Section II - The Principles Combined with the Sequence of Rules

1. Although the principles were combined with the rules in the third figure, here we keep up a continuous discourse through the rules so the intellect can get to know each principle combined with them in straight sequence. Further, in this part we intend to prove that each principle is general and to demonstrate the general nature of this art by proving that all its principles are general.

Chapter 1 - Goodness Combined With the Sequence of Rules

2. Is goodness a general principle? And we answer that it is, as shown by rule B and by the ladders of the second figure that comprehend all that is good; these ladders are general, and good by reason of the goodness they would not have if there were no general goodness.

3. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is general goodness? And we answer that it is a being that contains in itself every kind of special goodness sustained in specific subjects.

With the second species of rule C we ask: what innate coessential things does goodness have? And we answer that it has relative constituent concretes that are coessential with it and without which it cannot be a general principle. And this is proved by the first species of rule C and the second of rule D.

With the third species of Rule D we ask: what is goodness in other things? And we answer that it is a habit whereby subjects are habituated with active or passive goodness, so that they are good in activity with active goodness and good in passivity with passive goodness.

With the fourth species of the same rule we ask: what does goodness have in other things? And we answer that it has existence in substance without which it cannot be, and it has action and passion in it by reason of its nature signified by the second species.

4. With the first species of Rule D we ask: what does goodness arise from? And we answer that it exists in itself so it can be general and have its own nature designated by the second species of rule C and the first and second of D.

With the second species of rule D we ask: what does contracted goodness consist of? And we answer that it consists of itself, inasmuch as it is an innate substance, as signified by the second species of rule C and the first of E. Otherwise, it would not have any natural existence and action of its own, which is impossible. Further, goodness as a natural or moral habit is a figure of combined and diffused substantial goodness, or a likeness that represents its subject.

Now with the third species of rule D we ask: to whom does goodness belong? And we answer that it belongs to the subjects in which it exists, like a habit to the subject habituated with it, or the quantity of a quantified subject, etc.

5. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there goodness? And we answer that it exists on its own, as shown by the second and first species of rule C.

Next, with the second species of rule E we ask: why is there goodness? And we answer that there is goodness so that the other principles can be good by reason of it; now if there were no goodness, no principle would be good, just as nothing could be heated if there were no heat.

6. With the first species of rule F we ask: how much goodness is there? And we answer that there is as much of it as its habit in the subjects in which it exists.

With the second species of rule F we ask: how much goodness is there? And we answer that there is as much of it as the quantity of its own concrete correlatives, as was already proved with the second species of rule C, #3.

7. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the quality of goodness? And we answer that its proper quality is an accidental or substantial passion in the subjects in which it exists.

With the second species of rule G we ask: what is the quality of goodness? And we say that it has the quality of the good habits of the good subjects habituated with it, like the sweetness of honey which is good, or like the justice of a just man.

8. With all the species of rule H we ask: when is there goodness? And we answer that it exists at the time when time is good and exists in good, continuous successive motion through the ladders of the second figure. In this answer are implied all the species of rule H habituated with time. For the sake of brevity, we leave the application of this to diligent readers habituated with this art. And here the intellect takes on a great burden, however, the greater the burden it assumes, the loftier and more general it becomes.

9. With all the species of rule I we ask: where is goodness? Ans we answer, as we previously said about time, that it is in itself, as manifested by the first and second species of rules C and D, and by the principles of the first figure that are habituated with, and situated in goodness.

10. With the first rule K we ask: how does goodness exist? And we answer that goodness is a part of the subject in which it exists, as shown by the ladder of difference and by the second species of rule C and the first species of rule G.

Further, with the second species of K we ask: how does goodness exist in other principles? And the answer is given by the second species of rule C. And this is shown in the first part of the mixture of principles and in the first ladder of the third figure that goes from camera BC to camera BK.

Further, with the third species of rule K we ask: how is goodness in the whole, and the whole in it? And we say that it is in the whole as a habit in the habituated subject, as represented in the said ladder.

With the fourth species of rule K we ask: how does goodness transmit its likeness outwardly? And we say that it does it with the mode it has in the second species of rule C where the bonifier in its bonifiable generates peregrine or accidental instances of goodness habituated with it, like the good sweetness of honey, or the justice of a just man.

11. With all the species of the second rule K we ask: with what is goodness what it is? And we answer that it is with itself and the other principles, and with its correlatives, without which it cannot exist, as shown by the second species of rule C, with which it generates and imprints peregrine instances of goodness; and with the first and second species of rule D, as well as with the ladder of the third figure that goes from BC to BK, for it diffuses itself in this ladder to which it gives its likenesses.
 

Chapter 2  - Greatness Combined With the Sequence of Rules

12. Is greatness a general principle? And we answer that it is, as shown in the ladder of the third figure that goes from cameras BC and CD to camera CK. Now if greatness were not a general principle, goodness, difference, concordance etc. would not have anything to make them great, and this is proved by rule B.

13. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is greatness? And we answer that it is the principle whose proper function is to magnify and with which great things cause magnification. And this is shown by rule B.

With the second species of rule B we ask: what does greatness have in itself? And we answer that in corporeal things it has its own coessential magnifier, magnified and magnifying with which it causes substantial extension in subjects; quantities arise from them, whereby it measures itself and the other principles in the corporeal subjects in which it exists. And in a great spiritual subject it causes great acts, namely great understanding, remembering and loving habituated with spiritual greatness, where this greatness is a spiritual principle; and the same applies to great bonifying, enduring, judging etc. as proved by rule B.

Now with the third species we ask: what is greatness in other things? And we answer that it is a form that forms things that are greatly formed and greatly materialized, as indicated by the first species of rule D.

Further, with the fourth species of rule D we ask: what does greatness have in other things? And we answer that it has great action and great passion with which it is naturally present in the great subjects in which it exists. And this is indicated by the first species of rule D.

14. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does greatness arise from? And we answer that it exists in itself, so as to be primordial in the act of magnifying, because if it did not magnify, neither greatness nor any magnified beings would have anything from which to arise, which is impossible. And rule B shows this.

With the second species of rule D we ask: what does greatness consist of? And we answer that it consists of its own connatural correlatives designated by the second species of rule C.

Further, with the third species: to whom does greatness belong? And we answer that it belongs to the subject in which it exists, because the subject acts with it in itself and in other things, morally or naturally. And this is signified by rule B.

15. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there greatness? And we answer with the second species of rule C that it exists because it is made of the magnifier, magnified and magnifying, by reason of which greatness can naturally be what it is.

And with the second species we ask: why is there greatness? And we answer that there is greatness so that the other principles can be great on account of it. And this is signified by all the cameras of the third figure that contain the letter C.

16. With the first species of rule B we ask: how much greatness is there? And we answer that its quantity is the same as that of its essence continuously present in subjects, as designated in the third figure, in the ladder that goes from BC through CD to CK.

With the second species we ask: how much greatness is there? And we answer that its quantity is the same as what it can comprehend with its correlatives designated by the second species of rule D. And the same applies to the habits of greatness, which flow from it into the principles and are sustained, situated and enumerated in the first and second figures.

17. With the first species of rule G we ask: what quality does greatness have? And we answer that it has the quality indicated by the first species of rule C, and by the first and second species of rules D, E and F. And rule B attests to this.

Now with the second species of rule G we ask: what qualities does greatness have? And we answer that it has the qualities of its habits as they are diffused and sequentially combined in the third figure, through the ladder that goes from BC through CD to camera CK.

18. With the species of H we ask: when is there greatness? And the answer is that it exists when its subject, in which it is sustained and conjoined, exists. And this is proven by the ladder in the third figure that goes from BC through CD to camera CK, in this ladder all the species of rule H are implied, with which greatness in motion exists in time and time in it. But it would be too long to explain this here, and we leave it up to artists who know this art.

19. With all the species of rule I we ask: where is greatness? And we answer that it is with all the species of I designated in the cameras of the third figure. And diligent men who know this art can apply the art to this.

20. With the species of the first rule K we ask: how does greatness exist? And we answer that exists with the mode it has in rules C, D, E, F, G, H and I as signified in the ladder in the third figure that goes from BC through CD to camera CK.

21. With the second rule K and all its species we ask: with what does greatness exist? And we answer that it is with its correlatives signified by the second species of rule C; and it is with the first and second species of rules D, E, F, G, H and I and with the first rule K, without which it cannot be what it is. Further, it exists with the other principles without which it can neither be what it is, nor have the nature it has in itself and in other things. And the things said here are self evident and proven by rule B.

