are goodness and greatness plural because of plurality. Then there is the plurality of different kinds of goodness, greatness etc. shown by the second species of rule C, which is its source. Difference, concordance and equality are the prime causes of plurality and of all correlatives. In addition, plurality applies to the principles and vice versa. Its concrete applies to the concretes of goodness, greatness etc. as we see in good, great etc. elemented things or in a unit made of a plurality of things that sustain plurality in it.

Article 5 - Nature

46. Nature is the form whose function is to naturize. As principles are natural due to nature, so does nature apply to natural goodness, natural greatness etc. Thus, we can know nature by combining it with the principles and rules, as we already did in a broad sense in chapter 8. Further, nature applies to the natural correlatives of goodness, greatness, etc. because without nature, these correlatives cannot be natural. Concrete nature applies to the natural concretes indicated by the second species of rule C and the first of E. Moreover, as goodness has one natural relation to greatness, another to duration and conversely, we can apply nature to mixture in the same way as we combined goodness with the principles and rules, and likewise with greatness, duration etc.

Article 6 - Genus

47. We identify Genus as an intensely blended subject that is predicated of many things of different species. We dealt sufficiently with genus in the New Logic we wrote. Genus applies to the explicit principles because it is what makes them general, as genus is good in goodness, great in greatness etc. In addition, we know its correlatives by the second species of rule C. And its concrete applies to the second species of rule D and the first of E, whereby we know that genus is a real thing per se. Otherwise, the correlatives of the explicit principles cannot be general, and consequently, the correlatives of the implicit principles cannot be general either.

Article 7 - Species

48. Species is an explicit principle of this art, defined as follows: a species is something predicated of a number of individually different things. Species applies to mixture, following the process applied in the chapter about great goodness etc. Entirely general goodness is no longer entirely general when we say 'great goodness' because we have contracted it specifically to greatness and the same applies to the other principles. Further, species apply to all correlatives because each explicit principle has its own specific numerically differentiated correlatives, and consequently, species applies to difference, an explicit principle of this art. Difference differentiates genus into several different species, for instance, humankind constitutes one species, lions constitute another species etc. Species also applies to the middle. As the middle stands between the beginning and the end, so does a species stand between a genus and its individuals. Here, the intellect realizes that a species must be something real. As the beginning and the end cannot be extremes of the middle if the middle is not something real, likewise, genus and individuals cannot be anything real unless species are something real. Every specific thing is a concrete of species, applicable to the second species of rule D and the first of E whereby we can know, sense and imagine species.

49. There are also natural species, as for instance the different kinds of visibility that exist potentially in the power of sight as colours and shapes that the subject could potentially see. In addition, there are potential species in the moral virtues, including everything that can be potentially justified by justice, believed by faith, or specified by species. As these species are images of the faculties, they include everything that the imagination could potentially imagine, the intellect could understand, the will could desire and memory could remember. However, these species are sub-species of faculties and virtues.

Article 8 - Individuality

50. We define individuality with the first species of rule C: just as goodness is a reason for good to do good, so is individuality a reason for individuals to produce individuals. Moreover, just as individuality is good in goodness etc., so does individuality individuate goodness etc. by means of its concrete correlatives that constitute indivisible essence. The correlatives of goodness etc. apply to the correlatives of individuality, so that the intellect can identify them. These correlatives cannot be sensed or imagined because they are located and contained in essence without assuming any kind of shape. Every individual is a concrete of individuality, as the second species of rule D and the first of E show. Elemented individuals can be sensed and imagined, as we see in this rose, or that lion.

Article 9 - Property

51. Property shows up as an explicit principle in rule G, but it is an implicit principle in all the other principles and rules. To define it, we apply the first species of rule C. Just as goodness is a reason for good to do good, so is property a reason for proper things to act according to their properties; and just as goodness has its proper correlatives because of property, so does property have good correlatives because of goodness. Property applies to difference: as difference is a cause for differentiating, so is property a cause for appropriating, and likewise with the remaining principles.

52. Further, every proper thing is a concrete of property constituted of its concrete correlatives shown by the second species of rule C and the first of E. For instance, this man is properly called an animal, and this lion is properly called an animal, as is this horse, but this rose is properly referred to as another kind of corporeal being. Moral concepts apply to the third species of rule D: for instance, Socrates' horse is his own property, and Plato's horse is Plato's own property. Here, the intellect recognizes the originating principles of legislative science, with its constitutive principles, and which principles legislators need to use. Moreover, it realizes that mixture with the principles and the rules also applies to legislation.

Article 10 - Simplicity

53. Simplicity applies to the principles of this art because the principles are simple by reason of simplicity, just as simplicity is good by reason of goodness and great by reason of greatness. Just as the explicit principles combine in the mixture of principles and rules, so can simplicity combine with all the principles and rules. The first species of rule C defines simplicity as the form on account of which the principles are simple. By the second species of rule C, simplicity has its own correlatives. For instance, by reason of simplicity, goodness has its simple bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying, and together with simplicity and its correlatives, goodness constitutes one simple essence with simple and primordial principles by the first species of rule D. Every simple thing is a concrete of simplicity, as the second species of rule D and the first of E signify.

Article 11 - Composition

54. Composition is a formal aggregate of a plurality of essences. Composition applies to the method of drawing explicit principles together in mutual combination, as in the chapter on goodness combined with the principles, where we constitute a composite of several explicit principles by saying that great goodness is a dual reason, and great and durable goodness is a threefold reason etc. Here the intellect understands the origin of composition, and rule K consents to this. Further, composition has its own composite correlatives, as shown by the second species of rule C. Just as the bonifier, magnifier etc. enter into composition in creatures, the bonifiable and magnifiable also enter into composition, as do the acts of bonifying and magnifying. Together, they all constitute one composite essence, that we call a composition along with its concrete, which is the composite, or compound, as the second species of rule D and the first of E clearly show to the enlightened intellect.

Article 12 - Form

55. Form applies to the principles: just as we can combine each principle with the sequence of the explicit principles and rules, so can we combine form in its own way with this sequence. However, this applies only to the composite form of created beings, because every formable thing belongs to the genus of matter; though this is not the case with God. Form is the essence with which an agent naturally acts on matter. Compound form has its own compound correlatives, as we already noted; but by the first species of rule C, simple form in creatures has no correlatives because it is one simple part of substance, namely the formative agent. We can say the same about accidental form. This kind of form cannot be sensed or imagined as it has no physical shape. Everything that is formed is a concrete of form, because it is characterized by form. Beings that are formed and that belong to the corporeal genus are visible and their solidity makes them tangible, as we see in stones formed by the elementative power, in plants formed by the vegetative power and so forth. The second species of rule D and the first of E signify this.

Article 13 - Matter

56. Matter is a simple, passive essence and applies to the passive correlatives of the explicit principles, namely the bonifiable, magnifiable etc. which belong to the genus of matter by reason of passivity. The second species of rule C shows that matter has no concretes, because simplicity posits that it is one simple part of substance. Its passivity and primordial origin are signified by the first species of rule D. The materialized concrete of matter is composed of several passive principles, such as the bonifiable, magnifiable etc. and it is clarified by the second species of rule D and the first of E. This materialized concrete is the universal source from which all particular matter springs, just as the formed concrete is the source from which all particular forms derive when they come from potentiality into act .

Article 14 - Substance

57. Substance applies to the saffron triangle, which says that majority exists between substance and substance, etc. Moreover, every discourse on substance is implicit in the discourse on majority with all the principles and rules. Its definition applies to the definitions of goodness etc. Just as goodness is a reason for good to produce good, so is substance a general reason for producing substantial things. Substance has its own substantial correlatives by the second species of rule C, namely the substantiative, substantiable and substantiating. The substantiative applies to the bonifier, the magnifier etc. The substantiable applies to the bonifiable, the magnifiable etc. and substantiating applies to bonifying, magnifying etc. Now the intellect sees that substance is composed of form joined to matter, constituting a third number together with them. Its concrete, namely substantial being, is signified to the intellect by the second species of rule D and the first of E, and the senses and imagination can perceive substance in elemented things.

Article 15 - Accident

58. Accident is an explicit term in the saffron triangle where we say that there is majority between accident and accident; and so its discourse applies to all the principles and rules. This discourse is implicit in the said triangle. Accident is a form that exists neither on its own, nor chiefly for its own end, but for the end of substance. Accidents have no correlatives per se,

but only accidentally, because substance is accidentally habituated, quantified, disposed etc. In the chapter on goodness, accidents arise when we say that goodness is great etc. Quantity accidentally arises from the quantified increase of a composite, and as it stands in its subject, disposition arises accidentally, as does the accident of relation along with the remaining predicates, and with movement and so forth. Every accidental thing is a concrete of accident, applicable to the second species of rule D and the first of E; for instance, a box is a subject of accident because it has an accidental shape made by artificial means. Likewise, a logician is accidentally a master of his subject. The same applies to other things in their own way.

Article 16 - Quantity

59. Quantity is an explicit term in rule F of this art, and its definition applies to the definitions of goodness etc. Just as goodness is that by reason of which good produces good, so is quantity that by reason of which quantified things produce quantified things. Its primordial origin applies to the chapter on goodness combined with the principles. Goodness is one essence and greatness is another essence; when they are contracted together, multiplication results and consequently so does quantity without which there can be no multiplication of creatures. This is signified by the first species of rule D. Here the intellect understands the origin of quantity. Quantity also applies to the substantial correlatives signified by the second species of rule C, and by reason of difference that makes them distinct, the correlatives are quantitatively measured inasmuch as there are neither more nor less than three of them. Every quantified thing is a quantitatively measured concrete of quantity, just as everything white is coloured with whiteness.

Article 17 - Quality

60. Quality is an explicit term found in rule G, and its definition applies to the definitions of goodness etc. Just as goodness is that because of which good does good, so does quality posit that the bonifier has an active quality and the bonified has a passive quality. Quality applies to the substantial correlatives indicated by the second species of rule C, as these correlatives are habituated with quality, and quality is disposed in them. With the third species of rule C, quality posits a qualified subject in which it exists, and this qualified subject is its concrete. Further, quality applies to the second species of rule D in the chapter on goodness combined with the principles and rules, as well as to greatness etc. Goodness, as a supremely general principle, is not qualified unless it is contracted. If we ask what the qualities of goodness are, the answer is that it is great, durable etc. as quality arises accidentally from the contraction of principles.

Article 18 - Relation

61. Relation is an implicit term; its definition applies to the definitions of goodness etc. Just as good causes good through goodness, so do relative things cause related things through relation, for something relative necessarily implies something related and vice versa. If there is an antecedent, then there must be a resultant and vice versa. Everything that is related is a concrete of relation, habituated with relation, disposed in relation, and so forth. Further, relation as an accident applies to the contraction and mixture of the principles with the first species of rule D and the second species of rule C. If goodness is great, it follows that it has good and great correlatives without which it can never be great. The same applies to the other principles in their own way.

Article 19 - Action

62. Action is a term that is implicit in the correlatives and that applies to correlatives such as the bonifier, magnifier etc. while its definition applies to the definitions of goodness etc. Just as goodness is that by reason of which good does good, so is action the reason for the agent to act on the passive subject which is its concrete (though the term for the passive concrete part does not derive directly from the word 'action'). The second species of rule D signifies the concrete of action. Further, action as signified by the first species of D is clarified by the correlatives signified by the second species of C and by the definition of medium. The same applies to the remaining principles and rules in their own way.

Article 20 - Passion

63. Passion is an implicit term that applies to the correlatives indicated by the second species of rule C, namely the bonifiable, magnifiable etc. Just as these passive correlatives arise in the mixture of the principles, so does passion, as a general principle, combine with the mixture of the principles and rules. Every passive thing is a concrete of passion, disposed and habituated in passion. Passion originates in the contraction and mixture of the principles, for instance, goodness is passive inasmuch as it is habituated with greatness and vice versa. The first species of rule D clarifies this, and rule B consents to it.

Article 21 - Habit

64. Habit is an implicit principle that applies to the explicit principles. Just as good does good by clothing itself in the habit of good moral virtue, likewise, one who habituates himself with a moral habit does so by reason of habit, and the same with goodness clothed in the habit of greatness etc. Every habituated thing is a concrete of habit; just as white things are habituated with whiteness, coated things with coats, fire with heat or a just man with justice, so is every habituated thing habituated by reason of habit. Further, with the first species of rule D and the mixture of principles and rules, the intellect understands what habit arises from and in what subjects it is diffused; for instance, the intellect habituates its intrinsic intelligible with peregrine phantasms, so that the intellect is habituated with science by means of the phantasms known to it. Rule B clearly shows this.

Article 22 - Situation

65. Situation is an implicit term, but it applies to the correlatives by the first and second species of rule D and the first of E. Its definition also applies to the definitions of goodness etc. Given that goodness is a reason for good to do good in the essence of goodness, it follows that the correlatives of goodness are situated while conversely, the correlatives of situation are bonified; and thus, situation is an accident that causes the situating of the principles. Further, by the first species of rule D and by the contraction and mixture of the principles and rules, the intellect understands where situation arises from and where it is brought from potentiality into act: for instance, in the situation of great goodness, the correlatives of goodness are situated in the correlatives of greatness and vice versa. In addition, rule B consents to this. Every situated thing is a concrete of situation.

Article 23 - Time

66. Though time is an explicit principle of this art, to clarify its application, let us show how it applies to the other explicit principles and rules. For instance, its definition applies to the definition of principle: time is the principle by reason of which all created things were new. Its definition also applies to the tenth rule, because time is the instrument with which there are days, nights, hours, motion and so forth. Time applies to the correlatives by the second species of rule C, whereby it is brought from potentiality into act, when the doer acts on the doable with time and multiplies hours, days, nights and so forth. Everything that is timed is a concrete of time.

Article 24 - Locus

67. Locus is an explicit principle combined with the principles and rules, and its definition applies to the definition of principle: locus is the principle by reason of which all things are containers and contained. As locus is an instrument by means of which all mobile things can move from one new location to another new location, it applies to the tenth rule. In addition, locus applies to the correlatives from which it originates when substantial correlatives locate peregrine correlatives within themselves; for instance, when fire heats water, it locates water in fire's own intrinsic ignitable; and the generator generates the generated in its own intrinsic generable, and so forth. Everything that is located is a concrete of locus.

Article 25 - Movement

68. Movement is an implicit principle, and its definition applies to the definition of principle, to the tenth rule and to the remaining principles and rules. Movement is the principle because of which all mobile things are mobile. Its correlatives spring from substantial correlatives, as accidents from substance. Movement is the instrument with which substance moves locally, through growth or through alteration. Substance moves locally as heaven moves in a circle with its appetite that belongs to the genus of movement. Substance moves through growth when plants grow and reproduce; it moves through alteration when wine turns into vinegar, or cold water becomes hot, or a healthy man falls ill, or when justice turns into injury and so forth. Everything that moves is a concrete of movement, but the essence of movement cannot be sensed or imagined, although movement can be sensed and imagined in subjects in which it exists, for instance the sight can see the mover and the moved when a hammer strikes a nail, and the sense of touch can detect motion in the pulse. This does not mean that the senses can perceive the essence of movement, for they can only sense the figure of movement, and likewise with other things in their own way, for instance when the sight sees a falling stone, it does not attain the essence of movement or the essence of the stone, but only colour and shape.

Article 26 - Immobility

69. Immobility is an implicit principle, but we can apply its definition to the definition of principle. Just as principle is the cause on account of which things can begin, so is immobility the principle on account of which immobile things are immobile. Immobility applies to its intrinsic correlatives from which it can never be separated, as form cannot be separated from action, or matter from passion, or hot things from heat, or good things from goodness, and so forth. Everything that is immobile is a concrete of immobility. The correlatives of immobility

are the immobilizer, immobilized and immobilizing just as the essence of intellect comprises the intellective, intelligible and understanding which are immobile inasmuch as they are permanent in their difference, in their properties and in the duration of their numerical identities. If the correlatives of the intellect were mobile, the intellect's essence could be corrupted and altered, and the same applies to the essence of fire etc. The first species of rule E and the second of D signify this. In addition, by the second species of rule E, immobile things do not seek repose outside of themselves etc.

Article 27 - Instinct

70. Instinct is an implicit principle that applies to wisdom, and its definition applies to the definition of wisdom with the tenth rule: just as wisdom is that with which the wise understand, so likewise, natural instinct is that with which natural subjects naturally act in full accordance with their species. For instance, a plant instinctively produces flowers, leaves, fruit, taste etc. and irrational animals have the instinct and industry they need to survive. By the second species of rule C, the correlatives of instinct apply to the correlatives of the explicit principles, and every instinctive thing is a concrete of instinct, as the second species of D and the first of E signify. Moreover, the second species of rule E shows the purpose of instinct.

Article 28 - Appetite

71. Natural appetite is an implicit principle, and its definition applies to the definition of will. When the will wants something it makes it an object of desire and longing; likewise, appetite seek out its object in order to find repose in it. In this way, elemented things have an appetite for elementing, and plants have an appetite for vegetating, for producing flowers, leaves and fruit and for reproducing individuals of their own species. The explicit principles concur in this, for instance, goodness in a subject has an appetite for its act of bonifying. The second species of rule E shows this. Appetite has its own correlatives that apply to the correlatives of will. In addition, the concrete of appetite is indicated by the second species of rule D and the first of E, whereby it moves to find repose in the second species of rule E, as a man moves with his will toward moral principles, or toward his beloved, and so forth.

Article 29 - Attraction

72. Attraction is an implicit principle, which applies to the definitions of the end and of goodness. The end attracts completed things to itself just as the bonifier attracts the bonified, the will attracts the beloved, respiration attracts what we breathe, vision attracts coloured objects, taste attracts savoury objects and so forth. The correlatives of attraction apply to the correlatives of the explicit principles indicated by the second species of rule C. The attractor attracts the attracted to the passive part of its essence, just as fire attracts air to its heating power to heat it, respiration attracts air to breathe it, a power attracts its object to objectify it, and likewise with other similar things in their own way. Everything that is attracted is a concrete of attraction. Attraction attracts natural species and operations to itself to enable itself to act and to enable the explicit principles to have their acts and to repose in the second species of rule E. For instance, a magnet attracts iron with its entire species so that the cold dryness in the iron artificially reposes in the cold dryness of the magnet as if it were its natural subject. Here the intellect sees how natural things attract artificial ones.

Article 30 - Reception

73. Reception is an implicit principle whose definition applies to the definition of the material principle, whereas attraction applies to the formal principle, for active correlatives belong to the genus of attraction and passive correlatives belong to the genus of reception. This does not mean that reception has its own correlatives, because if it had any, then the active and passive correlatives, as well as form and matter, would be numerically identical, which is impossible. However, it does mean that the attractor receives the peregrine attracted object in the passive part of its essence, as sight receives colour in its own innate visible, or as the intellect receives peregrine species in its own innate intelligible, and so on. Here, the intellect realizes that the object does not move the power, but that the power moves itself with the object. Otherwise, the object would be both active and passive. Potentiality would be confused with actuality and the active and passive correlatives would be numerically and naturally identical so that we could say the very same things about attraction as we said about reception, which is impossible. Every thing that is received is a concrete of reception applicable to the second species of rule D and the first of E, which indicate that reception consists of a plurality of passive correlatives in the subject in which it exists.

Article 31 - Phantasm

74. Phantasm, or species, applies to the definitions of wisdom and will with the fourth species of the rule of instrumentality, because everything that these faculties do, they do with phantasms. Phantasm applies to the first species of rule D and to the definition of principle as follows. While a man is looking at a horse, he is not imagining it, but when he closes his eyes, or when the horse is absent, he imagines it. As a subject brings a phantasm from power into act, the imagination receives it, then the intellect gathers it into its own innate intelligible to build science and puts it away in memory for conservation, thus acquiring another new phantasm. The will acts in the same way with its concupiscible and irascible parts. Here the intellect sees how sciences and moral customs arise, with the concurrence of all the explicit principles and the rules. General phantasm is indeed difficult to know because the being in which it exists is so small. A fantasy imagined and constituted from a plurality of likenesses is a concrete phantasm. The fantasies of irrational animals do not reach beyond the imagination, or else beasts would also have science; but their fantasies remain permanently confined to their imagination while they provide them with the industry they need to survive. Rule B manifests this.

Article 32 - Fullness

75. Fullness is an implicit principle whose definition applies to the definitions of goodness, greatness etc. The fullness of goodness is a reason for good to produce good, and the fullness of greatness is a reason for goodness to be full of greatness and conversely. The same applies to the rest of the principles and rules, as we see in their mixture. Further, the correlatives of fullness apply to the correlatives of goodness, which are full of the correlatives of fullness. Every thing that is full is a concrete of fullness, as the second species of rule D and the first of E show, especially when it reposes in the second species of rule E. Emptiness is its opposite, and its definition applies to terms opposite to fullness; this is enough said about evacuation.

Article 33 - Diffusion

76. Diffusion is an implicit principle and its definition applies to the definitions of goodness, difference etc. Goodness is a reason that produces good. It is diffusive, expansive in the subject in which it exists as it contracts with greatness, duration etc. while difference distinguishes diffusion by means of its correlatives signified by the second species of rule C. Every thing that diffuses is a concrete of diffusion, habituated with diffusion and disposed in it, as the second species of rule D and the first of E show. The opposite of diffusion is restriction, which applies to the definition of concordance; misers practice avarice by means of restriction.

Article 34 - Digestion

77. Digestion is an implicit principle whose definition applies to the definitions of virtue and majority. Innate virtue digests peregrine virtues in its own species by means of majority, as a plant, with its own species, digests the elements into this species, and as animals digest food and drink. The correlatives of digestion apply to those of virtue and majority. Every thing that is digested and habituated with digestion is a concrete of digestion.

Article 35 - Expulsion

78. Expulsion is an implicit principle that applies to the definition of contrariety. An opposite expels its counterpart from the subject in which it exists, as we see when animals expel feces, urine and scabs; and plants act similarly by expelling flowers, leaves and fruit that do not permanently reside in them. Morally, a king can be expelled from his kingdom, and a sinner can be expelled from God's grace and from the end that is meant for him. Further, the correlatives of expulsion apply to the correlatives of contrariety. Every thing that is expelled and habituated with expulsion is a concrete of expulsion.

Article 36 - Signification

79. Signification is an implicit principle whose definition applies to the explicit principles and rules. Goodness is a reason for good to produce good, when goodness is contracted to greatness, it signifies that good and great things produce great good and likewise with the other principles. The correlatives of signification apply to those of goodness, greatness etc. and it is with the correlatives of signification that goodness signifies what it is and what it contains in itself. Every thing that is signified and habituated with signification is a concrete of signification. The opposite of signification is occultation and its definition applies to things opposite to signification.

Article 37 - Beauty

80. Beauty is an implicit principle whose definition applies to those of the explicit principles. Goodness, greatness etc. are instances of beauty, but contrariety and minority are not, although minority is beautiful when it is proportioned to the subject in which it exists, for instance in a small child. The correlatives of beauty consist of the second species of rule C. A beautiful cause naturally causes a beautiful effect, and the intellect causes beautiful figures in the imagination with love by reason of the end indicated by the second species of rule E and by rule G whereby beauty is more beautiful in its own habit than in an appropriated one.

Likewise, beauty consists more in majority than in minority, as we see in rhetoric when rhetoricians choose to colour their words in the light of a major end in preference to a minor end.

Article 38 - Newness

81. Newness is a primordial form whose subjects are habituated with new habits, as heaven is habituated with locus, time and movement; we can say the same about all elemented things. The first species of rule D signifies that there had to be a first newness just as there had to be a first movement in time and place. Here, the intellect realizes that newness cannot exist without place, time and movement because they all must exist together at the same time. Rules B, H and I consent to this.

Article 39 - Idea

82. An idea is God in eternity, but in newness, an idea is a creature – just as the shape of a box is old in the carpenter's mind and becomes new when it comes from potentiality to act. The divine correlatives indicated by the second species of rule C show this plainly enough. Now in its own infinite and eternal intelligible, the divine intellect attains every newness stripped of every created subject, and every such newness is a divine idea, but by the third species of rule C, they are creatures, and as such they are new, finite and delimited.

Article 40 - Metaphysics

83. Metaphysics is the form with which the human intellect strips substance of all accidents until only substance remains in order to distinguish genus from species and thus to acquire and to develop science. Because the metaphysical form is idea stripped of all creatures, it serves as an exemplar for knowing the divine idea. The first species of rule D, the second species of rule E and the fourth species of K show this. Metaphysical form is general to all forms arising from power into act, as shown in the ninth subject.

Article 41 - Potential Being

84. Potential being is a form that exists in its subject without any motion, surface, quantity, quality, and so forth, as for instance in a seed in which a tree potentially exists. As this form comes from power to act, or as it is generated, its accidents arise. These accidents already habituate it from the outset, because they arise from accidents actually existing in the subject in which the said form existed potentially. Here, the intellect sees how one substance naturally arises from another substance and how some accidents naturally arise from other accidents. Rule B consents to this, as do the definitions of goodness, power, virtue, principle and medium. The second species of rule C, rule G and the fourth species of rule K confirm the same.

Article 42 - Punctuality

85. Punctuality is the essence of the natural point, which is the smallest part of a body. A point is indivisible and so close to minority that neither the senses nor the imagination can attain it. Here, the intellect wonders how it can learn anything about the natural point, since we can neither sense nor imagine it. Nevertheless, it gets help from the mental point objectified by sight and imagination, which gives it access to knowledge about the natural

point on which it can build science. Rule B, the first species of rule D as well as rules F and I support this.

Article 43 - The Line

86. The natural line is a length constituted of a number of continuous points, and its extremes are two points. It is the second part of body, we say it is the second part because it consists of a plurality of points, as shown by rules K and F. Points signify discrete quantity, and length signifies continuous quantity - the fact that a line can divide into points shows that points signify discrete quantity. Width arises from a plurality of continuous lines and consequently, surface arises from the simultaneous presence of length and width in a subject. However, depth springs from the rotundity of the points, because a point is spherical in nature before having length and breadth, as we can see in the buds that grow into branches on a tree. A further reason for the point's rotundity is that the circle is a likeness of heaven, and as such, it is the strongest of all figures with regard to natural movement. Here, the intellect knows what the primordial principles of body are, namely: the point, the line, length, breadth, surface and depth.

Article 44 - The Triangle

87. A triangle is a figure with three angles contained by three lines, as we can see in elemented things where each element has its own triangle. For instance, fire has one angle that is hot and dry, another angle that is hot and moist, and another that is cold and dry. This triangle belongs to fire, which rules its two remaining angles by means of its heat and dryness. In addition, air possesses a triangle where it rules with moisture and heat, water also has a triangle where it rules with cold and moisture and earth has a triangle where it rules with dryness and cold. Here, the intellect knows the essences of which elemented bodies are full, and due to which the elements enter into mutual composition through difference, concordance and contrariety. However, the intellect doubts if it can have any scientific knowledge of such triangles because the senses have never perceived them. Then it remembers that we can sense the plane figure of a triangle which serves to imagine and know the natural triangle with the help of rule K and the second species of rules D and E.

Article 45 - The Square

88. The natural square is a figure with four right angles. Just as each right angle of the square implies two acute angles that belong to the genus of the triangle, so does each element have two qualities, namely a proper quality and an appropriated quality, as shown by rule G. Fire rules one angle of the square, air rules another angle etc. As diagonal lines visibly divide the square into four equal triangles, the intellect sees how the square results from four triangles, how the triangle results from three lines, and how the line results from a continuum of points.

Article 46 - The Circle

89. The circle is the ultimate figure. We call it ultimate because it is closer to perfection than any other figure, for it contains all the other figures from which it descends and of which it consists, as shown by the first species of rule D and the fourth species of rule K. For the circle springs from the triangle, the square, the pentagon etc. until the angles join together as points in a circular line to produce a likeness of heaven, which is the greatest figure of all. Moreover, rule B consents to this.

Article 47 - Body

90. A body is a substance full of points, lines and angles disposed in length, breadth and depth and habituated with a surface. A body's co-essential parts are the points, lines and angles that compose the body in its entirety. By the second species of rule C, one body terminates another body. By the second species of rule D, a body consists of its co-essential parts. By rule F, it has continuous and discrete quantity. By rule G, it is a common aggregate composed of substance and accidents. By rule H, it exists in time, by rule I, it exists in space and by rule K, it is in movement. Now the intellect wonders why the eighth sphere is not contained in any further place outside or beyond itself. It continues doubting until it realizes that there cannot be an infinite body because all bodies are finite and habituated with shape.

Article 48 - Figures

91. A figure is an accident made of disposition and habit, which are its parts by the second species of rule C. By the third species of this rule, figures are habits of bodies, and by the fourth species, figures have straight and curved lines. With colour, a figure is an object of sight, but with lines and angles and without colour, it is an object of touch and with all these things together, a figure is an object of the imagination. Here, the intellect realizes that the imagination is a power higher than the senses and more general than sight, for the intellect cannot objectify a figure without imagining it. Now the intellect realizes that after a man's death, his soul retains the species it had acquired through the imagination so as to preserve the memory of this earthly life and of the body in which it dwelt.

Article 49 - The Directions

92. There are six general directions, with the body at the center of the intersecting diametrical lines, so that the body can move up, down, to the right, to the left, forward and backward. Now the intellect wonders why there are no more or less than six general directions. Then it remembers that movement cannot be complete without them, for if there were more or less of them, movement would be imperfect, as shown by the third and fourth species of rule C. The second species of the same rule says that the six said directions are essential parts of all movement that situates and habituates bodies. However, the intellect wonders why spherical bodies have no such directions, for instance a human head, an eye, an apple and things like that. Then the intellect remembers that the world's body is spherical, and that no such directions can enclose it. Indeed, the world is the ultimate body that reproduces its likenesses in the said spherical bodies so that the intellect can come to know it. In addition, rules B and K consent to this.

Article 50 - Monstrosity

93. Monstrosity is a deviation of natural movement from the starting point to the ending point in the subject in which it exists, due to excessive or insufficient influence from the virtues of bodies above, below, to the right, to the left, to the front and to the back. The deviation of movement causes privative habits like blindness, deafness and so forth. Inasmuch as it moves outside the second species of rule C, this deviated movement is imperfect in the third species of rule C; and it has imperfections by the fourth species of rule C due to some deficiency in the second species of rule C.

Article 51 - Derivation

94. Derivation is a general subject through which the particular descends from the universal, like a stream from a fountain, a line from points, a triangle from lines, a child from parents through the general instruments of procreation, a conclusion from its premises, a resultant from an antecedent, science from things reflected through the intellect and so forth. As the intellect thus considers derivation, it knows by the second species of rule C that derivation contains its own innate essential correlatives from which many particulars derive, like many children from the same parents, or many elemented things from the four general elements, or like many sciences invented by the same intellect. The intellect contains its own innate co-essential and general correlatives with which it investigates and builds many sciences derived from the same specific form. Here, the intellect realizes that its own correlatives are above those of science, with species standing between the two as between the cause and the effect. Now the intellect knows what sciences derive from, and how they arise.

Article 52 - Shadow

95. Shadow is a habit that deprives light so it cannot move in the six directions we discussed earlier in article 49, because a body standing in the way blocks it out. We clearly experience this in the shadow of a tree or of a tower. Now the intellect asks what the colour of shadow belongs to and what a shadow's shape is. It considers that air is transparent, because outside the shadow, air receives the colour of the Sun and of fire, namely brightness. Where there is shadow, air receives the colour of earth. A crystal - and crystal is nothing but congealed water - when placed on something yellow takes on a yellow habit, and a black habit when placed on something black. Here, the intellect realizes that light is the colour of the Sun and fire; black is the colour of earth; transparency is the colour of air and white is the colour of water because it causes whiteness. The shape of a shadow is the terminus where light and shadow meet. The definition of medium and the second and fourth species of rule C concur in this.

96. Now, the intellect asks why there are shadows on the Moon. It remains in doubt until it considers that the Moon is a clear body on which the shadow of earth appears. Then it wonders why no shadow appears on the Sun, which is also a clear body. Upon reflection, it considers that the Sun is coloured by its own light and that moonlight comes from sunlight just as the heat of air comes from the heat of fire. Rules B, C, G and E confirm this.

Article 53 - Mirrors

97. A mirror is a clear body disposed to reflect all the shapes put before it. However, the intellect wonders: given that glass is a clear body, why does it not reflect shapes just like a mirror made of glass does? To clarify this issue, it remembers the article on shadow. The glass without the lead is a transparent body clear on both sides that lets light through in all the six directions we discussed in article 49. However, this is not the case with a mirror: here the lead with its gross and highly compacted matter blocks out the light in some directions. The particles of lead are all highly compacted together and just as a tree casts a shadow by standing in the way of the light, so does the glass standing between the lead, the air and the shape or colour presented to it generate within itself a shadow similar in habit and colour to the shape in front of it. Now the intellect understands the principles of shadow and reflection in mirrors.

Article 54 - Colour and Coloured Things

98. Colour is a quality that is objectified by the sense of sight. It is the habit of coloured things, or of substances that sustain colour. A coloured thing has its own substantial correlatives, and colour is a habit of these substantial correlatives. By the first species of rule D, colour exists on its own, and by the third species of this rule it belongs to the thing coloured by it. By the first species of rule G, colour is a proper quality in a real man or plant, but it is an appropriated quality in a picture of a man or of a plant, etc. The quantity of a colour does not properly belong to it but colour appropriates the quantity that belongs to the coloured thing. Here, the intellect understands how one accident is disposed in another by rule G. What we said about colour and coloured things, we can also say about heat and hot things, etc.

Article 55 - Proportion and Proportionate Things

98. Substantial proportion consists of consubstantial correlatives, for instance, infinity has its own proportionate consubstantial correlatives without which it can neither exist nor act. Finite being is not proportioned to the infinitizer by any proportional act of infinitizing, and the same can be said about the eternalizer, eternalized and eternalizing and about all the other divine reasons. However, infinity is truly proportionate to the infinite agent through an infinite act proportionate to both; we can say the same about the eternalizer, eternalized and eternalizing, and about the other divine reasons. We can likewise consider the substantial correlatives in created things, for instance the intellect whose innate intellectual, intelligible and understanding are its own natural proportionate correlatives. Science cannot be proportionate to the intellect because it can never be enough for the intellect, just there can never be enough wood for fire, given that fire can burn more wood than can be supplied to it. Nonetheless, there can be real accidental proportion in correlatives, as there is between a heated thing and heating. Here, the intellect realizes that no accident can be proportionate in weight to substance, because substance has more in itself and accidents have less. This is clear by the definitions of majority and minority. However, in accordance with justice, there can be proportion between substance and accidents, and between accidents and accidents. Now the intellect understands how an animal's organs are proportionate to it, and how mores are proportionate to man, and how things make a subject proportional.

Article 56 - Disposition and Things that are Disposed

100. Substantial disposition is a form in which substantial correlatives are equally disposed by the power, the object and the act. For instance, in infinite and eternal divine goodness, a reason is disposed for the bonifier whereby infinite and eternal good produces infinite and eternal good, and bonifying is likewise disposed by infinite and eternal goodness. However, there is another disposition, which is accidental, as shown by the third species of rule C: for instance, God is disposed to pass judgment and to produce everything that man is disposed to receive in the way of justice or mercy. Now this is not done according to weight, but according to justice, for God by his goodness is more disposed toward man than man is disposed toward God, just as fire is disposed to burn more wood than can be supplied to its combustive power. We can say the same about the human intellect, because the intellect is more disposed to understand an accidental object than the object is disposed to be understood by the intellect. For instance, the intelligibility of a stone is not proportionate to the human intellect because the latter can understand higher things, such as the intelligibility of the sensitive faculties, of heaven or of the angels etc., which are higher intelligibilities than those

of a stone. We can say the same about man: he can run more than he actually does, but he does not want to run as much as he could. We can say the same about other things in their own way.

Article 57 - Creation and Created Things

101. Creation is an idea in eternity by the second species of rule C because divine wisdom knows it and the divine will loves it from eternity and in eternity. But in created being, it is a habit and an act by the third species of rule C. By the fourth species of the same rule, creation as an idea has creation as a creature in a new created being made passive under its action and habituated with the habit of newness. Here, the intellect sees how idea transits to ideated being as the idea reproduces its likeness by the fourth species of rule K.

Article 58 - Predestination and Predestined Things

102. Predestination is an idea in God's eternal wisdom. As such, it exists from eternity and to eternity by reason of the correlatives of the second species of rule C. The eternal intellective in its own eternal intelligible understands all future and new things, as well as all past and old things. Future and new things are before, i.e. 'from eternity', whereas past and old things are after, i.e. 'to eternity'. Given this, the predestined man who exists in the middle between the said termini is accidentally clothed in the habit of a new predestination. Thus, we consider predestination in one way with the second species of rule C and in another way with the third species of this rule. By the second species of rule C it is an idea, but by the third species it is a created habit. Just like a man wearing a new coat or like a judge disposed to pass judgment by means of his habit of justice, the predestined man freely disposes himself toward doing good with this habit. Otherwise, predestination as an idea would have no way to create a new predestination that is objectified from eternity and to eternity, which is false, as shown by the fourth species of rule K. Here, the intellect rejoices because it has been greatly enlightened about predestination, nonetheless it grieves because this kind of clarification is little known in the world, where muddled concepts of predestination lead so many people into doubt and error.

