Part Eight - Mixing the Principles and the Rules
1. This part is divided into two parts: the first is about mixing the principles by combining each one with the others in sequence and the second is about the principles combined with the sequence of rules. This eighth part provides a doctrine for knowing each principle with the others, by combining it in turn with the sequence of principles and with all the species of the rules. Thus, if some doubt arises about any principle, by recurring to this part, the truth about it can be found through the other principles and the species of the rules. For instance, if we ask whether some goodness is a substantial being, and whether some moral goodness is a habit that really exists, than we recur to the chapter on goodness combined in turn with the other principles and the rules and choose the solution that seems the most reasonable according to rule B combined with the other rules and the definitions of the principles. And this mixture is the center and subject of this art. And although the mixture of principles and rules has already been dealt with in the third figure, in this part we will clarify it sequentially, by combining each principle in turn with the continuous sequence of all the principles and all the rules, so the intellect can discourse with each principle in turn. Now let us begin the first part.Section I - The Principles Combined with the other Principles in Sequence
Chapter 1 - Goodness Combined With the Sequence of Principles
1. Goodness is per se a reason for good to do good, and as it is great through greatness, it is a dual reason for good to produce great good.2. Goodness is durable through duration and thus, through duration it is a reason for good to produce enduring good, and since it is great through greatness (as we said), it is a threefold reason for good to do great and durable good.
3. Goodness can exist and act through power, and thus, goodness, on account of what it has per se and what it gets from power and what it gets from greatness and what it gets from duration is a fourfold reason for good to produce and do great, durable and powerful good. Now goodness can be mixed and multiplied with the other principles in this way, following the mode we have shown. However, we exclude contrariety and minority as they cannot give any increase to goodness. To save space, we will not give examples of how goodness is multiplied by five and by six, etc. So now we will show examples of how it is combined with all the principles.
4. Goodness can be known through wisdom, which is a reason for good to produce good scientific knowledge.
5. Goodness is loved by the will, which is a reason for good to produce a good and lovable beloved.
6. Goodness is virtuous through virtue, which is a reason for virtuous good to produce virtuous good.
7. Goodness is true by reason of truth which is well and truly a reason for good to do true good.
8. Goodness is glorious through glory, which is a good and glorious reason for good to do glorious good.
9. Goodness is clear without confusion by reason of difference, which is a good, distinct and clear reason for good to do good that is clearly distinct from itself.
10. Goodness can be concorded through concordance, which is a good and concordant reason for good to concordantly produce concorded good.
11. Goodness is against evil, which is its contrary, and concordance is against contrariety because they are opposites, and thus goodness is well and concordantly disposed against malice and contrariety.
12. Goodness has a principal meaning through principle, which is a good principal reason for good to produce original good.
13. Goodness has a medial meaning by reason of medium, which is a good mediated reason for good to do good through a medium.
14. Goodness has a final meaning by reason of the end, which is a good, final and perfect reason for good to produce perfect good in perfect repose.
15. Goodness has a major meaning by reason of majority which is a good major reason for good to do major good.
16. Goodness has an equal meaning by reason of equality, which is a good and equal reason for good to do good by equalizing many things.
17. Minor goodness has minor meaning on account of its minor acts, which are a good and minor reason for minor good to do minor good, in a relative, or comparative sense.
18. We have dealt with goodness combined in a linear sequence with every principle, and as we dealt with it in a general way, the artist can find many particulars at will in the line of goodness.
Chapter 2 - Greatness Combined with the Sequence of Principles
19. Greatness is good through goodness, and goodness is great through greatness; and thus from both there follows a concrete being, which is great good.20. Greatness is durable through duration, and duration is great through greatness; and from these follows a great concrete being.
21. Greatness can exist and act through power, and power is great through greatness; and thus greatness with power is a reason why there is a great concrete being with great power to exist and act.
22. Greatness is knowable to wisdom, and wisdom is great through greatness; and both together cause a great and scientific concrete entity with a great act of knowing.
23. Greatness is loved by will and will is great through greatness; and thus they cause a great beloved concrete being in which they are sustained.
24. Greatness is virtuous through virtue, and virtue is great through greatness; and thus a great, virtuous concrete entity in which both are sustained is caused by both: now this concrete is known as being and both are essences of it. And here we see how several essences compose one being of themselves.
25. Greatness is true by reason of truth, and truth is great through greatness; and from both there follows a great, true concrete being in which both are magnified and verified.
26. Greatness is glorious though glory, and glory is great through greatness; and from both there follows a subject in which they have magnificence and delight.
27. Greatness is distinct by reason of difference, and on account of this distinctness the magnifier, the magnifiable and magnifying are distinguished; and difference is great through greatness; and thus they participate in the same subject by magnifying and distinguishing.
28. Greatness is concorded by concordance, and concordance is magnified by greatness and thus they participate in the same subject by magnifying and concording.
29. Greatness is opposed by contrariety, inasmuch as it undergoes transmutation, but it does not naturally oppose itself; and contrariety is great through greatness: for instance, fire and water are in great opposition through greatness, as one heats and the other cools.
30. Through the nature of principle, greatness has its own innate coessential principles, namely the magnifier, the magnified and the act of magnifying, and principle is magnified by greatness, as it naturally has its own innate principiative, principiable and principiating.
31. Through the medium, greatness has reason to mediate, and the medium has reason to magnify through greatness, supposing they are both in the same subject.
32. Greatness is a cause for the end to be great and the end is a cause for greatness to have repose, when they are in the same subject.
33. Greatness is major through majority and majority is great through greatness, and this is necessarily so, so that both can act in their subject, as greatness magnifies and majority majorifies.
34. Greatness has its own innate equal things by reason of equality, namely the magnifier, magnifiable and magnifying which equally belong to greatness, and equality, by reason of greatness, has its own innate coessential things, namely a great equalizer, equalizable and equalizing.
35. Through majority, greatness is removed from minority, because in minority, greatness cannot be what it is. And the reason for this is that minority and smallness are convertible in the subject in which they exist, so that sin, for instance, is nothing; and likewise with accidents, because they cannot exist on their own.
Chapter 3 - Duration Combined with the Sequence of Principles
36. Duration is good in goodness and goodness lasts through duration, and this is an accidental reason for good to do lasting good.37. Duration is a cause for greatness to last, and it is great through greatness, and by enduring and magnifying both participate in the subject in which they exist, provided there is nothing standing in their way to impede them.