22. We have dealt with greatness combined with the sequence of the rules, and shown how the human intellect has a very general subject for attaining many great works caused by greatness and performed in the subjects in which they exist. And as this is so, is it any wonder that through this general art the human intellect is very general for causing great sciences, and can easily discover many new ones?

Chapter 3 - Eternity Combined With the Sequence of Rules

23. We ask: is there eternity? And we answer that there is, because otherwise, the world would have given rise to itself, made itself as something new and would have existed before existing, which would involve an impossible contradiction. And this is proven by rule B.

24. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is eternity? And we answer that it is a being that converts with its infinite goodness, greatness, power and virtue. And this is proved by the first and second species of D, E and F.

With the second species of rule C we ask: what does eternity have in itself? And we answer that it has its substantial and primordial correlatives, as proved by the first and second species of rules D and E.

With the third species of rule C we ask: what is eternity in other things? And we say it is a being that exists before time. And this is proved by its definition given above, as well as by the first species of rule D.

With the fourth species of rule C we ask: what does eternity have in other things? And we answer that it has the power to annihilate whatever exists because its power is infinite.

25. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does eternity arise from? And we answer that it exists on its own, because of its primordial singularity. And this is shown by rule B and by the first and second species of rule C.

With the second species of rule D we ask: what does eternity consist of? And we say it consists of the eternalizer, eternalizable and eternalizing without which it cannot be what it is, and without which it would be empty and idle, so that its being could fade into non being. And this is manifested by the second species of rule C and the first of D and E.

Now with the third species we ask: to whom does eternity belong? And we say that it belongs to no one, because an infinite being cannot be subject to anything other than itself.

26. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there eternity? And we say it is because eternity is made of infinite, primordial, substantial correlatives that are coessential with it, namely the eternalizer, eternalized and eternalizing, without which it can neither be what it is nor exist on its own. And this is proved clearly enough by all the species of rules C and D.

With the second species of rule E we ask: why is there eternity? And we answer that it is so that its goodness, greatness and power be primitive and the origin of all origins. And this is manifested by rule B and by the first species of rule D as well.

27. With the first species of rule F we ask: how much eternity is there? And we answer that there is as much of it as can exist outside of time, or else it would not be infinitely primordial, continuous and singular outside of time. And this is shown by rule B and the first species of rule C.

With the second species of rule F we ask: what is the discrete quantity of eternity? And we say that it has the quantity shown by the second species of rules C, D and E.

28. With the first species of rule G we ask: what quality does eternity have? And we say it has the same qualities as those of its definition and meaning combined with the second species of rule C and the other species of the same rule, as well as all the species of D, E and F.

With the second species of rule G we ask: what qualities does eternity have? And we answer that it is the cause of new time, and so it exists outside time and precedes motion as its substance is outside the intense and extended quantity of the world. And this is confirmed by all the species of rules C, D, E and F as well as by rule B.

29. With all the species of rule H we ask: when is eternity, when was it and when will it be? And we say with rules C, D and K that it was before time ever was, so that its eternal duration precedes time, just as its infinite greatness precedes the finite greatness of the world and as its goodness precedes the world's goodness. Further, eternity is in the "now" in which it has forever been from eternity and in which it will be throughout eternity, without any motion or succession; and there cannot be any time at all in such a "now", nor can time belong to the genus of eternity. Further, eternity was when there was no time in the aeviternal subject, so that the immobility of eternity measures and encompasses the world's mobility just as God's immense and infinite substance encompasses the world's finite quantity. And all the rules with their species attest to this.

30. With rule I we ask: where is eternity? We answer with rules C, D and K and with the other rules that in its infinite immensity it exists outside heaven just as with its infinity and immobility it exists outside of time and motion and as with its infinite goodness it exists outside of finite goodness. However, God's eternity is in the world and in all its parts, but not in a localized way, because it is infinite and undivided, as shown by the second species of rules C and D and proved by rule B.

31. With the rule of modality we ask: how does eternity exist? And we answer that its mode is designated by the second species of rules C, D and E without which eternity would have no mode for existing or acting in accordance with its nature. And all the rules corroborate this.

32. With the rule of instrumentality we ask: what does eternity exist? And we answer that it is with its essential correlatives designated by rules C, D and E, and as much with its infinite, singular and simple goodness, greatness, power etc. as with its infinite, simple and singular duration. And this is so that whatever exists be encompassed by what eternity is, for it is simply an infinite being that encompasses finite being. And all the rules convene in attesting to this.

33. We have dealt with eternity combined with the rules, and with the help of eternity's grace, we can discover and know it. Now we call this eternity God, may He be praised and honored in eternity. Amen.

Chapter 4 - Power Combined With the Sequence of Rules

34. We ask: is there an infinite power? And we answer that there is, as proved in the chapter on eternity. Now if there were no infinite power, then eternity, which is infinite, would not have any means to be infinite. And this id proved by rule B and by the third species of rule D, for unless there is infinite power, then finite power could prevent it from being and it would follow that power is a privative habit, subject to an infinite and positive habit, which is impossible.

35. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is infinite power? And we answer that it is a being whose proper function is infinite powering. And this is shown by the first species of rule D. And rule B also attests to this.

With the second species of rule C we ask: what does infinite power have in itself? And we say that it has natural and coessential correlatives with which it can be what it is. And this is proved by rule B and demonstrated by the second and third species of rules D and E.

With the third species of rule C we ask: what is power in other things? And we say it is a being that causes action and passion in subjects and on account of which subjects can have action and passion. And this is confirmed by rule B.

With the fourth species of the same rule we ask: what does power have in other things? And we answer that it has action like a cause in its effect, and also has passion in subjects in which it exists as power is habituated with goodness, greatness etc. And this is shown by rule B.

36. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does power arise from? And we answer that it exists in itself, because it is a general principle. And this is proved by rule B.

Further, with the first species of rule D we ask: what does power consist of? And we answer that it is of the powerer, powerable and powering. And this is proved by the second species of rules C and E.

Further, with the third species of the same rule we ask: to whom does power belong? And we answer that it belongs to the subjects in which it exists and which act with power as active causes in passive ones. And this is self evident.

37. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does power exist? And we say it is because it consists of the powerer, powerable and powering, but it is an accidental habit in subjects in which it exists, like whiteness that exists because its subjects are white.

Further, with the second species of rule E we ask: why is there power? And we answer that it is to enable the other principles to exist and act.

38. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does power have? And we answer that it has the quantity it needs to enter into its own nature so that one continuous existence is produced by both, and this is manifested by the second species of rule C. and rule B attests to this, as do the first and second species of rule D.

Now with the second species of rule F we ask: what quantity does power have? And we say it has the quantity of its concrete correlatives. This is shown by the second species of rule C, the first and second of G and by rule B.

39. With the first species of rule G we ask: what quality does power have? And we say it has the same quality as its subject's proper passion, like God's infinity and eternity, without which God cannot be what He is.

Now with the second species of rule G we ask: what qualities does power have? And we say it has the qualities of its subject's habits, like goodness, greatness etc. that can be what they are through power, as a judge can be a judge on account of power. And this is manifested by rule B.

40. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does power exist? And we say it exists when its definition exists by the first species of rule C. And by the second species of this rule it exists when it has its own coessential correlatives. And by the third, it exists when it is a habit in its subject. Further, by the fourth of the same rule, it exists when it has action and passion in its subject. And by the first species of rule D it exists when time, through power, can be in motion and motion in time. Further, by the second species of rule D it exists when it consists of its correlatives. And by the third species of this rule it exists when it is an instrument of its subject. And by the first species of the rule of modality it exists when it has its own mode per se. And by the second species it exists when it is a habit of its subject. And by the third species it exists when the correlatives are all within each other and all are in one essence that is in them all. And by the fourth species it exists when the other principles are habituated with power and the likenesses of power. Now by the first species of instrumentality power exists when it exists with its correlatives. And by the second species it exists when each principle exists with the others. And by the third species power exists when several essences can be in one common being, each one in the others and the common being in all. Further, by the fourth species, it exists when it transposes its likenesses into its subject with its essential innate correlatives.

41. With all the species of rule I we ask: where is power? And we answer that it is in locus with the same mode with which it exists in time, as described above; for power exists in its definition and in its correlatives through which all possible things are possible and without which nothing is possible. And it is in subjects in which it is a habit, and in subjects in which it has action and passion. And it is primordially in locus, and also in the things it consists of and in the subjects it belongs to. And it exists in modality whereby it has a mode for existing, acting and generating its likenesses; and it is in subjects that are active and passive with their power. This is demonstrated by all the said species, and proved by rule B.