Article 59 - Mercy and the Recipient of Mercy

103. Mercy is an idea in eternity by the second species of rule C. By the third species of rule C mercy is a habit that exists in a newly predestined man who is disposed to exercise contrition, confession and satisfaction for committed sins and to let mercy clothe him with its habit, just as predestination clothes a predestined man with the good deeds that he loves with his own free will. In the contrary case, a sinner who does not dispose himself to receive forgiveness cannot be clothed with the habit of mercy, just as an evil man committed to doing evil cannot put on the habit of goodness. This is a source of rejoicing for penitent sinners, because God can forgive more than man can sin, just as fire can burn more wood than you could ever supply to it.

Article 60 - Necessity and Necessitated Things

104. Necessity is a form that cannot be otherwise than the way it is, as the second species of rule C shows. Since nothing can be necessitated without necessity, it follows that necessity is the antecedent and the necessitated thing is the resultant. For instance, infinite and eternal divine goodness is a reason for infinite and eternal good to produce infinite and eternal good,

so that the producer is necessitated by reason of goodness, and consequently the produced and the production are necessitated as well. The second species of rule C shows this.

Further, there is another kind of necessity and necessitated things: for instance if a man is good, he is necessarily compelled to do good, but if he is evil, he is necessarily compelled to do evil. Just as God's justice necessitates judgment in judging, so does God's mercy necessitate forgiveness in granting pardon. Here, the intellect realizes that when a sinner disposes himself to receive judgment by sentencing himself to penance, he disposes himself to receive forgiveness. Further, the intellect sees how God's justice and mercy necessitate their acts in a new subject, and the intellect greatly rejoices in this knowledge.

Article 61 - Fortune and the Fortunate Man

105. Fortune is a mere accident extraneous to the second species of rule C. Fortune is a habit with which the fortunate man is accidentally disposed toward his good fortune, like a traveler who by chance finds gold on his way. Fortune consists in the second species of rule D, it has existence in its subject by the fourth species of rule C, and it is what it is by the third species of rule D. Fortune is extraneous to the beginning, middle and end and to concordance and contrariety but it is not extraneous to majority and minority. Here, the intellect realizes that although fortune is a very small thing in itself, it is a great thing for the fortunate man.

Article 62 - Order and Orderly Things

106. Order is the assemblage of many principles that enables them all to repose together in one common end. Everything that is ordered is a concrete of order and habituated with order. Order first emerges from the first species of rule C as a habit in the subject in which it exists, and finally reposes in the fourth species of rule C. Order has its own primordial principles shown by the first species of rule D and by the definition of principle. It derives from the definition of concordance, whereas contrariety is its enemy when the modality indicated by rule K is deficient.

Article 63 - Advice and Resolution

107. Advice is an unresolved proposition and resolution is its ultimate repose. The advisor must examine the unresolved issue at hand by applying the second species of rule C along with rule B to try and find a way to configure the resolution in the third species of rule C with the definitions of the principles and with the ninth subject, and clothe the resolution with the habit of virtue in the fourth species of rule C. The advisor shall ensure that this habit is segregated from the vices discussed in the ninth subject with the help of rules D, E, F, G, H, I and K.

Article 64 - Grace and the Recipient of Grace

108. Grace is a primordial form bestowed upon its recipient without any merit on his part, as clarified by the first species of rule D, by majority in the giver of grace and minority in its recipient, along with the habit of charity. Grace is also in its recipient by reason of the definition of goodness, and of the magnificence of a will habituated with liberality. The intellect now sees how grace diffuses itself in the subject in which it exists. Impediments to grace are not posed by higher principles but by lower ones, as when someone considers that

he is worthy and deserving of grace through his own merit, and not because of the generosity, liberality and kindness of the bestower of grace.

Article 65 - Perfection and Perfect Things

109. Perfection is a form reposing in a perfect subject by means of which the perfect subject reposes in itself by clothing itself in everything that constitutes the perfect subject's habit shown by the third species of rule C. This kind of perfection derives from the second species of rule C through many channels which are the numerous principles and rules of this art, and it is first and foremost the moral kind of perfection discussed in the ninth subject. Nonetheless, the supreme perfection is that natural perfection which is essentially, naturally, infinitely and eternally perfect. The supremacy of this perfection is due to its own consubstantial correlatives indicated by the second species of rule C. The perfecter produces the perfected from its own consubstantial and natural perfection, and not from any other being, for the perfected is co-essential with the perfecter and both together consummate their perfect act of perfecting which is essential and substantial .

Article 66 - Clarification and what is Clarified

109. Clarification is a form in which the intellect's discernment reposes by means of the definition of concordance entirely segregated from the definition of contrariety. Clarification is the habit of clarified subjects, as shown by the third species of rule C. Its very essence consists in the second species of rule C in which the knower clarifies knowledge, aware that the knower is active and that the knowledge is passive in the act of knowing. Here, the intellect sees how habit accidentally arises from substance, so that clarified subjects can be dealt with scientifically, with the help of the principles and the rules.

Article 67 - Transubstantiation and Transubstantiated Things

111. Transubstantiation is an act with which nature strips transubstantiated things of old forms and clothes them in new and different forms, enabling nature's act to move sequentially through everything that is subject to generation and corruption. Without this kind of transubstantiation, nature would be powerless to accomplish its own substantial act along with its accidental acts, its privative habit would be immutable and consequently the definitions of its principles would perish, which is impossible. The artist can get a general notion of transubstantiation from the seventh subject where the vegetative power is discussed in combination with the sequence of the principles and rules of this art.

Article 68 - Alteration and Altered Things

112. Alteration is a form that arises in altered things, as the third species of rule C shows. Just as a streamlet springs from a source, this kind of alteration arises from the alteration present in the second species of rule C. Here, the intellect recognizes the ways of natural movement and moral movement. It recognizes the natural way of movement in generation, where form and matter are altered while the altering agent, in its own alterable and with its co-essential altering act, alters things that come to it from outside so that movement can develop and actually exist by means of the definition of the middle. Moral alteration occurs when a man changes from one habit to another, as in changing from justice to injury, from ire to patience, from logic to medicine, from sadness to joy and so forth.

Article 69 - Infinity and the Infinitized Subject

113. Infinity is a form that has an infinite act removed from everything finite, and that has no way of existing without an infinitized subject because infinity cannot repose in a finite subject. Infinity has its own correlatives by the second species of rule C, and it cannot have them without infinite goodness, greatness, eternity etc. or else there would be a contradiction, whereby infinity would be both infinite and not infinite, impeded and unimpeded, which is impossible. Infinity is the cause of finiteness, or of finite being as shown by the third species of rule C. Infinity has action in infinite being by the second species of rule C, and in finite being by the fourth species whereby passion and newness both habituate finite being, or else it would have an infinite habit as well as a finite one, which is impossible. Here, the intellect realizes that just as finiteness has finite co-essential correlatives which are the finitizer, finitized and finitizing, so likewise and far better does infinity have infinite correlatives, namely the infinitizer, infinitized and infinitizing, or else the nature of finiteness would be greater whereas the nature of infinity would be lesser, which is impossible.

Article 70 - Deception and who is Deceived

114. Deception is a positive habit for the deceiver and a privative habit for the one who is deceived. Thus, by the second species of rule C, the knower causes deception in his innate knowledge as he clothes his knowing with a deceptive habit, and by the third species of rule C he is the deceiver of the deceived person he misleads. However, the deceived person is not deceived in his own second species of rule C, but only in the third species and in the fourth where he has a misleading habit with which he deviates from the final purpose of his existence. Here, the intellect sees where sin arises from and where it resides.

Article 71 - Honour and who is Honoured

115. Honour is an active habit in the giver of honour and a passive habit in the receiver of honour. Thus, the one who gives honour is greater than the one who receives it, because the giver produces the habit of honour in the second species of rule C, but the receiver receives the habit of honour in the third species, and has the habit of honour by the fourth species. Here the intellect sees how the same habit can reside in several terms. Moreover, it sees how the slanderer is more fully clothed in the habit of slander than is the person who is slandered. The intellect greatly delights in this knowledge thus discovered through the art.

Article 72 - Capacity and Incapacity

116. Capacity is a form whereby a capacious thing can contain and receive as much as can be supplied to it, whereas incapacity is the opposite of this. Capacity consists in the second species of rule C, which enables it to be a positive habit in the third and fourth species of the same rule, along with the definitions of the principles and the species of the rules. The second species of rule C does not cause incapacity, which is a privative habit deprived of any benefit from the principles and rules. Incapacity as such is close to the definitions of contrariety and minority. Here the intellect can detect the causes of intellectual obtuseness and pitiless cruelty of the will.

Article 73 - Existence and Agency

117. Existence is the form by means of which an existing thing is what it is; and agency is a form that moves an existing thing toward its intended goal. The second species of rule C, rule E and the definitions of goodness, power and medium show this. If we add the definitions of goodness, greatness and eternal duration, it follows that existence must be as great as agency. Here the intellect realizes that only God acts as much by the second species of rule C as He exists by the first species of rule E. To know more about existence and agency, refer to the first subject, the chapter on the definition of God, #92.

Article 74 - Comprehension and Apprehension

118. Comprehension is a likeness of infinity and apprehension is a likeness of finiteness. Thus, the agent comprehends things by means of comprehension and apprehends things by means of apprehension. Whereas it comprehends things by reason of infinity, it apprehends them by reason of finiteness. Now the intellect wonders how an agent can comprehensively objectify an apprehended object with comprehension, until it remembers tasting a drop of wine: by comprehending the quality of the wine in the drop in the taster's palate, the intellect apprehends the quality of the wine in the barrel; and likewise, through the senses, the intellect apprehends the essence of a sense object without comprehending this object's essence stripped of all sense impressions. Now the intellect recognizes the ways in which it comprehends and apprehends things by discoursing with the species of rule C. The intellect comprehends a thing when it defines it by the first species of rule C, whereas it apprehends it in the second species of this rule because it cannot comprehend itself, so that it is apprehensive in the second species whereas it is comprehensive in the first species. Further, it is comprehensive in the third species of rule C, whereas in the fourth species of the same, it has a dual habit of comprehension and apprehension. In realizing this, the intellect rises to a very lofty and subtle level of understanding.

Article 75 – Inventiveness and Invention

119. Inventiveness is the form whereby the intellect invents its inventions. The second species of rule C signifies that the inventor invents peregrine inventions in his own innate inventible, just as the intellect makes external species intelligible in its own innate intelligible. By the third species, inventiveness is the cause of all inventions made by inventors. By the fourth species, every invention has its source in inventiveness. Here the intellect knows how it develops science and what its subject is, namely this art, which discovers discoveries by applying principles and rules.

Article 76 - Similarity and Things that are Similar

120. Similarity is a form with which the assimilating thing assimilates what is similar to itself. Similarity originates in the principles, given that goodness, greatness etc. are similar inasmuch as they are principles; and likewise, greatness, duration etc. are similar inasmuch as they are good. In addition, another kind of similarity occurs by the second species of rule C, when an assimilating thing assimilates something similar to it, for instance a father who assimilates a son to himself in the human species and puts the seal of his own similarity on his son's appearance, colour and so forth. Further, goodness, greatness etc. are similar because just as goodness has its own correlatives, so does greatness etc. and the correlatives of goodness,

greatness etc. are essentially similar inasmuch as the correlatives of goodness taken together are one goodness etc. And likewise with other supernal, primordial and causal similarities from which the lower, sensible and imaginable similarities descend, as for instance many men who are similar in species and mores, or many luminaries that are similar in light and so forth.

Article 77 - Antecedents and Resultants

121. An antecedent is a form that causes a resultant. Conversely, a resultant is a subject in which an antecedent reposes. The principles and rules of this art are antecedents that give rise to resultants. When an agent acts with goodness and greatness, it follows that its act is good and great, and consequently that this act is an empowered act. In addition, goodness that is great in greatness results in greatness that is good in goodness. Further, greatness that is infinite duration due to eternity results in eternity that is infinite immensity due to greatness; power that is infinite duration due to eternity results in an eternity that is infinite powering due to power, and so forth. Moreover, the second species of rule C is antecedent to the third species of rule C and the third species of rule C is antecedent to the fourth species of rule C; for example, goodness with its bonifier, bonifiable and bonifying results in a good habit existing in a man, and if a man acquires good habits through goodness, then he has merit for his goodness. And there are other antecedents and resultants: for instance, if human nature exists, then animal nature exists; and if there are two premises, then they naturally result in a conclusion.

Article 78 - Power, Object and Act

122. The power is the form with which the intellect attains its object, whereas the object is a subject in which the intellect reposes, and the act is the connection of the power to the object. This triad consists in the second species of rule C, for example in the correlatives of goodness in which the bonifier is the power or form because it is active, the bonified is the passive object and bonifying is the act issuing from both. Here, the intellect realizes that it is false to say that the object moves the power, and that it is true to say that the power moves itself to the object with the object. In the third species of rule C, the power is active and the object is passive; and in the fourth species, the power has action and the object has passion. Here, the intellect realizes that the mover has no natural appetite to be mobile or vice versa. It also realizes that it has the capacity to receive great clarification in philosophy.

Article 79 – Generation, Corruption and Privation

123. In created things, generation is the form with which the agent causes new forms, corruption is the form with which it deprives old forms and privation is a form that stands in the middle between both. Here, the intellect sees how these three forms stand in their subject where the generating and depriving are done by the same form and power that positively generates new forms and in a privative way corrupts old forms by means of a single identical act that consists in generating and corrupting. The generable and the corruptible parts are not the same, as they have divergent ends because of their mutual opposition, given that the generable part is closer to being and the corruptible part is closer to non-being, even though they both belong to the same agent in the same subject. On the one hand, fire uses heat to dry out and to harden clay, whereas on the other hand it uses heat melt and to soften wax. Generation is active in the third species of rule C, corruption is passive in this species while they both move with the same natural movement. This is because in the fourth species of rule

C, the subject has action through generation and passion through corruption, so that this subject has a positive habit as well as a privative habit. Now the intellect sees how generation, corruption and privation are natural principles in elemented things.

124. We have dealt with 79 general forms to which particulars apply. For instance, in dealing with generation, corruption and privation, we can apply this article on generation, corruption and privation without violating the things we said in this article, as they are self-evident. Now we intend to apply this general art to particular arts, to show clearly how this art is general to all arts, so that one who possesses this art can learn and master other arts more easily. Let us begin with Theology.

Article 80 - Theology

125. Theology is the science that speaks of God. The first subject indicated by B is a locus where we artificially speak of God in a discourse based on the principles and rules. Whoever wants to speak of God either naturally or artificially can refer to the said subject and say the things about God that are said there. If they want to extend their discourse to implicit terms, they can apply them to the explicit terms used in discussing this subject, in a way that does not violate the explicit terms. For instance, let us ask whether it is possible for God not to exist. Here we can refer to the things said about God under B, C etc. If we ask why it is impossible for God not to exist, we can refer to the rule that asks why God exists. If we ask whether God can be evil, or whether there are several Gods, we can refer to the locus that says that goodness is a reason for good to produce great, infinite and eternal good, and to the locus where God is defined. In addition, if we ask which law is true, Christian, Jewish or Muslim, then let us refer to the subject on God and see which of these laws it indicates. If a preacher wants to preach about God, he can extract material for his sermon from this subject which provides expansive and far reaching material for preaching, and so forth. Here, the intellect realizes what a great object and what a great source of joy it has in the first subject.

Article 81 - Philosophy


126. Philosophy is a subject in which the intellect connects with all the arts and sciences. In this art, the philosopher can have a great subject for the benefit of his understanding, for he can philosophize by means of the subjects indicated by C, D, E, F, G, H and I along with the hundred forms. Now the philosopher deals in natural terms with angels, heaven, man, the imaginative, sensitive, vegetative and elementative powers, but there is no way for him to deal with miracles on natural terms, given their supernatural character. If someone wants to make a philosophical investigation, let him refer to the said subjects and apply them to the questions, and then answer it either in the affirmative or in the negative without violating what we said about the subjects. For the things dealt with in these subjects are clear and manifest to an intellect of subtle understanding. If the subject of a question is implicit or peregrine, then answer the question by applying the said explicit principles, so that the explicit and implicit terms convene rationally in the proposed conclusion. Here, the intellect realizes that this art is an admirable and most general subject for the philosopher's understanding.

Article 82 – Geometry

127. Geometry is the art devised for measuring lines, angles and figures. As this art deals with quantity indicated by F, and with the means of measurement also indicated by F combined with B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I and K, we understand that the subject of Geometry is quantity

inasmuch as measurement above causes measurement below, and goodness is one measure in its own right, and so is greatness etc. as signified by the ladders of the second figure and the species of the rules. Thus, goodness, inasmuch as it exists, measures itself as something good and great so that great good produces great good; and this is signified above where we deal with the point, the line, the triangle, the square, the circle and with figures in articles 42 and following.


128. Moreover, measurement arises in the correlatives of the second species of rule C, and it derives into the third species wherein the measurer, the measured and measuring are habituated. In the fourth species, the measured has a quantified habit with shape, just as a coloured thing has colour. Now we will show this with the two following figures.



Suppose this square is equivalent to four spans, and it is divided into two equal parts by a diagonal line; one of the parts is divided into two, the biggest part is called A, the second is B and the third is C. Now let us ask how the intellect begins to discover geometry. We answer that it is with the definition of principle, with rules F, H, I and K, and with subjects E, F and G. Now the intellect visually perceives nine angles in this figure, where A has three, B has three and C has three angles. However, with the imagination, the intellect perceives twelve angles. If A is equivalent to B plus C, then according to the intellect and the imagination, A has as many angles as the senses perceive in B and C. Now B plus C have six, therefore A has six, three of which are actually visible whereas the other three remain in potentiality, for the intellect and the imagination perceive the latter without using the senses, because they were never present to the senses; with them the geometer builds a science on potentially existing quantity, as this quantity translates into sensible signs through similitude and experience so that the science remains in the intellect and in the imagination outside of the senses. The second species of rule C is the subject of this science, and the third and fourth species are experiences of the said science. Here, the intellect sees how a geometer develops science by using potential quantity to measure quantity accessible to the senses. It also realizes that it is false to say that the intellect cannot be aware of anything not previously perceived by the senses, because the line conceived by the intellect was never present to the senses, just as said three angles in A were never present to the senses.

129. Given that the intellect cannot measure a circular line with a compass, how can it find out how many spans a circular line would measure if it we extended it? Here, the intellect ascends to higher measurement outside the senses - as we already discussed - and after this, it comes back down to measurement using the senses. By applying the definition of medium and rule F, through flow and reflux and with discrete and continuous quantity, the intellect

measures the circular line without using the senses, to find out how many spans it measures. First, we draw this figure, containing three squares and one circle, as shown.



Suppose that the minor square is equivalent to four equal spans, and the major square is equivalent to, or worth six spans. Then I say that whatever stands between four and six is equivalent to five spans; but the circle stands between the major and minor squares as shown, because it is contained by the major square and it contains the minor one through contact between lines. Therefore, it is clear that if we extended the circle it would be equivalent to five spans because five is equidistant from four and six, just as two is equidistant from one and three. We can say the same about the three units in the middle of the series of integers from one to nine, as they are equidistant from the three units before them and the three units after them.


130. The intellect makes a further demonstration by placing in the middle between the major and minor squares, one red square that squares the circle according to the measurement of the container and the content. The circle and the red square contain each other, as we can see in their extremes, and the line of the circle is equivalent to the line of the square. The red square is equivalent to five spans because it stands equally between the major and minor squares, and experience shows this if we extend the red square with a compass. Therefore, the circular line would be equivalent to five spans if we extended it.

131. A further demonstration also shows that the red square and the circle are equivalent. If four times four equals sixteen houses, and four times six equals twenty-four houses, it then follows that five times four equals twenty houses. Obviously, the red square and the circle are equivalent as they both stand equally between the major square and the minor square. Here the intellect sees how geometers develop science by using extrasensory measurement confirmed by sense experience. This is like a carpenter mentally measuring the potential size of a box in a piece of wood, and then actually producing a box of the same size as he had measured in potentiality in the wood.

Article 83 - Astronomy

132. Astronomy is the art with which astrologers know the virtues and movements that heaven effectively induces in things below. This art deals with heaven signified by the letter D, and if there is any unclear issue regarding heaven, then refer to the third subject and reply according to the explanations of the third subject, or heaven, but without violating what is said there about heaven. For instance, let us ask whether there is another heaven apart from the heaven of this world. The answer is no, by the definition of concordance: now if there was

another heaven, both heavens would convene in corporeity and shape without any subject common to both, and thus imply an impossible contradiction.



Species cannot exist without a genus; nor can there be any distance or closeness between the two worlds as shown in these two figures, one called A and the other called B, whose upper and lower parts would be separated by distance, but not the middle parts, as the three lines indicate: because two are long and one is short. Moreover, the void would be the subject of both the long lines and the short line, which would involve distance and closeness in a void subject, which is impossible. Here, the intellect knows that no other heaven has any capacity to exist, or else the said inconvenience would follow, and the definition of concordance would perish. Nonetheless, I say that there can be another heaven because God's power is infinite. And if this was the case, then distance and closeness between them would be disposed in potentiality, and they would not actually exist outside the heavens, given that there is no subject or locus for distance and closeness to exist in, for nothing but void exists between the heavens. Here, the intellect wonders: given that the Sun is not hot per se, why does it heat air? Then it considers the fact that the Sun causes heat by its presence just as it cause darkness by its absence, so that there can be days and nights.

Article 84 – Arithmetic

133. Arithmetic is an art devised for enumerating many units. The principles of arithmetic are the principles of this art. Indeed, primordial principles insofar as they are primordial can be enumerated, for instance, goodness is one general principle and greatness is another etc. By mixture, the principles compose two species of enumerated numbers, namely even numbers, such as two principles, and odd numbers, such as three or five principles etc. These two species encompass all numbers.

134. Other principles of number arise in the correlatives of the second species of rule C. For instance, in the essence of goodness, the bonifier is one correlative, the bonified is another and bonifying is another. In these three numbers, the essence of goodness is perfectly complete; the bonifier signifies the first numerical unit, the bonified signifies the second unit arisen from the first, and bonifying is the third arising from the first two. And because these units proceed through even and odd numbers, they can be multiplied by even and odd numbers so that two times two equal four, three times three equal nine units; and the fifth unit is found by adding an even number to an odd one: now two plus three equal five units, and so on. Here the intellect sees how arithmeticians compose and multiply numbers.

135. Further, by the third species of rule C, the arithmetician can represent numbers as figures, for instance, ten units can be represented by the letter X which signifies ten units, and so on with C, D, M and the rest. Here, the intellect realizes that Arithmetic derives from Geometry: just as the geometer uses the figure in the article on Geometry to measure a circular line with three squares, so does the arithmetician use letters like X, C, D and M to measure thousands of things and all things. The rule of modality and the second species of rule C signify this. By the fourth species of rule C, numbers have figures in which the intellect uses the senses and the imagination to attain many units, just as the geometer's intellect uses the senses to attain things that are outside the senses, as we said regarding figure A, B, C in article 82 on Geometry.

Article 85 – Music

136. Music is an art invented for ordering many concordant voices in one song as many principles to one end, and the definitions of concordance and principle signify this definition. Music also arises from its correlatives; just as a carpenter has in mind the concept of a box that he brings from potentiality to actuality, so does a musician have a mental concept of ordered voices that he introduces into the third species of rule C in which music is a habit with which a musician practices his art. Musicians practice music by ascending and descending in six steps and by saying ut, re, mi, fa, sol, la.

137. Now the intellect wonders why there are neither more nor less than six steps. Then it remembers article 49 about the six directions. Here, the intellect sees how it must get help from the 100 general forms we discussed earlier by applying them to issues in need of clarification.

138. Further, the intellect wonders why there are neither more nor less than five vowels. Then it remembers the four spheres of the elements along with the quintessence signified by the third and eighth subjects. The spheres and the quintessence are in constant movement, this movement generates sound, and as the musician extracts voices from sound, the intellect knows that the primordial order of voice proceeds with five simple vowels from which compound letters or consonants arise. Now it knows why there are neither more nor less than five vowels.

139. Again, the intellect wonders why the letter E combines with more alphabet letters than does A, and why A combines with more letters than does U. In addition, why do I and O not cause any consonants as A and U do? Then it remembers the triangle containing majority and minority and places the vowels in it: E has more matter than A or U because E causes B, C, D, F, G, L, M, N, P, R, S, T, and X in the alphabet. A causes H and K, which is more than the sole letter Q caused by U. Moreover, as there is majority and minority among the said vowels, so there is also equality between O and I, for they cause no consonant at all.

140. As the intellect thus considers that E is greater than A with regard to matter, it sees that E corresponds to the movement of earth and A to the movement of water. This is because earth has more matter than water has. Further, U corresponds to the movement of air, which has less matter than water has; and I corresponds to fire due to its slenderness and acuteness, given that it has even less matter than air has. O corresponds to the movement of heaven, and the mouth takes on a round, circular shape to pronounce it.

Article 86 - Rhetoric

141. Rhetoric is an invented art with which rhetoricians colour and embellish their words. As this art is general, it provides the rhetorician with general subject matter for adorning his words. For instance, we can say, "goodness is great, goodness is eternal", but it is even more elegant to combine the sentences together and say, "goodness is great and eternal". The rhetorician can adorn his words by adorning a beautiful subject with beautiful predicates, for instance, he can predicate all the principles of figure A about one and the same subject.

142. There is another way to decorate or to colour one's words that consists in embellishing a principle with its own correlatives, for instance by adorning goodness with the bonifier, the bonified and the act of bonifying. Then each correlative can be adorned with the correlatives of other principles for instance by saying "great, eternal and good being produces magnified, eternalized and bonified being".

143. There is a further way to adorn words that consists in adorning a principle with its own definition and with the definitions of other principles, as in saying: "good, great and eternal goodness is a reason for good to produce good, great and eternal good". Just as a logician discovers natural connections between the subject and the predicate to find the true conclusion to a syllogism, likewise, a rhetorician finds the connection between the subject and the predicate in order to adorn a beautiful subject with its natural predicate, as in saying: "her majesty the queen has a beautiful face, beautiful hair, and beautiful hands" and so on. In another way, we can adorn a subject with accidental attributes and we can say: "her majesty the queen has a beautiful crown and she speaks beautifully, her majesty the queen is good". Rule G indicates this.

144. The rhetorician adorns his speech with meaningful words; for instance, the words 'April' and 'May' are more beautiful than 'October' and 'November', because they suggest flowers, leaves, songbirds, seasonal renewal and regeneration. Conversely, 'October' and 'November' do not evoke anything of the kind. Likewise, we can mention fountains, rivers, streams, meadows, trees, shadows and so forth, which are beautiful words to the senses and to the imagination, and this is indicated by Rule C. Just as the rhetorician praises a friend with beautiful words applied to a good purpose, so does he vituperate and condemn an enemy with beautiful words that are deviated from their end, as in saying to a dishonest religious person: "If I was religious, I would speak beautiful and honest words." The definitions of difference, end and contrariety show this.

145. Moreover, to adorn his speech the rhetorician evokes the vocations of various people in terms of science, generosity, chastity and so forth. He speaks of chivalry in terms of bravery, nobility, integrity, horses, swords etc. He discusses the art of commerce in terms of gold, silver, precious merchandise and so on. With regard to agriculture he speaks of fields, tools, gardens, plants and animals. Just as a merchant finds beauty in words that speak of gold etc. so does a farmer find beauty in words that speak of fields, tools and such things.

146. Then the rhetorician adorns his speech in the three degrees called positive, comparative and superlative. The comparative degree is more ornate than the positive, and the superlative is more ornate than the comparative. If we say, "roses are beautiful," it is more ornate to say "roses are more beautiful than violets" and even more ornate to say, "roses are the most beautiful flowers of all." The definitions of majority and minority indicate this.

147. The rhetorician also adorns his speech by colouring a beautiful noun with a beautiful adjective, or by dishonouring a beautiful noun with a beautiful adjective, as in saying: "the queen is good, the queen is dishonest," because "dishonest" is a more beautiful word than "evil".

148. The rhetorician colours matter with beautiful form, and he colours beautiful matter with beautiful form, as in saying, "the human body has the rational soul, and the rational soul has a body well disposed to do good with vigour," and so on. This is clarified by the ladder of principle and by its definition.

149. The rhetorician adorns the middle with a beautiful beginning and he adorns the end with a beautiful middle; just as in love, the good lover adorns good loving with his goodness, and the beloved is adorned and coloured with good loving, like a good being clothed in a good habit. The definitions of the beginning, middle and end show this.

150. The rhetorician can adorn his speech better with substantial and necessary principles than with accidental or contingent ones, for instance by using facts which have more to do with reality than with appearances. This is because a necessary principle reposes in the end better than does an accidental or contingent one. The triangle of majority and minority indicates this, along with the definitions of the beginning and the end.

151. Then the rhetorician adorns his speech by declaring what is possible or impossible, easy or difficult, useful or useless, frequent or rare and so forth. Rules B, C, D etc. clearly show this.

152. The rhetorician also colours his speech with beautiful proverbs applied to the issue at hand, as shown in the book we wrote entitled "The New Rhetoric".

Article 87 - Logic

153. Logic is the art with which the logician discovers the natural connection between subject and predicate, which is a middle term that leads to necessary conclusions. The logician discovers a contiguous middle term by defining the middle term and by considering the affinities between the subject and the predicate. An example of this was given in the multiplication of the fourth figure.

154. The logician also deals with the five predicables and the ten predicates. We gave examples of them in articles 6 and following in this treatise on the hundred forms. In addition, the logician deals with syllogisms, figures and fallacies all of which were exemplified in the multiplication of the fourth figure. Thus, if any issue regarding Logic needs clarification, or if there is some peregrine question, then refer to the things said about Logic in this art, and give an affirmative or negative answer without violating anything that the art says about Logic .

155. The logician predicates more general things of less general ones, and so he predicates "animal" of "man", "body" of "animal" and "substance" of "body". He also posits multiple genera, for instance, he posits the supremely general genus, namely substance, and he posits subalternate genera such as body or animal. Likewise, he posits multiple species as he posits subalternate species like the ones existing in a straight line between substance and a man. An individual man constitutes an ultimately specific species without anything else below it. All this proceeds through the triangle of majority, equality and minority, and through the triangle

of beginning, middle and end. For instance, goodness is a supremely general principle when it is not contracted, but when it is contracted to the middle, it is a subalternate genus or principle. "Great goodness" stands in the middle between the supremely general and the ultimately specific; but when it is contracted to an ultimately specific species, namely to an individual purpose, then it is an ultimately specific principle, as when we say, "the goodness of this man called Peter is great."

156. The logician deals with difference by differentiating, with concordance by according, and with contrariety by opposing. Here, the intellect sees how Logic applies, or is applicable to figures A and T. In addition, it knows how and why a logician cannot stand up against an artist of this art: for any logician who seeks to destroy the stable and immutable principles of this art will be confounded. Indeed, by inquiring and by understanding what such a logician means by his conclusion, once the conclusion is understood, the artist can conclusively defeat it by means of the stable and immutable principles and the species of the rules, leaving the logician no escape.

157. Further, the logician deals with definitions by using only the first species of rule C, whereas the general artist of this art uses all the species of rule C. The logician deals with second intentions together with first intentions, but the general artist of this art uses the second species of rule C to deal with first intentions and the third and fourth species to deal with second intentions. Here, he knows that Logic is an unstable or unsteady science, whereas this general art is permanent and unchanging. Moreover, the logician draws conclusions from two general premises whereas the artist of this art also uses the mixture of principles and rules. A logician cannot discover the true law with Logic, but the general artist of this art can discover it, for the true law is the one that can stand the test of the principles and rules of this art. Further, Logic is a difficult art to learn, whereas this art is very easy because of the mixture and interconnection of its principles and rules. This is why the artist can learn more of this art in one month than a logician can learn of Logic in a year.

Article 88 - Grammar

158. Grammar is the art of devising the correct way to speak and write. By the definition of difference, Grammar divides into nine modes:

1. the eight parts of speech
2. cases
3. conjugations
4. declensions
5. gender
6. governance
7. construction
8. spelling
9. figures

Grammar applies or is applicable to this art; just as Grammar teaches the way to speak and write correctly, so does this art teach the way to discover other arts. So let us apply Grammar to this art to make it more surely and clearly known to the intellect.

159. There are eight parts of speech, namely: nouns, pronouns, verbs, participles, adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions and interjections. Nouns apply to the principles of this art, as

goodness, greatness etc. are nouns. Pronouns apply to, or are applicable to these principles; pronouns stand for nouns and as we just said, the principles of this art are nouns that have their own properties because they are proper principles that can apply to any faculty due to their general character. However, the principles of other faculties or sciences cannot apply to other sciences, for they do not have the general properties that the principles of this art have. Verbs apply to the second species of rule C, as in "to bonify," "to magnify," etc. because this species signifies an act, just as a verb does. Participles are implied or signified by the same species of rule C, for instance: the bonifying being and the bonified being, the magnifying being and the magnified being etc. Conjunctions are implicit in the same species of rule C, in the act of bonifying that joins the bonifier and the bonified in one perfect concrete being just as a conjunction joins diverse words or phrases together in one complete discourse. In addition, adverbs are implicit in the same species, as in saying "the bonifier bonifies well its bonified," for every agent intends to produce its effect well, and this implies the adverb. Prepositions apply to the fourth species of rule C and to the rule of instrumentality, because the grammarian uses the preposition as an instrument to bring a case into actuality. Interjections apply to the definition of the will, because joy and sadness are primarily expressed by the will.

160. Now let us deal with the cases. The nominative case is implied by the bonifier in the second species of rule C, because the bonifier is the origin of the bonified and of bonifying and as such, it exists on its own and does not descend from anything else. Likewise, the nominative exists on its own and as such, it does not descend from anything else because it is the origin of the other cases that descend from it. Likewise, the genitive case is implied by the bonified and bonifying in the second species of rule C which both depend on the bonifier just as the genitive depends on its nominative. The genitive case also applies to the third species of rule D, which equally signifies possession. The dative case is also implicit in the second species of rule C, namely in the bonified and in bonifying, because the bonifier gives rise to the bonified while the bonifier and bonified together give rise to the act of bonifying. The accusative case is implicit in the third species of the same rule C, where the act of the agent is terminated in its passive object, because in the accusative case, the doer's act terminates in its doable, or passive object. The vocative case is implicit in the fourth species of the same rule, because a man who calls someone has an object in the one he calls. In addition, rule B can also be applied here, as is clear to anyone who diligently penetrates the nature of this rule. The ablative is implicit in the second species of rule C, namely in the essence of the bonifier, bonified and bonifying, because it is essentially and naturally the original cause of these three correlatives.

161. Conjugation is implicit in the second species of rule C, namely in the essence with its correlatives, as in goodness with its correlatives, for goodness is the original cause of its correlatives which descend from it and differ from each other according to their diverse properties. Likewise, conjugation has principles from which descend words that are very different from each other because of different persons, tenses, and moods and so forth.

162. Declensions are implicit in the second species of rule C, as the bonified and the act of bonifying descend from the generating bonifier, just as one case derives from another in a declension.

163. Gender is implied by the correlatives in the second species of rule C, in which the three genders are implied, as the bonifier signifies the masculine gender because of action, the

bonified signifies the feminine gender because of passion, and the act of bonifying signifies the neuter gender because of its neutrality.

164. Governance implies major power and virtue in the governor and minor power and virtue in the governed. The one with greater power and virtue should govern and not be governed, whereas one with lesser virtue and power should be governed and not govern. For instance, a count should govern and control his simple soldier and not vice versa.

165. Construction is implicit in the triangle of beginning, middle and end because of due order. The beginning, by definition, naturally comes before the middle and the end; the middle, by definition, comes before the end; and the end by definition, comes after everything else, so that the beginning reposes in the end through a due orderly process. Just as in building a house, the part below is built first and the top is built afterward we say "Peter runs" rather than "Runs Peter". If someone wants to build a house by putting up the roof even before the foundation and the walls are up, his order is wrong and impossible.

166. Spelling is implicit in the rule of modality. This rule teaches how a part exists as a part; how one part is in another part, or joined to it; how the parts exist in the whole and the whole in its parts, and finally how the whole transmits its likeness outwardly. Likewise, spelling teaches how a letter is what it is, how letters are joined to other letters, syllables to other syllables, phrases to other phrases, sentences to other sentences, one accent to another accent etc.