38. Duration is a cause for power to last, and power is a cause for duration to exist and act, and thus, in the subject in which they exist, they participate by lasting and powering.
39. Wisdom lasts by reason of duration, and duration is known to wisdom, so that both participate in the subject in which they exist by lasting and knowing.
40. Duration is lovable by will and will lasts in duration and thus both participate in the subject in which they exist by enduring and loving.
41. Duration is virtuous through virtue and virtue is lasting through duration, and thus in the subject in which they exist, duration is separated from vice by virtue and the privation of virtue is prevented by duration.
42. Duration naturally makes things last and truth naturally verifies things; and truth endures through duration just as duration is true by reason of truth.
43. Glory lasts by reason of duration and duration is glorious by reason of glory, so that glory separates duration from punishment while duration separates glory from privation.
44. Duration is clear and without confusion through difference and difference lasts through duration, and thus, through difference, duration has its different endurer, durable and enduring while difference has its lasting differentiator, differentiable and differentiating by reason of duration.
45. By reason of concordance, duration has its innate concordant things while concordance has its innate lasting and permanent things by reason of duration.
46. Duration contradicts its opposite and destroys it as much as it can and contrariety destroys duration as much as it can. And this is because duration agrees with being and contrariety with non being.
47. By reason of principle, duration is naturally a principle, and whatever is lasting lasts by reason of duration, and thus, principle lasts by reason of duration.
48. By reason of the medium, duration has a natural medium, namely the act of enduring that exists in the middle between the endurer and the endurable, and the medium lasts in the subject in which it exists by reason of duration.
49. Duration is perfect and has repose by reason of the end, and the end endures in the subject in which it exists by reason of duration.
50. By reason of majority, duration is majorified in its subject and majority is durably sustained in its subject by reason of duration.
51. By reason of equality, duration has an equalizing nature because there is equality in duration among the coessential endurer, endurable and enduring while equality lasts in the subject in which it exists by reason of duration.
52. By reason of minority, duration is near to naught in the subject in which it exists, while minority approaches being through duration.
Chapter 4 - Power Combined with the Sequence of Principles
53. Power is good through goodness and goodness can exist and act through power, and thus, according to their nature, they mutually move one another in the subject in which they exist and with them, the subject moves itself so it can exist powerfully and well.54. Power is great through greatness, and greatness can exist and act through power, and thus, in the subject in which they exist, each supplies to the other whatever is lacking according to its nature. But sometimes, something intervenes and impedes this, because it is a principle of another nature.
55. Power is durable through duration, and duration can exist and act through power: and if duration is eternity, it must necessarily be in existence and action, because there is no newness in eternity.
56. Power is knowable to wisdom and wisdom can exist and act through power: and if they are mutually convertible, there must necessarily be existence, action and understanding because this cannot be otherwise; however, this only applies to God.
57. Power is lovable by will, and will can exist and act through power: and thus, the subject in which they exist can be powerful and virtuous as it exists and acts.
58. Power is virtuous through virtue, and virtue can exist and act through power: and thus, the subject in which they exist can exist in powerful and virtuous existence and action.
59. Power is true by reason of truth, and truth can exist and act through power; and if they are not convertible in the subject in which they exist, the privation of conversion posits that the subject in which they exist is potentially mendacious and idle.
60. Power is delightful through glory, and glory can exist and act through power; and if they are convertible in the subject in which they exist, then power is necessarily removed from punishment and glory from impotence.
61. Through difference, power is clear without any confusion, and difference can exist and act through power; and if they are convertible in the subject in which they exist, then it necessarily follows that the subject is active in powering and in distinguishing other things from itself.
62. Power can be concorded through concordance and concordance can exist and act through power, and if they do not mutually convert, the privation of conversion posits that the subject can possibly harbor acts of powering and opposing.
63. Power cannot be against itself through contrariety, and contrariety cannot be impotent by reason of power, and as they are not mutually convertible, the privation of conversion posits some power that is disparate from contrariety.
64. Through principle, power has reason to begin things and principle naturally powers things through power; and if they are convertible, powering and beginning are removed from contrariety and newness.
65. Power naturally mediates through its medium and thus, powering stands naturally in the middle between the powerer an the powered; and the medium can naturally exist and act through power; and thus, the medium can naturally include the flow of influence from the end to the beginning and the reflux of influence from the beginning to the end.
66. Power can have repose by reason of the end, and the end can exist and act through power; and if they are not convertible, there cannot be any repose in the subject in which they exist.
67. Power naturally majorifies through majority and majority naturally powers things through power, and because they are not convertible, the privation of conversion limits them in the subject in which they exist. Here we see how growing things grow up to a point determined by nature and are inclined to decay in old age.
68. Through equality, power naturally equalizes the powerer, powered and powering; and equality naturally powers things through power, and if they are convertible, powering and equalizing cannot possibly exist in any other way.
68. Power is close to non being through minority, and minority approaches being through power; and thus, minority and power are not convertible, because if they were convertible, then being would be convertible with non being, which is impossible.
Chapter 5 - Wisdom Combined with the Sequence of Principles
70. Wisdom is good through goodness, and goodness is known to wisdom; and if they convert in the subject in which they exist, then they are good reasons for it to act well and understand well, and this cannot be otherwise.71. Wisdom is great through greatness, and greatness is known to wisdom; and if they convert, then the subject in which they exist is comprised of magnifying and understanding, and this cannot be otherwise.
72. Wisdom is durable through duration, and duration is known to wisdom; and if this duration is eternity, knowing and eternalizing are necessarily present in the subject in which they exist and their opposite is impossible.
73. Wisdom is powerful through power and power is known to wisdom; and if they convert, then there is as much powering as understanding, and neither can be greater or less than the other.
74. Wisdom is lovable by will, and will is known to wisdom; and if they convert, then there is as much loving as understanding in the subject.
75. Wisdom is virtuous through virtue, and virtue is known to wisdom; and if they do not convert, then there is a possibility that ignorance as well as vice can be present in the subject.
76. Wisdom is true through truth, and truth is known to wisdom; and if they do not convert, the truth can be believed and understanding can be fallacious.
77. Wisdom is delightful through glory, and glory is known to wisdom; and when they do not convert, knowledge can come with suffering and ignorance with delight.
78. Wisdom is clear through difference, and for this reason it has its intellective, intelligible and understanding that are distinct from one another; and without distinction it would be confused; and difference is intelligible to wisdom: however, without the intellective, intelligible and understanding, difference would not be intelligible.