42. With the rule of modality we ask: how does power exist? We answer that power has a mode enabling it to exist and act in subjects and that enables the subjects to exist and act in it as it enables them to have action and passion. And this is sustained by the species of the rules in continuous straight sequence. It would be too long to clarify this here, but it can be done easily by those who possess the mode of this art.

43. With the rule of instrumentality we ask: what does power exist with? We answer that it is with its coessential correlatives. And with all the species of the rules, without which it cannot exist, just as they cannot exist without power. And this is sufficiently clear to those who are habituated with this art. Now we have said enough about power.

Chapter 5 - Wisdom Combined With the Sequence of Rules

44. We ask: is there some wisdom that is a habit? And we answer that there is. Now if wisdom could not be a habit, then the intellect would have no means to objectify real and necessary truths, and so it would be naked and impotent, which is impossible. And rule B proves this.

45. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is wisdom as a habit? And we answer that it is the instrument with which the intellect acts properly and well, and with which it is as well habituated as fire is with heat, a mantled man with a mantle and a just man with justice.

With the second species of rule C we ask: what does wisdom essentially comprise in itself? And we answer that it has its own correlatives without which there can be no substantial wisdom.

With the third species of the same rule we ask: what is wisdom in other things? And we say that it is a habit that exists in them.

With the fourth species we ask: what does wisdom have in other things? And we say that wisdom that exists as substance has a habit of good understanding in its subject.

46. With the first species of rule D we ask: what is the primordial origin of wisdom? And we answer that that it exists on its own, as a primordial principle general to all that can be known.

With the second species we ask: what does wisdom consist of? And we answer that substantial wisdom consists of its essential correlatives, whereas habitual or accidental wisdom is a simple form with no innate constituting correlatives. And this is manifested by rule B, the second species of rule C and by the fourth of K. Further, with the third species we ask: to whom does wisdom belong? And we answer that it belongs to the subject in which it exists, like a cloak belongs to the man cloaked with it etc.

47. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there wisdom? We answer that if wisdom is a substance, it exists because it is made of the knower, knowable and knowing; and if it is an accident, it exists because the intellect is habituated with it, like a logician with logic and so forth.

Further, with the second species we ask: why is there wisdom? And we answer that it is so that the wise can obtain science well and prudently. And rule B proves this.

48. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does wisdom have? And we answer that it has same quantity as that of its habit in the subject in which it exists.

Now with the second species we ask: what quantity does wisdom have? And we say it has the same quantity as that of its concretes habituated with wisdom just as the heater, heatable and heating are habituated with heat.

49. With the first species of rule G we ask: what are the qualities of wisdom? And we say it has the same qualities as those of its innate concrete correlatives that are habituated with it as signified by the second species of rule C.
 
Further, with the second species of the same rule we ask: what are the qualities of wisdom? And we answer that it has the qualities with which it can habituate its concrete correlatives with goodness, greatness etc. as manifested by rule B, the third species of rule C and the fourth of K.

50. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does wisdom exist? And we say it exists in the "now" in which it is, although it is in potentiality
in one "now", in act in another "now"; or in one "now" it is theoretical and practical in another "now", in accordance with the way the subject is habituated with time and motion. This is proved by rules C, D and K.

51. With all the species of rule I we ask: where is wisdom? And we answer with all species that it exists in its subjects, just like goodness exists in good things, heat in fire, justice in just men and so forth. And rule B attests to this.

52. With the rule of modality we ask: how does wisdom exist? And we answer that it exists through the modes of difference and property; now difference distinguishes the intellect's habit from all other habits and property specifies it as belonging to the intellect, so that by the second species of rule C each correlative of wisdom is habituated with the others and all its correlatives are mutually habituated with one habit. And this is shown by rule B and all the species of rule K.

53. With all the species of rule K we ask: what does wisdom exist with? And we say it is with its own intrinsic correlatives that are habituated with it; and it exists with the act of goodness because it is good, with the act of truth because it is true, the act of power because it is possible, with the act of the will because it is desirable, with the act of virtue because it is virtuous and with the act of glory because it is delightful.

Chapter 6 - Will Combined With the Sequence of Rules

54. We ask: is the will immortal? And we answer that its essence is immortal because it is not constituted of compound contrary correlatives as shown by the second species of rules C, D and E. However, it is mortal when habituated with sin, because it has deviated from the second species of rule E. And rule B attests to this.

55. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is the will? And we answer that it is a being whose function is to want or not want so it can be in repose by the second species of rule E.

With the second species of rule C we ask: what does the will naturally and really have in itself? And we answer that it has the lover, the beloved and loving constituted in its substantial relation and with which it habituates itself with moral habits that are either good or evil, great or small. Rule B also proves this.

With the third species we ask: what is the will in other things? And we answer that it is a habit of its subject whose faculty is habituated with either virtues or vices through its willing and not willing.

With the fourth species we ask: what does the will have in other things? And we answer that it has action and passion.

56. With the first species of rule D we ask: from what does the will originate? And we answer that it exists on its own, because if it were made of some other pre existing principle, it would not be primordial in willing and not willing, and would also be denuded of the second species of rule C, which is impossible.

With the second species of rule D we ask: what does the will consist of? And we answer that it is of its consubstantial correlatives designated by the second species of rule C, without which it would not exist per se but merely as an accident.

With the first species we ask: to whom does the will belong? And we answer that it belongs to man, as he freely moves it to perform its acts of willing and not willing.

57. With the first species of rule E we ask: Why does the will exist? And we answer that it exists because it is constituted of its natural correlatives. And it exists morally because it is habituated with its own habit as it exists in its subject, like a mantled man clothed with his mantle.

With the second species of this rule we ask: why does the will exist? And we say it is so that beings can be lovable and loved, for without the will they could not be objectified in the genus of will, and thus repose would be emptied of goodness, virtue etc. which is impossible. And rule B shows this.

58. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does the will have? And we say it has the quantity of its essence different from all other essences.

With the second species we ask: what discrete quantity does the will have? And we say it has the quantity of its essential constituting correlatives designated by the second species of rules C and D and by the first of E. And rule B proves this.

59. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the will's proper quality? And we answer that it is a proper substantial passion of the subject in which it exists, like man who cannot exist without will.

With the second species we ask: what appropriated qualities does the will have? We answer that the will is either good on account of good habits or bad on account of bad habits, as it clothes itself with good or evil desires. And rule B shows this.

60. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does the will exist? And we say it exists subjectively and objectively when it is combined with all the species of C, D and K. There is no need for further clarification of this, for it is manifest enough to an intellect good at speculation and habituated to this art. And rules B, E, F and G prove the same.

61. With all the species of rule I we ask: where is the will? We answer with all the species of this rule that it is in the subject in which it exists subjectively and objectively. And a diligent application of rules E, F, G and H shows this clearly enough.

62. With all the species of modality we ask: how does the will exist subjectively and objectively? We say it is through the mode of its combination with all the other rules and their species, and this is clear and evident. But it would be far too long to expound this here, and so we leave it up to the artists of this art.

63. With all the species of instrumentality we ask: with what does the will exist? And we leave it up to the reader of this art to give the answer which he can find in the last number of the previous chapter on wisdom.

But now we ask: with what does the will objectify its object? And we answer that it does this with its freedom, which is an innate habit of the will. And it also objectifies with its correlatives, because its subject, joined to the sensitive and imaginative powers, willingly extracts and deduces peregrine species from things sensed and imagined, to imprint them in its innate desirable correlative, and these impressions generate and give rise to things that desire wants or that irascibility rejects, all this with the intrinsic act of willing from which peregrine willing or not willing accidentally arise. And here we see that unwillingness is not of the essence of the will because it is caused by irascibility, and irascibility is the opposite of will. And here the intellect rises to a great height.

Chapter 7 - Virtue Combined With the Sequence of Rules

64. We ask: is virtue a habit common to the principles so that they can have virtuous acts? And we answer that it is, as shown by the second species of rule E which cannot be a subject of repose for principles unless virtue is a habit common to them. And this is proved by rule B.

65. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is virtue? And we answer that it is a habit with which the principles have virtuous acts.

With the second species we ask: what does virtue have essentially in itself? And we answer that it has its innate constituent correlatives with which it is a source for causing virtuous acts.

With the third species of rule C we ask: what is virtue in other things? And we answer that it is a habit in subjects, so that the subjects can have virtuous acts, like fire that has its act of heating with heat.

With the fourth species we ask: what does virtue have in other things? And we answer that it has its act in subjects habituated with accidental virtue.

66. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does virtue arise from? And we answer that it exists on its own, without which it would not be a general principle, which is impossible.