167. Figures of speech are implicit in the definitions of contrariety and concordance. Contrariety applies to these definitions, for inasmuch as a figure breaks the rules of Grammar, it is contrary to them. However, if a figure can be deemed grammatically correct for some reason of its own, it applies to the definition of concordance. If the reason intrinsic to the figure is concordant with Grammar, the figure is grammatically correct, otherwise, it is not.

Article 89 - Morality

168. Morality is the habit of doing good or evil. We dealt with morals in the ninth subject, and if there is some question about morals that is explicit in this subject you can refer to the subject; but if it is implicit, then refer to the things explicitly said in the ninth subject. For instance, if the question is about injury, then refer to justice, or if it is about generosity, then refer to avarice, because opposites are known by their counterparts.

169. If we take virtue as the subject and apply the principles of this art as predicates, virtue is fortified and amplified, not in essence but in act, as in saying: "charity is good, charity is great, and charity is durable" etc. Thus, charity is disposed as a habit with which a man does charitable works in a good, great, durable etc. way. To deal with a vice, make it a subject and apply to it the opposites of the principles of this art, by saying, for instance: "cruelty is evil, cruelty is as evil as it is great, it is as evil and dangerous as it is durable" etc.

170. An excellent exercise for cultivating virtue is to discourse on virtue by evacuating the third figure, for instance by saying: charity is good, great etc. Then, ask what good, great etc. charity is, and likewise with the rest of the content of camera BC. Next, go on to camera BD and so on, by saying, for instance "what does the duration of charity consist of?" and then give the answer in the same way as the questions are answered in this camera, so that there is no conflict between the things said in this camera and the things you say about charity. We

can deal with cruelty in a similar way. Thus, charity is nurtured by this method, but not cruelty. Good is lovable per se when it is known with greatness and duration whereas evil is detestable per se when it is known with greatness and duration. The things said earlier in the multiplication of the fourth figure help the moralist to use the virtues against the vices by discoursing on virtues or vices with the table and artificially finding the middle term just as a logician does with his art. This method enables the moralist to clothe himself in habits of virtue and to strip himself of the habits of vice; for instance, charity and goodness are naturally inseparable moral values, because charity cannot exist without goodness just as a man cannot exist without belonging to the animal species. Now the intellect is very glad to have this artificial doctrine.

171. Every virtue and every vice can be explored with the species of the rules. We can discover each virtue in one way with one species and in another way with another species. Just as the senses find colour in an apple in one way, taste in another way and weight in another way, likewise, charity is discovered in different ways when applied to the four species of rule C. Contrariwise, the same can be said about cruelty.

172. To acquire the virtues and to avoid the vices, or to increase the virtues and decrease the vices, refer to the fourth subject which is about man, and get help in acquiring the virtues against the vices from the things said there about man in combination with the principles and rules. If there is still an obstacle, refer to the subject of imagination and the subject of the senses, to better dispose yourself to acquire the virtues and eradicate the vices. If all this is not enough, then you can refer in prayer to the first subject and see how God is discussed with the principles and the rules to acquire the habit of hope, and this is the ultimate remedy. If the goal is attained, all is well, but if it is not attained, the shortcoming lies in insufficient knowledge of how to use the techniques of this art.

Article 90 - Politics

173. Politics is the art with which citizens provide for the public good of their city. Because they derive from morality, Politics apply to the ninth subject of acquiring the virtues against the vices. The public good is built on these virtues by discoursing on Politics with the principles and the rules in the same way as the virtues and vices are dealt with in the ninth subject. Politics is a term known by its definition and by its own correlatives signified by the second species of rule C. By the third species of rule C it is a habit of the people, and by the fourth species, the population has a political habit. In addition, Politics can be discussed in various ways with the other species of the rules.

174. Politics is order established in sensible things by means of the virtues, as we see for instance in a town market organized for providing the necessities of life such as food etc. Moreover, Politics consists of order conceived for well being as observed in attractively laid out rows of buildings, open spaces and other sites, elegant clothing and so forth. In addition, Politics must ensure that the city has walls, ramparts, armaments etc. to defend itself against its enemies.

175. A city and its ruler must convene on prerogatives that stand between them as a middle term like the one that logicians establish between the subject and the predicate with the definitions of concordance and end. City councillors and citizens must be custodians of these prerogatives so that relations between the ruler and the city are well tempered with a clearly defined rule of law.

176. With regard to the city as a whole Politics is a general form, and it is a specific form in each household in that city. This requires a middle term in which the general and specific forms join through the definition of concordance and the mixture of the principles, so that this middle term is entirely free of contrariety. Metaphorically, the body politic owes its health to the healthy mentality of virtuous councillors; but vicious councillors make the body politic sick and crippled. Politics thrive on substantial and necessary principles, but accidental and contingent principles place it in deadly danger. As Politics is not a difficult subject, we have said enough about it here.

Article 91 - Law

177. Law is the well-ordered act of a man possessing justice. By the first species of rule D, there are four basic principles of law, namely divine law, natural law, civil law and positive law. Divine law consists in defining the relations of majority, minority and concordance that exist between God and man. Natural law necessarily consists in the definitions of goodness, greatness etc. Civil law consists in defining the relations of concordance and contrariety existing between men. As for positive law, it consists of the voluntary decisions made by legislators as they apply the definitions of goodness, greatness etc. All laws in general are contained in these four principal terms by the second species of rule C, by the third species of rule C law exists in other things and by the fourth, it has its act in the things judged by it.

178. The constitutive form and matter of law are in the second species of rule D and the first of E. By the second species of rule E, justice is the subject of law. Judgment requires that justice be taken as the subject of which the principles of this art and their definitions are predicated, as in saying "justice is good," "justice is great" etc. Hence, it follows that justice is a good and great reason for a judge to make a good and great judgment, and this shows that the principles of this art are the form of justice and that justice cannot be complete without them. Justice is the subject of the principles sustained in it, and justice is a form with respect to the judge possessing it. Justice is also a form because of the action a judge exercises with it on matters at issue; and consequently we see that the matter at issue is the matter of justice, considering that a judgment is passed on the matter at issue by the judge, just as an act is done by the doer in the doable. In addition, this is clearly shown by the third species of rule C.

179. Perfect and righteous judgment requires that the judge discourse through the principles and rules of this art as we do in the ninth subject. If this is done, then justice necessarily acts as a perfect form in the matter under judgment, and the judge can use it in making his decision without any hesitation of conscience. But if the judge does not perform the said discourse, as we said, then he applies justice in a wrong and haphazard way with a hesitant conscience, which is a great and terrible danger for his soul, because anyone who causes great damage through his lack of prudence and discretion deserves a severe sentence.

180. A written law is true if it can pass the test of the principles and rules of this art, but if it does not pass this test, then it is a deformed and contrived fantasy. The principles and rules of this art are true, necessary and flawless, for each one is true and necessary, so that it cannot be anything else than what it is. Just as a crystal takes on the diverse colours on which it is placed, so do laws or canons take on the colours of the principles and rules of this art when applied to them. As the judge colours, fortifies and clarifies laws by means of various necessary reasons, he promptly detects the truth about both parties, which he cannot do without this art, for without it he can detect only some partial truth after lengthy hard work and study that nonetheless leave him with some doubts. Here, the intellect realizes that law is

not an art, but that it can be reduced to this art by referring it to the said principles and rules. In addition, because law is not an art, it is no wonder that it is so confusing, so long-winded and that it creates so many obstacles to understanding.

181. In the soul, the subject of law resides as much in memory as in the intellect, which goes against the right order among the powers of the soul wherein the intellect first investigates and discovers laws, then the will makes a choice, and then memory conserves the species. The universal is more than the particular, and memory is the subject of particulars from which no science can be built. Therefore, law as it now stands is not disposed in the right order in the soul. Here we see that without principles, there is no art.

182. The form of law cannot act outside of its own matter indicated by rule G, nor vice versa, and this is why legislators must know what the form and matter of law are. The form of law in terms of the principles of this art is the aggregate of the active correlatives of the principles, namely the justifier, bonifier, magnifier etc. which all convene in one form through concordance. And justifiable, bonifiable, magnifiable etc. things are the matter of law, inasmuch as form and matter are discussed in combination with the straight sequence of rules and definitions of principles. Now this paragraph implicitly contains all that can be said about law.

183. In law, the intellect is stronger with the imagination than with the senses because the imagination is a power higher than the senses, and since the intellect is a power higher than the imagination, it is stronger on its own than with the imagination. So that legislators may know how to use each power according to its higher or lower rank, I advise them to become familiar with subjects E, F and G, and to discourse with the species of the rules before making a decision. Otherwise, the decision may be compatible with one species, but incompatible with another species; for instance, in the second species of rule C, laws arise out of necessity, whereas in the third species of the same rule, they arise from contingencies. This is clearly shown by the definitions of majority and minority.

Article 92 - Medicine

184. Medicine is a practice with which the physician cares for his patient's health. The physician shall use the mixture of the principles and rules of this art, because the method for mixing them will lead him to a practical knowledge of ways to mix medicines, to prepare decoctions, ointments, plasters and syrups and administer herbs in measured degrees against illness.

185. In the subject signified by D, heaven is discussed with the principles and rules, and in the subject signified by E, man is discussed with the same principles and rules. As higher principles are active in things here below, the physician must refer to the said subjects and see which constellation is associated with the patient's problem, as he must go by this information in order to intervene in the case at hand.

186. The physician must be practically well-versed in the subject signified by F. because he has to know how to use his imagination. As the physician's intellect uses imagination to develop science about sense objects, he should know how to use imagination objectively without the senses, how to reach back down to the senses with the imagination, and then raise the sense perceptions to the level of imagination. Thus, the imagination functions as a

medium placed directly and in an ordered way between the senses and the intellect. The definition of medium clarifies this.

187. The physician shall refer to the subject signified by G, so as to know how to use the senses by observing the patient's colour, urine and feces, by smelling the patient's breath, by listening to his complaints and cries, by appraising his appetite, feeling his pulse and so forth. Indeed, a physician who does not know how to use the senses is not a good physician.

188. Then, the physician shall refer to the subject signified by H, to train himself practically in the method with which the vegetative is discussed there. This method will enable the physician to know the degrees of herbs and their virtues, with their effects on the patient. Suppose we make a decoction with one herb that is hot in the fourth degree, dry in the third, moist in the second and cold in the first. Then we add another herb that is cold in the fourth, moist in the third, dry in the second and hot in the first, and another herb that is moist in the fourth, hot in the third, cold in the second and dry in the first degree. Now the physician can know which herb prevails, or which one has the strongest virtue in this decoction. We say that the herb that is moist in the fourth degree prevails, because fire and water are opposites, whereas air is in agreement with both, and this is why it has greater virtue than fire and water have in this medicine. Moreover, fire, as it agrees more with air than water does, prevails over water in this medicine.

189. Then the physician shall refer to the subject signified by I, and become practiced in the method with which we discuss the elementative. He can then apply it to his patient. A physician should know the characteristics of the elements and of their composition in the patient, especially by applying rules F, G, H, I and K. Further, the physician shall apply the principles and rules of this art to the writings and discoveries of Hippocrates, Galen, Avicenna and other authors, inasmuch as they are applicable, and he shall judge the writings by expounding and clarifying the authorities. A moneychanger can tell real gold apart from false gold by rubbing it on a black stone. Likewise, the physician can gain true knowledge and experience of medical writings by applying them to the principles and rules of this art. He can see what colour - metaphorically speaking - the said writings take on when placed in contact with the principles and rules. Now the intellect is very glad to realize that it can reduce merely positive knowledge to this art and transform such knowledge into an art based on necessary conclusions.

Article 93 - Government

190. Government is the form with which a ruler informs and rules his people with good moral values. Therefore, let the ruler train his intellect in the ninth subject so he can rule and govern his subjects. Let him refer to the other subjects, for instance to subject B, to know and love God. This knowledge will guide him in reigning and governing. As he refers to subject E, if the ruler knows the method of disposing man in the principles and rules, he will know how to deal with men in judging or sparing them. Further, let him learn the subject indicated by F, to know how to apply his imagination to the city, to warfare, to judgments, to counsel and so forth. As a peasant does not know how to race a horse, so a ruler without a well-ordered imagination does not know how to reign, because without a well-ordered imagination, the intellect does not know what to do with the things that the senses perceive.

191. Then the ruler must know the subject indicated by G, to know how to use his senses to observe not only himself but his officials as well, and then to transfer the sense data to the

imagination, from the imagination to the intellect, and from the intellect to the ninth subject. But if the ruler says that these things are difficult, answer him by saying that he should do what he can, and entrust the things that are beyond his capacity to wise advisors who know how to advise him without violating the principles and rules, so that the ruler stands in concordance with the supreme subject removed from any contrariety. Here, the intellect sees how the ruler's governance can be reduced to the art and made into a science. If only a ruler could be found who would reduce his governance to the art, and who would dispose his son toward the art, and teach it to him, or have it taught to him. Indeed, I advise all rulers to learn it.

Article 94 - Chivalry

192. Chivalry is a practice with which the knight helps his prince to maintain justice. Given that knighthood was conceived for maintaining justice, the knight must familiarize himself with justice by following the way justice is discussed with the principles and rules in the ninth subject of this art, until he knows it perfectly. In addition, because a knight at war needs prudence, he must put on the habit of prudence to strengthen himself against his enemy. Therefore, the knight must know how prudence is discussed in the ninth subject and defend himself against his enemies with this technique because this art is an impregnable skill, and the knight who possesses it will defeat one who does not know how to use the art. Fortitude is a virtue that strengthens a man's heart, especially as he becomes more familiar with it, because the more he learns about fortitude, the more daring he becomes. Hence, it follows that if a knight wants to know fortitude perfectly, he can refer to the ninth subject where it is covered in full. A knight without faith, hope and charity is poorly armed in war, and so the knight must clothe himself with the said virtues, with God's help, following the way they are discussed in the ninth subject.

193. The knight wants to be good in goodness, and greatness makes him seek great victories, honours and such. Here, the intellect sees how chivalry can be reduced to this art; and it realizes that the soul's virtues are weapons more powerful than bodily weapons, because this art does not pertain to the body, but only to the soul. The knight should be of noble lineage, because nobility is a magnanimous disposition of heart, and a source of great daring in one's countenance and right hand, which ensure victory when supported by a valiant heart. Warfare requires great imaginative faculties and powerful senses whose greatness is inherent in the discourse on the virtues in the ninth subject. Just as a sword in stronger hands defeats a sword wielded by weaker hands, so does the knight with more powerful senses and imagination defeat other knights in battle. Here, the intellect knows that there are times when just a few knights can defeat a large number of foes.

Article 95 - Commerce


194. Commerce is an acquired practice whereby the merchant knows how to buy and sell so as to grow wealthy. The mixture of the principles and rules shows this, as we teach how each principle relates to the others. In trade, the buyer relates to the seller with his principles and rules, and the seller relates to the buyer with his principles and rules, so that each can acquire something more in exchange for something less. Hence, it follows that the merchant who knows how to discourse with his intellect, imagination and senses through the principles of this art has a major advantage over a merchant who does not know this discourse. Whatever a merchant does in buying or selling, he does with his intellect, will and memory. Therefore, he must use these powers in their natural order in the soul, whereby the intellect first

understands, followed by the will that makes a choice, then followed by memory that preserves the species with which buying and selling proceeds in the market. In addition, to use this technique intelligently, the merchant shall survey the transaction with his imagination and senses, without which there can be no buying or selling. Moreover, he will know how to go about this if he knows how to train himself in the subjects indicated by E, F and G. Here, the intellect sees how some merchants earn more wealth than others.

195. Subject E deals with man, and therefore with the human body, which is a part of man. Buying and selling involves things needed by the body, so a good merchant should discourse with his intellect through subject E to become aware of the body's needs. The third and fourth species of rule C are a great topic for the merchant's investigation, together with rules H and I, for the same merchandise or the same goods have more value at one time than at another and more in one place than another. In addition, they are more a matter of need and utility for some, but a matter of well being and honour for others. Further, the second species of rule E, with rule G, causes profit in purchasing and selling. As proper things have a higher purpose than appropriated ones, so whatever is more properly necessary for man is farther removed from contingency than what is only incidentally needed. In a faithful and virtuous man, commerce is a perfect practice; but in a deceitful and sinful man, it is a flawed practice. Therefore, anyone who wants to be a good merchant shall become practiced in the virtues following the way they are discussed in the ninth subject. Well-informed commercial practice fosters a common and social approach to goods, whereas a malformed practice destroys this common and social approach. Many other things can be said about commerce, but this is enough, for the sake of brevity.

Article 96 - Navigation

196. Navigation is the art by which sailors know how to navigate the sea. Navigation originally derives from Geometry and Arithmetic, through movement and its correlatives signified by the second species of rule C, namely the mover, the mobile and the act of moving; and through time and place, because a ship is in one place at one time and in another place at another time. Arithmetic and Geometry derive from our general art - as we proved in previous articles. Now the art of Navigation first originates in this art, and subsequently derives from Geometry and Arithmetic. To clarify this, we first draw this figure divided into four triangles, as shown, and consisting of right, acute and obtuse angles.



197. Supposing that the place where four angles meet is due north, and this is where the ship's port is, shown by the letter B. From here, a ship wants to sail eastward, but it is actually on a course due southeast. When it sails four miles, these four miles due southeast only amount to

three miles of progress eastward; and when the ship sails for eight miles, this only amounts to six miles of eastward progress; and if it sailed one hundred miles, it would amount to 75 miles eastward. And thus, the arithmetician calculates by saying that if four miles amount to three, then twice four amount to six, and if four times four equal sixteen, the three times three equal nine, and so with other multiplications of this kind, in their different ways. The reason for this is that in movement, first there is a point, followed by a line, then followed by a triangle, and then by a square, by reason of which successive local movement is generated through multiplication. The previous articles on the point and the line signify this. This kind of natural movement and multiplication is unknown to sailors and navigators, although they know what it is to experience it. To shed further light on this experience, we will provide a doctrine about it.

198. If a ship leaves the port at B and wants to sail due east, but is actually on a southward course, it then deviates twice as much as it would if it sailed southeast. This is because southeast is between east and south. If the ship is on a southwesterly course while it wants to sail eastward, it deviates three times as much, and if it is on a westward course, it deviates four times as much. Here, the intellect sees how the ship's movement consists of straight and oblique lines. We have shown a method with which sailors can gauge the deviation of their course from their intended destination, now we intend to provide a doctrine and art to enable sailors and navigators to know where a ship is located at sea, and we will show this by an example of calculating distances between different mountains.

199. Let L be a mountain four miles to the east of port B (where the ship is moored). M is another mountain four miles southeast from port B, and N is a mountain four miles south of the port. Now, let O be another mountain eight miles south of the port. We ask how far L is from N and from M, and how far O is from L and M.

200. In answer to the first and second questions, we say that sailors can gauge these distances by multiplying the miles and calculating the deviation. Now if four miles amount to three, it follows that mountain L in the east is three miles from mountain M in the southeast, and six miles from mountain N in the south. If mountain O in the south is eight miles from the ship, then the sailor reckons that O is proportionately more than twice as far from L as it is from M in the southeast. In answer to the third question, we say that there are eight miles from the port to O, and four miles from L to the port, which shows that L is nine miles from O. In answer to the fourth question we say that O is eight miles from the port, and M is four miles from the port, so that M is six miles from O. This is the solution to the fourth question.

201. Following the example in which the distances in miles between mountains L, M, N and O were reckoned, this art can be applied by the artist for proportionally reckoning the distances in miles between other mountains, by multiplying miles in triangles and squares. As an arithmetician multiplies numbers by calculating that three times three equal nine and four times four equal sixteen, so can the sailor make his calculations. Thus we have clarified a method by which sailors can determine the position of a ship at sea, by gauging the distances from north to east, south, as well as west, southeast, southwest, northwest and northeast, with respect to the ship's position. This doctrine is easy, brief and most useful, it is general and applicable to particulars.

202. By rule G and by the subject of the elementative we know that if the wind blows from the east, it is more inclined to the southeast than to the northeast, because the southeast is moist and warm, whereas the northeast is cold and moist, since it is caused by the north. If the

wind blows from the southeast, it is more inclined toward the east than toward the south, because the south is hot and dry. We can say the same about the other winds in their different ways. Then the sailor must consider different qualities of air: cold, gross air heralds the north wind; moist and tenuous air heralds the east wind; warm and subtle air heralds the south wind; dry and cold air heralds the west wind. The clouds signify the winds by their colours: red clouds herald the east wind; golden clouds herald the south wind; white clouds herald the north wind; black clouds herald the west wind. Clouds composed of several colours herald a mixture of winds, and the prevalence of different colours signifies the prevalence of the winds they stand for.

293. Rain coming from a direction signifies wind from the same direction. We can apply the same to lightning and thunder in their own way. A whirlwind at sea signifies wind in circular movement taking on a shape like a snail or conch shell, by whirling around in a circle to raise seawater aloft as if it was fine dust rising from the ground. In addition, a whirlwind's colours signify different winds in the same way a cloud's colours do.

204. We need not deal with magnets and iron in this article on Navigation, because what we know about them from experience is sufficient. Here we need not seek to know why a magnet attracts iron, as this topic does not belong here, but with the natural sciences. Those interested in the natural sciences can look into this for themselves. The intellect is delighted to reflect on the things said here about Navigation, because it has been amply instructed about the art of Navigation.

Article 97 - Conscience

205. Conscience is a form with which the intellect afflicts the soul for what it has done, and it is signified in subject E. Conscience is a form with which the intellect acts, the will chooses and memory retains things. Whoever wants to use his conscience well can discuss it in combination with the ninth subject. A great conscience arises from the definition of majority, but a temperate and virtuous conscience comes from the definitions of equality and virtue. Conscience arises from what is possible and understood, not from what is impossible and ignored, and thus we can treat conscience with the definitions of power and intellect. To learn about conscience, discuss it in combination with the principles and rules, and especially with the mixture of the principles, because each principle clarifies it in its own right and with respect to the other principles, and in this way, the conscience gives clear advice about contrition, confession and satisfaction for committed sins. Conscience arises with love from the correlatives of the principles. It exists in the third species of C with fear and sadness. In the fourth species of the same rule, the subject with conscience must feel remorse because of the second species of rule C. Even before a sin is committed, conscience has disposed justice, prudence, fortitude and temperance, but after the commission of a sin, it causes sadness, depression and sorrow. Thus, we can reduce conscience to the definition of principle, and to rule H.

206. Conscience lives on goodness, greatness and perseverance, but it dies from malice, smallness and inconstancy, and thus it can be reduced to the definitions of goodness, greatness, duration etc. Conscience fortified by discussing the first subject in combination with the principles and rules becomes increasingly active and gives rise to contrition, confession and satisfaction. Then conscience brings sighs from the heart, tears from the eyes and many prayers from the lips; and rule I signifies this. With divine justice, conscience gives warnings that it amplifies in greatness and eternity; but through the goodness and greatness of

God's mercy and through hope and penance, conscience brings consolation to all. It never sleeps, nor does it let a man sleep because of a sense of time lost and of the need to do penance by watching and praying in the company of diligence and fear, which are close relatives of conscience. As the intellect thus reflects on conscience discussed with the principles and rules of this art, it becomes impregnable and infallible. This knowledge gives it great courage.

Article 98 - Preaching

207. Preaching is a form with which the preacher instructs the people to foster good habits and to avoid bad ones, especially if the sermon is based on the principles and rules of this art and on the nine subjects, which enable the preacher's intellect and that of the listeners to receive an abundant supply of great subject matter. This kind of preaching is very useful and easy, as it is founded with consummate technique on a great subject. Just as the preacher artificially trains his intellect to understand, so must he train his will to love what is of benefit to his audience, so that his sermon be as valuable in reality as in appearance. He must apply the definitions of equality, intellect and will so that both the intellect and the will repose equally in the sermon, or else the sermonizer delivers his sermon clothed in vainglory. The preacher shall artfully educate the listeners' memory by applying techniques in artfully constructed sermons. For instance, in preaching about the first subject, he should deal with things that naturally belong together, as in saying: "God's justice is great, God's mercy is great, and each is as great as the other; for this reason, the sinner shall live in joy and fear, with the help of justice, prudence and hope." This kind of habit made of fear and love has great appeal to the listener, who can remember and love it as much as he understands it.

208. In preaching, the preacher must proceed in the same way as the intellect does in discovering what science is made of. The intellect makes science of sense objects that it transfers to the imagination away from the senses. Next, the intellect goes on to make science within itself, without the imagination; and thus the preacher shall first descend to the senses and refer to sense experience, after which he shall ascend to the imagination by referring to imaginable experience, and then ascend to the intellect by having it experience intelligible things. We can say the same about memory and the will, in their own way. However, if the preacher does not do this, his sermon is obscure and confusing to the listener who will not remember it, but ignore it with his intellect and disregard it with his will.

209. Part 6, on the evacuation of the third figure, has examples of how to evacuate cameras, and the sermonizer must likewise evacuate the sayings and propositions that make up the theme of his sermon. He must also seek out the middle term for drawing conclusions as shown in part 7 on the multiplication of the fourth figure. This approach fortifies the intellect when it understands the authorities of the saints instead of merely believing in them, because believing is not the intellect's natural act, whereas understanding is, and every faculty is happier and more contented when it can exercise its own act. The things said here about the intellect also apply to the will and to memory, in their own way.

210. The article on Geometry shows the method by which geometers make demonstrations. Likewise, the article on Arithmetic gives examples of how arithmeticians enumerate units. Then the article on Rhetoric tells how the rhetorician adorns his discourse. Therefore, the sermonizer in delivering his sermon must be skilled in Geometry, Arithmetic and Rhetoric, and enlightened by these arts so he can apply them to educating and enlightening the listeners' intellect. The preacher must be a theologian able to converse about God, and also a

philosopher able to trace effects to their prime cause, by referring to the subjects signified by B,C,D,E,F,G,H,I and K. A preacher who knows how to do this will dispose of great and broad subject matter for his sermons.

211. The preacher shall define the divisions or parts of his topic, or sermon, because the people recognize things by their definitions. Then he shall use the method of combining a topic with the principles and rules, following the examples given in the hundred forms. The preacher's intellect and that of his listeners will find much satisfaction in following this process. Because God is most intelligible, lovable and worthy of being remembered, the preacher must communicate great knowledge about God and make God very much understood, remembered and loved by the people, and he can do this with the mixture of principles and rules and with the first subject. If he does not do this, his sermon is flawed and on shaky ground.

There are three places, one of which is perfect and flawless in every way, namely paradise, where eternal and infinite glory dwells. Another place is very defective, namely hell where every imperfection is found. The third place has both perfect and imperfect parts, this is the condition of this world. Therefore, the preacher shall refer to these three places, and clarify what they are, what they contain and what they are used for. The entirely perfect place is entirely lovable, and the entirely imperfect place is entirely hateful; and the part which is partly perfect and partly imperfect is partly lovable because of perfection and partly detestable because of its imperfection. By considering these things, the intellect knows the method by which the sermonizer can reduce his sermon to the art of preaching and compose sermons quickly and easily, as we did in writing a book on the art of preaching which contains 108 sermons composed with this technique.

Article 99 - Prayer

212. Prayer is a form by means of which a person converses with God in a holy way when praying. Whoever wants to pray well should acquire a good disposition by the ninth subject, because God deserves to be honoured with the virtues and not with the vices. The person praying or contemplating should pray or contemplate God by the process of evacuating the third figure, as the prayer is signified in the figure's evacuation. Let him say, for instance, "Great and magnificent Lord our God, you are great and magnificent! Your innate and supreme goodness and greatness are in supreme concordance in their natural distinction and mutual agreement. Your goodness and greatness are your innate reasons for naturally producing great good. Therefore, let your supreme goodness and greatness be your reasons for morally producing, as an effect in this world, many good and great things whereby your people can be good and great, in praising You, magnifying You and being in harmony with You. Because You, Lord, are the essence and substance, in which your supreme goodness and greatness have the good, infinite and mutually distinct correlatives that we see in You. Lord, as you are a good and great creator, may it please You that your people become good and great in praising and serving You so that You have a good and great people with different and concordant mores." After evacuating camera BC, the person praying or contemplating will then evacuate camera BD, saying, for instance: "Sweetest goodness existing in distinct diffusion in an eternal subject removed from all contrariety, primordial and sole eternalizer subject to nothing else, with your kindness and eternity, please defend your people from everlasting torment."

213. Once the contemplating or praying person has evacuated the entire third figure during successive days, he goes on to multiply the fourth figure. Now he contemplates or prays according to the method of this figure, namely the method shown in column BCD and the others, by considering the natural middle term, which exists between the subject and the predicate. He can say, for instance: "Revered goodness, You are naturally the good, great and eternal reason for the good, great and eternal being that exists within yourself and from yourself, and there is nothing pre-existent to You; would this be why You appear to have forgotten your people? It seems that it would, given that there is more evil than good in the world, for the greatness of evil lasts longer than does the greatness of good. But this cannot be, Lord, because your most benign goodness and greatness brought your people from non-existence into existence within time, so it could praise and magnify You in eternity." The contemplative evacuates camera BCTB by saying, for instance: "Lord God, your supremely great goodness is a good and great reason for You to act with distinction to produce a good and great correlative, distinct from You as a correlative but not distinct from You with regard to goodness and greatness because your essence is one. This being so, your most lofty production descends to us with kindness and magnificence to clarify and demonstrate to us what good and evil are, to induce us to do great good and to defend us from great evil."

While one prays in this way, one cannot objectify any other object, as the intellect cannot understand other species while it is occupied with understanding the species it discovers through this process. Here, the intellect sees how one can constrain his soul and bind it continuously and artificially to the supreme subject in prayer. Now the intellect remembers the Art of the Philosophy of Love that we wrote, for it would be good to associate or combine it with the method of prayer described here.

214. Then the contemplative prays to God by praising and imploring him following the method by which God is discussed in the first subject. God does not listen to sinners against his own reasons or against his correlatives, or else He would be doing injury to himself, which is impossible. Here the intellect realizes that a sinner who prays without any conscience or contrition is not doing anything beneficial, instead, he is deriding and blaspheming God.

Then the contemplative prays to God as the prime cause of the subjects indicated by C,D,E,F,G,H,I along with K concerning the virtues, because knowledge of the cause leads to knowledge of the effect and vice versa. Here the intellect realizes that the subject of prayer is very great and wide ranging.

215. As you pray, you must love God more than yourself or others, for if you do this, you are prudent, just and well disposed in charity and holiness, and this disposition is your ally in prayer inasmuch as it will lead you to perfection in prayer. However, if you do not do this, you have no ally, instead, God is your enemy because you are insulting him.

216. When praying about your past sins, you must love God's justice and not hate it, for if you hated it, then God's mercy could not be your friend, because you would be unjust, disposed to cruelty and removed from hope and charity, and your love would be perverted into hate, a hate that could become your habit in eternity.

217. As you contemplate and pray, if you cannot understand and attain the lofty heights of the divine reasons and their acts, then pray as a believer, because you cannot be reproached for not doing what is beyond your capacity. Nonetheless, such an understanding is possible, and

your belief will be your ally in prayer and your understanding even more so, if you can attain it.

218. As you pray, you must arouse your conscience with your prayer and discuss it in combination with the principles and rules, for if you do this, you will obtain contrition. Discussing contrition with the principles and rules will set your heart in motion, giving rise to weeping and sighs, and water will well up from the heart to the eyes, soaking your face, your hands and your clothing. You will feel that the heat of this water springs from a hot and fervent source, and this holy water will lead you to confession. In addition, if you discuss confession with the principles and rules, it will lead you to satisfaction and penance, and this will unite you to God in everlasting glory.

219. As you pray, consider the adversities and the prosperities that God has given you out of his love: consider the adversities so that you can patiently bear God's justice, consider the prosperities so that you can have charity by his grace. Because prosperity and adversity are given to you by the same love, you must bless, praise and love God's love and thank him abundantly because God loves the prosperity and adversity in you with this kind of love, and if you love them in God, your love will lead to everlasting loving in eternal glory.

220. As you pray, if your intellect is impeded by your senses and imagination, then ascend in prayer to the first subject, and survey it without the senses and imagination. Alternatively, if you want to descend, then pray with the senses and the imagination by combining your prayer with the subjects indicated by F and G. Then you will see that in prayer, lower forms can do nothing against higher forms. And this doctrine is a great source of joy for the intellect.

221. As you pray, survey the ninth subject in prayer as you understand, love and remember God with hope, fear and thanksgiving, and do not let up until sighs rise from your heart and tears flow from your eyes, for if you let up before attaining this state, you are not a good and great contemplative. As you pray, get help from what is said about the hundred forms, by surveying one form and then another, and discuss each form in combination with the principles and rules, which will provide you with abundant subject matter for discovering many new prayers. Pray for the people, because universal prayer is most pleasing to God. Then pray for yourself, for your friend and for the deceased. Now do this artificially as we described above, and your soul will be trained to pray abundantly and well; this training will entirely bind and chain it to God.

Article 100 - Memory Combined with the Principles

222. Because memory as a faculty of the soul is just as perfect as are the intellect and the will, which we dealt with in a perfect way by mixing them with the principles, we now want to deal perfectly with memory, by discussing it in combination with the principles and rules, to gain perfect knowledge of it. Here we also provide a doctrine, for just as memory is discussed with the principles and rules, so can each of the hundred forms be discussed in combination with the principles and rules.

Just as memory is naturally good because of goodness, so is its goodness a moral reason for it to recall good objects.

Memory is great in greatness, and this is why its greatness is a reason for it to perform a great act of remembering with which it remembers a great object.

Just as a man wearing an overcoat and a suit is clothed in one habit with the coat and in another habit with the suit, so does memory have one condition with duration, whereby it makes its remembering last as it deals with past things; and it has another condition with power, whereby it deals with possibilities.

Memory has one condition with the intellect and another condition with the will; through the intellect, it receives species that are understood, whereas through the will it receives species that are either loved or hated; and memory restores species by remembering them in the same way as it received them from the intellect and the will.

Memory is naturally a virtuous habit because it naturally remembers objects. In addition, when it remembers an object with moral virtue, it accidentally clothes itself in a virtuous habit. However, when it remembers a vicious habit, it accidentally puts on a vicious habit.

Memory is true because of the truth whereby it truly remembers its object. When it attains its object with respect to the end, its habit is just and true; but when it attains its object in a way contrary to its ultimate end, its habit is unjust and false. Here, the intellect sees how virtues and vices are caused.

Memory enjoys remembering glory, but grieves when it remembers punishment. Whenever memory is unable to remember what it wants, it grieves because it has become a passive and dispossessed habit.

223. With difference, memory remembers objects in various ways, for it remembers differences between objects in the same way as the intellect understands them. This is because difference is a general principle or instrument of memory as well as of the intellect.

By reason of concordance, memory agrees with the intellect and the will in the object, as it remembers objects that are understood and loved or hated, so that the object is equally under the three faculties at the same time.

With contrariety, memory sometimes contradicts the intellect and the will when it does not retrieve the species they want to recuperate, because it is not well disposed to retrieve these species. It could be that the intellect and the will do not want to retrieve them because memory is not retrieving them in the same way as the intellect and the will supplied them. Perhaps the intellect is slow and the will is too hasty, or conversely; or else, the intellect is seeking out one species while the will wants some other species.

In the beginning, as a man actively remembers something, memory is his form or instrument with which he remembers the object and this object is the subject matter while the act of remembering is the final purpose. When remembering is impeded, memory suffers, and so does the man using it.

Memory's act of remembering is a medium existing between the one who remembers and the thing remembered through which they come together, supposing that they do so through a straight line equally measured between the one who remembers and what he remembers.

Memory terminates in three things, namely the power, the object and the act, for beyond these memory has no power. The end of privation deprives memory of its habit, for when it lacks an

object and an act, it is like eyesight in the absence of light and colour. The final purpose of memory is to remember memorable things.

Because of majority, one memory is greater than another in essence or in quantity, because one memory has a greater act than another. Further, when memory has a major act, it is a major habit; but when it has a minor act, it is a minor habit. I am not saying that its essence either grows or decreases, for as a spiritual faculty it is neither divisible nor corruptible; but man uses this faculty at will and thus he sometimes remembers much, and sometimes not much, just as he sometimes runs a great deal, and sometimes not much.

The memory exists naturally and equally between the intellect and the will, so that it equally receives and retrieves species that are understood and loved. However, it sometimes receives species that are loved but not understood, and this is when a man believes something he does not understand, because he has a greater preference and desire for believing than for understanding.

With minority, memory is close to nothingness because when it forgets, it is deprived of its habit by reason of minority.

Article 101 - Memory Combined with the Rules

224. We ask if memory receives species more readily from the intellect than from the will. The answer is yes, and this is because the intellect develops science, whereas the will freely deliberates.

225. With the first species of rule C we ask what memory is. We say that memory is a faculty whose specific function is to remember things.

With the second species of rule C we ask what does memory have essentially in itself. We say it has its correlatives, namely the memorative, memorable and remembering.