79. Through concordance, wisdom has concordant innate parts, namely the intellective, intelligible and understanding that concord in one essence consisting of them; and they concord as they exist as several things so that one is not another. And this concordance is intelligible by wisdom.
80. Through contrariety, ignorance is the enemy of wisdom, because it impedes understanding; but wisdom that converts with concordance does not fear contrariety, because it cannot impede its understanding.
81. By reason of principle, wisdom is a principle of understanding, and principle is intelligible to wisdom; and if they convert in the subject in which they exist, they must necessarily exist, and this cannot be otherwise.
82. As a natural medium, the act of understanding exists in the middle between the intellective and the intelligible; and the middle is intelligible to wisdom.
83. Wisdom can repose in the end, and the end is intelligible to wisdom; and if they do not convert in the subject in which they exist, there can be understanding without repose, and repose without understanding.
84. By reason of majority, wisdom can receive greater understanding in itself; but as it does not naturally convert with majority, it cannot increase infinitely, but only to a finite extent beyond which it cannot go.
85. By reason of equality, wisdom has its equal essential intrinsic reasons, namely its innate intellective, intelligible and understanding; and equality is intelligible to wisdom and this intelligibility is combined objectively with the equalizer, equalizable and equalizing.
86. Wisdom, or intellect do not convert with minority; now if they did convert with minority, understanding would always decrease and wisdom would be more adapted to ignoring than to understanding, which is impossible.
Chapter 6 - Will Combined with the Sequence of Principles
87. The will is good on account of goodness, and goodness is lovable by the will; and if they convert, the subject in which they exist always does good and loves well, and can never be contrary to this.88. The will is great on account of greatness, and greatness is lovable by the will, and thus the amativity of the will is great and so is the amability of greatness; and if they are convertible, then amativity and amability are in the infinite magnifier, magnifiable and magnifying in their loving.
89. The will is durable on account of duration, and duration is lovable by the will; and if eternal duration is convertible with the will, then eternalizing and loving must exist from eternity and in eternity.
90. The will can exist and act through power, and power is lovable by the will; but if they are not convertible in their subject, then the will can be impotent and power can be unloved.
91. The will is knowable to wisdom, and wisdom is lovable by the will; and if they proceed in eternal greatness, it follows that understanding and loving must necessarily exist.
92. The will is virtuous through virtue, and virtue is lovable by the will; but if they do not convert, then virtue can be hateful and the will can be vicious.
93. The will is true by reason of truth, and the truth is lovable by the will; but wherever truth and the will are not convertible, the truth can be hateful and the will can be false.
94. The will is enjoyable by reason of glory, and glory is lovable by the will; and thus, the will is removed from punishment by glory, and glory is removed from hate by the will.
95. Through difference, the will contains in itself the distinction among the lover, the lovable and loving, which exist in it clearly without confusion; and difference is lovable by the will.
96. Through concordance, the will has its innate concordant things, namely the lover, the lovable and loving, and concordance is lovable by the will; and as it is lovable with goodness, greatness, duration, power etc. it must contain a lovable concorder, concordable and act of concording.
97. With contrariety, the will hates vice and sin, and if the will and contrariety were convertible, the will could never love virtue with concordance.
98.By reason of principle, the will is a principle for loving. This is because whatever is lovable, is lovable by reason of the will; hence it follows that principle is lovable by reason of the will. And here we see how one being causes another being outside itself, so it can derive something useful from it.
99. By reason of the medium the will has its innate medium, namely the act of loving; and the medium is lovable by reason of the will.
100. By reason of the end, the will is perfect and in repose; however in this repose it needs to have great duration and powerful loving, without which it cannot be satisfied by the end.
101. With majority, the will has a major act of loving; and so it can have a major act, majority is lovable by the will.
102. By reason of equality, the will naturally equalizes through the lover, the lovable and loving; and equality is lovable by the will.
103. With minority, the will is a being close to naught, and through nothingness it is close to emptiness and idleness; and if the will and minority were convertible, non being would be more desirable than being, which is impossible.
Chapter 7 - Virtue Combined with the Sequence of Principles
104. Virtue is good on account of goodness, and goodness is virtuous on account of virtue; and thus, virtue, through goodness, is a reason for good to produce good, and per se, it is a reason for virtuous action.105. Virtue is great in greatness, and greatness is virtuous in virtue, which could not be unless virtue has its virtuficative, virtuficable and virtufying that are of its essence and identical with it.
106. Virtue lasts through duration, and if it is numerically identical with duration, its essence always contains the durable virtuficative, virtuficable and virtufying.
107. Virtue is powerful through power, so it can resist vice and sin: but it cannot resist if man does not want to use his power. And this is because he is vicious and idle.
108. Virtue is knowable to wisdom, and wisdom has virtuous knowledge through virtue, on the condition that the act of the will causes the will to love. And here we see how one virtue helps another.
109. Virtue is lovable by love, and love is virtuous through virtue, and thus they convene in loving and virtufying.
110. Virtue is true by reason of truth, and truth is virtuous by reason of virtue; and if they are identical in the subject in which they exist, then falsification or sin can never exist in it.
111. Virtue is enjoyable on account of glory, and glory is virtuous through virtue. And here we see how a virtuous being seeks delight in glory.
112. Through difference, virtue is clear without confusion, because difference posits a distinction among the virtuficative, virtuficable and virtufying, all identical in essence, and virtue provides difference with the virtue for doing this.
113. Through concordance, virtue contains its own innate essential concordant things comprising its single essence, and virtue gives concordance the virtue for doing this.
114. Virtue is against its contrary, namely vice and sin, which it opposes with goodness, greatness etc. whereas contrariety opposes virtue by depriving it of its own habit and of its habits of will, greatness etc.
115. Virtue is primordial in priority, because anything primordial is primordial in priority., and whatever is virtuous, is virtuous through virtue, and thus, principle is virtuous through virtue.
116. Virtue can be mediated through a medium and the medium is virtuous on account of virtue.
117. By reason of the end, virtue is perfect and in repose; and thus, the just seek repose through virtue.
118. Through majority, virtue naturally majorifies, and majority has a virtuous essence by reason of virtue.
119. By reason of equality, virtue equalizes justice with prudence, and likewise, understanding with loving whenever they are equally virtuous.
120. By reason of minority, virtue is sometimes minor just as it is sometimes major by reason of majority; and thus, when it is minor, it agrees with non being and when it is major, it agrees with being.