With the second species of rule D we ask: what things is virtue made of? And we answer that substantial virtue is made of its substantial correlatives designated by the second species of rule C, otherwise it would have no basis for existing on its own, nor would it have any nature, which is impossible.

With the third species we ask: to whom does virtue belong? And we answer that virtue existing as an accident belongs to substantial virtue, which is a substance. And this is proved by rule B.

67. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does virtue exist? And we answer that it exists because it is constituted of its substantial correlatives. But accidental virtue is an accidental being caused by substantial virtue.

Now with the second species of rule E we ask: why is there virtue? And we answer that it is so the other principles can virtuously repose with it in the end. And this is proved by rule B.

68. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does virtue have? And we answer that natural virtue has the quantity of its extension throughout the whole universe.

Now with the second species of rule F we ask: what quantity does virtue have? And we answer that it has the quantity of its concretes extended in various ways in subjects of different species. And this is proved by rule B, as well as by the second species of rule D and the first of E.

69. With the first species of rule G we ask: what are the qualities of virtue? And we answer that it is a proper passion of its subject.

With the second species of rule G we ask: what qualities does virtue have in subjects? And we answer that accidental virtue is an appropriated being with which subjects are habituated, like a just man with justice, the power of sight with the abstraction of species of color, the sense of touch with species of heat, cold and so forth, and likewise with the higher powers in their own way. And this is signified by rule B, the first species of rule D and the second of E.

70. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does virtue exist? And we answer that it exists when it is sustained in combination with the species of rule H. And we leave this up to the general artists of this art.

71. With all the species of rule I we ask: where is virtue? We say that it is in all its species, and everywhere in the universe, and in words, stones, herbs and all subjects habituated with it and in all acts caused by virtue. But the maximum virtue dwells in the prime cause and converts with it.

72. With the modal rule, signified by K, we ask: how does virtue exist? And we answer that it exists through the mode that substantial virtue has in habituating itself with accidental virtue, with which it reaches out to perform peregrine acts by subjectively infusing its likenesses and objectively receiving the reflux of the likenesses of objects to its own passion in which it imprints and characterizes these likenesses to make them virtuous. And here the intellect is heavily burdened and exhausted, but nonetheless it is raised aloft, as signified by rule B.

73. With the rule of instrumentality we ask: with what does virtue exist? And we say it is with its correlatives, and one virtue exists with another, as seen in the line constituted of the elementative, vegetative, sensitive, imaginative and intellective virtues. where one virtue attracts species through another so that they participate with each other. And this is proved by rule I, the second species of rule E and rule B.

Chapter 8 - Truth Combined With the Sequence of Rules

74. We ask: does created truth convert with its unity? And we answer that it does not, because if it did, it would be much too similar to the infinite truth of God which does convert with its unity. It would further convert with goodness, greatness, duration etc. and thus it would extend itself beyond time and place, which is impossible. And this is shown by rule B.

75. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is truth? And we answer that it is an incorruptible being; now if it were corruptible, there would be an impossible contradiction whereby it would and would not exist.

With the second species of rule C we ask: what does truth contain in itself essentially and naturally? And we answer that it has its correlatives without which it cannot exist and with which all things are verifiable, and without its essence no being can be true, as shown by the first species of rule D.

Further, with the third species of rule C we ask: what is truth in other things? And we answer that it is the cause whereby beings are verifiable.

With the fourth species of rule C we ask: what does truth have in other things? And we say it has a habit for verifying the subjects in which it exists.

76. With the first species of rule D we ask: what is the origin of truth? And we say it exists of itself, so that falsehood, its opposite, is not pre existent to it and so it can repose in its essence. And this is shown by the second species of rule C.

With the second species of rule D we ask: what things does truth consist of? And we answer that it is of its correlatives, otherwise its habit would have no foundation from which to reach out and verify the other principles.

With the third species we ask: to what does the habit of truth belong? And we answer that it belongs to its substantial foundation that sustains it. And rule B shows this.

77. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there truth? And we say that it exists because it is made of its substantial correlatives.

Now with the second species we ask: why is there truth? And we say that there is truth so that the other principles can be verified by it.

78. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does truth have? And we say it has the quantity in which the other principles are verified by it.

And with the second species we ask: what quantity does truth have? And we say it has the amount of quantity in which it is habituated with its own habit with which it causes peregrine acts. And this is clearly shown by rule B.

79. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the quality of truth? And we answer that truth as such is a proper habit of the subjects in which it exists and with which it verifies the other principles.

Further, with the second species we ask: what is the quality of truth? And we say it is an appropriated habit with which the intellect truly and really attains real principles that are truly understood, remembered and loved, and that really exist.

80. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does truth exist? And we answer that it exists when time is sustained in its species and combined with them, and this is because without truth, neither time nor its species can be true in any way.

81. With all the species of rule I we ask: where is truth? And we answer that it is outside of falsehood, and exists throughout all the species of I, as these species could not exist at all without truth. Further, truth exists in all elemented, vegetated, sensed and imagined things and in all things objectified by souls and by angels. In God there is infinite and eternal truth in existence and action. And this is manifested by rule B.

82. With all the species of modality we ask: hoe does truth exist? And we answer that it exists with the same mode as that of difference, concordance and the other principles, because difference posits that in creatures, truth is one principle, goodness is another, greatness another and so with the rest. and that in the essence of truth, the verifier is one thing, the verifiable another thing, and verifying is yet another thing; and that one kind of truth is substantial and another is accidental or habitual. And property posits that substantial truth has its proper habit whereby it has accidental truth with which to make other beings true. And concordance assists in this, so that truth can multiply its likenesses. And this is shown by rule B.

83. With all the species of instrumentality we ask: what does truth exist with? And we answer that substantial truth is with its correlatives, but habitual truth exists on its foundation in substantial truth. And moral truth exists with goodness and virtue, for it cannot exist with evil and vice, as these are privative habits with which falsehood exists; and no likeness of truth can exist in falsehood, for if it could, it would also be composed of opposites and involve contradictions, which is an impossibility.

Chapter 9 - Glory Combined With the Sequence of Rules

84. With rule B we ask: is glory a general and real principle? And we answer that it is, because if it were not, the universe would be emptied of the second species of rule E and all the principles would be deprived of enjoyment and repose, which is impossible.

85. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is glory? And we answer that it is an essence without which there can be no enjoyment at all.

With the second species we ask: what does glory have in itself essentially and naturally? And we answer that it has its correlatives, namely the glorifier, the glorified and glorifying with which and in which all things are glorious and delightful. And this is signified by the first species of rule D.

With the third species we ask: what is glory in other things? And we answer that glory as a habit is an instrument in substantial glory with which substantial glory conditions the other principles to seek enjoyment and repose.

With the fourth species of this rule we ask: what does glory have in other things? And we answer that it has action and passion as it finds repose and delight in the subjects in which it exists; and here we see how form takes delight in being active and matter in being passive, as is obvious between males and females and by the second species of rule C.

86. With the first species of rule D we ask: what is the origin of glory? And we answer that it exists on its own, so as to be a primordial principle comprising all that is enjoyable, or else appetite and delight would be without the essence of glory, which is impossible. And this is manifested by rule B.

Now with the second species of rule D we ask: what does glory consist of? And we answer that it is of its correlatives without which glory as a habit would not have any subject to sustain it.

Further, with the third species: to what does glory belong? And we answer that habitual glory belongs to substantial glory.

87. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does glory exist? And we answer that it exists because it is constituted of its correlatives.

Further, with the second species we ask: why is there glory? And we say it is so that habitual glory with substantial glory can place the other principles in bliss and repose.

88. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does glory have? And we answer that it has the quantity with which it exists in its being, as an abstract in its concrete.

Now with the second species we ask: what quantity does glory have? And we answer that it has the same quantity as its correlatives and habits with which it reproduces species in repose just like the intellect, with its habit, places species in its understanding. And here we see how the principles assist one another in reproducing species.

89. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the proper quality of glory? And we answer that glory as such is a proper passion of the subjects in which it exists.

Now with the second species we ask: what are the qualities of glory? And we say that appropriated glory has the qualities of the principles habituated with glory and reposing in it.

90. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does glory exist? And we say it exists when time is sequentially combined with all the species of rule H successively from one "now" to the next, like the glorifier that enjoys one species in one "now" and another species in another "now" as in its own intrinsic glorifiable it multiplies peregrine glorifying with which glory puts its innate glorifying into practice. And this is proved by all the species of rule H.