With the third species, we ask what memory is in other things. We say it is objectively good in goodness, supposing that the intellect and the will repose in some object. It is evil in malice, supposing that the will loves this evil. In addition, memory is a habit with which a subject preserves science.

With the fourth species of rule C we ask what memory has in other things. We say that it has goodness in a good subject, greatness in a great one, etc. In addition, it has action in the subject and the object.

226. With the first species of rule D we ask what memory originates from. We say that it exists on its own because it is created and neither engendered nor made from anything pre-existent to it.

With the second species of rule D we ask what memory is made of. We reply that it is made of its own specific matter and form with which it acts in accordance with its species.

With the third species of the same rule, we ask to whom memory belongs. We say that it belongs to the subject in whom it exists: naturally, as a part belongs to its whole, and morally, as a coat belongs to the one wearing it.

227. With the first species of rule E we ask why memory exists. We answer that it exists because it consists of its form and matter.

With the second species of this rule, we ask why memory exists. We answer that it exists so that things can be remembered, and to enable man to build science on things learned in the past.

228. With the first species of rule F we ask if memory has continuous quantity, as it is not linear. The answer is yes, because it is an indivisible and finite spiritual power. All finite things have quantity, and if a spiritual thing is finite, it has quantity, so it is clear that memory has quantity.

With the second species of rule F we ask whether memory has quantity. The answer is yes, so that it can have its own innate correlatives by reason of difference, for its essence has one correlative in the memorative, another in the memorable and another in remembering. To say that memory does not have these correlatives amounts to saying that it has been voided of its own nature and in need of it, which is impossible, and thus it is clear that memory has discrete quantity due to its correlatives.

229. With the first species of rule G we ask what the proper quality of memory is. We reply that its proper quality is its ability to recall, like man's ability to laugh.

With the second species of rule G we ask what appropriated qualities memory has. We reply that it has moral habits like justice etc. or injury etc. or like Grammar, chivalry, agriculture, etc.

230. With rule H we ask whether memory exists in time. The answer is yes, because it is new due to the motion of the subject in which it exists, as the soul is moved in a mobile body. The other species of rule H indicated by C, D and K can be likewise dealt with in their own way, and we leave this clarification up to the diligent reader for the sake of brevity.

231. As memory has no surface, we ask whether it exists in some place. The answer is yes, it exists as a part in its whole without any contact, just as compounded elements exist without contact in elemented bodies. Contact impedes composition, as we see in a pile of stones and coins, which is not a compound but an aggregate.

232. With the first rule K we ask how to dispose memory toward remembering an object that we want to remember, but cannot remember? We answer that the method consists in applying the definitions of the principles and the species of the rules to the likenesses we want to remember. Just as the intellect attains the thing signified through its signifier, so does memory remember its desired object through similitude. For instance, a man immediately remembers his son when he sees someone who looks like him.

233. With the second rule K we ask what memory forgets with. We answer that it forgets with minority in combination with all the principles and species of rules; just as majority causes positive habits, so does minority, in its own way, cause privative habits.

We have dealt with the hundred forms and provided a doctrine whereby the artist can discourse on each form with the principles and rules of this art. Moreover, in the last part of the forms we showed how this art helps to learn the liberal arts easily.

Part 11 - About Questions

This part divides into six parts, or loci:

1. Questions we formulate with the table
2. Questions we formulate by evacuating the third figure
3. Questions we formulate by multiplying the fourth figure
4. Questions we formulate by mixing the principles and the rules
5. Questions we formulate with the nine subjects
6. Questions about application

We will solve some of the questions here, and refer the others to the loci in this book that implicitly signify their solutions. By solving some questions we will teach the practice of this art and provide a doctrine for solving other, peregrine questions that can be solved in the same way. To avoid prolixity, we refer some questions to their appropriate loci without solving them, because anyone who knows this art can find the solutions in the relevant loci. Moreover, by formulating questions we provide a doctrine for extracting questions from the meanings of the rules.

Section 1 - Questions Formulated with the Table.

The table contains 84 columns, and to avoid prolixity, we will not devise questions with all of them, but only with seven, to show how to propose and solve questions with all the columns of the table.

Chapter 1 - Questions Extracted from the First Column BCDT

3. We already made questions with this column in the part on the table, where we proved that the world is not eternal; but to better display the general nature of this column, we now use it once again and we extract more questions from it. Just as this column is general, so are the other columns.

4. With camera BCDT, we ask if some goodness is as infinite and eternal in bonification as is eternity in duration. The answer is yes, or else eternity would be neither entirely good, nor entirely great, which is impossible.

Question - what is the infinite and immense bonification of the bonifier? Answer - the essence that has infinite and immense innate correlatives signified by the second species of rule C.

Question – what does infinite and immense duration consist of? Answer - by the first and second species of rule D and the second species of rule C, it consists of the correlatives of eternal goodness, greatness etc. without which eternity cannot be infinite and immense. Rule B attests to this.

5. BCTB Question - can goodness be great without distinction? Answer - no, because it would not be a natural reason for good to do good, as all action must involve distinction. Question - what is the great distinction of goodness? Answer – it is the distinction sustained in the constituent correlatives of goodness in which it has a great, natural and perfect essence.

6. BCTC Question - can goodness be great without concordance? Answer - no, because contrariety implies non-being and concordance implies being.

Question - what is the great magnitude of goodness? Answer – it is its possession of natural correlatives.

7. BCTD Question - is one angel greater than all heaven? Answer - yes, because unlike heaven, an angel has correlatives with which it objectifies God.

Question - what would be the great contrariety of heaven? Answer - the immobility it would have if it did not move on its own, just as fire would have great contrariety if it could not move on its own with its lightness.

Question - what does the great movement of heaven consist of? Answer - it consists of its correlatives signified by the second species of rule C.

8. BDTB Question - is there any difference in eternity? Answer - yes, so that eternity can have its own correlatives without which it can have neither its own nature nor its infinite goodness.

Question - what does the goodness of heaven arise from? Answer - it exists on its own, as signified by its correlatives.

9. BDTC Question - are divine goodness and divine greatness concordant? Answer - yes, for without concordance, divine goodness would not have infinite greatness, nor would divine greatness have infinite goodness.

Question - what is the great concordance of divine eternity and divine goodness? Answer - it is the essence of their correlatives, where the bonifier and eternalizer convene in one numerical identity, the bonified and eternalized convene in another one and the acts of bonifying and eternalizing convene in yet another one; and all three numerical identities convene essentially in one essence of goodness and eternity.

10. BDTD Question - is there any contrariety between divine goodness and divine eternity? Answer - there would be, if eternity and goodness impeded each other's acts, which is impossible.

Question - supposing there was contrariety between divine goodness and eternity, what would this contrariety consist of? Answer - it would consist of privative principles opposed to the positive correlatives of goodness and eternity, which is impossible and a clear contradiction.

11. BTBC Question - can difference and concordance both exist in the simple essence of goodness? Answer - yes, if goodness has correlatives signified by the second species of C that are in plurality through difference and in essential identity through concordance.

Question - what are difference and concordance in the essence of goodness? Answer - by the third species of rule C, they are what they are, and they are the selfsame goodness.

12. BTBD Question - supposing the world is eternal, we ask whether difference and contrariety can coexist in its eternal goodness. Answer - no, because good difference cannot resist eternal contrariety.

Question - what does good difference consist of? Answer - it consists of correlatives, signified by the second species of rule D.

13. BTCD Question - supposing the world was eternal, we ask whether concordance and contrariety could coexist in its eternal goodness. Answer - no, because if they did, concordance would have a good act of according and opposing from eternity and in eternity, and so would contrariety, which is impossible.

Question - what is the great contrariety of goodness? Answer – it is the existence of goodness in a natural subject habituated with moral evil, for instance in a sinner.

14. CDTB Question - what is the great difference of eternity? Answer – it is the difference that eternity has in its correlatives.

Question - from what does the great difference of eternity arise? Answer - by the first species of rule D, it exists on its own, because eternity can have no pre-existing cause.

15. CDTC Question - What is the great concordance of heaven? Answer – it is the concordance of heaven's correlatives, whereby heaven has its own identity and movement.

Question - what does the great concordance of heaven consist of? Answer - it consists of its correlatives whose natural movement moves and naturizes all lower bodies.

16. CDTD Question - what is the great contrariety between prudence and lust? Answer - it is moral contrariety.

Question - what does the duration of moral contrariety consist of? Answer - it consists of opposition between positive and privative habits in the subject in whom they exist.

17. CTBC Question - is there great difference and concordance between justice and prudence? Answer - yes, because they cause great acts of great merit.

Question - what is the great difference and concordance between justice and prudence? Answer - it consists in their great correlatives through which they differ and agree.

18. CTBD Question - in a great essence, can there be both difference and contrariety? Answer - yes, if the essence is a composite one, like the essence of man or of the elements, but in a simple essence, there can be no contrariety at all.

19. CTCD Question - supposing that concordance and contrariety coexisted in the simple essence of greatness, what would this greatness be? Answer - it would be an impossible essence.

Question - what do great concordance and contrariety consist of? Answer - by the first species of rule D, they exist on their own, because there is nothing pre-existent to greatness.

20. DTBC Question - do difference and concordance exist in eternity? Answer - yes, for otherwise, goodness would not be a reason for good to do good in eternity, and without concordance, eternity would have nothing to remove it from contrariety and idleness, which is impossible.

Question - what do difference and concordance consist of in eternity? Answer - they consist of their correlatives signified by the second species of rule D.

Question - what are the difference and concordance that exist in eternity? Answer - they are the selfsame eternity.

21. DTBD Question - can difference and contrariety coexist in eternity? Answer - no, because if they could, eternity would be composed of several different and contrary essences just as elemented things are.

Question - supposing that heaven consisted of several contrary essences, what would its duration consist of? Answer - it would consist of both positive and privative habits, which is impossible.

22. DTCD Question - supposing that concordance and contrariety coexisted in an angel's essence, what would the angel's duration consist of? Answer - it would consist of its contraries, which is impossible.

Question - what is the duration of an angel? Answer – it is concordance entirely free of contrariety.

23. TBCD Question - can difference be subject to concordance and contrariety? Answer - no, because concordance convenes with being and contrariety convenes with non-being in the subject in which they exist.

Question - what is difference in concordance and contrariety? Answer - difference is a positive principle in concordance, and a privative principle in contrariety.

Question - what does the duration of difference consist of? Answer - it consists of its correlatives that are essentially concordant and removed from all contrariety.

Chapter 2 - Questions Extracted from the Second Column CDET

24. CDET Question - what is the great power of eternity? Answer – it is infinite and eternal power, as its correlatives signify.

Question - what does the great power of eternity consist of? Answer - it consists of eternal correlatives.

Question - why does the great power of eternity exist? Answer - it exists so that eternity can have infinite and eternal correlatives.

25. CDTC Question - what is the infinite concordance of eternity? Answer – it is its infinite end eternal essence.

Question - what does infinite and eternal essence consist of? Answer - it consists of infinite and eternal correlatives without which it cannot be infinite and eternal.

26. CDTD Question - supposing that there was contrariety in eternity, what would this contrariety be? Answer - it would be an infinite, eternal and boundless essence constituted of infinite and eternal opposites, which is impossible.

Question - what does eternity's greatness consist of? Answer - it consists of its correlatives, without which it would be finite and idle.

27. CDTE Question - what is eternity's great principle? Answer – it is its infinite and eternal essence.

Question - what does eternity's great principle consist of? Answer - it consists of its infinite and eternal correlatives.

Question - why is there an infinite and eternal principle? Answer - because eternity has infinite correlatives segregated from every kind of idleness.

28. CETC Question - what is infinite power? Answer – it is infinite concordance.

Question - why is there infinite power? Answer - because power has its infinite correlatives.

29. CETD Question - what does infinite power consist of? Answer - it consists of its correlatives removed from every kind of contrariety.

Question - what is power without contrariety? Answer – it is an infinite essence separated from every kind of contrariety.

30. CETE Question - why is there an infinite principle? Answer - because it reposes in its own innate and infinite correlatives.

Question - why is there infinite power? Answer - because it cannot exist without an infinite subject.

31. CTCD Question - what is great concordance? Answer – it is a great essence entirely removed from contrariety.

Question - what does great concordance consist of? Answer - it consists of its own great and primordial correlatives.

32. CTCE Question - what is a great principle? Answer – it is great concordance entirely removed from contrariety.

Question - why is a principle great? Answer - because it has great correlatives.

33. CTDE Question - what is the great contrariety of a principle? Answer – it is an essence that voids a principle of its correlatives.

Question - what does a great principle consist of? Answer - it consists of its own correlatives entirely removed from contrariety, correlatives that contrariety cannot in the least resist or contradict.

34. DETC Question - why is there concordance between eternity and power? Answer - There is concordance between them so that they can exist and act from eternity and in eternity.

Question - what is the concordance of eternity and power? Answer – it is an eternally powerful essence.

Question - what does the concordance of eternity and power consist of? Answer - it consists of the eternalizer-powerer and the eternalizable-powerable with their eternalizing and powering.

35. DETD Question - why can't a contrary end exist from eternity? Answer - it cannot exist from eternity because there is repose in eternity.

Question - what does eternity's repose consist of? Answer - it consists of its correlatives removed from all contraries.

36. DETE Question - why is eternal power powerful from eternity and in eternity? Answer - because it is eternal primordially.

Question - why is eternal power an eternal principle? Answer - because it is powerful from eternity and in eternity.

37. DTCD Question - supposing that heaven was eternal, what would be its eternal concordance and contrariety? Answer - its concordance would be one active and passive eternity, and its contrariety would be another active and passive eternity, which is impossible, because eternity, being infinite, cannot consist of contraries.

Question - what does aeviternal contrariety consist of? Answer - it consists of a natural subject and a moral habit, like someone clothed in a coat of fire, as it were.

38. DTCE Question - what is the eternal principle? Answer – it is the concordance of eternity's correlatives.

Question - what does eternity's concordance consist of? Answer - it consists of eternity's correlatives.

39. ETCD Question - why can't concordance and contrariety be one and the same power? Answer - because concordance tends toward being whereas contrariety tends toward non-being.

Question - what is the contrariety between man's body and soul? Answer - it is the privation of concordance.

Question - what does the contrariety between man's body and soul consist of? Answer - it consists of the contrary purposes of contrary correlatives.

40. ETCE Question - what are the power of prudence and the power of conceit? Answer - the power of conceit is a privative habit, whereas the power of prudence is a positive habit.

Question - why aren't the powers of conceit and prudence one power? Answer - because the distinction of concordance cannot make them both agree in a single purpose, since they are contrary principles.

41. ETDE Question - why can't power consist of contraries? Answer - because concordance segregates the correlatives of power from contrariety.

Question - what do contrary principles consist in? Answer - they consist in contrary ends.

42. TCDE Question - why is concordance a primordial principle and contrariety a subsequent principle? Answer - because concordance is a positive principle, whereas contrariety is a privative one.

Question - what are the primordially of concordance and the posteriority of contrariety? Answer - the primordially of concordance is when several things work for the same purpose, whereas the posteriority of contrariety is when several things do not work for the same purpose.

Question - do concordance and contrariety arise from the same principle? Answer - no, because they do not work for the same end.

Chapter 3 - Questions Extracted from the Third Column DEFT

43. DEFT Question - why is God as powerful with his eternity as with his intellect? Answer - because his eternity and his intellect are the selfsame power.

Question - what does eternity's power consist of? Answer - it consists of its correlatives through which it can exist and act from eternity and in eternity.

Question - how much power does eternity have? Answer - it has as much power through powering as it has through understanding.

44. DETD Question - why can there be no contrariety in eternal power? Answer - because eternity's power is as infinite in powering as it is infinite in enduring.

Question - from what does eternal power arise?

Answer - it exists on its own, as shown by the first and second species of rules D and E.

45. DETE Question - why does God have no beginning? Answer - because He has eternal power, not preceded by any other power.

Question - from what does heaven's power arise? Answer - it exists on its own, as it does not derive from any other pre-existing principle.

46. DETF Question - how powerful is heaven? Answer - as powerful as its correlatives are.

Question - why is heaven mobile? Answer - heaven is mobile due to its correlatives, as shown by the first species of rule E. By the second species of E, it is mobile in order to cause mobility in things below.

Question - what does heaven's movement consist of? Answer - it consists of its correlatives, without which it can have no natural movement within itself or outside.

47. DFTD Question - how many correlatives does eternity have? Answer - as many as the divine intellect has, or else eternal contrariety would impede divine eternity, which is impossible.

Question - from what do the correlatives of eternity arise? Answer - they exist on their own. In addition, eternal contrariety cannot impede them, as it does not exist.

48. DFTE Question - why does eternity have no quantity? Answer - because its correlatives are infinite.

Question - how much does eternity eternalize? Answer - as much as the divine intellect understands.

Question - what does eternalizing proceed from? Answer - it proceeds from the eternalizer and the eternalized, just as divine understanding proceeds from the knower and the known.

49. DTDE Question - why is contrariety not a principle in eternity? Answer - because eternity is neither corruptible, nor does it sin.

Question - supposing there was contrariety in God's eternity, what would it consist of? Answer - it would consist of the opposer-eternalizer along with the opposed-eternalized and opposing-eternalizing, which is impossible.

50. DTDF Question - what does the medium between fortitude and faith consist of? Answer - it consists of virtues, just as a genus consists of its species.

Question - how much contrariety is there between faith and infidelity? Answer - as much as there is difference between them. Outside the soul, this contrariety amounts to nothingness in its subject, because faithfulness and faithlessness cannot coexist in the same subject.

51. DTEF Question - why is eternity a primordial principle? Answer - because its innate eternalizing is a primordial medium.

Question - what is the quantity of the eternal principle's medium? Answer - it has the quantity that is measured by the eternalizer and the eternalized.

Question - what does the eternal principle consist of? Answer - it consists of the eternalizer-initiator and the eternalized-initiated.

52. EFTD Question - supposing that the intellect was not joined to the human body, why would man exist? Answer - he would not exist because he would lack the second species of D and E.

Question - what does man consist of? Answer - he consists of a body and a rational soul.

Question - how much contrariety is there in a man? Answer - as much as his parts oppose each other.

53. EFTE Question - does God's power have the same priority as his intellect? Answer - it does, because they are the selfsame principle.

Question - why is there no matter in divine power? Answer - because it is infinity, where matter cannot exist.

54. EFTF Question - why must there be a medium in divine power? Answer - because understanding is a medium in the divine intellect, and rule E proves this.

Question - how great is the powering of divine power? Answer - it is as great as its infinite powerer and powerable.

55. ETDE Question - what do man's principles consist of? Answer - go to the ladder of angle D in the second figure and to the second species of rule D (in Part 4, Ch. 3 #12, and in Pt. 9, Section 4, Ch. 2, #25).

Question - why does man have free will? Answer - by the first species of rule E, it is because man is made of opposites. And the second species signify that man has free will for the purpose of acquiring merit.

56. ETDF Question - why doesn't the imaginative power consist of opposites? Answer - because its medium is simple.

Question - what does the imaginative power's medium consist of? Answer - go to the second species of rule D (Pt. 4, Ch. 3, #12, and Pt. 9, Sec. 5, #26)

Question - what size is the imaginative power's medium? Answer - it has the size measured by the imaginative and the imaginable.

57. ETEF Question - why does man have power to exist and act? Answer - because his principles are naturally so disposed.

Question - how much can man exist and act? Answer - as much as his principles dispose him to it.

58. FTDE Question - what do the intellect's principles consist of? Answer - go to the first and second species of rule D (Pt. 4, Ch. 3 #12)

Question - why do the intellect's principles exist? Answer - go to rule E (Pt. 4, #20 and #21).

Question - how many principles does the intellect have? Answer - go to the correlatives of the intellect (Pt. 4, Ch. 2 #6 and Ch. 5 #23 and #24).

59. FTDF Question - what does heaven's instinct arise from and consist of? Answer - go to the first and second species of rule D (Pt. 4, Ch. 3 #11 and #12 and Pt. 9, Sc. 3 # 31 and 32).
Question - how big is the imaginative power's instinct? Answer - go to the chapter on the imaginative where we combine it with the intellect and the medium (Pt. 9, Sc. 5, Ch. 1 #6 and #15).

60. FTEF Question - why is there a medium in the intellect? Answer - because without a medium, the intellect would not be a principle of understanding.

Question - how much knowing is there between the knower and knowledge? Answer - go to the chapter on the intellect (Pt. 8, Sc. 1, Ch. 5 #81, #82 and following; and Pt. 8, Sc. 2, Ch. 5 #48).

61. TDEF Question - what does the influence that influences man consist of? Answer - go to #12, 13 and 14 in the subject of heaven and in the subject of man.

Question - why does heaven act upon man? Answer - go to rule E at #34 in the subject of heaven; and #27 in the subject of man.

Question - how much can the imagination imagine heaven? Answer - go to the rule of quantity under #36 in the subject of heaven, #29 in the subject of man, and #30 and #31 in the subject of imagination.

Chapter 4 - Questions Extracted from the Fourth Column EFGT

63. EFGT Question - why is God as powerful in his power as He is powerful in his wisdom and will? Answer - go to Pt. 9, rule E, #101 and #102, and the first species of rule G, #106. God is as infinite in his infinite power as He is infinite in his intellect and will.

64. Question - how great is God's power? Answer –it is as great as infinity knows it to be great.

Question - what is God's power like? Answer - it is identical to his will.

63. EFTE Question - why is God's power an infinite principle? Answer - because his intellect has infinite knowledge of it.

Question - how much can God know his power? Answer - as much as his intellect is infinite.

64. EFTF Question - why is the act of powering the medium in divine power? Answer - because understanding is the medium in the divine intellect.

Question - how much powering does divine power have? Answer - as much as there is divine understanding.

65. EFTG Question - why does the end consist as much in divine power as in the divine intellect? Answer - because God is as infinite in his powering as He is infinite in his understanding. Question - how great is the purpose of divine power? Answer – it is as great as the purpose of the divine intellect.

Question - what quality does the end of divine power have? Answer –it has the quality that convenes with the infinite act of powering.

66. EGTE Question - why is divine power a principle? Answer - because its infinite will loves its powering.

Question - what kind of power is loved infinitely? Answer - the kind that has infinite correlatives.

67. EGTF Question - why can the divine will love one man more than all? Answer - go to the definition of power, will and medium (Pt. 3, #1) and to the ladder of the medium in the second figure (Pt. 1, Ch.. 2)

Question - what kind of man does the divine will desire the most? Answer - the kind that the divine will can love the most.

Question - why is there one man who is more lovable than all men are? Answer - because the divine will is absolute in loving.

Question - by what means can God most love man? Answer - go to the definitions of power and medium (Pt. 3, #1) and to the ladder of the medium (Pt. 1, Ch.. 2).

68. EGTG Question - why is the end of divine power as lovable as the end of the divine will? Answer - because divine power is as powerful as the divine will is willing.

Question - what kind of end can the divine will love the most in the medium? Answer - the kind that the divine intellect can most understand. Here, the intellect knows what kind of law is most lovable.

69. ETEF Question - why could God create the world? Answer - go to rule E (Pt. 4, Ch. 4) and to the definition of the medium (Pt. 3, #1)

Question - how great is the world's newness? Answer - as great as divine power measures it. Here, the intellect knows that it is impossible for the world to have existed from eternity.

70. ETEG Question - why can God initiate a major beginning? Answer - because He can initiate a major end.

Question - in what kind of principle does God have the most power? Answer - go to rule G (Pt. 4 # 26) and to the definitions of power and of the end (Pt. 3, #1)

71. ETEG Question - why can God create the greatest medium and the greatest end? Answer - because He has infinite power.

Question - what medium qualifies as the greatest created medium? Answer - the one in which divine power is most powerful, and that has utmost repose in this power.

Question - how great is the greatest created medium? Answer - as great as God can create it.

72. FGTE Question - why does God love some principle as much as divine wisdom can understand it? Answer - because the divine will can love as much as the divine intellect can understand.

Question - how much can the greatest medium be loved? Answer - it can be loved as much as it can be understood.

Question - what kind of principle is most lovable? Answer - the kind that is most intelligible.

73. FGTF Question - what kind of medium is most intelligible and lovable? Answer - the kind that God can most understand and love.

Question - how much can the major medium be understood and loved? Answer - as much as God can understand and love it.

74. FGTG Question - what kind of end is most intelligible and lovable? Answer - the kind that God can most understand and love.

Question - how great is the major end? Answer - as great as God can understand and love. Here the intellect knows which law is true, by the ladder of difference and concordance.

75. FTEF Question - why does the divine intellect understand the greatest created principle that it can understand? Answer - go to the definitions of intellect, principle, majority and to rule E.

Question - how great is the greatest medium that can be? Answer - as great as the divine intellect can know it to be.

76. FTEG Question - why does the divine intellect understand the major beginning? Answer - because it understands the major end.

Question - what kind of principle is the one that God can understand the most? Answer - the kind that can repose in the major end.

Question - how great is the beginning that can repose in the major end? Answer - as great as God can understand it in the major end.

77. FTFG Question - what kind of medium is the most intelligible? Answer - the kind that God can understand the most.

Question - how great is the medium that God can understand the most? Answer - as great as God can understand it to be.

78. GTEF Question - what kind of principle is the most lovable? Answer - the kind that the divine will can love the most.

Question - why is some principle more lovable? Answer - because the divine will can love it more.

Question - how great is the most lovable medium? Answer - as great as the divine will can greatly love it.

79. GTEG Question - what kind of beginning can the divine will love the most? Answer - the kind that can repose in the major end.

Question - why should the divine will love the major beginning? Answer - because the major beginning is most lovable.

80. GTFG Question - what kind of medium is most lovable? Answer - the kind in which the major end can repose.

Question - what is the magnitude of the greatest medium that can repose in the major end? Answer - it has the same magnitude as that of the divine will's supreme love for it.

81. TEFG Question - why should there be a medium in the beginning? Answer - so that the beginning can transit through it to the end and repose there.

Question - what size is a medium? Answer - the size that can be measured between its beginning and its end.

Question - what kind of medium is the most measurable? Answer - the kind that stands equally between its beginning and its end.

Chapter 5 - Questions Extracted from the Fifth Column FGHT

82. FGHT Question - what kind of virtue is supremely intelligible? Answer - the kind that is so intelligible that the divine intellect cannot understand a more intelligible one.

Question - how great is the greatest virtue that the divine intellect can possibly understand? Answer - as great as the divine will's supreme love for it can possibly be.

Question - when did that virtue exist, which God cannot understand and love more greatly than He does? Answer - it existed before the virtue that is not as greatly intelligible and lovable.

83. FGTF Question - what kind of medium is more intelligible? Answer - the kind that is more lovable.

Question - how great is the most intelligible medium? Answer - it is as great as the divine intellect understands it to be.

84. FGTG Question - what kind of end is the most lovable for the world? Answer - the kind that is so great that the divine intellect cannot understand it to be any greater.

Question - how great is the major end of the world? Answer - as great as the divine intellect understands it to be.

85. FGTH Question - what kind of substance is most intelligible and lovable? Answer - the kind that is free of all contrariety.

Question - when did the substance that is free of all accidents exist? Answer - it existed before the substance that cannot be without accidents.

Question - how great is the greatest created substance? Answer - so great that the divine intellect and the divine will can understand no greater substance.

86. FHTF Question - when did that medium exist, which is so great that the divine intellect can understand no medium greater than that? Answer - it existed before the media of lesser virtue came into being.

Question - how intelligible is the greatest created virtue? Answer – it is as intelligible as the divine intellect's understanding of it.

87. FHTG Question - when did the major end of virtue exist? Answer - it existed before the virtue of less intelligible ends came into being.

Question - how great is the major end of created virtue? Answer - as great as the divine intellect can understand it to be.

88. FHTH Question - when did the intellect's major virtue exist? Answer - it existed before the intellect's minor virtues came into being.

Question - how great is the intellect's major virtue? Answer - as great as the divine intellect can understand it to be.

89. FTFG Question - what kind of end can God understand the most in a medium? Answer – it is the end which is the act of understanding.

Question - how great is the end of major understanding? Answer – it is as great as the divine intellect.

90. FTFH Question - when did the greatest medium of the intellect exist? Answer - it existed when the greatest intellect existed.

Question - how great is the intellect's greatest medium? Answer – it is as great as the greatest intellect.

91. FTGH Question - what kind of major end does the intellect have? Answer - it has an end so great that the divine intellect cannot understand any end greater than that.

Question - how great is the intellect's major end? Answer –it is as great as substance without accidents can be great.

Question - when did the substance that can be without accidents exist? Answer - it existed before the substance that cannot be without accidents came into being.

92. GHTF Question - what kind of medium is most lovable in virtue? Answer –it is the kind whose virtue is the most lovable.

Question - when did the most lovable medium exist? Answer - it existed before that medium which is not as lovable came into being.

Question - how great is the will's medium? Answer – it is as great as it is virtuous.

93. GHTG Question - what kind of virtue is most lovable? Answer – it is the kind that causes the major end.

Question - when did the end of major virtue exist? Answer - it existed when it was supremely loved.

94. GHTH Question - what kind of virtue can be a major creature? Answer – it is the kind that can be loved the most.

Question - when did the most lovable virtue exist? Answer - it existed before the virtue that is not as lovable.

95. GTFG Question - through what kind of medium is the major end acquired? Answer - through the kind that cannot be loved more greatly.

Question - how great is the end that cannot be loved more greatly? Answer –it is as great as the will's end can be.

96. GTFH Question - what kind of medium is the greatest that can be? Answer - the kind that cannot be loved more greatly.

Question - when is there a medium that cannot be loved more greatly? Answer - it exists when major will exists.

Question - how great is major will? Answer –it is as great as the major act of loving is.

97. GTGH Question - what kind of major end does the will have? Answer – it has the kind of end that exists through major loving.

Question - when did the end that exists through major loving exist? Answer - it was before the end that does not exist through major loving.

98. HTFG Question - what kind of virtue has a major end? Answer – it is the kind that has a major medium.

Question - how great is the virtue that has the greatest medium? Answer – it is as great as its medium is.

Question - when did the virtue with the major end exist? Answer - it existed before the virtue with a minor end.

99. HTGH Question - what kind of end is major? Answer – it is the kind of end in which major virtue reposes.

Question - when did the virtue that reposes in the major end exist? Answer - it existed before the substance that cannot be without accidents came into being.

100. TFGH Question - what kind of end is in major privation? Answer – it is the kind of end that opposes major perfection.

Question - when did the end that is in major perfection exist? Answer - it existed before the end that is in major privation.

Question - how great is the end that is in major privation? Answer – it is as great as its deviation from the major end of perfection.

Chapter 6 - Questions Extracted from the Sixth Column GHIT

101. GHIT Question - what kind of law is most true? Answer - the kind that causes major virtues.

102. Question - where is the major law? Answer – it is in major virtues.

Question - when is the will virtuous and true? Answer - when it is clothed in hope, compassion and charity.

102. GHTG what kind of law is disposed toward the most virtuous end? Answer – it is the kind that causes major hope, charity and truth.

Question - when is the will virtuous? Answer - when it is disposed toward a virtuous end.

103. GHTH Question - what kind of law is major? Answer – it is the kind of law in which there is major hope and charity.

Question - when is the will major? Answer - when it is clothed in major hope and charity.

104. GHTI Question - what kind of equality is virtuous? Answer – it is of the kind that consists in the equal lover, beloved and loving.

Question - where is the virtuous equality of the lover and the beloved? Answer – it resides in the will in which charity is the highest virtue.

Question - when is there higher virtue in the will? Answer - when it has its own equal correlatives.

105. GITG Question - what kind of will is true? Answer – it is of the kind that is disposed toward a true end.

Question - where is the true end? Answer – it is in the will clothed with hope and patience.

106. GITH Question - what kind of patience is major? Answer – it is of the kind that exists in the will clothed with major hope.

Question - when is there major truth? Answer – major truth exists when it is loved by the major end with major love.

107. GITI Question - where are the will and truth equal? Answer - they are equal in God.

Question - what kind of will is true? Answer - the kind that consists of true correlatives.

108. GTGH Question - what kind of end is major? Answer – it is of the kind that is worthy of being loved with major love.

Question - when is the will major? Answer - when it objectifies the major end with hope.

109. GTGI Question - where are the will and the end equal? Answer - in the subject in which hope and patience are equal.

Question - what kind of equality is most lovable? Answer - the kind that consists of the will's correlatives.

110. GTHI Question - what kind of will is major? Answer - the kind in which there is major charity.

Question - when is there major charity? Answer - when there is major equality in the will.

Question - where is major charity? Answer - in the will in which there is major equality.

111. HITG Question - in what kind of end does the virtue of charity repose? Answer - in a true end.

Question - what kind of end is true? Answer - the kind in which there is major charity.

Question - when is there charity? Answer - when it is accompanied by patience.

112. HITH Question - where is there major charity? Answer - wherever there is major truth.

Question - when is there major charity? Answer - when there is major truth.

113. HITI Question - where are the will and truth equal? Answer - in the subject in which they convert.

Question - when are patience and charity equal? Answer - when virtue and truth are equal.

114. HTGH Question - when is the will major? Answer - it is major when charity disposes it toward a major end beyond its power.

Question - what kind of charity is major? Answer - the kind that convenes with major hope.

115. HTGI Question - when is there equality in the end? Answer - when hope, charity and patience are in proportion with it.

Question - what kind of equality is virtuous? Answer - the kind that consists in equal virtuous ends.

Question - where do equal and virtuous ends exist? Answer - in the proportion of hope, patience and charity.

116. HTHI Question - where is major equality? Answer – it is in that law in which the virtues can be equalized the most.

Question - when is there major equality? Answer - when there is major hope and patience.

117. ITGH Question - what kind of truth is major? Answer - the kind that is disposed toward a major end.

Question - where is there major hope? Answer – it is in that law in which man hopes in a major end.

Question - when did the major law begin? Answer - when major truth began.

118. ITGI Question - in which truth is there major equality? Answer - in the truth that has major correlatives.

Question - when is equality major? Answer - when it has major correlatives.

119. TGHI Question - in which end can the virtues be most equal? Answer - In the end in which hope, patience and charity, have major capacities.

Question - what kind of man is major? Answer - the kind in whom the virtues are, or were most equal.

Question - when did the major man exist? Answer - when the major end began.

Chapter 7 - Questions Extracted from the Seventh Column HIKT

120. HIKT Question - when do charity, patience and compassion exercise their acts? Answer - when man exercises them.

Question - where is the way to glory? Answer - wherever patience, charity and compassion are present.

Question - with what does the way to glory proceed? Answer - with charity, patience and compassion.

121. HITH Question - when is there major charity and patience? Answer - when they oppose major ire and falsehood.

Question - in which man is there major patience and charity? Answer - in the man who instituted the greatest law with the greatest virtue.

122. HITI Question - where is fire vegetated? Answer - it is vegetated in the vegetative, just as the vegetative is sensed in the sensitive.

Question - when are virtue and truth equal? Answer - when they are equal in their correlatives.

123. HITK Question - where is virtue in minority? Answer – it is in minor truth.

Question - when are charity, patience and compassion less true? Answer - whenever ire, falsehood and inconstancy fight against them.

Question - how do falsehood, ire and inconstancy fight hard against charity, patience and compassion? Answer - in every way in which they can oppose them.

Question - with what means do falsehood, ire and inconstancy struggle against charity, patience and compassion? Answer - with minor charity, patience and compassion.

124. HKTH Question - when is there major charity and compassion? Answer - when charity and compassion fight bravely against ire and inconstancy.

Question - how do charity and compassion overcome ire and inconstancy? Answer - they overcome them through the major mode with which they oppose the minor mode of ire and inconstancy.

Question - with what means do charity and compassion overcome ire and inconstancy? Answer - with the major acts they exercise.

125. HKTl Question - where does charity have major enjoyment? Answer - in the major enjoyment of its correlatives.

Question - when does charity have major enjoyment? Answer - when it joins with patience and compassion.

Question - how does charity join with patience and compassion? Answer - by combining their likenesses.

Question - with what means does charity join patience and compassion? Answer - with the correlatives of these virtues.

126. HKTK Question - when are charity and patience removed from minority? Answer - when they oppose ire and inconstancy in a major way.

Question - in what way are charity and patience removed from minority? Answer - in a way that enables them to exist in majority.

Question - with what means are charity and patience removed from minority? Answer - by means of the majority that they share.

127. HTHI Question - where is charity the greatest? Answer - in major substance entirely free of accidents.

Question - when is charity in major equality? Answer - when it has a major act joined to the act of patience.

128. HTHK Question - when are charity and compassion the greatest? Answer - it is when they are practically opposed to minor ire and inconstancy.

Question - how do charity and compassion segregate themselves from minority? Answer - they do it in a way that is enabled by their majority.

Question - with what do ire and inconstancy overcome compassion and charity? Answer - they do so with minor charity and compassion.

129. HTIK Question - when are minor charity, patience and compassion present? Answer - whenever major ire, inconstancy and falsehood are present.