Chapter 8 - Truth Combined with the Sequence of Principles
121. Truth is good on account of goodness, and goodness is true on account of truth; and if they convert, then the good and the true are always identical, but when they sometimes do not convert in some subject, someone falsely expects to have the truth in a way that is neither true nor virtuous. And here we see that truth and goodness in man are not convertible.122. Truth is great in greatness, which would not be so unless it had the verifier, verifiable and verifying.
123. Truth lasts in duration because the verifier, verifiable and verifying last in truth naturally, and sometimes also morally, when truth acts within itself with what is outside, as does radical moisture with nutritional moisture in sentient beings.
124. Truth is powerful by reason of power and if it is identical with power, no falsehood has any power over it.
125. Truth is knowable to wisdom, and wisdom seeks out truth so it can truly relate to what it knows.
126. Truth is lovable by the will, so that the will can truly have its beloved.
127. Truth is virtuous by reason of virtue, and virtue is true by reason of truth; and thus they participate in verifying to oppose falsification and sin.
128. Truth is enjoyable on account of glory, and glory is true on account of truth; and in this way, just men truly and gloriously strive for everlasting glory.
129. Through difference, truth is clear without any confusion, and difference posits that in truth the verifier is one thing, the verifiable is another thing, and verifying is yet another thing; and the truth makes this true.
130. Through concordance, truth contains innate concordant things, namely the verifier, verifiable and verifying, all concordant in one essence; and they are concordant because there is a number of them, and truth makes concordance truly have what it has.
131. Truth is against falsehood and it opposes it with its verifier, verifiable and verifying, and thus it is simply disparate from falsehood.
132. By reason of principle, truth is naturally a principle just as principle naturally verifies by reason of truth, and thus, truth is a principle because whatever is true, is true by reason of truth.
133. By reason of the medium, truth has verification in the middle between the verifier and the verifiable, and truth makes this true.
134. Truth is in repose by reason of the end, and the end is true by reason of truth; and if they are identical in the subject in which they exist, then truth can never be distressing and the end can never be wrong.
135. One truth is greater than another and one majority is more true than another, because truth and majority are not convertible.
136. By reason of equality, truth has its innate and equal verifier, verifiable and verifying; and by reason of truth, equality truly has what it has.
137. One truth is lesser than another truth, and the minor truth participates more with non being because it has less being. And the truth makes this true, as does minority in its own respect.
Chapter 9 - Glory Combined with the Sequence of Principles
138. Glory is good on account of goodness, and thus, by reason of the goodness it has, it is a reason for good to do good, and per se it is a reason for good deeds to be glorious.139. Glory is great on account of greatness, but it would not be great without its own glorifier, glorifiable and glorifying. And if its greatness is infinite, then it is infinite in its glorifying.
140. Glory lasts on account of duration, and if it is eternity, its enduring lasts through eternity where there cannot be any true innovation.
141. On account of power, glory is powerful in existence and action, and if it is identical to power, it cannot possibly have any defect or be idle.
142. Glory is knowable to wisdom, and wisdom is enjoyable on account of glory, and thus they agree in enjoying and knowing.
143. Glory is lovable by the will, the will is enjoyable on account of glory, and so the will delights in desiring and loving. And if glory and will are not identical in the subject in which they exist, then the will is sometimes grieved because it does not have its beloved.
144. Glory is virtuous on account of virtue, and virtue is glorious on account of glory; and thus, virtuous men delight in acquiring virtues.
145. Glory is true on account of truth, and truth is glorious on account of glory; and thus a truthful man delights and finds repose in his truth and glory.
146. On account of difference, glory is clear and separated from confusion, since difference posits that the glorifier is one thing, the glorifiable another, and so with glorifying, and glory makes this delightful.
147. By reason of concordance, glory has concordant things that agree in unity and plurality; in unity so that there be one glory, and in plurality so that there be the glorifier, the glorified and glorifying, all of one and the same essence.
148. With glorifying, glory is removed from punishment, its contrary, and without glorifying it cannot be perfectly removed from it.
149. On account of principle, glory has reason to initiate something, and in the subject in which the glorifier is the selfsame initiator, it initiates an initiated glorified entity from itself and both together glorify and initiate an act of glorifying and initiating as they spirate and love, and this is observed in divine contemplation.
150. Glory has its ebb and flow through a medium, and the medium has enjoyment and glorification on account of glory.
151. Glory is in repose on account of the end, and the end has glorification on account of glory; and thus the glorifier cannot have repose without the glorified and glorifying.
152. Major glory has major delight, and major majority is a major image of delight.
153. Glory cannot be at repose per se without having innate coessential equality, because it lacks its own equal glorifier, glorifiable and glorifying.
154. With minority, glory is close to punishment and non being, a therefore it is removed from punishment and non being by majority.
Chapter 10 - Difference Combined with the Sequence of Principles
155. Difference is good on account of goodness, and goodness is distinct on account of difference; and thus, goodness and difference are reasons for the subject in which they exist to produce distinct good by acting distinctly and well.156. Difference is great on account of greatness because it causes distinctions to exist between one genus and another, between genus and species, between species and individuals, between one individual and another and between an individual and his act. And thus, difference is so great that it comprises all things. Greatness is distinct on account of difference because it posits difference in its own number or genus, and difference posits a distinction among the magnifier, magnifiable and magnifying, all of which belong to the essence and nature of greatness.
157. Difference lasts on account of duration, and duration, on account of difference, has its innate distinct things, namely the endurer, the durable and enduring; and the distinction that converts with eternity lasts from eternity and in eternity as it distinguishes among the eternalizer, the eternalizable and eternalizing. And this is signified by the most holy Trinity.
158. Difference is absolutely an innate power, and it is powerful on account of power because it causes a distinction among the powerer, the powerable and powering, and power can do this with difference.
159. Difference is knowable to wisdom, and through the nature of difference, wisdom can understand the distinction among the intellective, the intelligible and understanding, so as to make them intelligible, because they cannot be objectified or understood without difference.
160. Difference is desirable by the will, so that the will can have its innate loving nature and exist as a clear reason among the lover, lovable and loving. Without this distinction, the will would be a confused reason and impotent in loving.
161. Difference is virtuous on account of virtue, and through difference, virtue has its innate distinct things in which it has existence and action; and through difference, virtue is disparate from vice, because without difference, all things would be one and the same number.
162. Difference is true on account of truth, and truth posits true things through difference, as it is true that there is a distinction among the verifier, verifiable and verifying, and among the intellective, intelligible and understanding.
163. Difference is enjoyable on account of glory, and through difference, glory can have enjoyment with the glorifier, glorifiable and glorifying, which cannot be in glory without distinction.