91. With all the species of rule I we ask: where is glory? And we answer that it is in its correlatives and in itself, for it is primordial, and also exists in its habits with which it is habituated, and in its mode because it is modal, and in instruments because it is instrumental, and in goodness because it is good,, and in greatness because it is great, and it is in all subjects in which there is appetite and repose. And this is proved by rule B.

92. With the rule of modality we ask: how does glory exist? And we say it exists with the mode whereby its correlatives are all within each other and with which the glorifier places the other principles in good, great, etc. repose in its intrinsic glorifiable as it delights in giving them its likenesses. And this is signified by the second species of rule C.

93. With the rule of instrumentality we ask: with what does glory exist? And we answer that it exists with its correlatives; and substantial glory exists with its habit with which it habituates the other principles, and with innate goodness because it is naturally good, and with moral goodness as when a good man delights in doing good with justice, prudence etc.

Chapter 10 - Difference Combined With the Sequence of Rules

94. Is difference a general and real principle? And we say that it is, as shown by rule B; now if it were not, then the world would not naturally consist of its parts, which are primordially different by reason of difference, concordant through concordance, contrary on account of contrariety, none of which could be without primordial difference; without it, the world would be emptied of primordial concordances and contrarieties, of the second species of rule E and all natural appetite and repose. And all things would want to have one and the same identity so that the world would not be what it is. We therefore conclude that this question must be answered in the affirmative.

95. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is difference? And we say that it is the cause of many things through its act of differentiating. And this is proved by rule B and by the scale of difference in the second figure and in the third figure from camera BC through to camera BK where difference causes many things as it is diffused and combined.

With the second species we ask: what does difference essentially and naturally have in itself? And we answer that it has its correlatives, namely the differentiator, the differentiated and differentiating without which it cannot exist and with which it contains in itself all its species that are different from each other.

Now with the third species we ask: what is difference in other things? And we say it is a being that differentiates peregrine differences in its essential differentiable, and with these it causes plurality habituated with difference.

Further, with the fourth species we ask: what does difference have in other things? And we say that it has plurality that is habituated with it just like hot coals are habituated with heat. And this is manifested by rule B.

96. With the first species of rule D we ask: what is the prime origin of difference? We say that it exists on its own, because if it did not, all things would appear as being one and identical, which is false. Now I have no desire to be you, or a stone etc. nor vice versa.

Further, with the second species of rule D we ask: what things does difference consist of? And we say it consists of the differentiator, differentiable and differentiating that are consubstantial with it and with which it differentiates all things through its own habit, for none of them can exist per se without difference, or have any foundation, nor could there be any distinction between substance and accidents.

With the third species of the same rule we ask: to what does difference belong? We say that habitual difference belongs to substantial difference. And all this is proved by rule B.

97. with the first species of rule E we ask: why does difference formally exist? And we answer that it exists because it is made of its essential correlatives.

Now with the second species of this rule we ask: what is the final purpose of difference? And we say it exists so that there can be many things that cannot exist without it. And if the world were deprived of difference, it would be emptied and annihilated as it would neither exist nor have any purpose.

98. With the first species of rule F we ask: what is the quantity of difference? And we say that there are two most general kinds of difference: one is substantial and causes substantial differences that differ substantially, because difference diffuses itself in them by reason of mixture. And there is another, habitual difference, with which substantial difference differentiates principles from one another.

Now with the second species of rule F we ask;,what is the quantity of difference? And we answer that it has as much quantity as the quantity extended into its correlatives; just as difference habituates quantity by enfolding it within its genus, so does quantity measure difference by enfolding it within its genus. And this can be seen with rule B.

99. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the quality of difference? And we answer that difference as such is a part of the world that cannot exist without it.

Now with the second species of this rule we ask: what are the appropriated qualities of difference? And we say that it is a passion appropriated by the world, whereby substantial difference habituates other principles not of its own genus. And this is manifested by rule B.

100. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does difference exist? And we say that difference existed when the world was created and begun, because it is primordial. Now just as the world was created with its parts, namely locus, motion, time etc., so was it created with its difference, as we already said. Further, difference exists now, and will be in another now in eternity, for without these it cannot exist. And this is sufficient as regards difference relative to time, as shown by rule B and all the species of rule H.

101. With all the species of rule H we ask: where is difference? And we say that it exists in all its species. And this is self evident. Further, difference exists in space because space is different from quantity, time etc. Also, difference is in space because without space, difference cannot be a passion proper to the world.

102. With the rule of modality we ask: how does difference exist? And we answer that it exists with the mode it has in its correlatives, and also with the mode it has for habituating the other principles with itself. Now just as a man has a mode for writing by moving his hand, so that the hand moves a pen, the pen moves the ink and letters are shaped by ink in motion, so does difference have a mode through motion whereby it differentiates things substantially from one another. And this can be demonstrated with all the species of the rules.

103. With the rule of instrumentality we ask: what does difference exist with? And we answer that it is with its correlatives and its habit with which it habituates the other principles by diversifying them, and it is also with goodness, greatness etc. and with motion, quantity, quality etc. Now difference cannot exist without these principles, and with difference, the principles are what they are because if they were deprived of difference, the principles would not be what they are.

Chapter 11 - Concordance Combined With the Sequence of Rules

104. With rule B we ask: is concordance substantial? And we answer that it is, so that substance can be entirely composed of its substantial parts because it exists as one entity in unity and in plurality as it is made of several parts, and this is by reason of substantial concordance. Now if concordance were not substantial and a substance, the entire essence of form would not be concordant with the entire essence of matter as they constitute a third substantial entity, so that this third substantial entity would be entirely emptied of mixture and composition, which is impossible. We therefore conclude that concordance is a substantial part of the subjects in which it exists. And this is obvious by rule B.

105. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is concordance? And we answer that it is the essence whose proper function is to concord, and without which no being can be concorded or concordable.

Now with the second species of rule C we ask: what does concordance naturally and essentially have in itself? And we say that it has its correlatives, namely the concorder, the concorded and concording.

Further, with the third species of this rule we ask: what is concordance in other things? We answer that it is concordant in contrariety, as when fire heats water, its contrary. And it is distinct by reason of difference, and simply sustained in its correlatives as well as in contrariety. And it is materially in rule B, formally in rule E, quantitatively in rule F, qualitatively in rule G, temporally in rule H, locally in rule I, modally and instrumentally in rule K.

With the fourth species we ask: what does concordance have in other things? And we say that it has existence, action and nature in its correlatives. And in rule D concordance has what it has materially, and in rule E formally and so on with the rest in their own way as said above under the third species or rule C. And this can be demonstrated by rule B.

106. With the first species of rule we ask: what does concordance arise from? And we answer that it exists on its own as a primordial entity, otherwise, it would me made of something else that preceded it, not of its own genus and nature, which is impossible.

Further, with the second species we ask: what things does concordance consist of? And we say that it is of its correlatives, so it can substantially exist in them.

And with the third species of the same rule we ask: to what does concordance belong? And we answer that habitual concordance belongs to substantial concordance, like a mantle to the man wearing it. And rule B clearly shows this.

107. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does concordance formally exist? And we say it is because of its correlatives. And here we see that substance is its own substantial raison d'etre. Now let us ask again: why does concordance formally exist? And we say that habitual concordance exists because substantial concordance habituates itself with it, like a man wearing a mantle. And here the intellect knows why concordance is what it is, and why it has quiddity, and makes a science of this.

Further, with the second species of rule E we ask: to what end does concordance exist? And we answer that concordance exists so that the other principles can repose in it. And this is shown by rule B.

108. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does concordance have? And we answer that it has quantity in two modes: first it has the quantity of its substance and secondly, the quantity of its habit, like a man wearing a mantle has the quantity of his substance as well as the quantity of his garment.

Further, with the second species we ask: what discrete quantity does concordance have? And we answer that it has the quantity of its correlatives. And this is manifested by rule B.

109. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is the quality of concordance? And we say that it has the quality of a proper passion in the subject in which it exists. And here the intellect recognizes the great and necessary connectedness between subject and predicate.

Now with the second species we ask: what are the appropriated qualities of concordance? And we say it has the qualities of its passion through goodness, greatness etc. And this is clear and self evident.

110. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does concordance exist? We answer that it exists when it is combined with all the species of rule H. And just as concordance exists in time, so is time sustained in concordance and sequentially combined with it through concording. And this is self evident to artists well versed in this art.

111. With all the species of rule I we ask: where does concordance exist? And we answer that it is in all the species of I. And it exists wherever it can be defined. And it is n its correlatives. And it is wherever it contradicts contrariety. And it exists wherever it has its act. And it also exists wherever it is primordial. And it exists wherever it is constituted. Further, it exists wherever it is subjective, modal or instrumental.