Question - where are minor charity, patience and compassion? Answer - they are in the subject from whom they are expelled by ire, falsehood and inconstancy.

Question - how do ire, falsehood and inconstancy corrupt charity, patience and compassion? Answer - by forming a coalition against charity, patience and compassion.

Question - with what means do ire, falsehood and inconstancy corrupt charity, patience and compassion? Answer - with the minority in which charity, patience and compassion exist.

130. IKTH Question - where is major glory acquired? Answer – it is acquired in the major law.

Question - when was major glory acquired? Answer - it was acquired when the truest man instituted the truest law.

Question - how was major glory acquired? Answer – it was acquired through the major mode of charity, patience and compassion.

Question - with what means was major glory acquired? Answer – it was acquired through the man who was clothed in major charity, patience and compassion.

131. IKTI Question - where are truth and glory equal? Answer - in substance entirely free of accidents.

Question - how are truth and glory equal? Answer - in the way in which they relate through equal correlatives.

Question - with what are truth and glory equal? Answer - with their equal correlatives.

132. IKTK Question - where is minor glory? Answer - in minor truth, charity, patience and compassion. Question - when is minor glory true? Answer - whenever charity, patience and compassion are slow to act.

Question - how is minor glory true? Answer - in the way that charity, patience and compassion act.

Question - with what is minor glory true? Answer - with minor acts of charity, patience and compassion.

133. ITHI Question - where is major truth? Answer - where its equality is major.

Question - where is minor truth? Answer - where its equality is minor.

Question - when is truth major? Answer - when its equality is major.

134. ITHK Question - where is major charity? Answer - in major patience and compassion.

Question - when is charity minor? Answer - when patience and compassion are minor.

Question - how is charity minor? Answer - through minor modes of patience and compassion.

Question - with what is charity minor? Answer - with minor patience and compassion.

135. ITIK Question - where is minor truth? Answer - in its minor equality.

Question - how is truth minor? Answer - through the minor mode that it has in its minor equality.

Question - with what is truth minor? Answer - with a minor law.

136. KTHI Question - where is major glory? Answer – it is where its major equality is.

Question - when is glory major? Answer - when its equality is major.

Question - how is glory major? Answer - through the mode of its equal consubstantial correlatives, which are free of all accidents.

Question - with what is glory major? Answer - with the majority of its correlatives.

Question - when do major and minor glories coexist? Answer - when the soul is joined to the body.

Question - how do major and minor glories coexist in a minor subject? Answer - through the minor modes of the imaginative and sensitive powers and the major mode of the rational power.

Question - with what do major and minor glories coexist in a subject? Answer - with substantial and accidental acts.

Question - with what do major and minor glories coexist in a subject? Answer - with the sensitive, imaginative and rational powers.

137. KTHK Question - when is there major glory? Answer - when there is no minor glory.

Question - how is glory major? Answer - through the mode of substance entirely removed from minority.

Question - with what means is glory minor? Answer - with a minor act of glory.

138. THIK Question - where is major minority? Answer – it is in sin, or in minor equality.

Question - when is equality minor? Answer - when there is privation of major equality.

Question - with what is minor sin committed? Answer - with the sensitive power and without any choice by the soul.

Question - how is minor sin committed? Answer - by the sensitive power only, and this is venial sin.

Section 2 - Questions from the Evacuation of the Third Figure

1. We already proposed and solved many general questions in the evacuation of the third figure; now let us make particular questions and solutions with the method we used for the universal ones, because particular methods arise from the universal method and they result from it as effects result from their cause.

2. In camera BC we said that goodness is great, then we asked whether goodness is great. Next, we proved that goodness is great. Since B signifies God, goodness, difference, justice and avarice, and C signifies angel, greatness, concordance, prudence and gluttony, as shown in the alphabet, we can extract many particular questions from camera BC. For instance, we can ask whether divine goodness is great; whether there are distinct correlatives in divine goodness; whether there is concordance in divine goodness; and then we can ask what the great goodness in God is, what the correlatives in divine goodness are; and what the concordance in divine goodness is. Further, with the second species of rule C we can ask what co-essential parts divine goodness has in itself, and the same with difference and concordance. Then we can ask with the third species of rule C what divine goodness is in other things, what divine difference is in other things and what divine concordance is in other things. And we can ask about what divine goodness has in other things, what divine difference has in other things and what divine concordance has in other things.

3. Having done all this, we can solve each question by the same method we used in solving the general questions, descending from universal solutions to particular ones by according them and avoiding contradictions, so that no universal opposes its particulars and vice versa. However, it would be far too long to give examples of all this here, and so we leave the solutions of the questions up to the artist, for the sake of brevity. To answer any question about divine goodness and greatness, extract the solution from the definition of God and from the definitions of goodness and greatness by combining the definitions with the species of the rules and by asserting the positive or the negative answer; and this is an infallible rule. In addition, following the example we gave of divine goodness and greatness, we can discuss angelic goodness and greatness, the goodness and greatness of justice, the goodness and

greatness of prudence. We can discuss evil and the greatness of avarice, and evil and the greatness of gluttony.

5. As we dealt with questions from camera BC, so we can also deal with the questions implicit in camera BD, camera BE and all the other cameras in the third figure. For the sake of brevity, this is sufficient with regard to the questions we can make with the third figure. Here, the intellect knows that the third figure is a very general subject from which we can extract countless particular questions along with their solutions.

Section 3 - Questions Made by Multiplying with the Fourth Figure

5. There are five ways to multiply with the fourth figure, as we previously said in paragraph #1 of part 7. Just as there are five ways of multiplying reasons, so there are five ways of making questions. Now let us say a few things about the first mode of multiplication. The first mode divides into four parts, as we showed by extracting twenty reasons from camera BCD to prove that the world is new. As we dealt with the world, so we can deal with all the things BCD stand for in the alphabet, by providing solutions about each item in its own way. For instance, B stands for God, goodness, difference, justice and avarice. C stands for angel, greatness etc. D stands for heaven, eternity etc. Thus, each particular question has its own implicit solutions, and we can reduce the solutions to the art by following the method of this art. As we dealt with the first mode, we can deal with the others in their own way. For the sake of brevity, this is enough about multiplying with the fourth figure.

Section 4 - Questions Made with the Mixture of Principles and Rules

6. In the mixture of the principles and rules we show how each principle is combined sequentially with the other principles and the rules, turning the subject into the predicate and vice versa, as in great goodness, eternal goodness, powerful goodness etc. and good greatness, eternal greatness, powerful greatness etc. Thus, when you have a question about goodness and greatness, or about goodness and eternity, refer to the chapter on goodness and the paragraph on goodness and greatness. If the question is about goodness and eternity, refer to the paragraph on goodness and eternity, and so forth, to extract solutions from the loci that signify them. We do this as follows.

7. The first paragraph of the chapter on goodness says that goodness per se is a reason for good to do, or to produce good, and as goodness is great, greatness gives goodness a dual reason to produce great good. Therefore, if we ask whether goodness is a reason for God to produce great good, the answer is yes, according to what we just said. Further, the third paragraph of the chapter on goodness says that goodness is durable through duration, and that because of duration goodness has a threefold reason to do great and durable good. Accordingly, if we ask whether divine goodness is a reason for God to produce eternally durable good we can refer to the third paragraph in the chapter about goodness and extract the solution from the text, by combining the definitions of goodness, duration and so forth.

8. Further, if we ask what great good God produces eternally, we refer to the chapter on goodness combined with the rules. For instance, if we ask what goodness is, the answer is found in the definition of goodness in the text. If we ask from what God produces good we refer to the paragraph on rule D in the chapter on goodness. Question D asks what goodness arises from, and what it consists of. We extract the solution from the text, and likewise with other questions.

9. As in the example that referred to God's goodness, we can also deal in their way with the goodness of angels, the goodness of justice, the goodness of prudence, the evils of avarice, gluttony, and so with other topics, each according to its own specific way. Now we have said enough about questions and the mixture of principles. We stop here for the sake of brevity and because the art is adequate for putting and solving other questions. Here, the intellect knows that the mixture of the principles is a very general subject for putting many questions and that the text implicitly signifies their solutions.

Section 5 - Questions about the Nine Subjects

Chapter 1 - Questions about God in Combination with His Principles

10. To avoid prolixity, we will propose a few questions about God by extracting them from the text and solving them with the text, to provide a doctrine that will enable artists to extract questions from the text and solve them with the same text. For the sake of brevity, we will not solve all the questions here, but we will refer them to the appropriate loci, to provide a doctrine whereby artists can solve questions by referring to relevant texts that are general to many questions. We also intend to apply this methodical order to the remaining subjects.

11. Question - Is it in any way necessary for God to produce good? Solution - go to the subject of God in combination with the principles, ar.1.#29.

Question - why did God create the world? Solution - ar.1.#30.

Question - does God produce a great infinite product? Solution - ar.2.#31.

Question - can God create an infinite being? Solution - ar.2.#32.

Question - does eternity have an infinite and connatural act? Solution - ar.3.#33.

Question - can God create an infinite and eternal heaven? Solution - ar.3.#34.

Question - does God necessarily have to produce an infinite product? Solution - ar.4.#35.

Question - is the primordial power the cause of all created power? Solution - ar.4.#36.

Question - does God's intellect necessarily make God produce an infinite intelligible product?

Solution - ar.5.#37.

Question - why do some people in this mortal life ignore the supreme product? Solution - ar.5.#38.

Question - is there an infinite willed product? Solution - ar.6.#39.

Question - what is the cause of created charity? Solution - #40. Moreover, we say that charity was created to enable created will to rise beyond its own power in objectifying its infinite beloved.

Question - does God produce an infinite virtuous product from his infinite virtue? Solution - ar.7.#41.

Question - what is the prime cause of the moral virtues? Solution - #42,#43 etc.

Question - can divine truth be naturally idle? Solution - ar.8.#46

Question - why were truths created? Solution - #47

Question - is God as powerful in his glory as in his being? Solution - ar.9.#48

Question - why is there an afterlife? Solution - #49

Question - can the divine reasons have infinite acts without being distinct in some way?
 Solution - ar.10.#50 and #51.

Question - what is the prime cause of the multitude of beings different in genus, species or identity? Solution - #52 and #53.

Question - is there co-essential concordance in God? Solution - ar.11.#54.

Question - why did God create one world and not many worlds? Solution - #55.

Question - why is there no contrariety in God? Solution - ar.12.#56.

Question - why is God unwilling to do certain things, given that his will is infinite? Solution - #58.

Question - is God a perfect principle in himself? Solution - ar.13.#59.

Question - why did God create the act of initiating? Solution - #60. Moreover, we say that He did it to make known the infinite act of initiating.

Question - is God as infinite in his intrinsic activity as He is in his intrinsic existence?
 Solution - ar.14.#61.

Question - why did God create natural media? Solution - #62.

Question - do the divine reasons repose in themselves? Solution - ar.15.#63.

Question - why did God create perfect ends? Solution - #64.

Question - would God be simply greater if his dignities had no infinite acts? Solution - ar.16.#65.

Question - why did God create majorities, and with what did He create them? Solution - #66.

Question - is there equality in God? Solution - ar.17.#67.

Question - why did God create equalities? Solution - #68. In addition, God created equalities with his equality just as he created many kinds of goodness with his goodness.

Question - why is there no minority in God? Solution - ar.18.#69.

Question - given that there is no minority in God, why did He create minorities? Solution - #70. Also, because an opposite is better known through its counterpart.

Chapter 2 - Questions about God Made with the Rules

12. Question - is God a necessary being? Solution - go to chapter 6 where the first subject is discussed with the rules, ar.1.#72.

Question - how do we prove God's existence? Solution - paragraph #72 and the following paragraphs.

Question - what is a necessary being? Solution - #74 and following.

Question - how do we define God? Solution - article 2.

Question - is God per se a pure act? Solution - in the third rule applied to the first subject, #98.

Question - in God, is there anything that consists of something? Solution - in the second species of the third rule, #99.

Question - why is God a necessary being? Solution - in the first species of the fourth rule, #101.

Question - does God proceed from God? Solution - in the second species of the fourth rule #102.

Question - is there any quantity in God? Solution - in rule F ar.5.#103.

Question - what are God's qualities? Solution - in rule G ar.6.#106.

Question - does the eternal act happen within time? Solution - in rule H ar.7.#108.

Question - is God located or contained in anything? Solution - in rule I ar.8.#109.

Question - how does God exist? Solution - in rule K, ar.9.#110.

Question - how does God act? Solution - #111.

Question - with what is God what He is? Solution - in the second rule K, ar.10.#112.

Question - with what does God do what He does? Solution - #113.

We made these questions about God with the principles and the rules, so that if there is any other question about God, you can apply it to the relevant place and solve it with the text by asserting the affirmative or the negative answer without violating the text. Further, if there are many questions about God, we can follow the method of the third figure and the seven columns as shown above, where we made questions and solved them with the significations of the questions. The part on application shows how to do this.

14. Further, if the artist wants to find many means for proving something about God, he can refer to the chapter on the multiplication of the fourth figure, which shows the way to find many middle terms and to prove things through prior and posterior reasons. Given that nothing can be proved about God by referring to anything prior to God, if a question must be proved through equal parity, then refer to the said locus, namely the multiplication of reasons with the fourth figure, where the doctrine is given for proving things through equal parity (#10). For instance, if we want to prove whether there is any infinite power, we can prove it by referring to infinite eternity. Further, if we want to prove by equal parity the reason why the intellect, memory and will are equal powers of the soul, we must say that it is because God is to be understood, remembered and loved equally. Further, if we ask why three correlatives as indicated by the second species of rule C are sufficient for each power of the soul, we answer that it is because three correlatives are sufficient for each divine reason. If we ask why God created one world and not several, the answer is that God created one world because God is one. If we ask why God loves one creature above all others, the answer is that when God created the world, He had in mind the greatest end for creation that He could understand. If we ask whether it is more fitting for God to create major things than minor ones, the answer is yes, because major things are more like his dignities than minor ones, and so forth.

Chapter 3 - Questions Made about Angels with the Principles

15. Question - why did some angels sin, as God created them entirely good? Find the answer in the definitions of majority and minority. Further, do angels have instruments with which they hold conversations? The answer is yes, as they have goodness and other principles connatural to them, each of which has its correlatives. The first chapter on angels, #1 signifies this.

Question - can one angel produce another angel? Solution - ibid. #1.

Question - what causes an angel's greatness? Solution - #2

Question - are angels corruptible? Solution - #3

Question - what are the instruments with which angels act? Solution - #4

Question - given that angels have no eyes, how do they understand colours? Solution - #5

Question - how can angels desire sense objects? Solution - #6

Question - how do angels acquire merit? Solution - #7

Question - with what do angels make science? Solution - #8

Question - what do angels enjoy? Solution - #9

Question - in an angel's essence, are there several things different in numerical identity?

Solution - #10

Question - with what do angels agree? Solution - #11

Question - how are good and evil angels opposed to each other? In addition, what is the evil

angels' punishment? Solution - #12

Question - are angels compounds? Solution - #13

Question - is an angel's will as perfect as its goodness and intellect? Solution - #14

Question - why do angels have power over things below? Solution - #16

Question - is it good for an angel's memory, intellect and will to be equal? Solution - #17

Question - given that angels are naturally good, what causes some of them to be morally evil?

Solution - #18

Chapter 4 - Questions Made about Angels with the Rules.

16. Question - how can we prove that angels exist? Solution - in the first rule, #19 and following.

Question— what is the definition of an angel? Solution - in the second rule, #23

Questions - What is an angel's nature? What are an angel's actions and passions? Given that angels have no imagination, how do they understand imaginable objects? All these questions are solved by the second rule, #24 and #25.

Questions - What are an angel's innate principles? What is the form of an angel, and what is its matter? To whom do evil angels belong? Solutions: in the third rule, #27, #28 and #29.

Questions - How are angels caused? Does an angel repose in one end, or in several ends?

Solutions: in rule four #30 and #31.

Questions - What is the continuous and discrete quantity of an angel? If an angel had no matter, would it be passive under anything? Solutions: in rule 5, #32.

Questions - What are the specific qualities of an angel with which it acts in its specific way? Moreover, what are its appropriated qualities, with which it acts on the moral level?

Solutions: in rule 6, #33.

Questions - What are continuity and succession in angels? Given that an angel is not corporeal, does it measure time? Solutions: in rule 7 #34.

Questions - Are angels located anywhere? Do angels travel through some medium? Solutions: in rule 8 #35.

Questions - How does an angel exist in itself and act externally to itself? How is an angel passive? Solutions: in rule 9 #36.

Questions - With what does one angel understand another angel? With what does an angel tempt humans? How does an angel move stones? Solutions: in the tenth rule, #37.

Can an angel suffer in fire? We say it can, as shown by the principles and by the first species of rule E, by rule G and by the definition of divine power. Now just as God wants incorporeal angels to be able to move stones, likewise, through divine power, an angel can suffer in fire.

Question - are the angels our messengers and helpers? The answer is yes, for just as heaven with its innate principles effectively and naturally helps elemented principles to act, so likewise, the angels help us to have moral virtues. Rule B proves this. In addition, we can solve other questions in this way.

Chapter 5 - Questions Made about Heaven with the Principles

18. Questions - Does heaven's goodness cause goodness here below? Why do monstrosities exist? Why do they say that Saturn is bad even though it does not consist of contraries? Solutions: in the chapter about heaven combined with the principles, #1.

If heaven could not move on its own, could it be great and durable? Solution - #2.

Is heaven durable? Solution - #3

Does heaven move on its own? Has it the power to move things below? Solution - #4
 Given that heaven has no intellect, how does it coordinate itself as it moves things below? Solution - #5.
 Given that heaven has no will, what causes it to arouse the appetites of things below as it moves them? Solution - #6
 Does heaven move the virtues of things below beyond the power of elemented, vegetated and sentient beings just as charity moves the will beyond its power and enables it to love the supreme object and to love its enemies? The answer is yes, but heaven moves things naturally, whereas charity moves the will morally. Go to #7.
 Does heaven have innate truth with which it causes truths below? Solution - #8.
 Given that heaven has no will, does it enjoy anything? Solution - #9.
 Does heaven have innate differences whereby it disposes differences in the elements below? Solution - #10.
 Is heaven's concordance its own innate principle whereby it disposes concordance and affinity in things below? Solution - #11.
 Does heaven have innate contrariety? Solution - #12.
 Does heaven have an innate principle whereby it initiates affinities here below? The answer is yes, now just as a craftsman uses his mind to bring the figure of a box from potentiality into act, so does heaven with its causes naturally dispose sentient and vegetal forms from potentiality into act. See #13.
 Does heaven have an innate medium whereby it moves and disposes media in things below? Solution - #14.
 What is the major natural end of heaven without which it can neither have repose nor naturally move the ends in things below? Solution - #15.
 Does heaven have majority whereby it moves and disposes majorities in things below? Solution - #16.
 Does heaven have innate equality whereby it equalizes and proportions equalities in things below? Solution - #17.

Chapter 6 - Questions Made about Heaven with the Rules

18. Question - why does heaven not exist from eternity, given that it is incorruptible? Solution - go to rule B in the third subject, chapter 2.
 If heaven did not move on its own, would it naturally be the prime mobile? Solution - in rule C #27.
 Question - does heaven naturally and formally have innate correlatives without which it cannot cause correlatives in things below? Solution - in the second species of rule C.
 Question - does heaven include majority and minority? Solution - in the third species of rule C, #29.
 Question - what does heaven have in things below? Solution - in the fourth species of rule C, #30.
 Question - why is heaven incorruptible? Solution - in the first species of rule D, #31.
 Question - does heaven have specific principles with which it acts in its specific way? Solution - # in the second species of rule D, #32.
 Question - can the movement of heaven offer any resistance to miracles? Solution - in the third species of rule D, #33.
 Question - is heaven necessary? Solution - in the first species of rule E, #34.
 Question - without the movement of heaven, could anything below move naturally? The answer is no: now just as the will without charity can neither be disposed to love what is

above it, nor to love its enemy, likewise fire cannot be naturally disposed to move water without the movement of heaven, for heaven is prior and fire is posterior. Go to the second species of rule E, #35.

Questions - why does heaven act within itself with oblique quantity, and externally to itself with straight quantity? Does heaven have discrete quantities, given that it is in continuous motion? Solutions: in rule F, #36.

Questions - why does heaven act according to its specific species? Are heat and dryness appropriated qualities of the Sun? Solutions: in rule G, #37.

Question - how does heaven's movement function as cause and effect, as heaven is the subject of this movement? Solution - in rule H, #38.

Question - is heaven located anywhere? Solution - in rule I, #39.

Question - how does heaven act upon things below? Answer - it has its own mode of action upon lower modes, just as prior things have their mode in acting upon posterior ones.

Question - With what does heaven act upon things below? Answer - it acts with its innate principles, as a cause that causes lower causes with its principles.

Chapter 7 - Questions Made about Man with the Principles

19. Question - does man produce good according to his species? Solution - in the first chapter about man, the fourth subject, #1.

Are the many great things in man reasons for him to do great things? Solution - #2.

Does man have a twofold duration? Solution - #3.

Does man have specific power to act? Solution - #4.

In the human species, is there just one intellect, or many of them? Solution - #5.

In the human species, is there just one will, or many wills? Solution - #6.

Question— from what do the moral virtues arise? Solution - #7.

Does the human intellect attain the essences of things? Solution - #8.

Given that the soul is not corporeal in nature, why is it grieved by the suffering of the body? Solution - #9.

How does man make sciences of intellect, love and memory? Solution - #10.

If man's body and soul were not joined, could the imaginative, sensitive and rational souls objectify the same object? Solution - #11.

Is sin natural? Solution - #12.

Are the causal principles included in man? Solution - #12.

Questions – how do the soul and the body join? Does the radical moisture live on nutrimental moisture? How does man live and die? How does man make up a third number? Solutions: #13.

Are there ends different in species and number joined together in man? Solution - #14.

Question - what are man's major and minor powers? Solution - #15.

Is man equally conjoined and compounded? Solution - #16.

Question - how is man inclined to sin? Solution - #17.

Chapter 8 - Questions Made about Man with the Rules

Why can we know man better through affirmation than through negation? Solution - in rule B, subject 4, #18.

Questions - how can more definitions be made of man than of any other created being? Can we know more about man than about angels, heaven, irrational animals, plants, stones, or elements? Solution - in species 1 of rule C, #19 and #20.

Question— of what things does man consist? Solution - in 2. C, #21.

When an embryo is in the womb, does it nourish itself, or is it nourished, and does it move on its own, or is it moved? Solution - in 3. C, #22.

Question - what does man have in himself? Solution - in 4. C, #23.

Question - what are man's primordial principles? Solution - in 1. D, #24.

Questions - If man did not consist of a body and a soul, what would he consist of? Does man die entirely, or only in part? Solutions - in species 2 of rule D, #25.

If the soul actually died, would God be just toward himself? Solution - in species 3 of rule D, #26.

Question - why does man's soul make him a necessary being? Solution - in species 1 of rule E, #27.

Is the human soul immortal? Solution - in 2. E #28.

Without the conjunction of body and soul, would man have continuous quantity? Solution - in 1. F, #29.

Given that the soul does not reside in the body through contact, how does man have quantity? Solution - in 2. F. #30.

Is man's ability to reproduce man a quality more proper to him than his ability to laugh?

Solution - in rule G, #31.

Question - does man have greater qualities through the virtues than through the vices? The answer is yes, because a positive habit is worth more than a privative one. Go to species 2 of G, #32.

Does man exist in himself? Solution - in rule I, #33.

Can the senses perceive man? The answer is no, because only accidents can be sensed, but substance cannot be sensed in any way, it can only be understood.

As the senses cannot perceive man, how can we understand him? Solution - the intellect can do more on its own and through the imagination and the senses, than through the senses alone. Go to rule K, #35.

Question - with what is man universal? Solution - in rule K, #36.

As the senses cannot perceive man's essence, with what can we understand it? Answer - just as through charity, the will can love God beyond its power, so can the intellect understand humanity beyond the power of the senses.

Question - with what will man resurrect? Answer - with God's justice and with his own merits.

Chapter 9 - Questions about the Imaginative Power Made with the Principles

21. Does the essence of the imagination mainly exist due to the act of objectification? Does the act of imagining goodness stand between the intellective and sensitive powers? Solutions - in section 5, #1 and #2.

Is the imagination's greatness objectively an instrument of the rational faculty? Solution - #3.

Is the imagination the highest faculty of irrational animals? Solution - #4.

Does the imaginative have power over the sensitive, and not vice versa? Solution - #5.

Does the imagination have a specific instinct whereby it acts in accordance with its species? Solution - #6.

Does the imagination have a specific appetite whereby it acts in accordance with its species? Solution - #7.

Does the imaginative have specific virtue? Solution - #8.

Do irrational animals attain their own essences and those of others through their imaginative faculty? The answer is no, or else, they would be making science, which is impossible. Go to #9.

Does the imagination of irrational animals move itself by means of its object, or does the

object move it? Solution - #10.

Without its specific difference, would the imaginative be adequate as a faculty? Solution - #11.

Is the image of a mirror best way to portray the imagination? Solution - #11.

Is the imagination an objective power by reason of the concordance between the power and its object? Solution - #12.

Is the imagination a faculty common to both joy and sorrow? Solution - #13.

Without its own specific matter, could the imagination receive peregrine species? Solution - #14.

If the imagination was absent, or did not exist between the intellect and the senses, could the intellect build science? Solution - #15.

Does the imagination have its specific and perfect repose? Solution - #16.

Does the imagination have its specific majority? Solution - #17.

Does the faculty of imagination stand equally between the rational and sensitive faculties?

The answer is yes, in a proportional way, but not with regard to weight. Go to #18.

Is the imagination of irrational animals less than that of humans? The answer is yes. For instance, an irrational animal cannot imagine a mountain made of gold. Go to #1

Chapter 10 - Questions about the Imaginative Power Made with the Rules.

22. Is the imagination corporeal in essence? Solution - in rule B, #20.

Question - how can we know more about the imagination? Solution - in species 1 of C, #21.

Does the imagination have a common imaginable specific to itself? Solution - in 2.C, #22.

What is the imagination in humans and in irrational animals? Solution - in 3.C, #23.

Does the imagination have skill and receptivity in sense objects? Solution - in species 4 of C, #24.

Is the imagination a species? Solution - in species 1 of D, #25.

Without its specific matter, could the imagination be passive matter? Solution - in 2.D, #26.

Does the imagination have specific causes? Solution - in species 1 of E, #28.

Would the world be complete without imagination? Solution - in 2.E, #29.

23. Question - What quantity does the imagination have? Solution - in species 1 of F, #30.

Question - What causes the imagination to increase or decrease its act without increasing or decreasing its essence? Solution - in species 2 of F, #31.

Question - What property is proper to the imagination? Solution - in species 1 of rule G, #33.

Question - Does the imagination have habits, given that it is a habit of the intellect? Solution - in 2.G, #34.

Question - How does the imagination exist in time, given that it is immobile? Solution - in rule H, #35.

Question - Where does the imagination have its act? Solution - in rule I, #36.

Question - How does the imagination objectify its objects? Solution - in rule K, #37.

Question - With what complexion is the imagination active and receptive? Solution - in the second rule K, #38.

Question - what deceives the imagination? Answer - excessive instinct and appetite deceive it.

Question - why cannot the senses perceive the imagination? Answer - because the lower faculties cannot rise to attain the higher faculties.

Chapter 11 - Questions about the Sensitive Power Made with the Principles.

Without great goodness, can the senses sense any objects? Solution - in chapter 1, #2.

Question - in which particular sense is the sensitive power greatest? Solution - #3.

Question - with what does the sensitive power last? Solution - #4.

Does each sense perceive things in accordance with its species? Solution - #5

Do the senses have instincts? Solution - #6.

Do the senses have appetite, and why does the sense of sight enjoy seeing things? Solution - #7.

Do the senses have specific virtues? Solution - #8.

Do the senses truly sense their objects? Solution - #9.

Why is beauty disposed toward the senses? Solution - #10.

25. Do the senses judge things with the common sense, or with particular senses? Solution - #11.

What causes the senses to sense their objects? Solution - #12.

What deceives the senses? Solution - #13.

How are the senses disposed with regard to their causes? Solution - #14.

Do the particular senses mediate between the common sense and sense objects? Solution - #15.

Does external sensing derive from intrinsic sensing? Is the affatus a sense? Solutions - #15.

Do the senses have an innate end? Solution - #16.

Is some majority an innate principle of the senses? Solution - #17.

Is some equality an innate principle of the senses? Solution - #18.

Is some minority essential to the senses? Solution - #19.

Chapter 12 - Questions about the Sensitive Power Made with the Rules

26. Are senses reproduced from senses? Is the sensitive faculty a graft on the vegetative power? Where do a man's senses go after death? Solutions: in chapter 2, rule B, #20.

Question - what is the sensitive power? Solution - in species 1 of rule C, #21.

Question - can the senses sense anything without their innate correlatives? Solution - in species 2 of rule C, #22.

Question - Objectively, what is a sense in sense objects? Solution - in 3.C, #23.

Is any sense object of the very essence of the senses? Solution - in the same species.

Can a sense have an extrinsic object without having an intrinsic one? Solution - species 4 of rule C.

Is the sensitive power as natural to humans as to animals? Solution - in species 1 of rule D, #25.

Without its own specific matter, can a sense be active or passive? Solution - in 2.D, #26.

Does the common sense possess the particular senses? Solution - in species 3 of D, #27.

Can the senses exist without their specific form and matter? Solution - in species 1 of rule E, #28.

Question - does the common sense exist for the sake of the particular senses? Do the particular senses exist for the sake of sense objects? Solution - in species 2 of E, #29.

27. From what does the quantity of the sensitive power arise? Solution - in rule F, #30.

Can the particular senses exist without discrete quantity? The answer is no, because each sense has quantity.

Do the proper qualities of the senses cause their appropriated qualities? Solution - in species 1

of G, #31.

Question - what allows the senses to perceive a stone? Answer - the habit of sense.

Does the sense perception of a stone remain when the eyes are closed? Answer - it does not remain any longer than its afterimage when the eyes are closed. Go to rule H, #33.

Question - where do the senses sense their objects? Solution - in rule I, #34.

Does a sense attain substance? The answer is yes, inasmuch as it is joined to it, but no, inasmuch as it is separated from it. For instance, the sight does not attain the substance of a lamp because it is not joined to it.

Question - how does the sensitive faculty sense its objects? Solution - in the first rule K, #35.

Question - does a sense reach its object through its perceived likeness of it, and is this likeness a habit that clothes the object as a coat clothes the man wearing it? Solution - go to the second rule K, #36.

Is the sensitive faculty joined to its own subject? The answer is yes, as shown by the definitions of concordance and medium, and so that the beginning has a medium through which it can transit to its end.

Is a sense joined to its object, such as a stone, a sound, etc.? The answer is no, because it is a newly appropriated habit, like a coat on a man, now the coat is not joined to the man, but only in contact with him.

Chapter 13 - Questions about the Vegetative Power Made with the Principles

28. Can the vegetative power be good without the act of goodness? Is it good with its own specific goodness? Solution - in chapter 1, #1.

Is the vegetative power in animals and plants the same? Solution - #2.

Supposing that the vegetative were not joined to what it vegetates, could its product last in any way? Solution - #3.

Can the vegetative exist and act through its own specific power? Solution - #4.

Does the vegetative have a vegetated instinct? We answer that vegetated things derive their instinct from the vegetative power, just as fire derives its instinct from heat, and the artist derives his instinct from the art. Go to #5.

What is the vegetative power's appetite? Solution - #6.

Does the vegetative power have a habit joined to itself? Solution - #7.

Is the vegetative power disposed in its own truth, and conversely? Are vegetated things truly vegetated? Solution - #8.

How does the vegetative power enjoy itself? Solution - through its appetite. Go to #9.

29. Is difference innate to the vegetative power? Solution - #10.

Question - Why is the green colour more general to plants than to other beings? Solution - also in #10.

Is there perfect concordance between the vegetative and the vegetated just as there is between reason and the reasonable, the imaginative and the imaginable, or the sensitive and the sensible? Solution - #11.

Question - what causes corruption in the vegetative? Solution - #12.

Question - how is the vegetative a principle? Solution - #13.

Question - does the vegetative mediate, and how do animals live from it? Solution - #14.

Question - how does the vegetative bring things to completion? Solution - #15.

Questions - does the vegetative have general innate majority from which particular majorities descend? In addition: why are some individuals of the human species bigger than others? In the same tree, why are some fruit bigger than others are? Solutions: #16.

Without its own innate equality, can the vegetative make many plants equally belong to one

species, as for instance, many roses? Solution - #17.

Without minority, could the vegetative produce minor things? Solution - #18.

Chapter 14 - Questions about the Vegetative Power Made with the Rules

30. Questions - in animals, does the vegetative have senses, and is it sensed? Are sentient beings produced by the vegetative? Solutions - in the first rule. Further, the answer is yes, so that the animal can constitute a third number. Go to #19.

Question - what is the vegetative? Solution - in the first species of rule C, #20

Without its own innate correlatives, could the vegetative have an act? Solution - in 2.C. #21.

Question - How is the vegetative disposed in the sensitive, the elementative and in the ten predicates? Solution - in 3.C. #22.

Is the vegetative planted in the elementative? Solution - in the fourth species of the same rule C, #23.

Is the vegetative the primordial vegetating power? Solution - in the first species of rule D, #24.

Can the vegetative exist without its own innate causes? Solution - in 2.D. #25.

Is the vegetative subservient to the animal in which it exists? Solution - in 3.D. #26.

Is the vegetative a necessary habit in the subjects in which it exists? Solution - in the first species of rule E, #27.

Question - does a vegetated being exist in the vegetative power, or does it exist in itself due to the vegetative power? Solution - in 2.E. #28.

31. Without continuous quantity, can the vegetative be in continuous motion? Solution - in the first species of F, #29.

If the vegetative had no discrete quantity, could it exist in its own essence, without which it could not be in successive motion? Solution - in 2.F.#30.

Could the vegetative act without its specific property? What do we call this property? Solution - in 1.G.#31.

Question - what is the appropriated quality of the vegetative? Solution - in 2.G.#32.

Question - is the vegetative in continuous movement through its continuous quantity, and in successive motion through its discrete quantity? Solution - in rule H, #33.

Question - does the vegetative have its own connatural locus? Solution - in rule I, #34.

Question - how does the vegetative vegetate? Solution - in the first rule K, #35.

Question - with what does one vegetated being vegetate another vegetated being? Solution - in the second rule K, #36.

Question - is the vegetative inaccessible to the senses? The answer is no, because it is a lower power than the sensitive. Does the vegetative move per se? The answer is yes, a shown by its definition, its correlatives, and by its instinct and appetite.

Chapter 15 - Questions about the Elementative Power Made with the Principles

32. Question - is it good for the elements to be a substrate for elemented things? Solution - #1. If the elements did not exist in elemented things, would the elementative be perfectly great? Solution - #2.

Do the elements get corrupted, or only elemented things? Solution - #3.

Does the elementative element elemented things from the elements? Solution - #4.

Does each element act in accordance with its own species? Solution - #5.

Question - what causes motion in the elements? Solution - #6.
 Do the virtues of the elements descend from one single virtue? Solution - #7.
 Is alchemy possible? Solution - #8.
 Question - what causes intensity and extension in the elements? Solution - #9.
 33. Do the elements actually exist in elemented things? Solution - #10.
 Question - what causes temperance among the elements? Solution - #11.
 Question - what causes the corruption of elemented things? Solution - #12.
 Can the essence of the elements be objectified in any way? Are the elements subject to each other? Does the mixture of elements precede their composition? Solution - #13.
 Is there a medium between the elements and elemented things? Solution - #14.
 Question - what is the repose of the elementative, or of the elements? Solution - #15.
 Question - how is elementative majority disposed in elemented things? Solution - #16.
 Are the elements equal in some way? Solution - #17.
 Question - how is minority disposed in the elements? #18.

Chapter 16 - Questions about the Elementative Power Made with the Rules

34. Question - are the elements compound? If they are compound, where are they compounded? Solution - in rule B, #19.
 Question - what is the elementative power? Solution - in species 1 of rule C, #20.
 Are the elementative power's correlatives substantial? Solution - in 2.C.#21.
 Can the elements act on their own without the elementative? Does the elementative reflect the image of God's infinity? Solutions: in 3.C.#22.
 Does the elementative have its being in the elements and in elemented things? Solution - in 4.C.#23.
 Is the elementative the primordial elementing principle? Solution - in species 1 of rule D, #24.
 Does the elementative element elemented things from the elements just as the vegetative vegetates them from the elements? Solution - in 2.D.#25.
 Is the elementative possessed by the elements, or by elemented things? Solution - in 3.D.#26.
 Question - what are the causes of the elementative? Solution - in species 1 of E, #27.
 Question - could the elementative be in repose without the elements? Solution - in 2.E.#28.