164. Through concordance, difference has innate concordant things that it receives in itself by distinguishing among the concorder, the concordable and concording. And difference does this with its own differentiative, differentiable and differentiating. And in the subject in which they exist, difference and concordance together posit the selfsame subject, one common to them both, with its own innate concordant and different constituent parts.
165. Innate difference and contrariety differ from one another, and this is because difference sometimes concords with innate concordance by distinguishing, concording and generating, and sometimes difference acts against concordance with contrariety by distinguishing, opposing and corrupting, so that the generation of one thing is the corruption of another and vice versa. And this occurs in a similar way in moral matters, as we will show in Chapter 12.
166. By reason of principle, difference has natural priority so that it is a principle general to all differences with its own differentiative, differentiable and differentiating, without which it can neither be at this level nor have the nature of a principle.
167. On account of the mean, difference has a medial nature and has its own innate medium, namely the act of differentiating with which it tells things apart, and this act of differentiating exists between the differentiator and the differentiable.
168. By reason of the end, difference has repose, and its repose is in distinguishing one thing from another, so it has subjects in which it can exist and act.
169. By reason of majority, difference is greater in one subject than in another, because it is greater in substantial essences than in accidental ones; and thus, difference has greater action in distinguishing substantial goodness from substantial greatness, than in distinguishing accidental goodness from accidental greatness. And it has greater action in distinguishing several things in one essence that constitute this essence, than in distinguishing one essence from another; this is represented in the intellect in which the intellective, the intelligible and understanding which are innate, natural and essential parts of the intellect, although its actin in distinguishing between one essence and another essence is more extended.
170. By reason of equality, difference has innate equal things, just as equality has its innate distinct things by reason of difference; and thus they communicate by differentiating and equalizing in the subject in which they exist.
171. By reason of minority, difference is minor, just as it is major by reason of majority; and since minority is a small subject of little quiddity, difference cannot enter into it with its greatness, nor can it differentiate much with minority, for as it enters little, it differentiates little.
Chapter 11 - Concordance Combined with the Sequence of Principles
172. Concordance is good on account of goodness, and goodness is concordant on account of concordance; and thus they participate in the subject in which they exist by bonifying and concording.173. Concordance is great on account of greatness, and it would not be great if it lacked the concordative, the concordable and the act of concording which are of its essence; rather, contrariety would be greater in opposing it; now concordance is greater than contrariety which is at a disadvantage because it is not a substantial principle, as proved in the Major Art of Preaching.
174. Concordance is durable through duration, as durable as its innate constituent concordative, concordable and concording.
175. Concordance can exist and act through power, and through concordance, power has its own innate concordant things; and thus, inasmuch as concordance and power are in mutual accord in the subject in which they are joined, they are removed from contrariety.
176. Concordance is known to wisdom or intellect, and when the intellect objectifies it by understanding its essence and its essential concordative, concordable and concording, it objectifies and attains it more than if it objectifies only its essence; and concordance communicates itself more greatly to the intellect by concording.
177. Concordance is lovable by the will, as concordance does its act in the will so that the lover, lovable and loving convene in one identical essence.
178. Concordance concords virtues with one another in the subject in which they exist, which it does in its own essence and in the essence of virtue, and it could not do this without essence because its act would not have any sustaining subject.
179. Concordance is true by reason of truth, and truth is concorded by concordance; and thus, in the subject in which they exist, their concording and verifying removes them from contrariety and falsehood.
180. Concordance is glorifiable, or enjoyable by glory, and glory is concordable by concordance, and thus both reasons seek one another.
181. Concordance cannot be without difference, although difference can be without concordance inasmuch as it convenes with contrariety. And here we see that difference is a greater principle than concordance.
182. Concordance and contrariety are opposed because concordance builds what contrariety destroys, and vice versa. But concordance is a higher principle than contrariety because it convenes with being by concording whereas contrariety convenes with non being by opposing.
183. By reason of principle, concordance is general to all concordable things, because principle posits that concordance has one active principle, one passive principle and one mediating principle with which it comprises all the lesser concordances beneath it.
184. By reason of the medium, concordance ebbs and flows between the concordable and the concordative, and the act of concording is the medium between them.
185. By reason of the end, concordance has repose in the concordative, the concordable and the act of concording, and it can have no repose without them, just as the end can have no repose without concordance.
186. Concordance is sometimes major and sometimes minor, and this is because in some subjects it concords greater things than in other subjects, for instance, it concords greater things in a man than in a rose, and greater things in a rose than in a stone.
187. Concordance convenes with equality so as to have its own innate coessential concordative, concordable and concording without which equality cannot be the subject in which the end of concordance reposes.
188. Some concordances are less than others and they are less because they cannot enter into minority with greatness and majority, and so concordance with minority is close to naught and close to contrariety, its enemy.
Chapter 12 - Contrariety Combined with the Sequence of Principles
189. Contrariety is sometimes good on account of goodness and sometimes evil on account of malice; it is good by reason of goodness as for instance a man in contradicting vice with virtue, and like the contrariety of the elements, without which there would be no generation; and it is evil through malice, like an unjust man who contradicts virtue with vice, and like disease that is contrary to health, and death is contrary to life.190. Contrariety is great by reason of greatness, because there is great contrariety between God and the sinner, between water and fire, between good and evil, truth and falsehood and so forth.
191. Contrariety lasts trough duration but not of itself, because it is an accident that does not exist on its own, and it lasts by accident, both because it is a privative habit that inclines being to non being, and because there are contrary beings, like the just and the unjust, sight and blindness, understanding and ignoring, heating and cooling, joy and sadness and so forth.
192. Contrariety can exist and act through power, because one kind of contrariety is innate and another is moral: innate contrariety as between heat and cold, and moral contrariety as it is possible to sin, although in sinning, contrariety does not have the power of countering per se, but is a habit acquired by man through sinning.
193. Contrariety is objectively knowable to wisdom; however, contrariety does not cause any knowledge but rather opposes ignorance to knowledge.
194. Contrariety is desirable in one way, and undesirable in another way. Desirable contrariety is like the contrariety among the elements and the contrariety whereby virtue opposes vice. Undesirable contrariety is like the one whereby death is against life and vice against virtue.
195. Contrariety stands between virtue and vice and communicates with both so that man can oppose vice through virtue, or if he wants, he can oppose virtue through vice. Now virtue does not compel a man to act virtuously because he has the free will to do good or evil with it.