112. With all the species of the rule of modality we ask: how does concordance exist? And we say it exists in the same mode with which it is combined with the subjects in which it exists and in all species; just like a crystal placed on a green object receives a green coloring,and a red coloring on a red object, so does concordance placed in goodness receive it in one way, and another way when placed in greatness etc. and the same applies to the species of the rules. And this is plainly self evident.

113. With the rule of instrumentality we ask: what does concordance exist with? And we say that it is with its own constituting correlatives; and it exists with all the species of the rules, and it is good with goodness, great with greatness and so forth. And this is self evident.

114. We have dealt with concordance, and following what was said here, man can contradict the contrariety of vice with concordance. And this is a very general rule with great moral power against sin.

Chapter 12 - Contrariety Combined With the Sequence of Rules

115. With rule B we ask: is contrariety a substantial principle? And we answer that it is not substantial but accidental, as we said in this Part 8, section 1, chapter 11 about concordance combined with the sequence of rules ??????#173, in this chapter 12 about contrariety #191?????, and in part 5 about the table, #26. Now if contrariety were substantial, it would impede concordance and prevent it from being first in the conjunction of form and matter in substance; and no principle could repose in the second species of rule E, which is impossible, as the second species of rule C clearly shows.

116. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is contrariety? And we answer that it is the essence without which no being can oppose another being.

With the second species we ask: what does contrariety have in its own essence? And we answer that it has its accidental correlatives, namely the opposer, opposed and opposing without which it cannot exist as a habit in various ways in different subjects.

With the third species we ask: what is contrariety in other things? And we say that in concordance it is an opponent that impedes concording with opposing.

With the fourth species we ask: what does it have in other things? And we answer that it has a corrupting nature, just as concordance has a generating nature. And this is shown by rule B.

117. With the first species of rule D we ask: what is the origin of contrariety? We say that it exists on its own, because it is primordial: now if it were not primordial, it would be something derived from pre existing concordance, which is impossible, as shown in #106 of the previous chapter.

With the second species we ask: what things does contrariety consist of? And we say that it consists of the meeting of objectified qualities such as heat and cold, dryness and moisture, lightness and heaviness, light and darkness, health and illness, life and death, justice and injury, affirmation and negation, generation and corruption and things like these.

With the third species of rule D we ask: to what does contrariety belong? And we answer that it belongs to the subjects in which it exists. And rule B makes this clear.

118. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there contrariety? And we say that it exists because there are subjects habituated with it, like heat that exists because its subject is hot and habituated with it. And there is deafness because some people are deaf; and there is injury because some people are injurious, and so forth.

119. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does contrariety have? And we say that it has as much quantity as subjects are habituated with it.

Further, with the second species we ask: what quantity does contrariety have? And we say that it has as much quantity as subjects are discretely habituated with it, like the igniter, ignited and igniting habituated with contrariety. And this is shown by rule B.

120. With the first species of rule G we ask: what is he quality of contrariety? And we answer that it is a passion proper to the subject in which it exists, such as the contrariety of the world, which is innate.

With the second species we ask: what are the appropriated qualities of contrariety? And we say that it is a passion appropriated by the subject in which it exists, as when a sinner who habituates himself with sin against virtue. And like deafness, sadness and things like that. And this is manifested by rule B.

121. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does contrariety exist? And we answer that it exists when its subject is habituated with it. Further, it exists when its subject performs practically, modally and instrumentally. And this is self evident.

122. With all the species of rule I we ask: where does contrariety exist? And we answer that it is in the species in which it performs its act, as in elemented things, generation and corruption, and between willing and not willing, between good and evil, and in every privative habit. And this is self evident.

123. With the rule of modality we ask: how does contrariety exist? And we say that contrariety has a mode for placing opposites together so as to expel concordance from subjects in which it exists; and it has a privative mode as it deprives concordance of its acts by opposing it; and it has a mode for impeding things from fulfilling their purpose; and it has a mode for deploying perseverance. This is obvious and needs no proof.

124. With the rule of instrumentality we ask: with what means does contrariety exist? And we say that it is with contrarieties mixed together in the subject in which they exist. And it exists with privative habits: now just as concordance with its essential correlatives is a cause of being, so is contrariety with its accidental correlatives a cause of non being. And just as concordance and generation produce being, so does contrariety cause non being through deviation from the end; and so forth...

Chapter 13 - Principle Combined With the Sequence of Rules

125. With rule B we ask: is principle substantial? And we answer that it is, because if it were not, substance would not belong to the genus of principle but would be a privative accident; and thus substance would not exists on its own, but by accident, which is contrary to rules B, C, D and E. Therefore etc...

126. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is principle? And we say that it is the essence without which no being can initiate anything.

With the second species we ask: what does it have in itself essentially? And we answer that it has its substantial correlatives in which all peregrine principles are initiated.
 
With the third species we ask: what is it in other things? And we answer that principle is active in the initiator and passive in the initiated, and both join together in initiating. And habitual principle is in the substantial principle habituated with it, and it is set in motion in the initiable.

With the fourth species we ask: what does principle have in other things? And we answer that formal principle has action in matter and matter has passion under it, and mobility from the agent and repose in the end. And this is clearly shown by rule B.

127. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does principle originate from? and we say that it exists on its own so as to be primordial, or else it would not be a general principle.

With the second species we ask: what things does it consist of? And we say that substantial principle consists of the efficient, formal, material and final causes; and accidental principle is made of the likeness of substantial principle as they both compose corporeal principle with quantity in quantified things, quality in qualified things etc...

With the third species we ask: to what does principle belong? And we say that habitual principles belong to substantial principles like garments to those wearing them. And this is all necessarily so, as shown by rule B.

128. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does principle exist? And we say that it has a dual existence. First, it exists substantially because it is constituted of the initiator, initiable and initiating. Secondly, it exists as an accident because substantial principle is habituated with it. And here the intellect builds science and also understands the origin of proofs from the cause and proofs from the effect.

With the second species we ask: for what final purpose does it exist? And we say that it is so the other principles can be sustained in it and be subalternate to it, because of its supremely general nature. And this is self evident.

129. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does principle have? And we answer that it has the quantity of its essence, as manifested by the medium between extremes.

With the second species we ask: what quantity does principle have? We say it has the quantity of its correlatives that are distinct by reason of difference, concordant by reason of concordance and identical in essence, as proved by rule B. And we experience this in man, in whom the elementative is one principle, the vegetative is another, the sensitive another, the imaginative another, the rational another; and all five under the number five are one man.

130. With the first species of rule G we ask: what are the qualities of principle? And we say that the proper principle we are investigating is supremely general, whereas the appropriated principles are peregrine, acquired and subalternate, as proved by the second species of rule G.

131. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does principle exist? And we say that it exists when its correlatives exist, with which it is a supremely general principle, and that it existed when the subalternate principles existed, like quantity, quality and the other predicates. And it also exists when there is a path habituating the mover, movable and moving as they transit through different successive "nows" in one locus and through different successive "nows" in another locus so as to generate motion that converts with the path. And this is plainly shown by all the species of rule H.

132. With all the species of rule I we ask: where does principle exist? And we say that it is with its correlatives, because it exists in itself, and it is in all subalternate principles, as a cause in its effects; and it exists in the motion it is habituated with, and in the situation in which it is situated, both modally and instrumentally, as proved by rule B.

133. With the rule of modality we ask: how does principle exist? And we answer that it is a causal principle by reason of the correlatives that constitute it, and that it is a habitual principle by reason of the mode that the causal principle has in habituating other, peregrine principles with its own habit so that they be principles in which it reproduces its likenesses. And this is self evident.

134. With all the species of instrumentality we ask: with what does principle exist? And we answer that it is with its correlatives of which it consists, and with its nature, without which it cannot exist. And general principles exist with the supremely general substantial principle, as well as with the supremely general habitual principle with which they are habituated, and with the final principle with which they are situated. And this is clear by the second species of rule C.

Chapter 14 - Medium Combined With the Sequence of Rules

135. In the substance of the world, is there one supremely general medium? And we answer that there is, otherwise there would be no subalternate media so that the world would be emptied of the medium of continuation, measure and conjunction, nor would concordance exist, nor would the beginning have a subject through which it can transit to reach repose in the end, and thus there would be no motion, and many other impossibilities would follow, as shown by rule B.

136. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is the medium? And we say that it is the subject in which the beginning and end meet and join together, so that the beginning can repose in the end. And the supremely general medium is the cause of all corporeal media.