35. Question -Does the elementative have continuous quantity through all the elements? Solution - in species 1 of rule F, #29.
 Question - does the elementative have discrete quantities? The answer is yes, because it consists of the elements. Go to 2.F.#30.
 Question - what is the proper quality of the elementative? Are there two essences of heat that differ in genus, and likewise, are there two essences of dryness? Solution - in species 1 of rule G, #31.
 Does the elementative have appropriated qualities? Solution - in species 2 of G, #32.
 Does the elementative move anything, and is it moved by anything? Solution - in rule H, #33.
 Is the elementative essentially present in elemented things? Is earth present in the sphere of fire? Solutions: in rule I, #34,35,36,37 and 38.
 Question - how do the elements enter into composition? Solution - in the first rule K, #39.
 Question - with what does the elementative participate in the motion of generation and corruption? Solution - in the second rule K, #40.
 Question - how is the elementative disposed in elemented things? Solution - in the rule of modality, #39.
 Is the elementative a habit of the elements and of elemented things? Go to article 21, about habit, in the 100 forms, #64.

Question - does the elementative element elemented things in the matter of the elements?

Solution - go to its correlatives signified by species 2 of rule C, #21.

Is there more than one fire? Is there a fifth element? Go to the definitions of the end and of concordance, Part 3, #1.

Section 5 - Questions about the Ninth Subject, or the Virtues and Vices

36. Just as the common sense senses sensible objects with its particular senses, so does the soul use its powers to treat virtuous things with virtue and vicious things as vice. With the principles of this art, we treat the virtues and the vices artificially, as a logicians use syllogisms with the principles of Logic. Thus, we will make questions with the said method, which also indicates their solutions. First, let us speak of justice.

Chapter 17- Questions about Justice Made with the Principles

37. Question - does justice cause good just things with its goodness? Solution - go to the first chapter on justice, #3.

Does justice magnify justifiable things with its greatness? Solution - #4.

Question - How does justice last? Solution - #5.

Does the soul clothe itself with the power of justice when it does just things? Solution - #6.

Question - how does justice exist in potentiality? Solution - #7.

Question - how is justice lovable? Solution - #8.

Question - how does justice arise, and how does it apply to law? Solution - #8.

Without truth, can the soul cause justice, and can justice justify what is justifiable? How can a jurist easily learn natural laws? Solution - #9.

Does justice bring repose with justifiable things? Solution - #10.

38. Question - with which principle can a jurist recognize intensive and extended justice? Solution - #11.

Question - how can we recognize justice? Solution - #12.

Question - with what can we recognize injury? Solution - #13.

Question - how is justice different from law? Solution - #14.

How does justice relate to causal principles? Solution - also in #14.

Does justice have a specific medium? Solution - #15.

Question - what is the purpose of justice? Solution - #16.

Question - what are the causes of the majority of justice? Solution - #17.

Question - with which principle of this art does justice have the greatest affinity? Solution - #18.

Question - with what do we recognize minor justice? Solution - #19.

Chapter 18- Questions about Justice Made with the Rules

39. Question— after the corruption of justice a man, can the removal of injury return justice to its identical previous state? Solution - in rule B, chapter 2 of the ninth subject, #20.

Question - what is justice? Solution - in species 1 of rule C, #21.

Question - with what things is justice a specific habit? Solution - in 2.C.

Question - what is justice in justifiable things? Answer - it is a moral cause in justifiable things just as the sensitive faculty is a natural cause in sense objects. Go to 3.C.

Question - is justice objectively disposed? Solution - in species 4 of C.

Question - what are the primordial principles of justice? Solution - in species 1 of D, #22.

Question - what specific principles of justice make it a specific form? Solution - in 2.D.

Question - who possesses justice? Solution - in 3.D.

Question - why is justice necessary? Solution - in species 1 of rule E, #23.

Question - why does justice exist? Solution - in 2.E.

40. Question - Does justice have continuous quantity? Solution - in species 1 of F, #24.

Is justice in a state of development, or in factual existence in the subject in which it exists?
Solution - in 2.F.

Question - what is the proper quality of justice? Solution - in species 1 of G, #25.

Question - what are the appropriated qualities of justice? Solution - in 2.G.

Question - how does justice exist in successive places? Solution - in rule H, #26.

Given that justice is not made of points or lines, how can it be present in space, and where does it justify justifiable things? Solution - in rule I, #27.

Question - how does justice consist of theory and practice? Solution - in the first rule K, #28.

Question - with what things is justice what it is? Solution - in the second rule K, #29.

Question - with what is justice generated and corrupted? Answer - it is generated with its positive principles, and it is corrupted with the privation of its acts.

Question - how does natural law exist? Solution - go to the first rule K, #28.

Question - with what does positive law exist? Answer - it exists with belief and supposition, and with contingent things objectified by memory and the will, without understanding.

Chapter 19 - Questions about Prudence Made with the Principles

41. Does the soul cause the prudent treatment of things with prudence just as the common sense senses sensible objects with its particular senses? The answer is yes, or else prudence would not be a specific virtue, nor would the soul have the wherewithal to provide for the future by choosing good and avoiding evil.

Question - how does a man develop the habit of prudence? Solution - in chapter 3 about prudence, #30.v.1.

Question - is the act of magnifying a function of prudence? Solution - v.2.

Question - how can one kind of prudence prevail over another? Solution - v.3.

Question - can prudence be powerful without power? Solution - v.4.

Question - to whom does the habit of prudence belong? Solution - v.5.

Question - what kind of prudence is primary, and what kind is subsequent? Solution - v.6.

Question - how does prudence move along straight or crooked lines? Solution - v.7.

Question - is every kind of foresight useful? Solution - #v.8.

Question - why does prudence choose to make an effort? Solution - #v.9.

42. Question - how are prudence and imprudence different? Solution - #31.v.10.

Question - can prudence exist without any of the other virtues? Solution - v.2.

Question - by what means do prudence and imprudence oppose one another? Solution - v.3.

Question - how are prudence and imprudence at war in a subject? Solution - v.4.

Question - how are prudence and imprudence opposed through a medium? Solution - v.5.

Question - how are prudent and imprudent men disposed toward the end? Solution - v.6.

Question - how are prudence and imprudence opposed in a major way? Solution - v.7.

Question - do prudence and imprudence fight each other on an equal footing? Solution - v.8.

Question - can prudence exist without minority in a subject? The answer is no, because prudence naturally chooses majority. Go to v.9.

Chapter 20 - Questions about Prudence Made with the Rules

Question - why does prudence envisage contingencies? Solution - in rule B, #32.

Question - what is prudence? Solution - in species 1 of C.

Are the correlatives of the intellect habituated with the correlatives of prudence? The answer

is yes. Go to 2.C.

Question - what is prudence in the virtues, and what is it in the vices? Solution - in species 3 of C.

Question - what does the prudent man gain from prudence? Solution - in species 4 of C.#33.

Question - what are the primal principles of prudence? Solution - in species 1 of D.

Question - how is prudence a specific virtue? Solution - in 2.D.

Question - can prudence be a sin in any way? The answer is yes, when the subject makes bad use of it, just as loving is a sin when it loves vice. Go to 3.D.

Question - why does prudence have form? Solution - in species 1 of E.

Question - Do discretion and disposition belong to the genus of prudence? The answer is yes, and go to species 2 of E, #35.

44. Question - Is prudence a measure of the prudent man? The answer is yes, and go to species 1 of F.

Question - What causes discrete quantities in prudence? Solution - in 2.F.#36.

Question - Is foresight a proper quality of prudence? Solution - in species 1 of G.

Question - Can malice be a quality of prudence in any way? The answer is yes, just as an instrument can be evil when used by an evil man for an evil end. Go to species 2 of G, #37.

Question - does prudence consist more in providing for the future than in choosing things in the present? The answer is yes, because there are more contingencies in the future than there are things known in the present by experience. Go to rule H, #38.

Question - which principles have the greatest affinity with prudence? Answer - the principles of goodness, intellect, virtue, difference, end and majority. Go to rule I, #39.

Question - how does a man exercise prudence? Solution - in the first rule K, #40.

Question - which principles strengthen prudence? Solution - in the second rule K, #41.

Question - does the essence of prudence wax and wane in the subject in which it exists? The answer is no. For it is an indivisible habit, not made of points or lines. However, the intellect wonders why the act of prudence waxes and wanes, until it considers the discrete quantities of prudence.

Chapter 21 - Questions about Fortitude Made with the Principles

45. Question - does fortitude mean that there are things that need fortifying just as the sense of sight means that there are things that need seeing? The answer is yes, or else fortitude would not have any phantasms, just as the sense of sight would have no visible objects.

Question - with what things is fortitude nurtured and governed? Solution - #42.v.1.

Question - what things make fortitude impregnable? v.2.

Question - how is fortitude victorious and dominant? v.3.

Question - what makes fortitude strong? v.4.

Question - what makes fortitude stronger? v.5.

Question - is fortitude stronger with love than with fear? Answer - it is stronger with love, because love is the cause of fear. Go to v.6.

Question - can any other virtue be strong without fortitude? The answer is no, or else there would be two fortitudes of different species. Go to v.6.

Question - how is a man bold? v.8.

Question - what makes a man magnanimous? v.9.

46. Question - how do fortitude and prudence agree? Solution - #43.v.1

Question - with what is fortitude major? Solution - v.2.

Question - with what is fortitude corrupted? v.3.

Question - without phantasms, can fortitude be a specific virtue? v.4.

Question - does fortitude mediate between justice and prudence, between justice and temperance, and between prudence and temperance? The answer is yes, so that the virtues are greater in the middle than in the extremes. Go to v.5.

Question - with what does fortitude bring victory? v.6.

Question - with what does fortitude overcome acedia? v.7.

Question - why is fortitude stronger with equality than with inequality? Answer - because its correlatives are equal. Go to v.8.

Question - with what is fortitude vanquished? v.9.

Chapter 22 - Questions about Fortitude Made with the Rules

47. Question - why is charity stronger in prosperity than in adversity? Solution - in rule B, #44.

Question - what is fortitude? Solution - in species 1 of C, #45.

Question - does fortitude have potentially fortifiable things in its innate fortifiable? Solution - in 2 of C.

Question - is fortitude a habit of the other virtues? The answer is yes, because they would have no force without it. Go to 3.C.

Question - does fortitude have its phantasms in its own principles? Solution - in 4.C.

Question - what are the first principles of fortitude? Solution - in species 1 of D, #46.

Question - how does fortitude possess its own natural phantasms? Solution - in 2.D.

Question - can fortitude exist in its subjects without any disposition? Solution - in 3.D.

Question - why does fortitude potentially have fortifiable and specifiable things? How does it act in practice? Solutions: in species 1 of E, #47.

Question - why do the other virtues win their battle against the vices? Solution - in 2.E.#47.

48. Question - what is the quantity of fortitude in the other virtues? Answer - as much as it brings them victory. Go to species 1 of F, #48.

Does fortitude act in a measured way? Solution - in species 2 of F.

Does the essence of fortitude wax and wane? Solution - in species 1 of rule G, #49.

Question - why can acts of charity wax and wane at will? Solution - in species 2 of G.

Question - does fortitude exist in time, given that per se, it exists continuously in the present instant? Solution - in rule H, #50.

Question - does fortitude exist in the victory of the virtues? Solution - in rule I, #51.

Question - how is fortitude caused? Solution - in the first rule K, #52.

Question - with which habits is fortitude the most habituated? Solution - in the second rule K, #53.

Question - is fortitude stronger with the imagination than with the senses? The answer is yes, because it has deliberation with the imaginative power, but none at all with the senses.

Chapter 23 - Questions about Temperance Made with the Principles

49. Question - Does temperance mean that there are things that we can temper, just as the sense of hearing means that there are things that we can hear? The answer is yes. Just as hearing would be pointless if there was nothing audible, so would temperance be pointless if nothing could be tempered. Here, the intellect realizes that every specific virtue causes its specific species, as the antecedent causes the consequent, and this realization makes the intellect very knowledgeable in moral matters.

Question - what makes temperance lovable? Solution - #54.v.1.
 Question - is temperance great when it is difficult? v.4.
 Question - is temperance easy? v.3.
 Question - can temperance exist per se? v.4.
 Question - without knowledge, does temperance occur merely by chance? v.5.
 Question - without lovability, does temperance fail? v.6.
 Question - why do we need temperance more frequently than any other virtue? Answer - because gluttony fights it every day.
 Question - how does temperance agree with truth? Answer – without truth, temperance cannot overcome gluttony.
 Question - what is the usefulness of temperance? v.9.
 50. Question - with which principle is temperance the most vigorous? Solution - #55.v.1.
 Question - with what does temperance seek out its repose? v.2.
 Question - which vice is the worst enemy of temperance: is it gluttony, or avarice? v.3.
 Question - when does temperance need fortitude the most? v.4.
 Question - where does temperance measure things? v.5.
 Question - why does temperance repose in effort? Answer - in order to acquire merit through effort. v.6.
 Question - what makes temperance major? v.7.
 Question - what makes the act of temperance exist? v.8.
 Question - what makes temperance fall ill? v.9.

Chapter 24 - Questions about Temperance Made with the Rules.

51. Question - how does temperance participate with the other virtues? Solution - in rule B, #56.
 Question - what is temperance? Solution - in species 1 of C, #57.
 Question - with what and where does temperance cause its tempered objects, or its species? Solution - in species 2 of rule C.
 Question - what is temperance in a subject in which it exists? Solution - in 3.C.
 Question - what does temperance have in the other virtues? Solution - in 4.C.
 Question - what are the first principles of temperance? Solution - in species 1 of D, #58.
 Question - can temperance exercise its act without imagination? Solution - in species 2 of D.
 Question - does temperance belong to man, or to his soul? The answer is that it belongs to both, but more to man, because man causes temperance with his soul.
 Question - why does temperance exist formally? Solution - in species 1 of E, #59.
 Question - why is there temperance? Answer - so that we can temper things. Go to species 2 of E.
 52. Question - what is the quantity of temperance? Solution - in species 1 of F, #60.
 Question - how many discrete quantities does temperance have? Answer - as many as the things tempered by it. Go to species 2 of F.
 Question - what is the proper quality of temperance? Solution - in species 1 of G, #61.
 Question - are the temperabilities of the principles secondary qualities of temperance? Solution - in species 2 of rule G.
 Question - how does temperance cause species in time? Solution - in rule H, #62.
 Question - where does temperance cause its species? Solution - in rule I, #63.
 Question - how does temperance temper temperable things? Answer - through similarity, in the same way as the senses sense sensible things. Go to the first rule K, #64.
 Question - with what does temperance exist? Answer - it exists with justice, prudence etc.

Question - is temperance a higher virtue than chastity? Answer - intensively, yes, but not extensively.

Chapter 25 - Questions about Faith Made with the Principles

53. Does faith mean that there are beliefs just as the sense of smell means that there are things that smell? The answer is yes. As there would be no point in having a sense of smell if there was nothing to smell, so there would be no point in faith if there was nothing to believe.

Question - what causes the intellect to act beyond its natural power? Solution - in part 9, section 9, chapter 9 about faith, #66.

Question - what causes belief to rise above understanding? Solution - #67.

Question - what is faith in a sinner? Solution - #68.

Can faith and understanding coexist in the same intellect? Solution - #69.

Question - how does the intellect ascend to the supreme object through faith? Solution - #70.

Can the intellect understand the supreme object without faith? Solution - #71.

Is faith a habit of the intellect? Solution - #72.

Question - do we first reach the truth through faith, or through understanding? Solution - #73.

Question - why does the intellect have toil when it ascends through understanding, but enjoyment when it ascends through belief? Solution - #74.

54. Question - how does the intellect objectify things instantaneously and sequentially? Solution - #75.

Question - how do belief and understanding concord in the same object? Solution - #76.

Question - by what signs can we recognize which one is the true faith, if we compare the Jewish faith, the Moslem faith and the Christian faith? Solution - #77.

Question - how does faith dispose the intellect to understand? Solution - #78.

Question - how do faith and the intellect ascend to their object? Solution - #79.

Question - in this mortal life, how does faith stand between the intellect and God? Solution - #80.

Question - can two opposite laws both be good and true? Solution - #81.

Question - by what signs can we tell true faith apart from false faith? Solution - #82.

Question - does an increase in understanding mean a decrease in belief? Solution - #83.

Chapter 26 - Questions about Faith Made with the Rules

55. Question - which is the first to earn merit: faith, or understanding? Solution - in rule B #84.

Question - what is faith? Solution - in species 1 of C, #85.

Question - how is faith a habit? Solution - in 2.C.

Question - how does one habit stand above another? Solution - in 3.C.

Question - what does faith have in the soul's powers, and conversely? Solution - in 4.C.

Question - does faith exist through procreation, or through creation? Solution - in species 1 of D, #86.

Does faith act with a specific form? Solution - in 2.D.

Is faith possessed by the intellect? The answer is yes, because it is a habit of the intellect. Go to species 3 of D.

Question - on what does faith depend? Solution - in species 1 of E, #87.

Does faith exist so that the intellect can rise to a higher understanding, or to a higher belief? Solution - in species 2 of E.

56. Question - what is the quantity of faith? Solution - in species 1 of F, #88.

Question - what are the discrete quantities of faith? Answer - they are its beliefs. Go to 2.F.
 Question - with what does faith act? Solution - in species 1 of G, #89.
 Question - what is the disposition of faith? Solution - in 2.G.
 Question - how does faith exist in time, given that it is immobile? Once it has been corrupted, can the same faith return? Solution - in rule H, #90.
 Does faith exist in the intellect? Solution - in rule I, #91.
 Question - how does God cause faith? Solution - in the first rule K, #92.
 Question - with what does faith exist? Solution - in the second rule K, #93.
 In the afterlife, does faith still exist? The answer is no, because faith and understanding cannot exist on the same level.
 Does an infidel have faith? The answer is no, because faith cannot exist without truth.

Chapter 27 - Questions about Hope Made with the Principles

57. Does hope cause us to hope in things just as the sense of taste causes us to taste things? The answer is yes. Otherwise, hope would not be a virtue. Hope causes us to hope in things morally, whereas taste causes us to taste things naturally.
 Is hope a habit of memory just as charity is a habit of the will and faith is a habit of the intellect? Solution - #94.
 Question - with what does memory ascend to the supreme object? Solution - #95.
 Question - with what does hope endure? Solution - #96.
 Question - what are the higher and lower powers of memory? Solution - #97.
 Question - who is man's greatest friend at the hour of death? Solution - #98.
 Question - who is man's greatest friend in adversity? Solution - #99.
 Question - with what does memory exercise virtue? Solution - #100.
 Question - what is well-formed faith, and what is distorted faith? Solution - #101.
 Question - why does hope bring joy, and why does its opposite bring sadness? Solution - #102.

58. Question - what is the difference between hoping and remembering? Solution - #103.
 Question - how are remembering and hoping mutually disposed? Solution - #104.
 Question - can legitimate faith and spurious faith coexist in the same subject? Solution - #105.
 Question - how are the causal principles included in memory and hope? Solution - #106.
 Question - how does hope mediate between God and man? Solution - #107.
 Question - how does hope bring repose? Solution - #108.
 Question - how is hope a sign of the true law? Solution - #109.
 Can hoping and remembering be equal in attaining the supreme object? Solution - #110.
 How do sinners fall into despair? Solution - #111.

Chapter 28 - Questions about Hope Made with the Rules

59. Is hope a habit of memory? Solution - in the 9th subject, Ch... 12 on hope, rule B, #112.
 Question - what is hope? Solution - in species 1 of C, #113.
 Question - with what things does hope act in accordance with its own species? Solution - in 2.C.
 Question - why does hope exist in other things? Solution - in 3.C.
 Question - to whom does the faculty of hope belong? Solution - in 4.C.
 Question - does hope arise through generation, or through creation? Answer - it arises through creation because it covers its subject, as a coat covers the man wearing it. Go to species 1 of

D, #114.

Question - from what things do the correlatives of hope derive? Solution - in 2.D.

Question - to whom does hope belong as an instrument? Solution - in 3.D.

Question - why does hope exist? Solution - : in species 1 of E, #115.

Question - what is the purpose of hope? Solution - in 2.E.

60. Can hope be divided? Solution - in species 1 of F, #116.

Question - in what does hope wax and wane? Solution - in species 2 of F.

Question - what is hope's proper act? Solution - in species 1 of G. #117.

Question - what are the secondary powers of hope? Solution - in species 2 of G.

Question - how is all time encompassed by hope? Solution - in rule H, #118.

Question - where does hope cause its species? Solution - in rule I, #119.

Question - with what is hope generated and corrupted? Solution - in the first rule K, #120.

Question - is hope present due to the disposition of the subject in which it exists? Solution - in the second rule K, #121.

Is hope a virtue higher than justice? The answer is yes, because justice measures things with measure, whereas hope measures beyond measure.

Is hope a friend of mercy? The answer is yes, because it is its helper.

Is hope the treasure of the poor? The answer is yes, because it causes joy and dispels sadness.

Question - what is hope's enemy? Answer - it is forgetfulness.

Question - does hope give rise to justice? The answer is yes, because by hoping in God, a man becomes just.

Chapter 29 - Questions about Charity Made with the Principles

61. Is charity the cause of charitable things just as touch is the cause of tangible things? The answer is yes, because if charity were not the cause of charitable things, it could not be a habit of the will, just as the common sense and touch would not be a cause for judging sense objects if nothing was tangible.

Question - why is charity a habit of the will? Solution - #22.v.1.

Question - why does charity consider all good things as common good? v.2.

Question - with what does charity make itself durable? v.3.

Question - why does charity overcome all things? v.4.

Question - in what way is charity an instrument of the intellect for understanding the supreme intelligible object? v.5.

Question - with what does the will dispose itself toward loving the supreme lovable object? v.6.

Question - why is charity the highest virtue of all? v.7.

Question - on what does charity live, and with what does it overcome the objects of the imagination and of the senses? v.8.

Question - why does charity find delight in all things? Answer - because it raises the will above the objects of the imagination and of the senses.

62. Question - why does charity not seek its own interest? Solution - #123.v.1.

Question - what is natural to charity? verse 2.

Question - why does charity not find any adversary? Answer - because it vanquishes them all. Go to v.3.

Question - how is charity prior and posterior? v.4.

Question - who is the messenger between the lover and his beloved? v.5.

Question - with what does charity find repose in all things? v.6.

Question - what makes charity a sign of the true law? Answer - it is majority. Go to v.7.

Question - what is the sign of charity? v.8.

Question - what is the corruption of charity? v.9.

Chapter 30 - Questions about Charity Made with the Rules

63. Is charity a habit of the will? Solution - in the 9th subject, chapter 14 on charity, rule B, #124.

Question - what is charity? Solution - in species 1 of C, #125.

Question - what is charity that has specific species whereby it is a specific virtue? Solution - in 2.C.

Question - what is charity in the other virtues? Solution - in 3.C.

Question - why does charity have whatever it wants? Answer - because it is a virtue higher than all the other virtues.

Question - why is charity infused and not acquired? Answer - because it cannot be as high a virtue through acquisition as through infusion.

Question - from what does charity arise? Solution - in species 1 of D, #126.

Question - what does charity consist of? Solution - in 2.D.

Question - why does charity belong to the will? Solution - in 3.D.

Question - what is the cause of charity? Solution - in 1.E.#127.

Question - what is the purpose of charity? Solution - in 2.E.

64. Question - is charity great in quantity? Solution - in species 1 of rule F.

Does the essence of charity wax or wane? The answer is no, because it is neither a punctual nor a linear habit. Go to species 2 of F.

Question - what is the prime quality of charity? Solution - in species 1 of G, #129.

Question - what is then secondary quality of charity? Solution - in species 2 of G.

Question - how does charity exist instantaneously and successively in time? Solution - in rule H, #130.

Question - where is charity? Solution - in rule I, #131.

Question - how does charity exist? Solution - in the 1st rule K, #132.

Question - with what does charity exist? Solution - in the 2nd rule K, #133.

Question - by what can a man know whether he has charity? Answer - by the things said about it above.

Chapter 31 - Questions about Patience Made with the Principles

65. Does patience cause us to endure things just as the affatus causes us to say things? The answer is yes. Just as the affatus would not be a sense if there was nothing to say, so patience would not be a virtue if there was nothing to endure.

Question - with what is patience a habit of the will? Solution - chapter 15 on patience in the ninth subject, #134.v.1.

Question - with what does the will overcome ire? v.2.

Question - with what is patience strong? v.3.

Question - is patience powerful when it acts with abstinence and prudence? v.4.

Question - on what does patience live and feed? v.5.

Question - what makes patience belong to the genus of humility? v.6.

Question - under which virtue does patience rise the highest as a virtue? v.7.

Question - does true patience seek its own interest? v.8.

Question - does patience drive out sadness? v.9.

66. Question - does patience make any distinction between its friend and its enemy? Solution

- #135.v.1.

Question - with which virtues is patience associated? v.2.

Question - why is patience a winner? v.3.

Question - what causes does patience have? v.4.

Question - between what things does patience mediate? v.5.

Question - with what does the patient man find repose? v.6.

Question - what makes patience a major virtue? v.7.

Question - what is the role of patience? v.8.

Question - with what does patience fail? v.9.

Chapter 32 - Questions about Patience Made with the Rules

67. Question - why is patience absolutely stronger than impatience? Solution - in rule B, #136.

Question - what is patience? Solution - in species 1 of C, #137.

Question - with what does patience endure things? Solution - in 2.C.

Question - is patience kind through charity and discrete through prudence? Solution - in 3.C.

Question - does the will get what it wants through patience? Solution - in species 4 of rule C.

Question - what are the prime principles of patience? Solution - in species 1 of D, #138.

Question - what are the secondary principles of patience? Solution - in species 2 of D.

Question - with what does the will descend to the love of suffering? Solution - in species 3 of rule D.

Question - which virtues necessarily cause patience? Solution - in species 1 of rule E. #139.

Question - what is the purpose of patience? Solution - in species 2 of rule E.

68. Question - does the essence of patience have anything to make it grow? Solution - in species 1 of rule F, #140.

Question - does patience have discrete quantities? Solution - in 2.F"

Question - what is the prime property of patience? Solution - in species 1 of rule G.

Question - what are the secondary qualities of patience? Solution - in species 2 of G"

Question - how does patience exist instantaneously in time? Answer - through the newness it receives upon its creation, it exists from one successive present moment to the next. Go to rule H, #142.

Question - what are the loci of patience? Solution - in rule I, # 143.

Question - how do we acquire patience? Solution - in the first rule K, #144.

Question - with what do we fortify patience? Solution - in the second rule K, #144.

Question - of patience and abstinence, which one opposes ire more strongly? Answer - it is patience, because abstinence arises from patience.

Do fortitude and prudence cause patience? The answer is yes, or else patience would not give rise to abstinence.

Chapter 33 - Questions about Compassion Made with the Principles

69. Does compassion cause compassionate acts, just as the imagination causes imaginable things? The answer is yes, because just as without imaginable things, the imagination would not be a habit, so likewise compassion would not be a habit without compassionate deeds.

Question - with what does the will dispose itself toward feeling sorrow for the suffering of one's fellow man? Solution - in chapter 17 on compassion, subject nine, #146.v.1.

Question - are sighs and tears signs of great compassion? v.2.

Question - with what does compassion last? v.3.

Question - what signs does the power of compassion display? v.4.

Question - how does the intellect recognize patience? v.5.

Question - why is compassion lovable? v.6.

Question - how does compassion display itself as a virtue? v.7.

Question - what is the remedy for a cruel will? v.8.

Question - with what does the will console itself? v.9.

70. Question - why does compassion not draw any distinction between proper and common good? Solution - #147, v.1.

Question - with what does a compassionate man pacify his enemies? v.2.

Question - with what does compassion overcome pitilessness? v.3.

Question - what is the material of compassion? Answer - it is conceit, not directly but indirectly, because it is an occasion and not a cause. v.4.

Question - does compassion stand in extremes? v.5.

Question - with what does the will find delight in adversity? v.6.

Question - is major compassion a major sign of the true law? v.7.

Question - with what does compassion measure its sighs? v.8.

Question - is the absence of tears and sighs a sign of minor compassion? v.9.

Chapter 34 - Questions about Compassion Made with the Rules

71. Is charity a habit of compassion? Solution - in rule B, #148.

Question - what is compassion? Solution - in species 1 of C, #149.

Question - with what things does compassion act in its own specific way? Solution - in 2.C.

Question - of what is compassion a sign? Solution - in 3.C.

Question - what does compassion have in the subject in which it exists? Solution - in 4.C.

Question - what are the prime principles of compassion? Solution - in species 1 of D, #150.

Are sighs and tears signs that signify the material of compassion? Solution - in 2.D.

Does compassion belong to the will? The answer is yes, because the will is the prime mover of compassion. Go to 3.D.

Question - why does there have to be compassion? Solution - in species 1 of E, #151.

Question - what is the purpose of compassion? Solution - in 2.E.

72. Question - with what can we know the quantity of compassion? Solution - in 1.F.#152.

With what does compassion increase or decrease its acts? Solution - in 2.F.

Question - what is the prime quality of compassion? Solution - in species 1 of G, #153.

Question - what is the secondary quality of compassion? Solution - in species 2 of G.

Question - how do we recognize compassion? Solution - in rule H, #154.

Question - where does compassion exist? Solution - in rule I, #155.

Question - how does compassion generate sighs and tears? Answer - it is through the mode that charity has in moving the imaginative with compassion, and thereby moving the sensitive faculty, warming the heart so it gives out sighs, with which it heats the water that rises and heats the eyes, and from their warmth tears flow like water.

Question - with what does compassion exist? Solution - in the second rule K, #157.

We have dealt with the nine virtues, and as we dealt with them by using the principles and rules, likewise, but in a contrary mode, we can discuss the vices, which are their opposites, namely injury, imprudence, faint heartedness, intemperance, infidelity, impatience and impiety.

Chapter 35 - Questions about Avarice Made with the Principles

73. Does avarice have species of its own, just as generosity does? The answer is yes, or else they would have no way to oppose one another.

Question - with what does avarice impede generosity? Solution - in the ninth subject, chapter 19 about avarice, #159.v.1.

Question - with what does avarice magnify evil? v.2.

Question - why does an avaricious man never find repose? v.3.

Can an avaricious man find repose with avarice? v.4.

Why does the avaricious man believe that he is generous? v.5.

Does avarice elevate the will above the power of generosity? v.6.

With his habit of avarice, does the avaricious man believe, or does he understand? v.7.

Question - does the avaricious man believe falsehood to be true and truth to be false? v.8.

Does the avaricious man get any satisfaction or repose with his avarice? v.9.

74. Question - does the avaricious man believe that his avarice is generosity? Solution - #160.v.1.

Can an avaricious man be in agreement with one who is just, prudent etc? v.2.

Question - Why is an avaricious man a bad neighbour or associate? v.3.

Question - how does an avaricious man relate to the causal principles? v.4.

With what does an avaricious man measure his possessions? v.5.

Does an avaricious man find repose with privative principles like a generous man finds repose with positive principles? v.6.

What is major avarice? v.7.

Question - why does avarice not find the middle ground? v.8.

Is minor avarice opposed to generosity? v.9.

Chapter 36 - Questions about Avarice Made with the Rules

75. Is avarice a generalized sin? Solution - in rule B, #161.

Question - what is avarice? Solution - in species 1 of C. #162.

Question - what are the correlatives of avarice? Solution - in 2.C.#162.

Question - why does avarice belong to the genus of poverty? Solution - in 3.C.

Question - what does the avaricious man have in his wealth? Solution - in 4.C.

Does avarice have a nature. The answer is no, because generosity has one.

Question - from what does the sin of avarice arise? Solution - in 2.D.#163.

Does the avaricious man belong to avarice? The answer is yes, just as the generous man belongs to generosity, but in a contrary sense.

Question - why is there avarice? Solution - in species 1 of rule E, #164.

Does avarice exist to deprive man of repose? Solution - in 2.E.

76. Is avarice connected to generosity? Solution - in 1.F.#165.

Question - with what does avarice increase or decrease its acts? Solution - in 2.F.

Question - why does the avaricious man always want even more when he gets more? Solution - in species 1 of G, #157.

Question - what are the appropriated qualities of avarice? Solution - in 2.G.

Question - how does an avaricious man spend his time? Solution - in rule H, #168.

Question - where is avarice located? Solution - in rule I, #169.

Question - how does avarice exist? Solution - # in the first rule K, #170.

In addition, it exists through the mode of unwillingness, just as generosity exists through the mode of willingness.

Question - with what does avarice exist? Solution - in the second rule K, #171

Are perverted willingness and perverted unwillingness causes of avarice? The answer is yes, because righteous willingness and righteous unwillingness are causes of generosity.

Chapter 37 - Questions about Gluttony Made with the Principles

77. Does gluttony cause over indulging as its species, just as temperance causes moderation? The answer is yes, or else gluttony could not be a specific sin in any way, as temperance has what it needs to be a specific virtue.

Question - why does a glutton believe that overeating is good for him, even though he knows that it is harmful? Answer - because the habit of gluttony makes him believe in something beyond his understanding. Go to the ninth subject, chapter 21 on gluttony, #172.v.1.

Question - Why does a glutton believe that excessive drinking does him no harm? Answer - because great gluttony increases belief and decreases understanding. v.2.

Question - Why are there gluttons, given that the enjoyment they derive from gluttony does not last as long as the suffering it brings afterward? Answer - because they suppose things that they do not understand. v.3.

Question - why is a glutton addicted to the habit of gluttony? v.4.

Question - what is the intellect's disposition to commit sin? v.5.

Question - what causes perverse appetites in the will? v.6.

Question - why is gluttony opposed to all the virtues? v.7.

Question - with what does a man deceive himself at the table? v.8.

Question - to which sense does gluttony give enjoyment, and to which sense does it cause pain? v.9.

78. Why does a glutton not see the difference between health and illness? Solution - #173.v.1.

Question - how does a glutton use concordance? v.2.

Question - whose enemy is gluttony? v.3.

Question - what are the symptoms of gluttony? v.4.

Does a glutton pervert measure into something beyond measure? v.5.

Why is a glutton never satisfied? Answer - because he is seeking satisfaction through gluttony. v.6.

Question - what things do gluttons enjoy the most? v.7.

Question - with what measure does a glutton measure the innate principles of the vegetative power? v.8.

Question - with what does a glutton get closer to health? v.9.

Chapter 38 - Questions about Gluttony Made with the Rules

70. Does gluttony have more to do with the will than with the intellect? Solution - in rule B, #174.

Question - what is gluttony? Solution - in species 1 of C, #175.

Question - what are the monstrosities of gluttony? Solution - in 2.C.

Question - what is gluttony in the subject in whom it exists? Solution - in 3.C.

Question - what does gluttony have in the subject in whom it exists? Solution - in species 4 of rule C.

Question - why does gluttony arise from nothing? Solution - in species 1 of rule D, #176.

Does gluttony consist of privative habits? Solution - in species 2 of D.

Question - does gluttony belong to the body or to the soul? The answer is that it belongs first

to the soul, and secondly to the body; now sin first arises in the soul and through the soul, before arising in the body. Go to species 3 of D.

Does gluttony occur through necessity, or as a contingency? Solution - in species 1 of E, #177.

Question - why is there gluttony? Solution - in 2.E.

80. Question - why can the glutton have no moral satisfaction, why can he have only physical satisfaction? Solution - in species 1 of F, #178.

Question - what is the quantity of gluttony? Solution - in species 2 of F.

Further, the answer is that there is as much of it as the glutton can broaden his act.

Question - how does gluttony arouse appetites in the will, the imagination and the sense of taste? Solution - in species 1 of G, #179.

Question - which species of gluttony belong to the soul, and which ones belong to the body? Solution - in 2.G.

Question - how does gluttony exist in time? Solution - in rule H, #180.

Question - where are the loci of gluttony? Solution - in rule I, #181.

Question - how does gluttony exist? Answer - it exists through a mode contrary to temperance. Go to the first rule K, #182.

Question - with what does gluttony exist? Solution - in the second rule K, #183.

Chapter 39 - Questions about Lust Made with the Principles

81. Does lust cause fornication just as chastity causes sexual morality? The answer is yes, or else lust would have no way of resisting chastity.

Question - with what does lust resist chastity? Solution - #184.v.1.

Question - how does lust give occasion to remorse? v.2.

Question - with what does guilt endure? v.3.

Question - how does a lecher become addicted to lust? v.4.

Question - why does the lecher believe that lust is not a sin? v.5.

Question - why does lust cause horrible acts behind attractive appearances? v.6.

Question - does lust make belief rise above understanding? v.7.

Question - with what does a lecher deceive himself? v.8.

Question - how does a lecher set himself up for trouble? v.9.

82. Why is a lecher intellectually stubborn? Solution - #185.v.1.

Question - why do beauty and ugliness convene in lust? v.2.

Question - Is lust a habit of contrariety? The answer is yes, because it is a perverse habit. Go to v.3.

Question - when is lust a sin? v.4.