196. Some contrarieties are true and others are false, true contrariety is like justice against injustice and false contrariety is like injury, which is a habit opposed to the habit of justice.
197. Contrariety can come either with delight or with sorrow; it comes with delight when a man forsakes vice and rejoices in virtue, it comes with sorrow when a man is sorry for what he has done.
198. Contrariety has three different modes, as shown in the Major Art of Preaching, in the chapter on contrariety and elsewhere, in the first part of the first distinction.
199. With its modes, contrariety opposes concordance and vice versa, as shown in the said book , in the chapters on concordance and contrariety.
200. By reason of principle, there is naturally innate contrariety that contains all natural contrarieties in itself, but moral contrariety is a habit acquired by man, as said above in number 192.
201. Contrariety can be mediated in two ways: naturally and morally: naturally, like heating that contradicts cooling and vice versa, morally, like in doing good and evil, which is because a man who does good and a man who does evil are opposed in a certain measure
202. Contrariety never has repose per se, because if it were in repose per se, it would have perfect repose so that contrariety would convene with being through perfection and being would convene with non being, which is impossible.
203. Some contrarieties are major and others are minor: major contrariety exists, for instance, between virtue and vice; minor contrariety exists between heating and cooling, etc.
204. In one way, contrariety convenes with equality, as in the elements considered in an absolute sense; in another way, it does not convene with equality: for instance, there is no virtue and vice are utterly incompatible.
205. By reason of its genus, contrariety always convenes with minority. This is because it inclines being to non being; and thus, whoever is more aggressive with it is more aggressed in turn and placed in peril and tribulation and removed from patience. May God Almighty liberate us from this kind of contrariety.
Chapter 13 - Principle Combined with the Sequence of Principles
206. Principle is good on account of goodness, and by reason of principle, goodness can be called a principle. And since whatever is bonifiable or bonified is so by reason of goodness, it is good to initiate good, and if good does not do good, it does evil because it stands against its own nature and the nature of principle.207. Principle is great by reason of greatness. And given that whatever is initiable or initiated is so by reason of principle, and as there are a great many great things that are initiated or initiable, principle must be great. However, it is not great if it does not initiate anything great although is able to do so. And if greatness and principle convert in the subject in which they exist, then this subject must necessarily have its innate acts of infinitizing and initiating. And here we see that production necessarily proceeds in God's essence through infinitizing and initiating.
208. Principle lasts through duration, and if duration is eternity and principle is identical to eternity, then initiating and eternalizing must necessarily proceed within the subject in which principle and eternity are identical.
209. Principle is powerful by reason of power, and if principle and power are identical, it follows that principle can initiate as much with its own essence as with the essence of power.
210. Principle is knowable to wisdom, and if wisdom is infinite, eternal and identical to principle, then principle must necessarily coexist with eternalizing and knowing.
211. Principle is lovable by the will, and if it is identical to greatness, eternity and will, then this principle must have innate and lovable acts of initiating, magnifying and eternalizing, and this cannot be otherwise.
212. Principle is virtuous by reason of virtue, and virtue is initiable by reason of principle; and if initiating and virtufying are impeded in the subject in which they exist, then principle and virtue are not identical.
213. Principle is true by reason of truth, and truth is initiable by reason of principle; and if principle is identical to truth and eternity, then initiating, verifying and eternalizing must necessarily proceed within this principle.
214. Principle is delightful and glorifiable by reason of glory, and if it converts with glory, then glorifying and initiating must necessarily convert.
215. Principle is clear and without confusion by reason of difference, and if the principle is intellect, then initiating and understanding are convertible, and difference posits that the intellective is one thing and the intelligible another, and that the initiator is one thing and the initiable is another, otherwise, principle and intellect cannot be free of confusion.
216. By reason of concordance, principle is naturally concordant, which it cannot be without the concordance of the initiator, initiable and initiating.
217. Contrariety opposes principle when it impedes its act of initiating, but in the subject in which principle is identical to power, contrariety cannot impede principle from initiating as it has no ability or power in general to do this.
218. Through the medium, the beginning goes to the end, as it cannot reach the end without a medium; and when the medium is impeded, the power of the beginning and end wanes and the appetite suffers sorrow and toil. But when goodness, greatness and duration arrive, power increases and the impediment is destroyed.
219. The beginning reposes in the end and it cannot have repose in the end without initiating, and both the initiator and the initiable must be of the essence of the beginning; but sometimes, in lower beings, the initiator believes in vain that it can find repose in an initiable being not of its own essence through an accidental act of initiating. And here we see that only God is the supreme beginning and end.
220. Some principles are major and others are minor. The major principle is the one that is in act without having been brought out of potentiality, as no potential principle can be greater than one that is in act, because a principle in potentiality is close to naught as compared to a principle in act. And here we see that God, who is the greatest principle that can be, has His own innate act, namely the initiator, initiable and initiating, as seen in the divine persons.
221. No principle can have repose in itself without natural equality. This is because it seeks to have equality within itself through the initiator, initiable and initiating: but God has repose in Himself, therefore etc.
222. God is a principle, He is the supremely perfect principle, whence it follows that the things whereby God is most removed from minority of principle must necessarily exist in Him; therefore the initiator, initiable and initiating are all in God.
Chapter 14 - Medium Combined with the Sequence of Principles
223. The medium is good by reason of goodness, and as without the medium, the beginning cannot reach the end, nor can there be repose in the end, goodness is a reason for good to do good by means of bonifying, which is a medium.224. The medium is great through greatness, and as there is great distance between the beginning and the end, the medium must be great; however, it is not very great if it is not of the essence of the beginning and end.
225. The medium lasts through duration, the influence of the end and the reflux of the beginning. And if the medium converts with duration, and if they are eternity, the flux and reflux lasts from eternity as do the mediating and eternalizing.
226. The medium can exist and act by reason of power, and by reason of the medium, power has a medium in its act of powering.
227. The medium is knowable to wisdom, but is not knowable without a beginning and end.
228. The medium is lovable by the will, without which it cannot have the lover, lovable and loving, nor would the beginning have repose if there were no end. And if the medium is convertible with the will, mediating and loving are convertible.
229. The medium is virtuous on account of virtue, and virtue transits from the beginning to the end through the medium; and virtue exists in its own medium.
230. The medium is true by reason of truth, and by reason of the medium, truth has its own innate medium in verifying.
231. Without a medium, glory cannot have its act of glorifying, nor can the glorifier have any delight in glory.
232. By reason of difference, the medium is clear without confusion, as is the intellect's innate essential act of understanding, because the intellective is one thing, the intelligible is another and understanding is their act: But if there were no difference between the intellective and the intelligible, the medium would be confused and unclear.