With the second species we ask: what does the medium essentially have in itself? And we say that it has its correlatives, namely the conjoiner, the conjoined and conjoining and connecting extremes in a continuum, as signified by angle F in the second figure.

With the third species we ask: what is the medium in other things? And we answer that it is the conjunction of form and matter, and it is the act of igniting in fire, of heating in heat, of vegetating in plants, of sensing in the senses, of imagining in the imaginative, of reasoning in the rational power, of moving in motion, of generating in generation and so forth.

With the fourth species we ask: what does it have in other things? And we answer that it has a habit with which it is habituated to cause secondary acts that do not belong to its genus. And all this is manifested and signified by rule C.

137. With the first species of rule D we ask: what is the origin of medium? And we answer that it exists by itself, so as to be a general principle on its own.

With the second species we ask: what things is it made of? And we answer that it is made of the essence of the form and matter in which it exists, and of motion and things like this.

With the third species we ask: to what does the medium belong? And we say that it belongs to the whole subject in which it exists. This is self evident and manifested by rule B.

138. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does the medium exists formally? And we say that it is because it is constituted of its correlatives, as manifested by the second species of rule C.

With the second species we ask: for what end does the medium exist? And we say it exists so that substance can be full and continuous, and so the predicates can have secondary acts so that, for instance, substance can substantiate, quantity can quantify, the agent can act, the mover can move, and so with other things in their way -- the delineator can delineate, etc. -- for without these acts, powers cannot have repose. Rule B clearly shows that all this is self evident.

139. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does the medium have? And we say that it has the quantity of its continuation in the subject in which it exists, like the act of joining in conjunction, generating in generation, racing in a race, composing in composition,; and like in man who is a third medium constituted of the body and the soul, and so with other things like these.

With the second species we ask: what quantity does the medium have? And we answer that it has the quantity of the parts of the entire medium, like igniting, aerificating, aqueificating and terreificating which constitute one common medium in elementating, and so with other things in their way. And this is clear.

140. With the first species of rule G we ask: what quality does the medium have? And we answer that it has the quality of the proper passion of the subject in which it exists, like igniting in fire, racing in a race, and things like these.

With the second species we ask: what qualities does the medium have? And we say that a nail joining two boards is an appropriated medium, and so is heating in hot water, and things like these. And this is self evident.

144. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does the medium exist? And we answer that it exists when its subjects exist, such as joining, measuring, continuing, moderating and working artificially. And rule B shows this to the diligent reader of this art.

142. With the rule of modality we ask: how does the end exist? And we answer that it is through the mode that form has for acting and matter for being passive, fire for heating, plants for vegetating, senses for sensing, imagination for imagining, and the rational power for reasoning. And all these modal media are parts with which agents have modes modally, medially and morally. And this is self evident.

143. With all the species of instrumentality we ask: what does the medium exist with? And we answer that it is with its correlatives, and in the extremes between which it exists, like generating between the generator and the generated, racing between the racer and the raced, and so forth. And this is self evident and clear by rule B.

Chapter 15 - The End Combined With the Sequence of Rules

145. With rule B we ask: is there an ultimate end? And we answer that there is, because otherwise, the medium would be determined by the beginning but not by the end so that motion would proceed into an infinite future where the beginning would never reach an end of repose, which is impossible and contrary to the first species of rule D and the second of E.

146. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is the end? And we answer that it is the principle without which there is no repose.

With the second species we ask: what does it have in itself essentially? And we answer that it has its correlatives, namely the reposer, reposable and reposing in which all the other principles repose.

With the third species we ask: what is it in other things? And we answer that it is good in goodness, great in greatness, in difference it is different from all the other principles, and in concordance it is concordant with all the other principles except contrariety.

With the fourth species we ask: what does it have in other things? And we answer that in goodness it has a good habit as well as the situation of all the other principles, and in difference it has an act different from the acts of all the other principles. And this is self evident, and shown by rule B.

147. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does the end originate from? And we answer that it exists on its own, because if it did not, then principles would have nothing to repose in, and their nature would be emptied of motion and appetite, which is impossible.

With the second species we ask: what does the end consist of? And we say that it consists of its correlatives, as said in the second species of rule C.

With the third species we ask: to what does the end belong? And we answer that the created end belongs to the increate end as well as to the subject in which it exists and which is habituated with it like a man wearing a mantle as a habit. And here the intellect recognizes that proof by the cause is more potent than proof by the effect.

148. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does the end exist? And we answer that it is because of its constituting correlatives, and this is a proof by the cause. But according to the effect, we say that the end exists because its subject is habituated with it, like a man wearing a mantle as a habit.

With the second species we ask: for what purpose does the end exist? And we answer that it exists so that all the other principles can finally repose in it.

149. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does the end have? And we answer that it has quantity inasmuch as its subject is habituated with it.

With the second species we ask: what quantity does the end have? And we answer that it has the quantity of its correlatives habituated with quantity. But this applies to the created end and not to the increate end which is infinite, and because of this, its correlatives cannot have any quantity. Then there is the end of privation, which is the source of all privative habits like deafness, malice and so forth. And there is also the end of termination, whereby the ultimate end differs from all the other principles such as created goodness and greatness etc. each in its way, because otherwise, all the principles would be one identical number and the world would be emptied of the end of termination, whereby it would also be emptied of natural motion and appetite, which is impossible.

With the first species of rule G we ask: what quality does the end have? And we answer that it has the quality that the proper quality of its subject can have, like the will that has the quality it can have through lovability which is the proper passion of will, or like power through possibility, and so forth.

Now with the second species we ask: what appropriated qualities does the end have? And we say that it has the qualities it can have through appropriated passion, like will that has an appropriated quality in detestability, and the intellect has an appropriated quality in ignorance, and likewise, power has an appropriated quality in impossibility since impossibility does not naturally arise from power, and so with other things in their way, like deafness, injustice, injury and things like these in man. And this is manifested by rule B.

151. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does the end exist? And we answer that it is when it is really present in all the species of its rules, in which it cannot exist without time just as time cannot exist without an end. And rule B signifies this to the subtle understanding of the intellect.

152. With all the species of rule I we ask: where is the end? And we say that it is in all its species as well as in its primordiality and in its correlatives; and it is a perverted habit in privation and injury, and a righteous habit in achievement and justice. And subtle investigation makes this clear.

153. With all the species of modality we ask: how does the end exist? And we answer that it is through the mode of difference which posits that its correlatives are distinct from all the other principles and their correlatives. And it exists through the mode of concordance that concords the end with all the other principles except contrariety. And it exists through the mode of the medium that mediates between the end and all the other principles. And it exists through the mode of appetite that seeks repose in the end, and likewise with the other principles in their way.

154. With all the species of instrumentality we ask: what does the end exist with? And we answer that it is with its correlatives and with all the species of its rules without which it cannot exist. And it is good with goodness, like a man wearing a good habit is good, and great with a great habit. And it is desirable with appetite, and so forth.

Chapter 16 - Majority Combined With the Sequence of Rules

155. We ask: is majority a primordial principle in its own genus? And we answer that it is, by rule B and the first species of rule D; now if it were not, it would exist by accident, so that substance, which is prior to and greater than accident, would not exist on its own, but by accident, which is impossible.

156. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is majority? And we answer that it is a being that exists per se and without which any majorifying is impossible.

With the second species of rule C we ask: what does majority have in itself, essentially and naturally? And we say that it has its constituting correlatives.

With the third species we ask: what is it in other things? And we say that it is a habit under which subalternate majorities are situated, like the substantial and accidental majority of goodness. And it is a being distinct from all the other principles in the subject in which it exists, for without this distinction, all the principles would be one and identical, without any equality, minority or relation, which is impossible because the world cannot be emptied of the said things.

With the fourth species we ask: what does majority have in other things? And we answer that it has its own act, namely majorifying that gives rise to generating, moving, growing and things like these.

157. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does majority arise from? And we answer that it exists on its own, because if it did not, then it would consist of either equality or minority, as it belongs to the genus of relation.

With the second species we ask: what things is it made of? And we answer that it is of its correlatives, namely the majorifier, the majorifiable and majorifying in which its essence is sustained and rooted.

With th third species we ask: to what does it belong? And we answer that it belongs to the subject in which it exists because the subject is habituated with it. And all these things are clear and manifest.

158. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does majority exist? And we say that it exists because is essence naturally and essentially contains its concretes.

With the second species we ask: for what purpose does majority exist? And we answer that it is so the other principles can be subalternate to its genus and find repose in it.

159. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does majority have? And we answer that it has the quantity of its continuous presence in the subject in which it exists.