Question - how is the imagination an instrument of lust? v.5.

Question - what is the ultimate end of lust? v.6.

Question - what are the symptoms of major lust? v.7.

Question - through what kind of equality does lust increase? v.8.

Question - how does lust exist in its subject at the same time as something still in progress and as something already done? v.9

Chapter 40 - Questions about Lust Made with the Rules

83. Why does lust begin in the imagination sooner than in the senses, given that its symptoms are sensible? Solution - in rule B, #186.

Question - what is lust? Solution - in species 1 of C, #187.

Question - what does lust have as a species? Solution - in species 2 of C.
 Question - where is lust an intensive sin and where is it an extended sin; where does it exist instantaneously and where does it exist in successive time? Solution - in species 3 of C.
 Why does lust have such great power over the lecher? Answer - because it is his habit.
 Since lust is a very harmful habit, why is it said to be nothing? Solution - in 1.D.#188.
 Question - does lust have anything to do with moral monstrosity? Solution - in 2.D.
 Question - does the lecher belong to lust and vice versa? Solution - in species 3 of D.
 Question - why is there lust? Answer - it exists because its causes exist. Go to species 1 of E, #189.
 Question - why is lust a privative habit, given that the subject in which it exists uses it as an instrument? Solution - in species 2 of rule E.

84. Does lust have continuous quantity? Solution - in species 1 of F, #190.
 Does lust go away when its acts are gone? Solution - in 2.F.
 What is the prime quality of lust? Solution - in species 1 of rule G, #191.
 Question - what is the secondary quality of lust? Solution - in species 2 of rule G.
 Question - how does lust exist in time? Solution - in rule H, #192.
 Question - where does lust cause its species? Solution - in rule I, #193.
 Question - how does lust exist? Solution - in the first rule K, #194.
 Question - with what does lust exist? Solution - in the second rule K, #195.
 Question - with what is lust generated, and with what is it corrupted? Answer - it is generated with the corruption of chastity and corrupted with the generation of chastity.
 Question - what remedy is there for lust? Answer - it consists in often remembering the things said about it, and in imagining the torments of hell and the glory of heaven.

Chapter 41 - Questions about Conceit Made with the Principles

85. Does conceit cause conceited acts just as humility causes humble acts? The answer is yes, because they are contrary habits.
 Question - why does conceit descend as it ascends? Solution - #196.v.1.
 Why does conceit diminish its subject, given that it wants to make him great? verse 2.
 Why is conceit an enemy of the subject in which it exists? verse 3.
 Why can the power of conceit not withstand the power of humility? Answer - because conceit is a privative habit whereas humility is a positive habit. Go to v.4.
 Is conceit a habit that rises aloft through belief and that descends below through understanding? v.5.
 Question - why does a man develop conceit, why does he descend through conceit, and why does he descend by his own act of will? verse 6.
 Does conceit arise from belief or from understanding? verse 7.
 Does conceit belong to the genus of truth? verse 8.
 Why does a conceited man find no repose? Answer - because repose is found in humility. Go to verse 9.
 86. Why does a conceited man have no discretion? Answer - because he does not know himself. Go to #197.v.1.
 Why does conceit convene with every vice? Answer - because humility is in concordance with every virtue. Go to v.2.
 Why does conceit contradict every virtue? Answer - because humility contradicts every vice. Go to v.3.
 Is conceit an occasion for humility? v.4.
 What causes conceit to descend? v.5.

Why does a subject in whom conceit exists find no repose? Answer - because he can find repose in humility. Go to v.6.

What are the symptoms of major conceit? v.7.

Why does a conceited man not want anyone he associates with to be his equal? Answer - because humility wants this. Go to v.8.

Is conceit associated more with the senses than with the intellect, given what the intellect believes? v.9.

Chapter 42 - Questions about Conceit Made with the Rules

87. In which power of the soul does conceit play a greater role, and in which one does it play a lesser role? Solution - in rule B, #198.

Question - what is conceit? Solution - in species 1 of C, #199.

Question - why is conceit a specific sin? Solution - in 2.C.

Question - what is conceit in the other sins? Solution - in 3.C.

Question - what does conceit have in the subject in whom it exists? Solution - in 4.c.

Of what things is conceit a privative habit? Solution - in 1.D.#200.

Question - what are the primary and secondary species of conceit? Solution - in 2.D.

Does the conceited man belong in some way to conceit? The answer is yes, because he is its captive. Go to species 3 of rule D.

Why is there conceit? Solution - in species 1 of E, #201.

Question - what is the intention of conceit? Solution - in 2.E.

88. Can the continuous quantity of conceit be corrupted? Solution - in species 1 of F, #202.

Question - why does conceit have discrete quantities? Solution - in 2.F.

Question - what is the primary passion of conceit? Solution - in species 1 of G, #203.

Question - what is the appropriated passion of conceit? Solution - in species 2 of G.

Question - when does conceit begin? Solution - in rule H, #204.

Question - where does conceit produce its species? Solution - in rule I, #205.

Question - how does conceit exist? Solution - in the first rule K, #206.

Question - with what does conceit exist? Solution - in the second rule K, #207.

Is conceit inherent to all the other sins? The answer is yes, because humility is inherent to all the other virtues.

Is conceit present in evil angels? The answer is yes, because they are inherently evil.

Chapter 43 - Questions about Acedia Made with the Principles

89. Question - does acedia naturally produce acedious acts just as diligence naturally produces diligent acts? The answer is yes, so that they can have the wherewithal to oppose each other.

Question - is the acedious man the way he is because of his evil nature? Solution - #208.v.1.

Question - why does acedia encompass both laziness and diligence ? Solution - v. 1 and 2.

Question - with what things does acedia last? v.3.

Question - why does someone who wants to do good neglect to do it? v.4.

Question - why is the intellect unaware that it has the habit of acedia? v.5.

Question - since the will was created for loving good, why does it hate good? v.6.

Question - why does acedia deem that diligence is a vice? v.7.

Question - why is acedia lazy in acting upon the truth? v.8.

Question - why is the acedious man delighted with evil, and disgusted with good? v.9.

90. Why is acedia an enemy of science? Solution - #209, verse 1.

Question - how does acedia establish concordance? verse 2.

Question— to what is acedia opposed? verse 3.
 Question - how does laziness relate to the causes? verse 4.
 Question - how does acedia impede good? verse 5.
 Question - why is the acedious man always in trouble? verse 6.
 Question - what is the source of vice? verse 7.
 Question - how does acedia increase in strength? verse 8.
 Question - what is minor acedia close to? verse 9.

Chapter 44 - Questions about Acedia Made with the Rules

91. Question - why is acedia the least known of the sins? Solution - in rule B, #210.
 Question - what is acedia? Solution - in species 1 of C, #211.
 Question - where do the correlatives of acedia come from? Solution - in 2.C.
 Question - what is acedia in the other vices? Solution - in 3.C.
 Question - what does laziness have in good things, and what does it have in evil things?
 Solution - in species 4 of rule C.
 Question - why is acedia a privative habit? Solution - in species 1 of D, #212.
 Question - what things does acedia consist of? Solution - in 2.D.
 Question - is acedia a bond that binds its subject to doing evil? Solution - in 3.D.
 Question - why does acedia act in accordance with its own species? Solution - in species 1 of E, #213.
 Question - what is the purpose of acedia? Solution - in 2.E.
 92. Can acedia be mixed without continuous quantity? Solution - in species 1 of rule F, #214.
 Why does acedia have successive acts, although it is not made of points or lines? Solution - in specie 2 of F.
 What is the proper quality of acedia? Solution - in species 1 of G, #215.
 Question - what are the appropriated passions of acedia? Solution - in species 2 of G.
 Question - how does an acedious man spend his time? Solution - in rule H, #216.
 Where is acedia located? Solution - in rule I, #217.
 How is acedia engendered? Solution - in the first rule K, #218.
 With what things is acedia made? Solution - in the second rule K, #219.
 Question - is acedia caused by the intellect or by the will? Answer - by both, in different ways: it is caused by the intellect through laziness, but the will causes it more through solicitude, because the intellect has to work to acquire species, whereas the will does this without effort.
 Question - why are both laziness and diligence species of acedia? Answer - because the intellect's inherent lack of interest in the truth causes laziness, whereas the will inherently disposed to do evil causes diligence.

Chapter 45 - Questions about Envy Made with the Principles

93. Does envy have enviable objects just as the senses have sensible objects? The answer is yes, or else envy would not be a specific sin. However, the sensitive power has natural species, whereas envy has moral species.
 Is it absolutely good to have an appetite for good things? Solution - #220.v.1
 Can any one virtue alone destroy envy? v.2.
 Question - how can envy be vanquished? v.3.
 Question - with what powers can envy be vanquished? v.4.
 Question - what is the remedy against envy? v.5.
 Question - what is the corruption of envy? v.6.

Question - how can the envious man change his habits and become virtuous? v.7.
 Question - how does the envious man deceive himself? v.8.
 Question - why does envy bring no enjoyment to the subject in whom it exists? v.9.
 94. How can an envious man cure himself of envy by enumerating the vices? Solution - #221.v.1.
 What does the intellect do to resist envy? v.2.
 How do the habits of envy compare to those of charity? v.3.
 What is the disposition of envy? v.4.
 With what does the envious man measure things? v.5.
 Can envy bring repose? v.6.
 With what majority can major envy be vanquished? v.7.
 With what kind of equality can the equality of envy be vanquished? v.8.
 How does the envious man consider his own possessions and those of others? v.9.

Chapter 46 - Questions about Envy Made with the Rules

95. Why is envy a sin more generalized than avarice? Solution - in rule B, #222.
 Question - what is envy? Solution - in species 1 of C, #223.
 What things make envy what it is? Solution - in 2.C.
 What is envy in its subject? Solution - in 3.C.
 What does envy have in the acedious man? Solution - in 4.C.
 Question - from what does envy arise as a specific sin? Solution - in species 1 of D, #224.
 What are the secondary components of envy? Solution - in species 2 of D.
 Does envy consist of intellectual ignorance and ill will? Solution - in species 3 of D.
 Why is envy an effect of something else? Solution - in species 1 of E, #225.
 Is envy an enemy of the subject in which it exists? Solution - in 2.E.
 96. What quantity of envy is there? Solution - #226.
 Why can envy have a great number of different acts? Solution - in 2.F.
 What is the primary passion of envy? Solution - in 1.sp.G.#227
 What is the secondary passion of envy? Solution - in 2.G.
 How does envy exist in time? Solution - in rule H, #228.
 Where are the symptoms of envy found? Solution - in rule I, #229.
 How does envy exist? Solution - in the first rule K, #230.
 By what symptoms can one recognize envy? Solution - in the second rule K, #231.
 Does envy come down from the intellect or from the will? Answer - from both, by conceit from the intellect and by avarice from the will.
 Are the powers of memory and imagination common to envy? The answer is yes, because they are powers common to the intellect and to the will.

Chapter 47 - Questions about Ire Made with the Principles

97. Does ire have as many things to be angry about as charity has things to which it can be charitable? The answer is no, given that nature has more perfections than monstrosities.
 What is the remedy against ire? Solution - #232.v.1.
 With what do we overcome ire? v.2.
 Is the act of ire also the duration of ire? v.3.
 With what power is the power of ire defeated? v.4.
 How does prudence defeat ire? v.5.
 How does charity increase its act? v.6.
 How does the will pass from ire to virtue? v.7.

How is ire above understanding, and vice versa? v.8.

What makes the irate man suffer, and what makes him recover? v.9.

98. Why does the irate man not distinguish between his own evil and the evil in others?

Solution - #233.v.1.

With what things does the irate man agree and with what things does he disagree? v.2.

What dominates ire? v.3.

With what is ire generated, and with what is it corrupted? v.4.

With what does ire measure things? v.5.

Why can one find no repose in anger? Answer - because there is no repose in ire, but only in patience. v.6.

Which is greater, absolute ire or absolute patience? v.7.

What things in the genus of ire can be equalized? v.8.

Which can be lesser: patience, or ire? v.9.

Chapter 48 - Questions about Ire Made with the Rules

99. Is ire a sin more general than any other sin? Solution - in rule B, #234.

What is ire? Solution - in species 1 of C, #235.

Why is ire a confused habit? Solution - in sp.2.C.

What is ire in the soul? Solution - in 3.C.

Why does ire increase as more attention is paid to it? Solution - in 4.C.

Does ire arise on its own? Solution - in species 1 of rule D, #236

What are the constituent principles of ire? Does ire have any dominion? Solution - in species 3 of D.

Why is ire an effect of something else? Solution - in 1.E.#237.

What is the purpose of ire? Solution - in species 2 of E.

100. What is the continuous quantity of ire? Solution - in 1.F.#238.

Why does ire increase or decrease its acts? Answer - because the things one gets irate about are species of ire.

Is fury the proper passion of ire? Solution - in species 1 of G, #239.

What are the secondary passions of ire? Solution - in 2.G.

How does ire exist in time? Answer - it is through its indivisible continuous quantity and through its discrete quantity, with which it successively increases and decreases its acts. Go to rule H, #240.

Where is ire located? Solution - in rule I, #241.

How does ire exist? Solution - in the first rule K, #242.

With what does ire exist? Solution - in the second rule K, #243.

What provides material to ire? Answer - the things that arouse ire.

What is the act of ire? Answer - it is the act of getting irate, which arises from action and passion.

Chapter 49 - Questions about Falsehood Made with the Principles

101. Does falsehood have as many things to falsify as legality has things to legitimize? The answer is no, because falsehood is a privative habit whereas legality is a positive habit.

Can a false man falsify as much as a law-abiding man can verify? The answer is no, because goodness is a habit of legality, whereas evil is a habit of falsehood. Go to #244.v.1.

How do we recognize falsehood? v.2.

With what is falsehood destroyed? v.3.

What makes falsehood powerful? v.4.
 With what does falsehood deceive the intellect? v.5.
 What are the symptoms of falsehood? v.6.
 Is hypocrisy a habit of falsehood? v.7.
 Why can falsehood be detected? v.8.
 How are joys and sorrows signs of falsehood? v.9.

102. Does falsehood confuse differences to make them unrecognizable? Solution - #245.v.1.
 How does falsehood deceive the imagination? v.2.
 What can be used to apprehend falsehood, and what can be opposed to it? v.3.
 How can falsehood be detected through the causal principles? v.4.
 How can falsehood be detected by considering the medium? v.5.
 How can falsehood be detected by considering the end? v.6.
 By what majority can major falsehood be detected? v.7.
 How can falsehood be detected by considering equality? v.8.
 Is it legitimate to lie in order to communicate a greater truth? The answer is yes, on the condition that falsehood is not a cause but an occasion. v.9

Chapter 50 - Questions about Falsehood Made with the Rules

103. Can falsehood resist temptation as strongly as truth can? The answer is no, because fortitude is a virtue that concords with legality. Go to rule B, #246.
 What is falsehood? Solution - in species 1 of C, #247.
 With what things does the essence of falsehood exist? Solution - in 2.C.
 What is falsehood in other habits? Solution - in 3.C.
 How can one be skilled in falsehood? Solution - in species 4 of rule C.
 What is the prime principle of falsehood? Solution - in species 1 of D, #248.
 Does falsehood act in accordance with its own species? Solution - in species 2 of D.
 Does falsehood have more to do with the will or with the intellect? Answer - it has more to do with will as a cause, but with the intellect as an instrument.
 What causes falsehood? Solution - in species 1 of rule E, #249.
 To what end does falsehood lead? Solution - in species 2 of E.

104. What is the continuous quantity of falsehood? Solution - in species 1 of F, #250.
 What is the material for increasing or decreasing falsehood? Solution - in 2.F.
 What is the primary passion of falsehood? Solution - in 1.sp.G.#251.
 What is the appropriated quality of falsehood? Solution - in 2.G.
 Does falsehood exist in succession with discrete quantity, and in its subject with continuous quantity? Solution - in rule H, #252.
 Question - where is falsehood located? Solution - in rule I, #253.
 How does falsehood exist? Solution - in the first rule K, # 254.
 With what does falsehood exist? Solution - in the second rule K, #255.
 What resists falsehood the most: prudence, or charity? Answer - prudence resists like a lion, but charity resists like a lamb.
 Does falsehood most resist the imagination, or the senses? Answer - it resists the imagination with lies, but the senses with hypocrisy.

Chapter 51 - Questions about Inconstancy Made with the Principles

105. Does inconstancy have species as constancy has? The answer is yes, or else it could not be an evil habit of falsehood and things of this kind.

Why is inconstancy a sin? #256.v.1.

How do we overcome inconstancy? v.2.

Why is constancy corrupted? v.3.

Why does inconstancy have no power over the power of constancy? Answer - because the power of constancy convenes with being, whereas the power of inconstancy convenes with non-being. Here, the intellect understands why sinners can recover from sin. v.4.

Why does inconstancy debilitate the intellect? Answer - because it is a habit of alteration. v.5.

Why is inconstancy not lovable in any way? v.6.

Why is there feigned constancy? v.7.

Is truth common to both constancy and inconstancy? v.8.

Why does inconstancy belong to the genus of trouble? Answer - because constancy belongs to the genus of repose. v.9.

106. What does inconstancy do with difference? Solution - #257.v.1.

How is concordance a sign of inconstancy? v.2.

How is prudence an enemy of inconstancy? v.3.

Why is inconstancy a secondary thing? v.4.

Why is perseverance an enemy of inconstancy? v.5.

Can constancy and inconstancy both have a common purpose? v.6.

Why can major inconstancy overcome major constancy? Answer - because being is prior and non-being is consequent. v.7.

How are constancy and inconstancy equal? v.8.

Why is inconstancy easily defeated? v.9.

Chapter 52 - Questions about Inconstancy Made with the Rules

107. With which faculty is inconstancy most closely connected? Solution - in rule B, #258.v.1.

What is inconstancy? Solution - in 1.sp.C.#259.

How is inconstancy a specific sin? Solution - in 2.C.

What is inconstancy in a man's faculties? Solution - in 3.C.

What does inconstancy have in man's will and intellect? Solution - in species 4 of rule C.

Does the essence of inconstancy descend from some other essence? Solution - in 1.D.#260.

Of what specific principles does inconstancy consist? Solution - in 2.D.

To whom does inconstancy belong? Solution - in species 3 of rule D.

What is the true similarity between moral habits and natural habits? Solution - in species 1 of E, #261.

How does the intellect know that sin is nothing? Solution - in species 2 of rule E.

108. With what measure can we measure the quantity of inconstancy? Solution - in species 1 of rule F, #262.

On which faculty does the power of inconstancy depend? Solution - in 2.F.

What is the primary passion of inconstancy? Solution - in species 1 of G, #263.

What is the secondary passion of inconstancy, and what is its disposition? Solution - in 2.G.

How does inconstancy exist in time? Solution - in rule H, #264.

Where is inconstancy located? Solution - in rule I, #265.

How does inconstancy exist? Solution - in the first rule K, #266.

With what does inconstancy exist? Solution - in the second rule K, #267.

Question - with which vices does inconstancy fight most strongly against constancy? Answer - with avarice, pride and gluttony.

We are done with the questions about the vices, and with the nine subjects; and we have given a doctrine for solving the above questions as well as peregrine ones, following the method we used.

Section 6 - Questions about the Tenth Main Part of this Book, on Application

1. In this part, we make questions and refer them to the chapters and articles found in the tenth part, as they implicitly contains the solutions which we leave up to the diligent reader's intellect. Now we formulate many questions about each chapter and each article, and the solution to each question is implicit in the appropriate part of the text so that the first question refers to the first verse, the second question to the second verse and so on. The verses have neither titles nor numbers, for the sake of brevity, at the end of each set of questions, we refer their solutions to the appropriate chapter or article. Nonetheless, we will solve a few questions right here.

Chapter 1 - Questions about Applying Implicit and Explicit Terms

2. We ask; how do implicit and explicit terms apply?

How do these terms apply to the question: "is God eternal?"

How do they apply to this question: "is it good for God to be as great in his greatness as in his eternity?"

How do they apply to the principles in the question: "is God as powerful with his power as with his will?"

How do they apply to the principles in the question: "is God just?"

Go to the tenth part of this book, chapter 1, where the solutions to these questions are implicitly contained.

Chapter 2 - Questions about Applying Abstract and Concrete Terms

3. Question: how do the principles apply in abstract and concrete terms? Answer: it is through the four methods discussed in the tenth part of this book, chapter 2.

By the first method we ask whether there is any difference between fire and igneity. When the terms are applied to goodness, greatness etc. with their correlatives, the difference between abstract and concrete becomes evident.

By the second method: "is there any difference between quantity and quantum?" Accidental goodness is applied to the abstract and moral goodness to the concrete, namely "quantum".

By the third method: "is there any difference between heat and a hot thing?" Substantial goodness applies to heat, and accidental goodness to hot things.

By the fourth method: "is there any difference between whiteness and white things?"
Accidental goodness applies to whiteness, and substantial good to white things, as to a white man, who is a substance. Go to part 10, chapter 2.

Chapter 3 - Questions about Applying the First Figure

4. Can we prove things about God through equal parity, which is a proof different from those made with reference to the cause or to the effect? For instance, we ask whether goodness and greatness convert in God. To answer this question, we can apply eternity, power etc. with their definitions and correlatives signified by species 2 of rule C, so that there is a circular conversion of subjects and predicates. Go to part 10, chapter 3, on applying the first figure.

Chapter 4 - Questions about Applying the Second Figure

5. We ask how to apply the second figure, for instance if we ask if there is any difference between one goodness and another. The terms in the question apply to the ladder of difference. We can ask, "What are entirely general principles, subalternate principles and entirely specific principles?" Moreover, we can ask, "How does the second figure apply to and serve the first figure?" Go to part 10, chapter 4, on applying the second figure.

Chapter 5 - Questions about Applying the Third Figure

6. If we ask whether goodness is great; or whether goodness can be great without concordance; or what the correlatives of goodness are; we can apply the questions to camera BC, and hold to the conclusions signified by the camera. Go to part 10, chapter 5, on applying the third figure.

Chapter 6 - Questions about Applying the Fourth Figure

7. We ask whether divine goodness is as great as divine eternity and whether God is as powerful in his power as he is in his intellect and will. We can apply the terms of the first question to camera BCD and the terms of the second question to camera EFG, and hold to the conclusions signified by the letters of the cameras. Go to chapter 6 on applying the fourth figure.

Chapter 7 - Questions about Applying Definitions

8. If a question is put about anything, apply the subject of the inquiry to its definition, that is to say, define it and draw the conclusion about the subject from its definition. For instance, we ask whether God has an infinite act. We define God as follows: God is infinite being. We conclude as follows: no being can be infinite without having an infinite act; but God is infinite; therefore, God cannot be infinite without an infinite act; likewise with other questions. Go to chapter 7 on applying definitions.

Chapter 8 - Questions about Applying the Rules

9. If we are investigating some uncertain issue, we can apply the rules to its definition and discuss it with the entire sequence of rules, and clear up the doubt by applying the rules and their species. Now the clarification of a doubt leads to an affirmative or negative conclusion.

This rule is infallible, like a sign that never fails to signify what it stands for. Examples of this are given in the nine subjects. Go to chapter 8 on applying the rules.

Chapter 9 - Questions about Applying the Table

10. We ask whether there is an infinite and eternal act. We can apply this question to the first column, and ask, by rule C, what an infinite act is in goodness according to the definition of goodness, what it is in greatness according to the definition of greatness and what it is in eternity according to the definition of eternity; all this by the third species of rule C. Then we apply it to the correlatives of goodness, greatness and eternity signified by the second species. Then we draw our conclusions according to the meanings of the letters, and so forth. Go to chapter 9 on applying the table.

Chapter 10 - Questions about Applying the Evacuation of the Third Figure

11. The evacuation of the third figure applies as follows. If the question is in terms of goodness and greatness, or goodness and concordance, and so forth, we can apply the question to camera BC and evacuate this camera following the method provided for evacuating the third figure, and apply the things extracted from the camera to the issue at hand. Go to chapter 10 on applying the evacuation of the third figure.

Chapter 11 - Questions about Applying the Multiplication of the Fourth Figure

12. We ask; how can we find 20 reasons in support of the same conclusion?
How does one find the middle term between the subject and the predicate in making a syllogism?
How do we prove the major and minor premises of a syllogism?
How we resolve fallacies by this art?
How can we easily learn other sciences with this art?
Go to chapter 11 on applying the multiplication of the fourth figure.

Chapter 12- Questions about Applying the Mixture of Principles and Rules

13. We ask - how do principles combine with each other to solve questions?
How are principles and rules combined to solve questions?
How do the rules combine with each other to solve questions?
How do implicit principles apply to explicit principles, such as the hundred forms and other peregrine forms? Go to chapter 12 on applying the mixture of principles and rules.

Chapter 13 - Questions about Applying the Nine Subjects

14. If the question asks about God, angels, heaven, man, the imaginative, the sensitive, the vegetative, the elementative, or about morals, to which loci should we refer to find the solution? Go to chapter 13 on applying the nine subjects.

Chapter 14 – Questions about Applying the Hundred Forms - Article 1 – About Entity

15. We ask - what is entity? What is the concrete of entity? What is the difference between entity and being? We answer by the second species of rule C, which signifies its concretes, as do the second species of rule D and the first of E. Go to the hundred forms, the first article on entity.

Article 2 - Questions about Essence

16. Do entity and essence convert? The answer is yes, or else 'thing' and 'being' would not convert. Is there any difference between essence and being? *ibid.* article 2.

Article 3 - Questions about Unity

17. We ask; what is unity? Why is this goodness in unity, why is this greatness in unity? Are goodness, greatness etc. different in creatures? Moreover, if they are different, why are they different? Answer: so that unity can be the cause of many unities, just as difference causes many numerically different unities. What is the concrete of unity? And if we say that unity is one, may I ask why its concrete exists? I answer that unity has 'unit' as its concrete so that it can have a subject to sustain it, and so that difference can enter between unity and unit, just as it enters between essence and being. Go to article 3.

Article 4 - Questions about Plurality

18. We ask: what is plurality? What is the source of plurality? What causes the difference between goodness, greatness etc? What is the concrete of plurality? Article 4, *ibid.*

Article 5 - Questions about Nature

19. We ask; what is nature? Are there any substantial principles? The answer is yes, as shown by the second species of rule C. What is the concrete of nature? With what things does nature combine? Go to article 5.

Article 6 - Questions about Genus

20. We ask; what is genus? To which principles does genus apply? Is absolute good a genus? Is absolute, great, eternal etc. being, a genus? Is goodness more general substantially than accidentally? The answer is yes, goodness is primarily a substance, and secondarily an accident. Is genus a real thing that exists outside the soul? The answer is yes, or else the soul would cause the differences among species, which is impossible. Can irrational animals imagine a genus? The answer is no, or else they would develop science. Moreover, the imagination does not attain abstract objects through lines, figures and colours and other such imaginable things; it only attains concrete things in this way. Go to article 6.

Article 7 - Questions about Species

21. What is a species? To which loci of this art does species apply? How does a form act in accordance with its species? Is species something real outside the soul? Can a genus without species have any individuals? What is the concrete of species? What is the difference between natural and moral species? What are the species of the virtues and vices? Article 7.

Article 8 - Questions about Individuality

22. What is individuality? How do we define individuality? What are the correlatives of individuality? Why is an individual indivisible? Would an individual exist outside the soul, supposing that species did not exist outside the soul? Why are the correlatives of individuals not perceptible to the senses? What is the concrete of individuality? Why is "individual" the concrete of individuality? Answer - because individuality has indivisible concretes. Go to article 8.

Article 9 - Questions about Property

23. We ask; what is property? How is property an implicit principle of this art? To which rule does the definition of property apply? Why is property a reason for proper things to produce proper things? Is property a cause for appropriating just as difference is a cause of differentiating? What things does the concrete of property consist of? How does property relate to natural and moral things? How is property a cause? In addition, how does property relate to the mechanical arts? Go to article 9.

Article 10 - Questions about Simplicity

24. What is simplicity? What things does simplicity cause? To what things does simplicity apply? What are the correlatives of simplicity? What is the concrete of simplicity, and from what does it arise? Go to article 10.

Article 11 - Questions about Composition

25. We ask; what is composition? To what things does composition apply? From what does composition arise? What are compound correlatives? Could composition exist in a subject, supposing that its principles were not essentially in the subject? The answer is no, because the compound would have nothing to sustain its existence, and the correlatives of composition, the second species of rule D and the first of E would not exist in the world. Go to article 11.

Article 12 - Questions about Form

26. We ask: what is form? To which principles does form apply? What is the difference between created and uncreated form? Can form act without its correlatives? Why is form imperceptible to the senses? What is the concrete of form? What sensible things signify form? Go to article 12.

Article 13 - Questions about Matter

27. We ask; what is matter? To which principles of this art does matter apply? Does matter have correlatives? The answer is no, or else it would belong to the genus of action. Of what does the concrete of matter consist? What is the universal source of matter? Go to article 13.

Article 14 - Questions about Substance

28. We ask; what is substance? To which principles does substance apply? Does substance have correlatives? Does all created substance consist of form and matter? What is the concrete of substance? Why does substance exist on its own? Answer: because it is active in form, passive in matter and compound due to the conjunction of form and matter. Why is substance the substrate of accidents? Answer: because it cannot exist or act without them. Can substance be sensed? The answer is no, because the senses cannot objectify a much with substance as with accidents. Go to article 14.

Article 15 - Questions about Accidents

29. We ask; what is an accident? Where does accident apply? Is an accident mainly an end in itself, or does it exist for some other end? From what do accidents arise? What is the concrete of accident? Are there two kinds of accidents, namely intrinsic and extrinsic ones? Do the senses attain intrinsic accidents? Can the imagination imagine an intrinsic accident without a sensible extrinsic accident? Can the intellect make science without intrinsic and extrinsic accidents? Go to article 15.

Article 16 - Questions about Quantity

30. We ask; what is quantity? Go to the definition of goodness, part 3 #1, and define quantity in the way that we defined goodness by saying: quantity is the thing whereby a quantum quantifies a quantum. From what things does quantity arise? Does sequence cause quantity? What are the principles for measuring quantity? What is the concrete of quantity? Go to article 16.

Article 17 - Questions about Quality

31. We ask; how do we define quality? Go to the definition of goodness and define it in the way that we defined goodness, saying: quality is the reason for qualified things to produce qualified things. To what does quality apply as a habit? In what things is quality disposed? What is the concrete of quality? What does quality arise from, and why is it an accident? Go to article 17.

Article 18 - Questions about Relation

32. We ask; which terms help us to define relation? What is a related thing? Is contraction a principle of relation? Can a principle without correlatives be a principle? Go to article 18.

Article 19 - Questions about Action

33. To what things does action apply, so it can be applied as a term? Is action the thing whereby the doer does what is done? Is an activated thing a concrete of action? By what things is the concrete of action indicated and clarified? Go to article 19.

Article 20 - Questions about Passion

34. To which principles does the definition of passion apply? Is general passiveness the source of passion? Is passion something from which passive things arise? Is a passive thing a concrete of passion? How is passion passive? Go to article 20.

Article 21 - Questions about Habit

35. To which principles of this art does the definition of habit apply? How is a natural habit different from a moral habit? What is the concrete of habit, and with what is it habituated? From what does habit arise? Are there both extrinsic and intrinsic habits? Go to article 21.

Article 22 - Questions about Situation

36. To which principles of this art does the definition of situation apply? Is situation an accident? What are the correlatives of things situated in? What is the concrete of situation? From what does situation arise, and where is it located? Go to article 22.

Article 23 - Questions about Time

37. What is time? To which principles does time apply? With what is time multiplied? Is motion a sign of time? What is the concrete of time? Go to article 23.

Article 24 - Questions about Locus

38. What is locus? To which explicit principles does locus apply? Is locus something mobile? From what things does locus arise? What is the concrete of locus? Are located and mobile things signs of locus? The answer is yes. Go to article 24.

Article 25 - Questions about Movement

39. To which principles does movement apply? From what correlatives do the correlatives of movement arise? Does movement arise when its correlatives arise? Can absolute innate movement be sensed? Is mobility a disposition of movement? When motion is under way, is it both a mover and something moved? Does appetite cause motion? Does heaven have correlatives through movement? What is the concrete of movement? Does heaven repose in movement, or in what is moved? Go to article 25.

Article 26 - Questions about Immobility

40. What is immobility? To which principles does immobility apply? What is the concrete of immobility? What are the concretes of immobility? Why are immobile things immobile? How can something mobile be immobile? Go to article 26.

Article 27 - Questions about Instinct

47. What is natural instinct? To which principles does natural instinct apply? What is the concrete of natural instinct? What is the general source whereby each form acts in accordance with its own species? Go to article 27.

Article 28 - Questions about Appetite

42. How can we define natural appetite? To which principles can we apply natural appetite? Which are the general principles that precede appetite? What things cause the concrete of appetite? Can appetite repose without an object? What makes appetite last? What makes appetite grow? Is appetite both a mover and something moved? Go to article 28.

Article 29 - Questions about Attraction

43. How can we define attraction? To which principles does attraction apply? Does attraction in any way belong to the genus of passion? Does an attractor attract the attracted outside of its essence? From what does the attractor attract the attracted? What is the concrete of attraction? Is an attracted thing a subject of attraction? Is attraction a habit of the attracted thing? Why is there attraction? Does an attractor attract things in accordance with its species? From which attractions do moral attractions derive? Go to article 29.

Article 30 - Questions about Reception

44. What is reception? To which principles does reception apply? Due to its correlatives, does reception belong to the genus of action and passion? Where does reception receive the receivable? From what does it receive it, and why? Does the receiver belong to the genus of power and the received to the genus of object? Does a power move itself with its object, or does the object move the power? What is the concrete of reception? Is the passive correlative an entirely general genus? Is the receivable correlative a subalternate genus? Does the receivable correlative have species? Go to article 30.

Article 31 - Questions about Phantasm

45. What is a phantasm? To which principles does the definition of phantasm apply? Are phantasms in their subjects potentially through possibility, or are they in their objects as matter? Where does a power receive phantasms? Can phantasms arise without any passion in the faculties? Are phantasms in the making in the senses, and in actual being in the imagination and intellect? How are science and morality generated? How can the soul receive the same phantasm in different ways? Why are phantasms more general to man than to irrational animals? Are fantasies subjects or concretes of phantasm? Do fantasies consist of the likenesses of principles? Are there any phantasms in the senses? Go to article 31.

Article 32 - Questions about Fullness

46. What is fullness? To which principles does the definition of fullness apply the most? Can a power be full without correlatives? Can an elemented thing be full in the absence of the elemental essences? Is idleness the emptiness of a power? What is the concrete of fullness? Can empty things entirely fill a full thing? Do the correlatives of the principles belong to the genus of fullness? Does a full thing mean being and does an empty thing mean non-being? Do

positive habits belong to the genus of fullness? Do privative habits belong to the genus of emptiness? Does generation lead to fullness and corruption to emptiness? Go to article 32.

Article 33 - Questions about Diffusion

47. What is diffusion? To which principles does its definition apply? What are the correlatives of diffusion? Can goodness, without its innate diffusion, diffuse itself outwardly into other essences? Is a diffused thing a subject of diffusion? Is diffusion a habit of diffused things? Does diffusion signify genus, and does restriction signify species? Does diffusion cause generosity and does restriction cause avarice? Go to article 33.

Article 34 - Questions about Digestion

48. What is digestion? To which principles does its definition apply? To what correlatives do the correlatives of digestion apply? What is the concrete subject of digestion? Are the species of the powers digested, and where are they digested? Are they digested in the same way in the sensitive power as in the vegetative; and in the imaginative in the same way as in the sensitive; and in the rational faculty in the same way as in the imaginative? Go to article 34.

Article 35 - Questions about Expulsion

49. What is expulsion? To which principles does its definition apply? What are the signs of expulsion, and in what subjects do they appear? Does one phantasm expel another phantasm just as in the vegetative, a new leaf expels an old leaf? Does the act of one habit expel the act of another habit? What is the concrete of expulsion? Is sin expelled from divine grace? The answer is no, because sin never was in divine grace; but it is expelled from the sinner by divine grace. Go to article 35.

Article 36 - Questions about Signification

50. What is signification, and to which principles does its definition apply? Is a good thing a sign of goodness, and vice versa? What is occultation, and to which principles does its definition apply? Is an occulted thing a sign of occultation and vice versa? Is an accident a sign of substance and vice versa? Is greatness a sign of goodness and vice versa? Does an opposite signify its opposite and vice versa? Without signs, can the imagination imagine, or can the intellect understand anything? Is an act a sign of a power? Is an object of an act a sign of the power? Is the affatus a sign of the mind? Is a sensible object a sign of sense? Does the subject signify the predicate and vice versa? Go to article 36.