233. Without concordance of the intellective and the intelligible, understanding could not be a medium, because it would not have the means to be one.
234. Sometimes the medium is impeded by contrariety, and this is because it lacks the influence of the end and the reflux of the beginning in the subject in which they exist, because the subject is not perfect; but as it reaches perfection, some contrariety is removed from the subject as the medium is made perfect.
235. The medium exists by reason of the beginning, without which it cannot exist; and when it is not perfect, it does not have the natural end which it acquires as it reaches perfection.
236. The medium reposes in the end because the beginning transits through the medium to reach the end, and the medium also transits through the transit of the beginning to the end because the beginning cannot transit without the medium. And here we see how elemented things and other mixable ingredients enter into mixture.
237. Some media are greater and others are less; a greater medium is for instance: the substantial medium that has a substantial beginning and end with which it is one in essence, substance and nature; a lesser medium is for instance: an accidental medium like running or eating because it is not of the essence of the runner and what is run, or of the eater and the eaten.
238. Through equality, the medium stands equally between the beginning and the end: it stands there perfectly when it is of their essence and formally free of all matter, because with matter, it cannot stand equally in the middle, given that form is something more than matter. Nonetheless, in a manner of speaking and in due proportion, the act is said to stand equally between form and matter as it is equally comprised of, or formed by both.
239. No medium existing between matter and form can ever be far from minority, and this is because matter is minor and form is major. And so it follows that the medium that exists between the formative and formable both free of all matter is simply removed in every way from minority.
Chapter 15 - The End Combined with the Sequence of Principles
240. The end is good on account of goodness, so that the end be good and goodness has repose in the end; and thus, goodness in repose is a reason for good to do good. But when good does not do good, there is repose neither for good nor for goodness because good is in a state of idleness contrary to the end of goodness.241. The end is great on account of greatness so that the essence has final repose in greatness, but the end is not very great if the reposer, reposable and reposing are not of its essence.
242. The end lasts through duration, and if it converts with duration, it has repose in itself. And if it seeks a peregrine end to repose in, it cannot be the supreme end.
243. The end can exist and act through power, and power can have repose in the end. And if they convert, power can repose as much in existence as in action, as in the Godhead where God reposes as much in divine action as in divine existence, and his power is as great in powering as in existing, and likewise with the other dignities.
244. The end is understandable to wisdom, and it is as intelligible in its existence as in its action, without which it is not the supreme end, but a lower end seeking a higher one. And here we see that all created beings seek, or should seek the supreme end.
245. The end is lovable by the will, and as it is great, it is greatly desirable, and as it is good, it is well to desire it. And as the will is great, it greatly loves and desires the end; but if it does not do this, it is idle in its greatness and injurious to the end, and because of this it toils without repose.
246. The end is virtuous by reason of virtue, and thus there is repose in virtue.
247. The end is true by reason of truth, and thus repose truly acquired is free of toil and sorrow.
248. Beyond glory, there can be no repose in the end, just as there can be no delight in glory deprived of an end.
249. By reason of difference, the end is a clear object without confusion. And this is because it has its own natural and coessential perfecter, perfectible and perfecting, without which it would be not only confused but also an end of something other than itself, which is impossible.
250. By reason of concordance, the end has concordant things just as concordance has things in repose by reason of the end.
251. With contrariety, there can be no repose in the end, and this is because the end has a friend in concordance, and an enemy in contrariety.
252. The end is that in which the beginning reposes, and when they convert, the end initiates with the beginning, and when they do not convert, the beginning might not repose in the end.
253. Without a medium, the end cannot be a subject of repose for the beginning because without a medium, there is no connection between the beginning and the end.
254. In a major end there is major repose, and the greatest repose is when the reposer, reposable and reposing are of the same essence.
255. Without equality among the reposer, reposable and reposing, the end cannot be a subject in which concordance reposes.
256. With minority, there is no repose in any end, and this is because minority is close to naught, and nothingness brings on toil and sorrow inasmuch as it is a habit that deprives perfection.
Chapter 16 - Majority Combined with the Sequence of Principles
257. Good majority is a reason for good to do major good, and such goodness is substantial because substance is greater than accident; and so when it produces major good by reason of substantial goodness and majority, it produces major good substantially, and it places this product in the species of majority and goodness.258. Majority is great, and there is some major greatness, whence it follows that it is a substance, for if it were not, it would not be major, nor could substance be more great than accident.
259. Majority lasts through duration, and duration is greater in substance, for if it were not, accidents would last on their own and not on account of substance, and more on account of minority than of majority.
260. Majority can exist and act through power, and through majority, power can me major, whence it follows that majority and power can be substantial parts of the subject in which they exist.
261. Majority is known to wisdom, and thus it is a substantial object, for if it were not, majority would not be knowable per se but by accident, which is impossible.
262. Majority is lovable by the will so that through majority, the will can have a greater object.
263. Majority is the image of virtue's immensity and so it follows that there is some substantial majority, for if there were none, it could not be an image of immensity because accident is inadequate for this since it means minority just as substance means majority.
264. Majority is true by reason of truth, and truth is major on account of majority, and so it follows that there is some substantial truth, for if there were none, then truth could not be more than an accident, nor could majority be true by reason of substantial truth.
265. Majority is delightful on account of glory, and through majority, glory has greater delight; therefore there must necessarily be some substantial majority so that glory can be greater in substance than in accidents.
266. Majority is free of confusion by reason of the difference that distinguishes between substantial and accidental majority, and without this distinction, majority would be confused.
267. Without concordance, majority cannot be an image of the immensity of virtue, greatness etc. and so concordance posits that some majority is substantial in existence and action.
268. Majority overcomes minor contrariety with major concordance, but majority cannot overcome major concordance with major contrariety, and this is because majority does not belong to its genus. And here we see how sinners commit sins and incur guilt, because the virtues have major positive value and the vices have minor privative value.
269. By reason of principle, majority is a principle; and through majority, principle is naturally substantial because if it were not, it could not be major. For a principle to be major to the fullest extent, it must have innate essential constituent parts, for without them, it could be greater in potentiality than in act, and potential majority could be greater than actual majority, which is impossible.
270. Without its innate coessential medium, namely majorifying, majority cannot be in its own genus, nor can the medium without majority be a substantial being.