With the second species we ask: what quantity does majority have? And we say that it has the quantity of the subalternate majorities that stand beneath it. And this is signified by rule B.

160. With the first species of rule G we ask: what quality does majority have? And we say that it has the quality it can have through the proper passion of the subject in which it exists and without which the subject cannot exist.

With the second species of the same rule we ask: what qualities does majority have? And we say it has the qualities it can have through the appropriated passions present in the subject in which it exists, for instance, some men are greater in size, or have more intensely white color, or are more just in justice than others.

161. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does majority exist? And we answer that it exists when it is really present in all the species of its rules in which it is sustained or habituated. And this is clear to the diligent reader.

162. With all the species of rule I we ask: where is majority found? And we say that it is found in major subjects, habits, loci and so forth. And this is clarified by all the species of rule I.

163. With the rule of modality we ask: how does majority exist? And we answer that it exists through the mode of difference which makes its correlatives major in differentiation. It also exists through the mode of concordance which makes them major in concording. And it exists through the mode of rule G by reason of major appropriation, and so forth. And all these majorities exist under their general majority, just as particular instances of white stand under universal whiteness.

164. With all the species of instrumentality we ask: what does majority exist with? And we say it is with its correlatives and with major habits with which the subalternate majorities are habituated, such as major acts that reflect its likenesses.

Chapter 17 - Equality Combined With the Sequence of Rules

165. We ask: is there some equality that is a supremely general principle? And we answer that there is, as can be seen in the subalternate and individuated equalities of plants that belong to the same species, and this is likewise manifest in fruits that are equally individuated. And rule B shows this.

166. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is equality? And we say that it is the being whose proper function is to equalize.

With the second we ask: what does it have in itself essentially? And we say that it has its own innate constituting correlatives, namely the equalizer, the equalized and equalizing.

With the third species we ask: what is it in other things? And we say that it is active and passive because it is equally constituted of form and matter.

And with the fourth species we ask: what does it have in other things? And we say that it has its habits with which individuals are equally habituated, like the apples on an apple tree that are equally of the same species, and likewise with elemented things, beings endowed with sense, imagination and reason, mechanical arts, liberal arts and moral science.

167. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does equality arise from? And we answer that it exists on its own, otherwise the subalternate equalities would not have the genus without which they cannot exist.

With the second species we ask: what things is equality made of? And we answer that it is made of its substantial correlatives without which it cannot at all be what it is, and without them, there could be no peregrine equalities.

With the third species of the same rule we ask: to what does equality belong? And we say that the equality of acts belongs to the equality of powers, for instance, the equality of understanding, remembering and willing belongs to the equality of intellect, memory and will, and the same applies to the senses. And this is self evident.

168. With the first species of rule E we ask: why is there equality? And we answer that it exists because it is made of its equal, substantial, true and necessary correlatives with which proofs by the cause can be made, as well as proofs by the effect.

With the second species we ask: for what purpose does equality exist? And we answer that it exists in the soul so that God can be equally remembered, understood and loved by it; and in the senses so that objects can be equally sensed, and so forth.

169. With the first species of rule G we ask: what quality does equality have? And we say that continuous equality has the quantity in which it is sustained in its subjects.

With the second species we ask: what quantity does it have? And we answer that it has the quantity with which it exists in its correlatives and in their corresponding peregrine number. And this is self evident.

170. With the first species of rule G we ask: what proper quality does equality have? And we say that it has the quality it can have through the proper passion of the subject in which it exists, for instance, in the equality of substance, form and matter; and through the innate equalities of sentient beings, etc.

And with the second species we ask: what appropriated qualities does equality have? And we say that it has the qualities it can have through the appropriated passions of its peregrine subjects in which it exists; for instance, two logicians are equally versed in logic, two judges are equal in justice, two men wearing mantles are equally dressed, and so forth.

171. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does equality exist? And we say that it exists when it is truly sustained in its concretes by all the species of H, like a race that stands equally between the racer and the raceable; and the present stands equally between the past and the future, and so with other things in their way.

172. With all the species of rule I we ask: where is equality? And we answer that it exists in itself because it is made of its correlatives, and in the subject in which it equally combines action and passion; and it is in goodness, greatness etc. in which it exists equally to make the principles equal; and it is in difference to make its correlatives equally distinct; and likewise, it is in concordance that makes its correlatives equally concordant; and it is in modality so that they exist modally; and it is in instrumentality so that they exist instrumentally. And all this is clear by rule B.

173. With the rule of modality we ask: how does equality exist? And we say that it exists through the mode it has in its correlatives; and it exists through the modes of justice, weight, measure and proportion in the subject in which it exists, both naturally and artificially. And this is self evident enough.

174. With all the species of instrumentality we ask: what does equality exist with? And we say that it is with its correlatives, and it is with difference with which the agent distinguishes things; and it is with concordance with which the agent equally concords things; and it is with its own proper property with which it cause proper habits, and so forth, as seen in elemented and vegetal beings etc. And this is signified by rule B.

Chapter 18 - Minority Combined With the Sequence of Rules

175. We ask: is there one kind of minority that is substantial and another kind of minority that is accidental? And we answer that there is, otherwise the substantial relation that exists between majority and minority would be destroyed, and all principles would be equal, and there would be no real relation of majority to minority between substance and accident, which is impossible. And rule B proves this.

176. With the first species of rule C we ask: what is minority? and we say that it is the being whose proper function is to minorify and to stand away from majority.

With the second species we ask: what does minority naturally have in itself? And we answer that it has its innate correlatives in which it exists and with which other principles can be minorified as it divides and annihilates the subjects in which it exists.

With the third species we ask: what is it in other things? And we say that it is an entity that is consumptive so it can stand near to naught.

With the fourth species we ask: what does it have in other things? And we answer that it has minor essence, minor being, minor nature, quantity, quality etc. And this is self evident.

177. With the first species of rule D we ask: what does minority arise from? And we say that it exists on its own so as to be a general principle without which subalternate minorities cannot belong to the genus of minority.

With the second species we ask: what is substantial minority made of? And we say that it is made of its correlatives without which it cannot naturally exist; now accidental minority exists on its own inasmuch as it is a habit with which substantial minorities are habituated, and the minorities of the powers belong to its genus.

With the third species we ask: to what does minority belong? And we answer that it belongs to the agent inasmuch as it causes minorities through it and with it. And all these things are self evident and shown by rule B.

178. With the first species of rule E we ask: why does minority exist? And we answer that it exists because of its correlatives by reason of which it is a principle in its own genus.

With the second species we ask: why does minority exist? And we answer that it exists so that minor beings can belong to its genus, without which there would be no motion, division, generation, corruption and privation. And this is clear and self evident enough.

179. With the first species of rule F we ask: what quantity does minority have? And we answer that it has the quantity with which it stands outside the genus of majority and equality.

With the second we ask: what quantity does minority have? And we say that it has the quantity of its correlatives, its subalternate minorities and its individuals that belong to its genus.

180. With the first species of rule G we ask: what quality does minority have? And we answer that it has the quality it can have through the proper passion of the subject in which it exists, like one substance is lesser than another through its proper passion without which it cannot exist.

With the second species we ask: what qualities does minority have? And we say that it has the qualities of the lesser predicates appropriated to it, such as minor quantity, quality etc.

181. With all the species of rule H we ask: when does minority exist? And we say that it exists when it is really sustained by all the species of rule H in the concretes of its own genus; and also when it is put into practice through minorifying. And all this is clear to the diligent reader.

182. With all the species of rule I we ask: where is minority? And we answer that it is in itself as it exists in the correlatives of which it is made; and it is in subjects composed of minor substance with minor accidents, like someone wearing a mantle that is smaller, or like water that is less hot, and a horse in a lesser race, and so forth, and a man with a minor mode, and a craftsman with a lesser artifice.

183. With the rule of modality we ask: how does minority exist? And we answer that it exists with the mode it has through its correlatives so as to be lesser in existence and action than any other principle, like some man who morally has a mode for existing in lesser virtue and doing little good; and like a horse that sometimes does not run very fast. And this is clear and self evident.

184. With the rule of instrumentality we ask: what does minority exist with? And we answer that it is with all the things that belong to its genus and come together in a subject in which it exists with minor essences and with minor acts of the powers, such as lesser running, heating and so forth.

185. We have dealt with the principles combined with the sequence of the rules. And the things said about them here provide a doctrine with which one can sequentially combine other, implicit or peregrine principles. And through this doctrine the intellect is very general for finding many media and for investigating true conclusions.

Next
Previous
Contents