Article 37 - Questions about Beauty

51. What is beauty? To which principles does its definition apply? Is greatness the beauty of goodness? Are correlatives beauties of goodness? Are the moral virtues beauties of goodness? Is majority a beauty of virtue? Are vices human ugliness? Is greater faith the beauty of a greater law? Are disposition and proportion forms of beauty? Is beauty the ultimate end? Go to article 37.

Article 38 - Questions about Newness

52. What is newness? Can an effect exist without newness? Can time and place be without newness, and vice versa? Does a second newness make a previous newness old? Do infinity and eternity belong to the genus of newness? Why is nobility more due to oldness than to newness? Why do people enjoy new things? Answer - because we are traveling on a road. Can there be movement without newness? Go to article 38.

Article 39 - Questions about Idea

53. What is an idea? To which principles does its definition apply? Can the same idea be at the same time old in one way and new in another way? Can an idea exist without the divine correlatives? Is newness the effect of an idea? Is an idea impeded by its own effect? Do finite and new things impede infinite and eternal ones, and vice versa? Are ideated things signs or likenesses of ideas? Are ideas infinite as a cause and finite as an effect? Go to article 39.

Article 40 - Questions about Metaphysics

54. What is metaphysics? Is metaphysics the cause of all sciences? Is metaphysics a sign of the ideas? Why is metaphysics beyond nature? Answer - because it is not outside the soul. Why can a body divide into an infinite number of parts? Answer - because metaphysics is a sign of infinity. Is metaphysics a habit of the intellect with regard to intelligible infinity just as faith is a habit of the intellect with regard to credible infinity? Go to article 40.

Article 41 - Questions about Potential Being

55. What is potential being? Is a being that exists in potentiality outside of movement, quantity and things like this? How do accidents arise? Does one accident arise from another, like motion from motion, quantity from quantity and so forth? How does one substance arise from another substance, and one accident from another accident, and accidents from substance? Go to article 41.

Article 42 - Questions about Punctuality

56. What is punctuality? Why are there points? Can we sense or imagine a point? Is the natural point accessible only to the intellect? Given that the natural point has never been sensed or imagined, what does the intellect use to make a science of it? Why is a point indivisible? Go to article 42.

Article 43 - Questions about the Line

57. What is a line? Why is the line the second part of body? Is a line made of points? What is the most basic physical particle? What are the prime causes of continuous and discrete quantity? If a line was not made of points, could it be divided? What is the cause of length? What is the cause of breadth? What things cause surface? From what things does depth arise? What comes first in generation: is it rotundity, or length, or breadth, or depth? What are the prime basic principles of body? Why is circumference a higher figure? Go to article 43.

Article 44 - Questions about the Triangle

58. What is a triangle? Where is the natural triangle? How does one triangle rule over other triangles? How does the triangle stand in generation and corruption? What things constitute an angle of a triangle? How many triangles are there in an elemented thing? Of what things is a body full? Is there anything in the intellect that the senses never perceived? Go to article 44.

Article 45 - Questions about the Square

59. What is a square? Why can a square divide into four equal triangles? Why does the natural square have four right angles? How does natural multiplication proceed in elemented things? In natural things, why does multiplication first proceed with a line, secondly with an acute angle, third with a right angle and finally with a circle? Are the point and the circle extremes of natural things? What are the causes of straightness and obliqueness? Go to article 45.

Article 46 - Questions about the Circle

60. What is the circle? Why is the circle the ultimate figure? Why does the circle extensively contain all other figures whereas they do not contain it? What are the prime parts of the circle? Why is the circle the greatest figure that can be? Is the circle a sign of infinity? Is circular movement a sign of the infinite at work? Go to article 46.

Article 47 - Questions about Body

61. What is body? Which parts of body are different in species? Does body consist of several species? Why does body act in accordance with its species? Is there some species consists of several species? Why is body the only divisible thing? Why does body have continuous and discrete quantity? Why do bodies terminate one another? Of what things is body composed? Why is the eighth sphere not in any locus? How does body exist in space, time and movement? Why are all bodies finite? Is there intrinsic and extrinsic movement in body? Go to article 47.

Article 48 - Questions about Figure

62. What is a figure? What is the difference between a figure that we sense and one that we imagine? Of what things does a figure consist? Is a figure an objective sign of matter? Which senses objectify figures the most? After death, does the soul retain impressions of the senses through figure? Go to article 48.

Article 49 - Questions about the Directions

63. What are the six directions, and why are there neither more nor less than six of them? What things cause the center? Is movement possible without the six directions? Are the six directions co-essential parts of movement? Is a diametrical line one of the six directions? Given that the eighth sphere is a body, why does it not have six directions? Answer - because a concave figure does not essentially contain any diametrical lines. Go to article 49.

Article 50 - Questions about Monstrosity

64. What is monstrosity? Does monstrosity stand somewhere between positive and privative habit? Is there a general monstrosity from which all particular monstrosities descend? Is monstrosity something outside the natural correlatives? Does monstrosity arise from contingent factors? The answer is yes, because it lacks straight instinct and appetite. Go to article 50.

Article 51 - Questions about Derivation

65. What is derivation? Does derivation contain any correlatives? What are the causes of derivation? What are the effects of derivation? Is movement possible without derivation? Does derivation follow from disposition and proportion? From what do sciences derive, and how? We ask the same about the mechanical arts. Go to article 51.

Article 52 - Questions about Shadow

66. What is shadow? Is shadow a privative habit? What causes shadow? To what does the colour of a shadow belong? To what does the shape of a shadow belong? How does a shadow exist? Is there one general shadow from which all particular shadows descend? Given that crystal is transparent, why are there shadows in it? Given that the sun and the moon are clear bodies, why is the moon a shadowy body, whereas the sun is not? Is monstrosity a shadow of nature? Is ignorance a shadow in the intellect? Is sin a shadow of virtue? Go to article 52.

Article 53 - Questions about Mirrors

67. What is a mirror? Why does a mirror reflect figures, whereas plain glass does not? From what does the shadow in a mirror arise? What are the constituent principles of shadow in a mirror? Why does a whole mirror cause one shadow, but when divided, why does it cause several shadows of the same species? Answer: it is because its quantity is continuous and divided. Go to article 53.

Article 54 - Questions about Color

68. What is colour in its subject? Of what correlatives are the correlatives of colour a habit? Can one colour include many colourable things? Does colour lend colour to air in accordance with its species? How is colour a proper and an appropriated passion? Why can the sight not perceive colour without shape? How does one habit exist on top of another? Why are there not many whitenesses of different species? Answer - because colour is an entirely general genus. Go to article 54.

Article 55 - Questions about Proportion

69. What is proportion? To which principles does its definition apply? What are the principles of proportion? Can there be proportion without disposition and conditions? Is there any monstrosity in proportion? Why is there no proportion between finite and infinite things? If infinite being had no correlatives, would finite being be in proportion to it? Does newness have any proportion to eternity? Can there be any proportion in infinity? Go to article 55.

Article 56 - Questions about Disposition

70. What is disposition? What is substantial and accidental disposition? Is a stone as disposed to be sensed as the senses are disposed to sense the stone? Is a sense as disposed to be imagined as the imagination is disposed to imagine it? Is the imagination as disposed to be understood by the intellect as the intellect is disposed to understand the imagination? Is the intellect more disposed to believe in God than to understand God? The answer is yes, but only through faith. Is God more disposed to be remembered than memory is disposed to remember him? The answer is yes, or else there would be no point in hope. Is God more disposed to be loved than the human will is disposed to love him? The answer is yes, or else there would be no point in charity. Is God more disposed to create the world than the world is disposed to be created? The answer is yes, because the passive effect does not have as much capacity as the active cause has; otherwise, heaven would have the capacity to be infinitely great in extension, and to be created from eternity, which is impossible, as was shown above in part 9, section 3 about heaven, chapter 1, #18 and following. Now we ask whether God is more disposed by his infinity and eternity to act infinitely than He is disposed by his intellect and will to understand and to will. The answer is no, because there is nothing prior or posterior in God. Is God more disposed to create a major creature than to create a minor one? The answer is yes, because a major efficient cause is better disposed to do more than to do less. Having considered all these things, the intellect and the will are greatly disposed to rejoice. Go to article 56.

Article 57 - Questions about Creation

71. What is creation? What is creation in the creator and in created things? How does creation transit from the idea to the ideated? Go to article 57.

Article 58 - Questions about Predestination

72. What is predestination? Is predestination an idea? In predestination, why does the idea precede what is ideated and created? How does the predestined man exist in predestination? How is predestination diversified? How do predestination and free will relate in the subject in whom they exist? Supposing that predestination destroyed free will, could the world be created and could God's justice act upon it? Go to article 58.

Article 59 - Questions about Mercy

73. What is mercy? Is mercy an idea in eternity? Is there a mercy that is God? Is God disposed to forgive more than the sinner is disposed to sin? Do predestination and mercy convene in a new subject in the same way as in eternity? Can predestination hinder the act of mercy and justice? The answer is no. Go to article 59.

Article 60 - Questions about Necessity

74. What is necessity? What is necessity in God? What is necessity in a new subject? Do divine justice and mercy necessitate that man can attain glory if man does penance for the sins he has committed? Do God's justice and mercy necessitate man's salvation by judging and forgiving as much as predestination and divine intelligence do by understanding? Go to article 60.

Article 61 - Questions about Fortune

75. What is fortune? Where is the subject of fortune? Does fortune have more being through its effect than by itself? Is it fortune that makes the fortunate man fortunate, or does the fortunate man make himself fortunate with fortune, like a scientist acquires his science through understanding? The answer is no, because the scientist acquires his science through understanding, whereas the fortunate man makes himself fortunate through ignorance. Go to article 61.

Article 62 - Questions about Order

76. What is order? Where does order begin and where does it repose? What are the prime principles of order? Can predestination and heaven destroy order in man, plants, animals and elements? Go to article 62.

Article 63 - Questions about Advice

77. What is advice? What is resolution? To which principles does advice apply? Does advice have general principles whereby it is general? Is advice well formed when it is processed with the principles and rules, and is it deformed when it is not processed with them? Is advice assertive when it is processed with the principles and rules, and when it is not processed with them, is advice doubtful and hazardous? Why does advice deal more with prior matters than with secondary ones? Are ignorance and sin the greatest enemies of advice? Go to article 63.

Article 64 - Questions about Grace

78. What is grace? Which principles serve to identify grace? Can grace exist in a subject not disposed toward it? Can there be grace without charity? Does grace inform hope? Is faith futile without grace? Which virtues require a greater disposition toward receiving grace: the cardinal virtues, or the theological ones? Why is there grace, what is it made of and how much of it is there? Is grace a proper passion? When is there grace, where is it, how, and with what does it exist? Go to article 64.

Article 65 - Questions about Perfection

79. What is perfection? What does perfection derive from? With what things does perfection repose, and what does it repose in? Does supreme perfection consist in perfecting an imperfect thing? Can a perfect thing bring an imperfect thing to perfection? Is a power perfect without an act? Does the ultimate end belong to the genus of perfection? Is moral perfection a sign of natural perfection? Go to article 65.

Article 66 - Questions about Clarification

80. What is clarification? Where does the intellect clarify doubtful matters? How does clarification arise as a habit? What is the material for clarification in this art? Go to article 66.

Article 67 - Questions about Transubstantiation

81. What is transubstantiation? Is transubstantiation in process, or already done? Why is there transubstantiation? How does transubstantiation occur? With what does transubstantiation operate? What does transubstantiation consist of? How does transubstantiation exist in time and space? Go to article 67.

Article 68 - Questions about Alteration

82. What is alteration? How is natural alteration different from moral alteration? Does natural alteration proceed with innate potential whereas moral alteration proceeds with acquired potential? What does alteration consist of, why does it exist, when does it occur, where is it, how and with what does it exist? Go to article 68.

Article 69 - Questions about Infinity

83. What is infinity? Does infinity have its own co-essential and natural correlatives? What things signify the conditions of infinity? Can anything impede infinity? Can infinite being act infinitely more than finite being can act finitely? Does the potential ability of fire to burn an infinite amount of wood (supposing it was available), signify divine infinity and God's infinite act? Is the virtue that a human intellect has when it lasts in eternity with enough objects to multiply an infinite number by understanding, and by the will's willing, a sign of God's infinity and of his infinite act? Supposing that heaven had innate memory and movement in eternity where it could count and remember an infinite number of days, would such a memory be a sign of divine infinity and eternity with their acts of infinitizing and eternalizing? The answer is yes, as shown by the proof concluding from the smaller to the greater. Rule B cannot deny this. Go to article 69.

Article 70 - Questions about Deceit

84. What is deceit? How are positive and privative habits different in deception? What does deception consist of, how does it exist, how do we detect it, with what does it operate, and with what do we detect it? Go to article 70.

Article 71 - Questions about Honour

85. What is honour? What priority does someone who honours another have over the one whom he honours? Why is someone who vituperates against another more subject to vituperation than the one against whom he vituperates? Why can someone who craves honour never find his fill of honour? Answer: man must honour God only. Is seeking greater honour for oneself than for God a worse sin than sin committed through avarice or some other vice? Does God require anything more from men except that they honour him? Which is the greater sign of God's honour: is it the honour of the giver of honour, or the honour of the recipient of honour? Go to article 71.

Article 72 - Questions about Capacity

86. What is capacity? What is the difference between capacity and incapacity? What is the cause of intellectual dullness? Why is the intellect more capable of counting an infinite

number of units, supposing it had enough objects, than fire is capable of burning up all bodies if it had enough wood? Is the intellect as such more capable of understanding than of ignorance? Go to article 72.

Article 73 - Questions about Existence and Agency

87. What is existence? What is agency? Is there some existence that can contain in itself as much agency as being? Can the principles of the first figure exist in any essence without agency? Can the separated intellect's understanding be equal to its existence? Can principles exist in subjects without the empowerment of power? Go to article 73.

Article 74 - Questions about Comprehension

88. What is comprehension; and what is apprehension? How does the intellect comprehend and apprehend things? Why can the senses not comprehend the sense objects that they sense as much as the intellect can comprehend them by its understanding? Can the intellect understand intelligible things more than fire can ignite ignitable things? Why are the faculties impeded by apprehension but not by comprehension? Would heaven moving in eternity comprehend more days than the amount of firewood that fire could comprehend by burning it? The answer is yes, because heaven would be causing days in its own essence, whereas fire does not cause wood either in itself or in other things. Through comprehension and apprehension, are the intellect, heaven and fire similar signs of God's infinity and of the world's creation? Go to article 74.

Article 75 - Questions about Discovery

89. What is discovery? What do we discover? Where does the intellect discover its discoveries? Is discovery an innate habit? Can the intellect discover any discoveries outside of its own essence? How, and with what does the intellect discover what it discovers? Are discovered things the subjects of science? Does the imagination discover the imagined object outside of its own essence? Does a sense discover sensible objects outside of its own essence? Go to article 75.

Article 76 - Questions about Similitude

90. What is similitude? From what things does similitude arise? Of what things does similitude consist of? How are the agent and the patient similar? How can diverse things be similar? Why can similitude not exist without concordance? What are the higher and lower similitudes? How are priority and posteriority similar? Does God have anything similar to himself? Does one similitude move another one? Does one similar thing arise from another similar to itself? Does the intellect have any things similar to itself? Are there more similitudes than dissimilitudes? Go to article 76.

Article 77 - Questions about Antecedents and Resultants

91. What is an antecedent; and what is a resultant? Is there necessarily a medium between the antecedent and the resultant? Can the antecedent and the resultant exist without the correlatives of the principles? Is the ultimate end antecedent or resultant? In addition, we ask; as "animal" is a genus and "man" is a species, why is man the antecedent and animal the resultant? Why does the antecedent come before the resultant? Go to article 77.

Article 78 - Questions about Power, Object and Act

92. What are power, object and act? Does the act stand in the middle between the power and the object? Is an act both moving and moved? Is a power both moving and moved? Does the power move itself with the object, or does the object simply move the power? Is the object's mobility prior or posterior? Does an act have an intrinsic and an extrinsic object? Which object is prior: is it the intrinsic one or the extrinsic one? Go to article 78.

Article 79 - Questions about Generation, Corruption and Privation

93. What is generation; what is corruption; and what is privation? Do generation, corruption and privation exist together simultaneously in a subject? Is generation active and corruption passive? Can the same thing be an agent of both generation and corruption? Does privation belong to the genus of generation and corruption? Does privation imply essence? Can the senses perceive generation, corruption and privation? Are generation, corruption and privation natural principles? Does corruption exist between generation and privation? Does corruption exist between being and non-being? Go to article 79.

Article 80 - Questions about Theology

94. What is Theology? Is Theology a science? How is Theology a science? Can we know that God exists? Can we know that God is not a plant, a stone or anything like that? Can we know God's correlatives? Can we define God? Can we know God's essence? Can we know God's science and charity? Can we know God's justice and mercy? Can one know that there is no God? Can any imperfection exist in God? Can we know God's perfection? Does the human intellect earn more merit by understanding God than by believing in him? Is God as intelligible as He is lovable? Does faith elevate the intellect to understand God as much as charity elevates the will to love God? In objectifying God, does hope stand between understanding and loving? How can we recognize a true law? How can we say many true things with understanding and love? Go to article 80.

Article 81 - Questions about Philosophy

95. What is Philosophy? What is the greatest subject for the philosophizing intellect? In what way is the intellect very general? In what way is the intellect highly trained in technique for attaining its object? Can the intellect rise aloft without great disposition and proportion? When disposition and proportion fail, does the intellect fail? Is Philosophy an image of Theology? Without Philosophy, can the intellect use its natural resources? Can the intellect rise aloft without art? Does the art remove ignorance from the intellect? Go to article 81.

Article 82 - Questions about Geometry

96. What is Geometry? What is the subject of Geometry? With what does Geometry measure measurable things? Can a theologian measure the principles of the first figure like a geometer measures acute and right angles? From which principles do measurements derive? What are the subjects of measurement? Is quantity the habit of quantum? Which explicit principle serves to explain Geometry? Are the nine subjects subject matter for Geometry? Can geometers measure the nine subjects with their methods? Which principle and method serves to discuss Geometry in this art? Question: where are the loci that apply to Geometry? Answer: wherever we deal with quantity. How does the intellect discover and use Geometry? By what

method does Geometry abstract and multiply mathematical measurements from sensible objects? In what way does a geometer multiply extrasensory angles from the angles perceived by the senses? Does the geometer make science about quantity that the senses perceive, or about extrasensory quantity? Is Geometry a subject, sign or instrument for theologians to measure Theology, for philosophers to measure nature, and for moralists to measure morals? In Geometry, which measurements are prior and which ones are posterior? By what method can a geometer measure an extended circular line and square the circle? How can a circle be squared, in other words, how can we measure a circular line with a quadrangular line and vice versa? Go to article 82.

Article 83 - Questions about Astronomy

97. What is Astronomy? Does Astronomy depend on Geometry? Is there another eighth sphere, or another world, or another starry sky? Given that the Sun is not hot, why does it heat air? Many other questions can be made about Astronomy, and their solutions are implicit in the third subject, which is heaven. For instance, we may ask: supposing that there was another eighth sphere, would there be any actual or potential distance or closeness between them? Go to article 83.

Article 84 - Questions about Arithmetic

98. What is Arithmetic? Does Arithmetic depend on Geometry? What are the prime principles of Arithmetic? What is the cause of number? How many species of numbers are there? Which come first: the even numbers or the odd numbers? What are the correlatives of number? Question: how is the first unit the beginning of numbers and how are the first and second units the beginnings of the third unit? Why is number perfected in three units? Is the third unit as close to the first unit as to the second? What is the prime multiplication of numbers? In what way are Geometry and Arithmetic similar? Go to article 84.

Article 85 - Questions about Music

99. What is Music? Why is there Music? By which principles is the definition of Music signified? Why are there six steps in the musical scale? What are the prime principles of voice? Why are there neither more nor less than five vowels? From what does voice arise? From what things do consonants arise? Why is the letter E composed with more letters than is the letter A, and A with more than U? In addition, why do I and O produce no consonants as do A and U? How do the vowels apply to the different elements? Why is the vowel O attributed to heaven? Is Music descended from Geometry? Go to article 85.

Article 86 - Questions about Rhetoric

100. What is Rhetoric? Why is there Rhetoric? What are the principles of Rhetoric? How does a rhetorician colour and adorn one principle with another? How is the subject adorned by the predicate? How is a subject adorned with its correlatives? How is one correlative adorned by another? How are subjects adorned with definitions? How does a rhetorician adorn a proposition with the natural medium between the subject and the predicate? How does a rhetorician adorn a proposition with an accidental medium? With what kind of meaningful expressions does the rhetorician colour his words? Why do expressions that signify ugly things not belong to Rhetoric? Why are old age, death, October, November and things like this signs of ugliness? How does a rhetorician use beautiful words to praise his friend and

vituperate against his enemy? How does a rhetorician adorn his words according to various lifestyles? In how many degrees does a rhetorician adorn his words? How does the rhetorician adorn a noun with an adjective? How does the rhetorician adorn and colour form with matter and vice versa? With what medium does the rhetorician adorn the beginning and the end? Why does the rhetorician adorn his words more with substantial principles than with accidental ones? How does the rhetorician colour his words with possibility and impossibility? How does a rhetorician colour his words with proverbs or examples? Go to article 86.

Article 87 - Questions about Logic

101. What is Logic? With what does a logician draw necessary conclusions? How does a logician investigate and inquire into the medium between the subject and the predicate? How does the logician deal with the five predicables and the ten predicates? To which principles of this art does Logic apply? Why can a logician not stand up against a natural philosopher? How can we tell that this art is general whereas Logic is something particular? Why is Logic shaky and unstable, but not this art? Why is Logic inadequate for discovering the true law, and why is this art adequate? How is this art different from Logic? Given that Logic is contained in this art, why is this art easier to learn and more permanent than Logic? Go to article 87.

Article 88 - Questions about Grammar

102. What is Grammar? Into how many modes is Grammar divided? How does Grammar apply to this art? To which principles do nouns apply? To which principles do pronouns apply? To which loci of this art do verbs apply? Where do participles apply in this art? Where do conjunctions apply in this art? Where are adverbs implied? Where are prepositions implied? Where are interjections implied? Where is the nominative case implied? Where is the genitive case implied? Where is the dative case implied? Where is the accusative case implied? Where is the vocative case implied? Where is the ablative case implied? Where does conjugation apply? Where do declensions apply? Where does gender apply? Where is governance implied? Where does construction apply? Where does spelling apply? Where are figures of speech implied? We ask, what the source of grammar is. Go to article 88.

Article 89 - Questions about Morality

103. What is morality? Where are the loci that apply to morality in this art? How is virtue multiplied? How is vice multiplied? How can people use the third figure to exercise the virtues well and to destroy the vices with it? How can we investigate the virtues and the vices with the fourth figure? How do we discover the virtues and vices? How does man acquire virtues or vices, and what is their subject? How can man rise aloft in prayer and contemplation? Go to article 89.

Article 90 - Questions about Politics

104. What are Politics? Where do Politics arise from? How should we deal with the public good? With which correlatives do we recognize Politics? How do Politics produce order in sense objects? Do Politics include well being? Are Politics descended from Rhetoric? What are the conditions of Politics? What is the general form of Politics, and what is their particular form? With what kind of men are Politics healthy, and with what kind of men are Politics

unhealthy? With what things do Politics live, and with what things do they die? Go to article 90.

Article 91 - Questions about Law

105. What is Law? What are the prime principles of Law? What is the subject of Law? To which principles is divine Law attributed? To which principles is natural Law attributed? To which principles is civil Law attributed? To which principles is positive Law attributed? How does Law exist in other things? Where does Law have its form and its matter? What does Law consist of? Why is there Law? How does Law relate to judgment? Is justice the form of Law and the subject of Law? How can justice be the form and the subject of Law? With which principles is law discussed and discovered? How does law transit from necessity to contingency? How do we know whether a written law is true, or that a law is a deformed fantasy? We ask: in what way is law true and necessary? How can positive law be reduced to true and necessary law? If some positive law cannot be reduced to necessary law, is it a true law? How can a law be tested and known? How is a law proved, fortified and clarified? We ask: is law a science? Does written law depend more on belief than on understanding? In what way do credible laws differ from intelligible laws? What kind of laws appeal most to the conscience: credible ones, or intelligible ones? Is law healthy when it is understood and unhealthy when it is believed? Why does written law depend more on memory than on the intellect? Why is there such prolixity in written law? Are believing and remembering the causes of prolixity in laws? How does written law stand in the soul's faculties? Would it be good to transfer law from believing to understanding? How do we discover the form and matter of law? Do jurists do injury to law, and if so, how do they do this? Go to article 91. We could put many more questions, and find their solutions implicit in the said paragraphs. Now the intellect wonders: why do high-ranking leaders not reduce law to the intellect, given that the intellect has priority over memory.

Article 92 - Questions about Medicine

106. What is Medicine? To which principles can we reduce Medicine? Which principles show that health is the subject of Medicine? How does a physician produce the second mixture of remedies from the prime mixture? What are the prime principles of Medicine? Does Medicine require that the physician use his imagination to imagine imaginable objects drawn from sense objects, so that the intellect can make a science of Medicine? Is Medicine a science? In Medicine, which faculty of the soul plays the leading role, and which faculty is secondary? With which principle or principles does the physician know how to apply Medicine? What are the signs of Medicine? Do the signs of Medicine speak first to the understanding, next to belief, then to the imagination and the senses? Why is Medicine so difficult and so verbose? In a herbal decoction, which herb has greater virtue, and which herb has lesser virtue? In a decoction of roses and violets, which herb prevails in virtue? How does a physician know how to graduate decoctions or ointments? Are the elementative and vegetative powers subjects of Medicine? Moreover, if they are, we ask; how can they be discussed in medical terms? How can the principles and rules of this art serve to test the writings of physicians of former times? Question: how can we reduce positive Medicine to natural Medicine? Is Medicine made healthy by understanding and made unhealthy by believing? Go to article 92. We could put many other questions about Medicine, and their solutions are implicit in the said paragraphs.

Article 93 - Questions about Governance

107. What is governance? What is the subject of governance? Are virtues means of governance? If they are, we ask whether virtues are means of governance as we discuss them in the ninth subject. When we discuss the virtues with the general principles, do the virtues remain hidden? Does a virtue remain hidden because of contingencies? Does the ruler need to know God in the way we discussed God in the first subject? If the ruler does not know how to learn this, we ask whether he should have an advisor who does know. Does a ruler need to know the human condition? If he does not know it, we ask whether he should have a man who does know it as set out in the fourth subject. Should the ruler know about the imagination as in the fifth subject? Should the ruler have knowledge of the sixth subject? How can we reduce governance to the principles of this art? Should a ruler use the art to teach his son about governance? Go to article 93.

Article 94 - Questions about Chivalry

108. What is chivalry? Is victory the subject of chivalry? Why is there chivalry? Must a knight know what chivalry is? Must a knight have prudence? Must a knight have fortitude? What superior weapons guarantee that the knight wins and does not lose? Can we reduce chivalry to the liberal arts? Is nobility a tradition of chivalry? Should a knight know how to discuss the imaginative power in the fifth subject and the sensitive powers in the sixth subject? Why are there times when just a few knights defeat many enemies? Go to article 94.

Article 95 - Questions about Commerce

109. What is commerce? Which principles must govern relations between buyers and sellers? Is acquiring something more in return for something less the subject of commerce? How must a merchant use the natural faculties of his soul to deal with the subject of commerce? Are some merchants better than others? The answer is yes, because some know better than others how to use the soul's higher and lower faculties. Can we reduce positive commerce to this art? How do some merchants earn more money than others do? Can a merchant use rule E to avoid contingencies? How must a merchant deal with time, place and persons? With what does a merchant know how to use proper and appropriated things in trade? With what can we know commerce as a perfect habit of the buyer and the seller? Go to article 95.

Article 96 - Questions about Navigation

110. What is navigation? From which arts does navigation derive? What is the subject of navigation? What figure shows the image of navigation? Is a figure or image the subject of navigation? We ask; how is distance in miles caused and multiplied through straight and slanted lines? What is the difference between navigational theory and practice? How do four miles result in three miles? How can we calculate motion composed of straight and slanted lines? How can sailors tell where the ship is at sea? How can sailors tell how near or far apart mountains are? How does a wind incline more toward one wind than toward another one? How do sailors recognize winds of different nature? How do we identify the qualities of rain? How can we identify winds from the colours of clouds? How does rain signify one kind of wind and not another? How is a whirlwind disposed? Go to article 96.

Article 97 - Questions about Conscience

111. What is conscience? Where does conscience stand in the soul? Does the ninth subject provide the disposition of conscience? What causes a great conscience? What causes a small conscience? With what things does the subject of temperate conscience exist? Where does conscience arise, and where does it not arise? The definitions of which principles serve to study conscience? With what things can we recognize conscience be recognized? What are the effects of conscience? Are the effects of conscience also its signs? Where is conscience with love? How does conscience exist in time? With what things does conscience live, and with what things does it die? What things serve to fortify conscience? How does conscience grow? With what things is conscience bound or unbound? Why does conscience not sleep? How does the intellect artificially recognize and perceive conscience? Go to article 97.

Article 98 - Questions about Preaching

112. What is preaching? What is the subject of preaching? What provides great material for preaching? Can preaching be great without applying some technique? Without art, is preaching done haphazardly? How can preaching be hazardous? How can preaching be easy and praiseworthy? How can preaching be fruitful? We ask how a preacher must order and equalize his intellect and his will. In a sermon, does memory remain idle if no technique is applied? How can vainglory sometimes creep into a sermon? How must a preacher habituate his audience with love and fear? In a sermon, how must the intellect discourse through the higher and lower faculties? Should a preacher use the natural medium between the subject and the predicate more than the accidental medium? Does the ninth subject show the natural and accidental media between the subject? How can a sermon be useless? As there are so many sermons, the intellect wonders why more people do not turn away from sin. Then the intellect remembers that this is because preachers do not teach about the natural medium that exists between the subject and the predicate. How should we evacuate and clarify the expression of a theme? Is a sermon more useful through belief or through understanding? Should a preacher be trained in Geometry, Arithmetic, Rhetoric and Logic? Why should a preacher be a philosopher and a theologian? Must a preacher adhere to the definitions of terms? How is it easy to find definitions for terms? Must a preacher give great knowledge of God? To which three loci must the preacher apply his sermon? How can we reduce a sermon to the art? Go to article 98.

Article 99 - Questions about Prayer

113. What is prayer? We ask; how do we make good prayers? We ask; how do we make the greatest, loftiest and sweetest prayer? How does a contemplative rise aloft in prayer to God's essence with the principles and rules in the third figure? How does a contemplative rise aloft in prayer to God and his dignities with the fourth figure? How does a contemplative rise aloft in prayer to God with the columns of the table? How does a contemplative rise aloft in prayer to God by following the method with which we discussed God in the first subject? How does the contemplative rise aloft in prayer through the eight subjects signified by C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K? How is prayer well formed, or misshapen; fruitful or destructive? How do we pray with justice? How do we pray with belief or faith? How do we pray with continence? How do we pray in prosperity and in adversity? How do we pray with the senses and the imagination? How do we pray with memory, intellect and will? How do we pray with the hundred forms? How does a contemplative pray for common and for special good? Go to article 99.

Article 100 - Questions about Memory with the Principles

114. What is memory? How can we know memory? What disposes memory to be morally good? Does memory have objects of recollection that are as great as the intellect's objects of understanding and the will's objects of desire? How do past things condition memory? How can memory act with power? How do the intellect and the will condition memory? How does memory relate to virtue and vice? How is memory true or false? Through which habit does memory cause joy or sadness? Does memory have difference in its recall just as the intellect has difference in its understanding? Does memory have its own things to concord with, as the intellect and the will have? Why does memory contradict the intellect and the will? How does memory relate to the beginning? Does memory have its own co-essential medium? What is the end of memory? Does memory wax or wane? Is one memory greater than another memory? Is the essence of memory equally common to the intellect and to the will? How does memory relate to understanding and belief, and to wanting or hating? How is memory a privative habit? Go to article 100.

Article 101 - Questions about Memory with the Rules

115. Does memory receive species from the intellect sooner than from the will? As we already asked what memory is, now let us ask: what things does memory essentially contain in itself? What is memory in science? Does memory act in the subject and the object? Does memory exist on its own? Does memory act in accordance with its species? To whom does memory belong? Does memory consist of matter and form? What is the intent of memory? Why is memory indivisible? Without discrete quantity, can memory have correlatives? What is the proper passion of memory? What is the appropriated passion of memory? How does memory exist in time? Why is memory more powerful in dealing with the past than with the future? Where does memory store its species? How is memory disposed toward its object? With what does memory forget? Go to article 101, where we discussed memory with the rules.

We are done with the questions about the tenth part of this book, and we have provided a doctrine whereby the artist will know how to make questions and refer them to their loci. The practice of this art consists mainly in solving questions.

Part 12 - Training in this Art

1. Here, we deal with training in this art in three parts: the first comprises the 13 parts in which this art divides. The artist in this art must be thoroughly familiar with them and know how to apply questions to loci appropriate to the conditions of each question's subject matter.
2. Secondly, the artist must be skilled in applying the technical procedure of this art and using the methods of proof provided in the text so he can prove the solutions to peregrine questions, as one example exemplifies and clarifies another.
3. Third, the artist must be skilled in the method of applying questions and solutions to the same conclusion, as shown in the third and fourth figures. This is enough about training, for the sake of brevity.

Part 13 - The last part - How to Teach this Art

1. This part is about teaching. It divides into four parts. First, the artist must have thoroughly memorized the alphabet, the figures, the definitions, the rules and the layout of the table.

2. Second, he shall clearly explain the text to the students through reasoning, without any appeal to authority, and the students shall read the text, and put any questions they have about it to the teacher.

3. Third, the teacher shall propose questions to the students and solve them by providing reasons according to the process of this art, for without reasoning, the artist cannot make it work. Here we should note that the art has three friends, namely intellectual subtlety, skill in reasoning, and good intentions, for without these, no one can learn it.

4. Fourth, the teacher shall have students solve questions he puts to them. In addition, he shall instruct them to multiply many reasons for the same conclusion. Moreover, they must identify the loci where the answers are found and multiply reasons for the answers. If the students do not know how to give answers, multiply reasons, or find the loci, then the teacher must show them all this.

5. There are three degrees of comparison, namely good, better and best; and this science has three degrees of aptitude for learning it.

Someone with the best kind of intellect trained in Logic and natural science, with diligence, can learn it in two months: one month for theory and another month for practice.

Someone with the better kind of intellect trained in Logic and natural science, with diligence, can learn it in four months, two for theory and two for practice.

Someone with a good, subtle intellect trained in Logic and natural science, with diligence, can learn it in half a year: three months for theory and three months for practice.

Someone who cannot learn it within this period, probably either has an obtuse intellect, is not diligent enough, or is busy with other things. Such a person will never be able to learn this art.

6. To learn this art more rapidly I advise you to study *Ars Brevis*, which is the abridged form of this art. It begins as follows: "God, with your grace, wisdom and love, here begins the abridged art, which is an image of the general art." Anyone with a subtle and well-educated intellect who learns this can also learn the general art.

The End of this Book

Raymond Lull began to write this art in Lyon-by-the-Rhone in November 1305. He finished it in the city of Pisa, in the monastery of Saint Donnino, to the praise and honour of God, in March 1308 of the Incarnation of Our Lord Jesus Christ. Now we entrust it to him and to his Mother, the Blessed Virgin Mary. Amen.

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The main resource for the references below is the Ramon Llull Database by Professor Anthony Bonner, on line at the University of Barcelona web site:

<http://orbita.bib.ub.es/ramon/index.asp>

The text in red gives the reference to the Ramon Llull Database through which you can access a full listing of the manuscripts, editions etc. of the work. The bulleted list gives the works consulted by Y. Dambergs who did the English translation.

Ars Generalis Ultima

Date: 11/1305 - 3/1308 Place: - Pisa

Catalogue number: III.80

Short title: ArsGenUI

- Raymundus Lullus, *Ars generalis ultima* (Frankfurt/Main : Minerva, 1970).
- ROL XIV, 4-527
- ROL = Raimundi Lulli Opera Latina, F. Stegmüller et al., editors, 21 vols. published so far, Palma de Mallorca/Turnholt, Belgium.
- Anthony Bonner's translation of *Ars Brevis* in *Selected Works of Ramon Llull* (1232-1316), ed. Anthony Bonner, I (Princeton, N.J., 1985), 569-646.
Doctor Illuminatus. A Ramon Llull Reader, ed. Anthony Bonner and Eve Bonner, "Mythos" (Princeton, 1993), 289-364. (Recommended reading)

Manuscripts on line at FREIMORE, the Freiburger Multimedia Object Repository - Albert - Ludwigs – Universität, Managed by Dr. Viola Tenge-Wolf

<http://freimore.ruf.uni-freiburg.de/> Enter "ars generalis ultima" in the search box and follow the links.

Yanis Dambergs PhD, Gatineau, Quebec, Canada, March 2009.

<http://lullianarts.net>

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