271. Majority causes major repose, and so it follows that by reason of majority, some end is simply and not relatively substantial, because repose exists by reason of majority, not minority; and this is so because repose must be removed from conceit, envy and things like that.
272. Without equality, majority cannot be an image of the immensity of goodness, greatness etc. because it would have no means of having its own equal coessential things, namely the majorifier, majorifiable and majorifying.
273. Majority and minority are respectively opposed in the subject in which they exist, like substance and accident, which are not, however, naturally opposed because substance and accident convene in constituting a third entity, such as a body. And thus, majority per se convenes with being and minority with non being. But there is some majority that convenes with non being because it causes sin, or corruption.
Chapter 17 - Equality Combined with the Sequence of Principles
274. Good equality is a reason for good to do good in an equal way; this definition is a source from which natural and moral justice arise.275. Equality is great on account of greatness, and by reason of equality, greatness has its own equal innate coessential parts; now equality cannot be great in greatness without the natural equalization that proceeds within its own innate natural and coessential equalizer, equalizable and equalizing.
276. Equality endures in duration because the endurer and the durable are sufficient for the equalizer to make the equalizable and equalizing endure; and if eternity and equality were identical in created beings, equalizing and eternalizing would last in them from eternity and in eternity, without any corruption of some things and generation of others, and this is impossible. And here we see that the world is new and that equality and eternity do not convert in it.
277. Equality is powerful in power, and through equality, power has its own equal innate coessential things that cause equalizing and powering to proceed within the subject in which they exist.
278. Equality is knowable to wisdom, and since wisdom as well as equality are great in greatness, it necessarily follows that equality is in actuality with its coessential equalizer, equalizable and equalizing; and if equality is identical to the intellect, it follows that equalizing and understanding always proceed within it.
279. Equality is lovable by the will, so that the will can have equality in its lover, lovable and loving; and as equality and will are great in greatness, powerful in power and as they repose in the end, they must necessarily exist in act.
280. Equality is virtuous in virtue, and virtue has equal innate things by reason of equality, and here we see that the virtues are equalizable and that this is a virtuous equalization.
281. Equality is true in truth, and as it cannot receive the habit of truth without its nature, it must imprint its natural habit in truth, and by reason of equality, truth must have its own equal coessential things.
282. Equality is enjoyable by reason of glory, and glory is equalizable with equality; and so the glorifier in glory delights in equalizing the glorified and the glorifying with itself.
283. Through difference, equality is a clearly manifest reason without confusion, and this is because difference posits that the equalizer is one thing, the equalized another, and the equalizing yet another thing; but if difference were removed from equality, then equality would be emptied of clarity and overshadowed or filled with darkness.
284. Through concordance, equality has concordant things, and if they convert, they are forever concordant in concording and equalizing so that contrariety and inequality can have no participation with them.
285. Equality and contrariety are not friends, because equality is a friend of concordance. And here we see that justice arises from equality and concordance whereas injustice arises from contrariety and inequality.
286. By reason of principle, equality is a principle; and by reason of equality, principle has its own innate, equal and coessential things, and if equality and principle convert, they are forever permanent in initiating and equalizing.
287. By reason of the medium, equality naturally mediates, and by reason of equality, the medium naturally equalizes; and thus they join together in equalizing and mediating.
288. Equality is the subject in which the end of concordance reposes, and there is majority in this repose so that the repose not be deprived of major equality simply disparate from minority which does not belong to the genus of repose.
289. By reason of majority, equality is major, and majority essentially and naturally requires its own equal coessential things that remove it in every way from minority, its enemy. And here we see how majority exists as a real and natural being outside the soul and independently of the rational mind .
290. Equality and minority are enemies, and this is so because there can be no minority wherever there is equality, for if there were any, it would destroy equality; however, inasmuch as some equalities are lesser than others, equality convenes to some extent with minority through which it convenes with non being.
Chapter 18 - Minority Combined with the Sequence of Principles
291. By reason of goodness, minority is not close to naught, because goodness is always close to something; but goodness is close to naught on account of minority; and thus when good does not do good and is idle in its goodness, then goodness is minor and close to naught, but this occurs by accident.292. Minority does not belong to the genus of greatness, as compared to majority, its contrary; but it is great inasmuch as it is a substance so that substantial beings are different in majority and minority.
293. Minority endures in duration in its own genus, but it cannot do so in eternity which does not belong to the genus of minority. And here we see that the world is not eternal because if it were, it would also belong to the genus of some eternity lesser than God's eternity just as the goodness of the world is lesser than God's goodness.
294. Through power, minority can be what it is, but not more than what it is, and the same applies to what it does.
295. By reason of wisdom, minority is knowable and wisdom is minor by reason of minority; and I say it is minor when it is in a state of potentiality or idleness, because potentiality and idleness belong to minority, whereas actuality and activity convene with majority.
296. Minority is lovable by the will, not because the will loves minority in itself but rather because it likes minority in some subjects in order to appreciate majority; for instance, men like heat in water as heat reduces water to minority so that they can use it for heating and bathing.
297. Minority is virtuous on account of virtue because virtue compensates for the small quantity of some minor subjects, for instance, a mustard seed has great virtue in its sharp taste and because it reproduces and yields a large number of seeds.
298. Minority is true by reason of truth, and this is because truth truly posits that minority is close to naught, and minority, by lessening, posits that some truths are lesser than others.
299. Glory is minor by reason of minority, and has no repose in minority; but by reason of its abundance, glory increases its enjoyment in the subject in which it exists, unless minority impedes it, and it does impede it because it cannot sustain great enjoyment.
300. On account of difference, minority is a clear reason without confusion, but its clarity is small, as is its genus.
301. Minority participates with concordance, and so it has several concordant constituent principles, but this concordance is small because minority cannot proceed with greatness.
302. With contrariety, minority opposes majority just as majority opposes minority with contrariety. And here we see that minority is easily overcome. (Chapter 15 #21)
303. By reason of principle, minority is naturally a principle, and so it is a principle general to all minor agents that are of small value.
304. Minority mediates by reason of medium, as it is the medium through which equality and majority tend toward non being, which they do not reach without having transited through minority and received its nature before waning into nothingness.
305. Minority never has repose in itself, and this is because it is close to non being; but majority has repose because it is major and makes minority its servant.
306. Majority and minority are not, and cannot be identical, because majority means being and minority means non being; but they do convene well in one purpose, like master and servant.
307. Minority and equality cannot belong to the same species because minority stands between equality and non being, whereas equality stands between majority and minority.